Koenkai

Koenkai (後援会) are an invaluable tool of Japanese Diet members, especially of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). These groups serve as pipelines through which funds and other support are conveyed to legislators and through which the legislators can distribute favors to constituents in return. To avoid the stringent legal restrictions on political activity outside of designated campaign times, koenkai sponsor year round cultural, social, and "educational" activities. For example, Tanaka Kakuei used his "iron constituency", or invincible constituency, in rural Niigata Prefecture to build a formidable, nationwide political machine. But other politicians, like Ito Masayoshi, were so popular in their districts that they could refrain, to some extent, from money politics and promote a "clean" image. Koenkai remained particularly important in the over represented rural areas, where paternalistic, old style politics flourished and where the LDP had its strongest support. In the classic oyabun kobun manner, local people who were consistently loyal to a politician became favored recipients of government largess. In the 1980s, Tanaka's third electoral district in Niigata was the nation's top beneficiary in per capita public works spending. The importance of local loyalties is also reflected in the widespread practice of a second generation's "inheriting" Diet seats from fathers or fathers in law. This trend is found predominantly, although not exclusively, in the LDP.

Koenkai (後援会) are Japanese political support groups centered on individual politicians that emerged in the post war period. In their most basic form, koenkai serve two functions. First and most importantly, they act as a vote mobilization machine that supports the politician for whom the koenkai was established. Throughout time, the vote gathering role played by koenkai has been substantial and consistent, especially for the LDP. From 1972 to 2003, people who identified themselves with koenkai were found to be 10% more likely to vote in comparison to people who did not. At the same time, this allows for the possibility that members of a candidate's koenkai might cast their vote for a politician of a different party. This happened before with the case of Toshiki koenkai, who despite being a conservative politician, was able to win 80% of the vote of CGP (Komeito) supporters in the 2000 election. Koenkai also display some consistent characteristics. First of all, koenkai are permanent formal membership organizations. A certain fee, usually of an insignificant amount, is collected upon entrance and a membership card or an equivalent is distributed. Koenkai differ from campaign organization, since activities are held all year round and not limited to election season. At any rate, these groups' interests might overlap, and their embodiment was the candidate representing the koenkai. During the 1980s, the number of people who identified themselves as members of koenkai accounts for 15 18% of the whole electorate. Members of the medium sized and rural areas were the majority, with farmers, shopkeepers and manufacturers forming the core of parties like LDP. "Floating" voters in urban areas were equally desirable, but their resistance to political enticement was higher due to their volatility. Between 1972 and 2003, more men were shown to be associated with koenkai than women. Even though women membership reached an all time high in 1993, their participation dropped to just 80% that of men by 2003. Koenkai members also tend to belong to older age groups. People in their twenties are the least likely to join koenkai, while those over fifty are found to be more likely.

