Теңіз әуе күштерінің 24-ші тобының тарихы

Marine Aircraft Group 24 (MAG 24) is a United States Marine Corps aviation unit based at Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay. MAG 24 is subordinate to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF).

Provide combat ready, expeditionary aviation forces capable of short notice, worldwide employment to a Marine Air Ground Task Force.

MAG 24 was activated along with Marine Aircraft Group 23 (MAG 23) at Marine Corps Air Station Ewa on 1 March 1942 and attached to the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (2d MAW) (which had only been activated in Jan 1941). MCAS Ewa was located on southwest Oahu and adjacent Naval Air Station Barbers Point. The intended use of MAG 24 was to "fill the need of dive bombers in combat areas." MAG 24 was first commanded by Maj I. L. Kimes and consisted of only two squadrons (VMF 211 and VMF 212) mostly on paper. Both MAG 24 and MAG 23 struggled along without aircraft for several months as almost all available assets were diverted to Midway or elsewhere. The only aircraft available to both MAGs were a few overhauled SBD 1s and SBD 2s which were, according to LtCol Claude Larkin: "no good but gave us something to fly."

Two weeks after the activation of MAG 24, on 15 March, the Headquarters Squadron commanded by Capt John K. Little departed for Efate, New Hebrides to help construct an airfield. The importance of Efate to the U. S. war effort was its relative location. Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, stated: "let Efate be the first rung in a ladder from which a step by step general advance could be made through the New Hebrides, Solomons, and Bismarcks." Over the next 24 months, the Allies accomplished exactly that. While never attacked by the Japanese at Efate, the efforts to construct the airfield were hampered by a lack of appropriate engineering equipment and malaria. Capt Little and the men of MAG 24 received a letter of commendation from Brig Gen Neal C. Johnson, USA for work completed "in the face of tremendous odds." The Headquarters Squadron of MAG 24 departed Efate for MCAS Santa Barbara on 24 May and by August 1942 the airfield had a 6000 ft runway capable of supporting combat operations for Guadalcanal.

In the period between May 1942 and December 1943, MAG 24 moved several times as the war in the Pacific escalated. In June 1942, MAG 24 was the first unit at the newly opened MCAS Santa Barbara with only 12 Officers and 125 men. At first, MCAS Santa Barbara was more like an advanced island base, and the air station was initially nicknamed "the Swamp". Heavy rains and the tide often flooded the field requiring 4 wheel drive Jeeps to get anywhere. Pilots would also jokingly ask for clearance to land on the "Santa Barbara Lake." Because a Japanese submarine had just shelled the nearby Ellwood Oil Field on 23 February 1942 the Marines were given a warm welcome as the protectors of Santa Barbara. One week, this warm welcome resulted in 15 weddings being performed by the MAG 24 chaplain. MAG 24 initially stood port/starboard watch to thwart any further attacks from the Japanese by building fighting holes and manning defensive positions on the coast adjoining the airfield. Initially the airfield only had one aircraft, a Grumman J2F Duck, that was loaded with depth charges should a Japanese submarine return. Eventually the Duck was joined by a SNJ 3 Texan, and a SBC 4 Helldiver biplane. However, by the fall of 1942, MAG 24 was composed of VMSB 143, VMSB 144, VMSB 242, VMSB 243, and VMSB 244, all flying the SBD Dauntless. Once appropriately equipped, MAG 24 underwent an accelerated training program in preparation for combat duty. By January 1943, MAG 24 was returning to MCAS Ewa aboard