Koenkai operate throughout the year, thus there is a need for a wide range of activities to keep members engaged. Due to their non political characteristics, this function of koenkai is often heavily criticized, especially by the media. Another study conducted in 1975 proposed the sum of US$500.000 for a modest koenkai, in contrast to 700.000 1 million USD for more expensive ones. A large part of this money goes to organizing various activities, especially non political ones. 15 20% of the designated funds are channeled to different activities held all year round, while another 15 20% are contributed to weddings and funerals. The LDP's jiban was initially made up of the self employed, those in the agricultural forestry fishery industries, and in non urban areas. In the past, Japanese people organized their lives around communal farming activities, such as water and tool management. However, the country's economic prosperity destabilized the usual links by which people related to each other, and koenkai was conjured up as a replacement. As has been discussed previously, koenkai's leaders usually start out with their immediate circle of relatives and friends, and the area where they live is to be the first target of the vote gathering campaign. From this perspective, the urban village explanation offers a striking insight into the existence of koenkai, as it can be seen that the family, close relations and the villages have served as the core value of Japanese lives throughout history. After 1955 we saw its transformation into becoming a more political entity. This theory is further supported by evidence showing that the chonankai – the neighbourhood associations existing in many regions in Japan – support local politicians and their koenkai in favorable terms. Therefore, the timeline relevant to the history of koenkai is traced to figure out the factors on a macro scale. Tanaka's Etsuzankai literally translated into "cross the mountains of Niigata to get to Tokyo" – was based in the Third District of his hometown –Niigata Prefecture. By the 1970s, the number of people associating with Etsuzankai reached an all time high of 98,000 members, accounting for approximately 20% of Niigata's eligible voters. Among these were very powerful figures, including the 26 out of 33 mayors of Niigata's separate municipalities, and half the number of city councils and prefectural legislature officials. The organization also ran its own publication, called the Monthly Etsuzan, whose circulation was over 50,000. Etsuzankai was founded on June 28, 1953 in Kamo village, with the help of Seiji Tanako, Jiro Kikuta and Seihei Watanabe. One year before that, Tanaka gained a reputation among people in the northern region of Niigata almost over night, thanks to a railway construction bestowed to the villagers. People living in other municipalities of Niigata quickly joined his koenkai and provided him with ardent support in expectance of favourable treatment in return. Tanaka was able to seize upon the opportunities and turn that into a major source of support for his political activities. Etsuzankai financed its own structure, first and foremost, with funds from Tanaka's Tokyo based business and political acquaintances. For example, one of Tanaka's friend – Kenji Osano – was an annual donor of 24 million yen. However, more importantly, Etsuzankai's tendency to initiate construction works attracted several firms who wished to secure construction bids. After 1965, it became common that Tanaka in return would receive 0.02% to 0.03% of a whole project expenditure as 'thank you money'. This money was then spent upon organizing activities for its members at an immense scale. Etsuzankai was famed for one of its specialties, called the "pilgrimage to Meijro". This was a 3 days and 2 nights trip for members to spend time leisurely bathing and eating in Tokyo, touring the Diet building and Imperial Palace, watching musical at Asakusa and occasionally going to resorts at Enoshima, Atami and Izu. Other activities including contests, sing a longs and picnics. He had also spent some time as a high ranking officer in the Ministry of Justice, Home Affairs, International Trade & Industry as well as the Ministry of Education. The New York Times claims Aichi Kiichi was one of the key figures who "helped Japan through her trying but economically triumphant postwar period". Winning a seat in the Lower House was particularly challenging. Thus, Aichi's secretary, Muto Yoichi, and Aichi's wife found the need of initiating a strong support group – or koenkai for Aichi. In the summer of 1955, a series of talk sessions in the morning, speeches in the afternoon and dinner and alcohol at night were held for 45 days on end to gather interests from the people. Former classmates of Aichi in High School were elected to leaders of local koenkai, as youth groups, women's political groups and women's support groups were established. At the same time, taking advantage of being vice minister of MOF, Aichi started mobilizing for financial support from local financial institutions in Tokyo, including Shichijushishi Bank and Tokuyo Bank. After Aichi's death in 1973, his son in law Aichi Kazuo (愛知 和男, born 20 July 1937) succeeded the organization that has been developed by his father. Despite the initial faltering and disintegration, Kazuo was able to gather more votes than his father in law in his day, using the existing organization. Aichi kai's influence over rural agriculture co ops, or nokyo, small businesses associations of barbers, public baths, and restaurants remained significant. These were people who started out supporting his father, and their sense of loyalty was then dedicated to Achi's son in law. Supporters saw him as a respectable "family man", who went to elite school (Hibiya High School and Tokyo University) and who had a "charming wife and good children". Takeshita's political base was founded in Shimane Prefecture, where he held a seat in the House of Representatives between 1958 and 2000. In total, Takeshita was consecutively re elected to this seat fourteen times. Over his political life, Takeshita established a large koenkai, which was primarily made up of local business owners and local government workers, both of which contributed to strength of his local support group. Due to the huge support Takeshita enjoyed as a result of his koenkai, his electoral district in Shimane came to be known as ‘Takeshita Kingdom'. Despite being embroiled in many political scandals, related to insider trading and corruption (for which he was never charged), Takeshita's immense local support never waned. In return for this unwavering support, Takeshita dedicated much of his time and effort to developing his local constituency. As a result, under Takeshita's watch, his Shimane constituency was host to many "excessively huge public works projects", and throughout the 1990s Takeshita's electoral district received the highest amount of public investment per capita in the whole of Japan. Takeshita's health declined considerably in early 2000, leading to him stepping down from his role in Shimane. He died two months later, just two days before the 2000 general election at which he had initially intended to run for an unprecedented 15th time.