the USS Mormachawk, and then assigned to the 4th Marine Base Defense Aircraft Wing. MAG 24 Headquarters Squadron would remain at MCAS Ewa, but attached personnel found themselves at Midway Atoll, Johnston Atoll, and Palmyra Atoll until it was MAG 24's turn to deploy into the Pacific theater. Efate was the gateway to the Pacific conflict; units remained there for 2–4 weeks for training and receiving replacements. Assigned to Marine Air Wing South Pacific (MASP), MAG 24 was assigned the mission of local air defense awaiting deployment to the front line. While the squadrons assigned to MAG 24 were in constant rotation, the MASP consisted of five fighter squadrons (VMF), three dive bomber squadrons (VMSB), and three torpedo bombing squadrons (VMTB). Concurrently during the MAG 24 deployment was the landing and occupation of Arundel Island and the isolation of Kolombangara as the Allied forces completed the campaign for New Georgia. During this time, the air war at the front line consisted of fighter sweeps and bombing runs as the Allied forces advanced towards Bougainville. Throughout September and into October the Japanese airfields on the island of Bougainville were bombed steadily and with increasing intensity. On 17 November 1943, MAG 24 moved to Banika, part of the Russell Islands, where they would support the invasion of Bougainville until the allied airfields were complete on the island objective. Rabaul was a strategic deep water harbor that the Japanese captured in 1942, and fortified. The Bougainville campaign, utilizing maneuver warfare, bypassed all but 2,000 of 40,000 Japanese forces on the island to seize a beachhead of 6 by 8 miles at Cape Torokina. Cape Torokina was naturally defendable but mired in swamps and midway between the bulk of enemy forces on the north and south ends of the island. The landing on Bougainville started on 1 November 1943, and 31 TBFs and 8 SBDs completed pre landing aviation fires, which were commended by the Commander of Southern Pacific Forces for timing, execution, and reducing resistance. The landing force would consist of the 3rd Marine Division (including 3rd Marine Regiment) and the 2nd Raider Regiment. [9] Robert Sherrod, a war correspondent who accompanied Marines from Tarawa to Okinawa, would later comment, "the audacious attack at Cape Torokina caught the Rabaul admirals napping; the landing was in the best hit 'em where they ain’t tradition." During an ill conceived attack on nearby Allied ships, the Japanese lost another 41 aircraft on 11 November. Because of these losses, the Japanese pulled all carrier aviation out of the fight for Bougainville on 13 November. By 16 November, the Japanese had lost a total of 70 planes from Rabaul, and 121 from the carrier forces. From this point on, the air war over Bougainville would calm to small scale attacks that occurred mostly at night. On 9 December, ground crews from VMF 212 and VMF 215 arrived at Cape Torokina a day before completion of the first airstrip. On 21 December, MAG 24 came to Bougainville where the group commander (LtCol William McKittrick) assumed command of Air Operations Bougainville. While the first two missions were unsuccessful, the third on 9 January knocked out the Tobera airfield and 21 Japanese fighters. Beginning 12 January, seven squadrons of SBDs and TBFs from Bougainville along with other allied medium and heavy bombers (over 200 in total) would bomb Rabaul every day. By mid March, the allies would complete strikes without fighter escort. The Rabaul bombing and isolation would continue for 44 months until mid 1945. During this time 10,000 Japanese personnel were killed, and the strategic stronghold of Rabaul would remain isolated from all Japanese lines of communication for the remainder of the war.

While the allied forces, including MAG 24, continued to pulverize Rabaul the remaining Japanese forces on Bougainville under Gen Harukichi Hyakutake finally realized that there would be no more ground force invasions on the island. At the end of December, the Japanese troops finally started moving to attack the captured beachhead airfields near Cape Torokina. During this time the Marines of 1st Marine Amphibious Corps (including 3rd Marines) were relieved by the U. S. Army's Americal Division and continued the defensive position buildup. MAG 24 was assigned defense of the north sector around Piva Uncle and organized into two infantry type battalions of four companies each to mount the defense. Reinforcing each of the MAG 24 battalions was an Army heavy weapons company. During the battle, the combined allied forces of 27,000 personnel on Bougainville faced 15,000 Japanese infantry and the most field artillery the Japanese had managed to concentrate anywhere in the Pacific. The attacks on the airfields began in earnest on 8 March 1944 and lasted until 24 March. Because of the attacks, all aircraft at Bougainville would be evacuated every night to Barakoma, Munda, or Green Island to return every morning dropping their bombs on enemy positions before landing for the first time. By 10 March 114 SBDs and 45 TBFs would be flying "almost continuously," and were noted for pinpointing the enemy artillery positions with increasing accuracy. During the next few days, the tempo of defensive strikes increased on the hills surrounding the Bougainville airfields. The Allies dropped 123 tons of bombs on 13 March, and 145 tons on the 14th. This increase in bombing quieted Gen Hyakutake's forces (known as "Pistol Pete") for a couple of days. The last attack by Japanese forces was on the night of 23–24 March which was thrown back only a few hours after it started but wounded 16 MAG 24 Marines during the melee. After 16 days of attacks, the Japanese had lost 5,469 men as compared to only 263 men in the allied forces (including MAG 24). General Hyakutake planned another offensive in May but ultimately canceled the operations when his rice rations fell to a third of pre invasion rations by April and to nothing by September. All the while the ground crews of MAG 24 tenant squadrons were noted for their efficiency under fire. VMF 215 kept it plane availability at 95% despite a high rate of ulcers, dysentery, malaria, and fatigue. VMSB 244 suffered 10% casualties in ground echelon but claimed the highest availability on the island. The Commander of Air Solomons commended VMSB 235, which had six men wounded in shelling on 18 March, for "untiring efforts, unselfish devotion to duty Their disregard of their own personal safety during the shelling of Bougainville airfields, in order that the aircraft assigned to them could operate, is worthy of the highest praise and admiration." Similar recommendations went to other MAG 24 units including: HqSq 24, SMS 24, VMF 218, VMF 223, VMTB 232, and VMTB 134. This warning order and mission initiated a formative period in which the Marine Corps Close Air Support doctrine was honed and implemented. While some early Close Air Support had been attempted and met with success in Nicaragua during the Interwar period, there was very little doctrine other than defining requirements and no structured development was completed prior to WWII. During Guadalcanal, Air Liaison Parties (ALPs) were improvised, trained on the island, and would only occasionally visit the front lines to observe targets. On New Georgia, the ALPs began briefing a day prior to action, offering occasional improvements. The Bougainville campaign itself marked the beginning of Close Air Support in the modern sense of the term, though it still met with suspicion from ground commanders. Three months before the Bougainville invasion a small ALP school was organized by the 3rd Marine Division Air Officer to teach capabilities and limitations, the procedures for requesting Close Air Support, and the details of air ground communication. The school was small (only three pilots, and six radiomen) but it would pay dividends in increasing communication (and thus accuracy and lethality) during Bougainville. The most notable use of Close Air Support was the multiple attacks on "Hellzapoppin," ridge where according to the 3rd MARDIV historian "it was the air attacks which proved to be the most effective factor in taking the ridge the most successful example of close air support thus far in the Pacific War." LtCol Keith McCutcheon, the OPSO of MAG 24 (and "head professor" according to war correspondent Robert Sherrod) would expand on previous Close Air Support development by creating a school and coherently assembling all doctrines and procedures. They did this with the 37th Army Division, whom they would later support in the Philippines. Furthermore, during this period of schooling, the aviators began to furnish their own ALPs and radio jeeps with the same radio capability as the SBD Dauntless. These ALP jeeps would be attached at the battalion command or higher and directly control the aircraft providing Close Air Support. Previously the 5th Air Force (whom MAG 24 fell under) had furnished their own ALPs which were attached to a Division or higher; request and control were relayed through a centralized communication structure away from the front line. The ALP jeeps and front line control were unorthodox but not entirely new as both the Navy and Army had tried this