Suzuki Zenkō (鈴木 善幸, 11 January 1911 – 19 July 2004) was an influential Japanese politician for the LDP. He served as the 44th Prime Minister of Japan from 17 July 1980 to 27 November 1982. He was a member of the LDP from its establishment in 1955 until his death in 2004. Suzuki was elected to his seat in Iwate Prefecture on 12 consecutive occasions until his retirement from politics in 1990. During his time in politics, Suzuki formed a substantial koenkai in his home district. Partly in thanks to the large influence which Suzuki acquired through the various high ranking positions he held in government, during his time in politics his electoral district received many subsidies from the government, allowing economic development to flourish in the region. Suzuki's contributions to the area are considered to be particularly responsible for the development of fisheries in the area. One notable example of the benefits Suzuki returned to his support groups in Iwate is that of Shimanokoshi, a small hamlet on the Iwate coast. The hamlet received enough subsidies for economic development, that it in the 1960s it became the first designated "fourth class fishing port" on the whole coast. Another notable beneficiary of Suzuki's work was in the town of Tanohata, whose mayor was also a member of Suzuki's koenaki (despite he himself not being a member of the LDP). During the time in which Suzuki held his seat, the town saw a rapid development of its agricultural (particularly in regards to dairy farming) and road infrastructures.

Under the SNTV system, each multimember district had a typical range of 3–5 seats available. Due to this, in order to capture a majority of seats in the lower house, larger parties like the LDP had to nominate more than one candidate in each district. Allegiance of koenkai members to a candidate is personal, parochial and particularistic, essentially identical with that between intraparty faction members and their leader. Over 90% of the LDP candidates belonged to factions and each had his own koenkai back home; for a faction to successfully promote its leader as a contender for party leadership or to retain or increase its influence over the distribution of cabinet, party and parliamentary posts according to the shifting current of coalition formation after each presidential election, it had to increase the number of mass party members whose primary election behaviour it could control. Campaigns could only create officially approved campaign posters that could only be placed in publicly provided and designated locations. A key characteristic of SNTV electoral systems is that each individual political party will typically field multiple candidates for the same political district seat. As a result, intra party candidate rivalry became the norm in Japan under the SNTV system, forcing candidates to differentiate themselves on factors external to political policy.

While koenkai are still regarded as important in Japanese politics, they have nevertheless declined from their peak of strength. The election reforms did play a part in this, though less so than expected. Another explanation is that though politicians remained as interested in developing koenkai as they were previously, voters are no longer interested in joining one. Hatoyama's premiership was placed under large pressure when it emerged that he had received large sums of undeclared political donations. Most famously, it emerged that Hatoyama's mother, Yasuko, heiress to Bridgestone Tyres Co., had contributed ¥900 million in undeclared donations between 2004 and 2008. Whilst Hatoyama survived the scandal and remained in office, his credibility was left damaged by the scandal.

In 2009, the DPJ president Ichirō Ozawa was forced to resign as party leader after becoming embroiled in a fundraising scandal, related to the alleged false reporting of land purchases and loans to his koenkai made between 2004 and 2005. Whilst Ozawa denied any involvement from him or his funding group, two of his aides were formally convicted and jailed for their involvement in the scandal. In 2011, Ozawa went on trial in Tokyo and was charged with breaking political fundraising laws. However, in April 2012, Ozawa was formally acquitted.

The Recruit scandal was an insider trading and corruption scandal which engulfed the LDP government in 1988. It emerged that the Tokyo based company Recruit Holdings Co., Ltd. had been making donations to the koenkai of prominent LDP politicians, many of whom had also bought shares in the company. Amongst those caught up in the scandal was former LDP Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. It emerged that Recruit had donated 112 million yen to Nakasone's koenakai throughout the 1980s, whilst his aides had purchased 29,000 shares in Recruit in 1984.

Whilst koenkai is a distinctly Japanese term, the form of clientelism which it is characterised by is not unique to Japan. Members of political systems in countries around the world have also been found to employ similar clientelistic tactics, in order to garner support for votes.

Christian Democracy (Italian: Democrazia Italiana, DC) was a Christian democratic centrist political party in Italy. It employed clientelism as a means to cement the party's domination of Italian politics across a 50 year span from 1944 to 1994. Similar to the tactics found in Japanese koenkai, they used clientelistic policies in order to gain support and insight into public opinion, which then influenced public policies.

The centrist Mexican political party Institutional Revolutionary Party (Spanish: Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) has in the past employed clientelistic tactics, similar to those found in Japan. During the party's rule of Mexico from 1929 to 2000, the party established a network of local civil and political organisations which were loyal to the party. Through this, political powers and benefits, and state resources were predominantly directed to regions in which the party had large support bases.