tactic before. The Marine planners on Bougainville were passionate that given the future mission on the Philippines it would be more efficient and significantly increase the operational tempo to talk the planes onto the target with direct communication. Due to the successful isolation of Rabaul, the preparation for the Philippine campaign was unique in that it gave seasoned aviators a three month period of training and specializing on the single mission of Close Air Support. U. S. Army engineers moved quickly with the construction of Magaldan airfield, and MAG 24 aircraft started arriving on 25 January 1945. For the campaign MAG 24 and MAG 32 would combine to form MAGSDAGUPAN (MAGSD). The first missions would occur on 27 January by VMSB 241 and by 31 Jan MAGSD would host seven squadrons and 174 SBDs. For these first few missions once the Marine dive bombers were in the air no further ground control was furnished. Fortunately, on 31 January Gen MacArthur gave MAGSD opportunity to prove the utility of Close Air Support. General MacArthur ordered the 1st Cavalry division to make an audacious advance of 100 miles to Manila and free the internees at Santo Tomas. The assignment of MAGSD was a unique mission of guarding the 1st Cavalry Division flank with a standing nine plane patrol from dawn until dusk. With some "superior salesmanship and a determination to show the soldiers what Marine flyers, under proper front line control could do for them," the MAGSD was able to attach two Marine ALP jeeps to follow the 1st and 2nd Brigades of the 1st Cavalry. The standing nine plane patrol reconnoitered ahead of the flying column spotting the Japanese positions and routing the forces around ambushes. On 2 February 1945, a portion of the Cavalry was blocked by a Japanese battalion which occupied a ridge that was reported to withstand an entire division. The attached ALP was able to call the SBD patrol to complete multiple shows of force and allowed the Cavalry to route the Japanese without the SBDs firing a shot. The same day the SBD patrol completed an ad hoc bombing run ahead of the 1st Cavalry line in which all bombs landed within a 200 by 300 yard area and left the target in shambles. Finally, the ALP demonstrated the increased speed of communication when a Regimental commander dashed to one of the MAG ALP jeeps to report a Japanese fighter in the area. An officer in the ALP pointed to a burning fighter 2,000 yards away which had been destroyed by two P 51s the ALP had vectored in. Despite the successful dash to Manila, the ALPs of MAGSD still had a long way to go convincing the other Army commanders to make maximum use of the Close Air Support that Marine dive bombers could provide. Ultimately the demonstration that won over one of the most skeptical Army commanders, General Patrick, was an attack on the Shimbu line east of Manila on 8 February 1945. General Patrick was visiting the position of the 1st Cavalry as they called an attack on a ridge that had been drilling heavy machine gun and mortar fire on his troops. Due to the standing order that air support could only fire outside of a 1,000 yardsan, the ALP called the attack on the reverse side of the slope. Marked with white phosphorus, seven SBDs unloaded their bombs accurately to the cheers of the men they were supporting. Afterward, the 1st Cavalry advanced unopposed to find eight machine gun positions, 15 mortar emplacements, and 300 dead. General Patrick was impressed and asked when he could get support like that. When asked about the standing 1,000 yard restriction he retorted, "I don't give a damn how close they hit." General Patrick would use the ALP further on 24 February when the 6th Infantry Division would mount a full attack on the Shimbu line. Capt McConaughy, the assigned ALP officer, stated that the close air support went to "perfection." The attacks were first at 1,000 yards, then 500 yards, and sometimes inside 500 yards. They would work all the tricks such as dummy drops to allow the American infantry to advance while the Japanese heads were down. Afterward, General Patrick insisted on Close Air Support and that all subordinate units submit accurate evaluations of air strikes so that "the air forces will continue to give this command an increasing number of support aircraft."

Operations in the Luzon would start winding up mid February 1945 when MAG 32 would move to the Southern Philippines in Mindanao. MAG 24 would follow suit at the beginning of April to join MAG 12, and MAG 32 to form MAGSZAMBOANGA (MAGZAM). During operations with MAGZAM, MAG 24 flew out of Titcomb airfield named after an ALP officer who was killed by sniper fire in the Luzon campaign. LtCol McCutcheon chose the location of Titcomb airfield during a daring reconnaissance during which he coordinated air support for Filipino guerillas and gained intelligence which allowed the ground forces in the area to land unopposed. This action netted McCutcheon the Silver Star. MAG 24 arrived on 17 April 1945 and resumed flight operations on 22 April. Henry Chapin described the Philippine campaign as a "watershed" for Marine aviation. The previously "sketchy doctrine of close air support had been fleshed out, refined, and honed in combat." And for the most part, the Close Air Support became factory like; precise and efficient. In one example, every day, every hour, from 0800 1500 a flight reported to the 24th Division ALP. The Marines of MAGZAM received over 30 accolades from every level of Army command.

On 22 September 1945, 1st Marine Air Wing (1st MAW) started moving from the Philippines to China via Okinawa along with the 3rd Amphibious Corps (IIIAC). MAG 24 was at Nanyuan Airfield in Beiping, China and had VMF squadrons flying the F4U 4 "Corsair," and F7F Tigercat along with multiple transport and observation aircraft directly attached to the Group such as the C 47 SkyTrain, C 46 Commando, SNB 3 Navigator, and OY 1 Sentinel. During World War II, China contained three different belligerents: the Nationalist Forces under Chiang Kai Shek, the Communists under Mao Zedong, and the occupying Japanese and Korean forces. At the end of World War II, there were still over 630,000 Japanese and Korean forces remaining in China. The mission of the Marines in China as stated by the Secretary of the Navy Artemus Gates was "to accomplish the disarmament of the Japanese and to provide for their repatriation up to the point where the Chinese Nationalist government troops alone could carry out this mission. Quickly after arriving at Beiping in November, 1st MAW was flying show of force patrols and frequently fired upon from the ground by small arms fire. The typical missions flown by 1st MAW and MAG 24 were reconnaissance, and air cover for the Marine infantry in addition to the show of force patrols. The statuses of the rail lines, in particular, were a common mission objective for the MAGs as they were subject to constant sabotage from the Communist forces. To reconcile the Communists and Nationalists, President Truman appointed General Marshall as his Special Representative to broker a peace between the two sides. In February 1946, he was able to arrange a cease fire. However, by mid March, the tenuous cease fire was being openly violated, mostly by the Communists, although the pretense of brokering a peace deal would continue until the end of 1946. Additionally, the Communist forces received a significant amount of support from the Soviet Union who were still occupying parts of China. The Marshall brokered cease fire and aid from the Soviets provided respite for allowing the Communist forces to increase their military position significantly. The Nationalists would follow suit by increasing the strength of their armies in Manchuria. Concurrently in the spring of 1946, the Marines in China would drawdown due to post war decreases in end strength and policies to return deployed personnel back to the U. S. By summer of 1946 most Japanese had been repatriated to their home islands, and the withdrawal of the Marines accelerated. The only missions left to the Marines were the guarding of strategic coal lines, and bridges and these missions were transferred to the Nationalist Forces as quickly as possible. By the end of 1946, President Truman ordered that the American participation in China ended when it was clear that the Nationalists and Communists would not reach a truce. MAG 24 would receive orders to deploy to Guam on 1 April 1947. The location of the missiles were 15 miles from Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO) and just 90 miles from the Florida coast. When operational, these arms would radically change the rivalry between the U. S. and U. S. S. R. The Soviet buildup was a response to the U. S. ballistic missile presence in Western Europe and particularly to the ballistic missiles present in Turkey. On 20 October, both the MAG 24 and Marine Air Base Squadron 24 (MABS 24) COs departed for GTMO on a leader's reconnaissance. At Key West MAG 26, and MAG 32 ( ) had joined M=Shortly after 28 October the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was moved east with 18,000 Marines, 20 Ships, and included HMM 361, VMA 121, and VMGR 352. Overall, 400,000 American troops were mobilized to the meet the threat. The international and U. S. condemnation of the invasion was quick. On 5 August 1990, then President Bush called the attack "naked aggression," and that "this shall not stand." By the 6th, Saudi Arabia had given the U. S. permission to deploy military forces in their country and The Pentagon began what would become Operation Desert Shield within hours. The first 3rd MAW proposal for fixed wing forces included four F/A 18 Hornet squadrons, two AV 8B Harrier squadrons, two A 6E Intruder squadrons, and all of the Marine EA 6B Prowlers. By the start of hostilities, the total fixed wing aircraft in theater would nearly double that number and include the venerable OV 10 Bronco. The desire to keep unit integrity of aircraft and personnel was met with a harsh reality of previous operational commitments, squadrons transitioning and retiring aircraft (F/A 18A to F/A 18C), and G limited aircraft (A 6E Intruder). The assortment of aircraft issues, including the typical pre deployment personnel issues, resulted in the wholesale swap of aircraft and personnel to deploy the best mix of aircraft to Saudi Arabia. To meet the desired anti armor capability HMLA squadrons were mixed to be Cobra heavy using a blend of 18 Cobras and six Hueys instead of the usual half and half mix. The swap of aircraft and personnel caused friction as the deployed forces started to have disparities in readiness and training between those squadrons that arrived first and those that came last. The assault support requirement was more modest for Desert Storm starting with three HMM squadrons flying the CH 46E, and three HMH squadrons flying a mix of CH 53Ds and CH 53Es. This too would nearly double once the build up was complete to six HMM squadrons, and nearly five HMH squadrons including detachments. The CH 46E was showing its age in 1990; a transmission failure had reduced the maximum gross weight of the aircraft from 24,300 lbs to 22,000 lbs. The CH 46E was further constrained by the high pressure and density altitudes in the Persian Gulf region resulting in a standard combat load of eight personnel in each aircraft. The remaining MAG 24 F/A 18C squadrons also ordered to deploy arrived in the Persian Gulf on 19 December. VMFA 212 anticipating being assigned to the Gulf deployed first to MCAS Yuma to conduct all the pre deployment training it could. MAG 24 also sent eight CH 53Ds from HMH 463 and 12 CH 46Es from HMM 165 which arrived via strategic air in the first week of September 1990. HMM 265 would also be assigned to deploy with the 5th MEB which would arrive after the transition from Desert Shield to Desert Storm. Once in Saudi Arabia, the Marine Air assets balanced required logistical mission sets and the final tasks to become combat ready. The Hornet squadrons had the added responsibility of standing Combat Air Patrol (CAP) to block any further Iraqi aggression. From deployment through mid January when Desert Storm kicked off fixed wing assets concentrated on Night Vision Goggle operations, aerial gunnery, mass air strikes, and Air Tasking Order (ATO) rehearsals. Of particular importance to the deployed Hornet squadrons was the employment of HARM anti radar missile which they would be employing for the first time. When not flying in general support of 3rd MAW the assault support helicopters concentrated on increasingly complex heliborne assault rehearsals. The final rehearsal, executed on 7 January 1991, launched two dozen CH 53s and CH 46s, eight AH 1Ws, a section of AV 8Bs and OV 10s, and finally two UH 1Ns for command and control. Operation Desert Shield would shift to Operation Desert Storm on 15 January.

Early in Desert Shield, by late October 1991, President Bush and his administration decided that economic sanctions would lead to "long term stalemate," and that a ground campaign would be necessary to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait While President Bush would wait for the mid term elections on 7 November to finish, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were cleared to prepare the necessary build up. Combat began on 17 January 1991 when in the early morning forty six fixed wing Marine aircraft joined a plethora of coalition aircraft to destroy critical Iraqi command and control facilities. F/A 18s primarily flew the first Marine missions of Desert Storm because the aircraft could fly in the sanctuary above the Integrated Air Defense (IAD) threat and carried flares to protect against surface to air threats during bombing runs. The first missions were complex, precisely timed, had little to no external communications and were mostly at night utilizing aerial refueling. Eventually, AV 8B Harriers and AH 1W/J Cobras which didn't have the necessary countermeasures for the IAD threat flew in support of the Air Tasking Order. The Harriers and Cobras were used to destroy Iraqi forces shelling and attempting to occupy the town of Khafji, a Saudi Arabian city near the Kuwait border. For action at Khafji, the AH 1Ws received a Distinguished Flying Cross for a nights work destroying observational posts and anti aircraft sites while under intense fire. During this time the assault support helicopters were kept busy with an aerial resupply of ordnance in preparation of the ground campaign. Furthermore, on 23 January the CH 53s, the first of several artillery raids took place using 17 aircraft. Similar missions and attacks would continue until "G Day," (24 February 1990) the designated day to commence the ground campaign. The first use of Marine aviation during the ground campaign was UH 1N Hueys, for C2 at the breach sites into Kuwait. The Marines pouring into the breach sites were attacked with Iraqi artillery and used counter battery radars to guide Harrier and friendly artillery fire to destroy 42 enemy artillery sites. Most facets of Operation Desert Storm were a resounding success the failed large scale heliborne lift of Task Force X Ray was a notable exception and of particular interest to a Rotary Wing MAG. Task Force X Ray was to provide a blocking force and protect the flank of Task Force Papa Bear between the first and second obstacle belts just over Kuwait Border. The heliborne package consisted of 12 × AH 1W/Js, 6 × UH 1N, 20 × CH 46Es, and 13 × CH 53E/Ds. The Air Mission Commander was the Commanding Officer of HMM 165 (MAG 24). The mission was an event driven, emissions controlled (EMCON), day mission on 24 February 1991. One of the specific criteria for the mission was that it launch in the daytime to avoid a night insert that crews were neither equipped nor qualified to carry out (one flight of CH 53Ds had no Night Vision Goggles at all). The failed lift did result in the roll over of a CH 46E on takeoff from the Pick up Zone, and a hard landing of a CH 53D on return to base. Factors that led to the failure were lack of oversight from higher headquarters, failure to complete a mission rehearsal, and the failure to adhere to the launch criteria. The ground campaign lasted a short four days from 24 to 28 February 1991. The culminating event for the Marine Corps was the capture of Kuwait International Airport early on the morning of the 27th by Task Force Shepherd. During the entire ground campaign, all 3rd MAW fixed wing aircraft flew at surge rates in what amounted to four Hornets and four Harriers launching every 30 minutes. 3rd MAWs rotary wing aircraft remained equally as busy, and the helicopters crews spent far more time in the vicinity of the enemy than the fixed wing pilots. During the entire ground campaign, Marines found well stocked and un damaged Iraqi units well entrenched, camouflaged and untouched by the three week air campaign. Most Iraqi units surrendered after a token amount of resistance – they simply had no desire to die fighting over another country.

Due to the planned reduction of the Marine Corps after the Cold War, also known as Base Re Alignment and Closure (BRAC), MAG 24 was re designated as Aviation Support Element Kaneohe (ASEK) on 30 September 1994. The re designation of MAG 24 was completed in conjunction with the deactivation of the 1st MEB Command Element, and re designation of the 1st Brigade Service Support Group to the 3rd Combat Service Support Group. The reduction was the result of a plan started in 1990 by the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to reduce military spending by 12% and the armed forces by 25% by 1996. At the height of the cold war, the Marine Corps had a force of  199,525 Marines, this decreased slightly to 194,040 during Desert Shield/Desert Storm and rapidly declined to 174,158 by 1994 to its lowest point since 1960 of 172,641 in 1999. The reduction was in large part due to the Soviet push towards peaceful reform and the inability of the Soviet forces to mount any challenge to U. S. interests. In the summer of 1994, MAG 24 transferred all three of its F/A 18 “Hornet,” squadrons (VMFA 212, 232, and 235) to MAG 11 located at MCAS El Toro. MWSS 174 deactivated on 8 Sep 1994. Leading up to the MAG 24 re designation ceremony HMH 463 "Pegasus," was the single CH 53D squadron attached to MAG 24. During the ceremony, HMH 463 transferred half of its helicopters to form HMH 366 the “Hammerheads.”  Additionally, MALS 24 was re organized as the Marine Air Logistics Element Kaneohe (MALSEK). Beginning in September 2001, the Commanding General of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (then MajGen Cartwright) started the process to return the ASEK to MAG 24( ). The justification for the return of MAG 24 was that the goals of the drawdown/BRAC in Hawaii were never fully realized, that the ASEK and its tenant units had been operating in both training and employment as a MAG, and finally that the change was necessary to prepare for the transition of the CH 53D to the MV 22. The request was favorably endorsed as it was, in effect, a name change only. The redesignation included no change to the ASEK mission statement (which hadn't changed in the transition from MAG to ASEK). Furthermore, there was no increase in manpower, the addition of any of the other squadrons to form an Aviation Combat Element, enablers such as an MWSS, or even an S 2 department in the MAG headquarters. The approval was so quick that the ASEK had no time to order a MAG( ) flag in time for the designation ceremony. Instead, the commander of troops and future Executive Officer then LtCol Mark Dungan, broke out the old MAG 24 flag (with no minus) which had been on display in the ASEK commander’s office.

On 9 April 2003 the decisive fighting in the invasion of Iraq and Baghdad finished and ended Saddam Hussein's twenty four year reign. The campaign, which lasted just over 30 days, was just the beginning of MAG 24 involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Throughout the summer of 2003, violence in Iraq increased, especially in the Sunni populated areas. As violence escalated, combined airpower was reinstated in the fall for the first time since the end of decisive fighting to combat the growing insurgency. The early part of 2004 started with a temporary calm in violence but exploded, leading to the first and second battles of Fallujah in April and November, respectively. The fighting in Fallujah was the most intense urban combat since the battle of Hue City in Vietnam nearly a half century before. The increased activity brought with it a need for more personnel. MAG 24 sent over 10 individual augments during the latter half of 2004. In December 2004, HMH 363, the "Lucky Red Lions," sent a detachment of CH 53Ds to the 31st MEU. The 31st MEU was quickly sent to the middle east to finish combat training in Kuwait before supporting OIF. While in support of OIF, HMH 363 participated in desert flight operations, tactical missions, and raids while battling the constant sandstorms. Of note, HMH 363 also assisted in the recovery of remains and aircraft in January 2005 when a CH 53E crashed in western Iraq, killing 30 Marines and a single sailor. Up to that date, it was the single deadliest event of OIF. The detachment from HMH 363 returned to Hawaii in May 2005. It wasn't until March 2006 that MAG 24 had a constant presence of CH 53Ds supporting OIF. Starting preparation in the fall of 2005, HMH 463 trained in desert operations following the fall Weapons and Tactics Instructor course. By 22 March 2005, HMH 463 "Pegasus" was deployed to Al Asad Airbase in the Anbar province of Iraq with eight aircraft and 170 Marines. Most of the CH 53D mission in Iraq was general support of the Marines in the Area of Operations. Generally, daytimes missions were flown west of Al Asad to Forward Operating Bases such as Korean Village, Waleed, Trebil, Haditha Dam, Al Qa'im, Camp Rawah, and Bayji. nighttime missions were sent east of Al Asad to Al Ramadi, Baharia, Blue Diamond, Hurricane Point, Habanniyah, Camp Fallujah, Al Taqaddum, and Balad. The Lucky Red Lions also participated in several raids in support of II MEF and the Multinational Coalition forces. Unfortunately, in September, a night raid resulted in a hard landing and the aircraft remaining in the objective. When the HMH 363 investigation and tactical recovery force was inserted, it was attacked and defended itself from the insurgency. On 7 October 2006, HMH 463 "Pegasus" conducted a Relief in Place (RIP) and Transfer of Authority (TOA) taking over for the "Lucky Red Lions". On 29 April, Marines from 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) from the 24th MEU stormed into the Garmsir District, located in the heart of the Helmand. In February 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates continued building momentum in the Helmand by ordering 8,000 Marines of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to deploy. HMH 362 "The Ugly Angels," which had been stationed at Al Asad Air Base as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), was ordered to attach to MAG 40 the ACE for the 2nd MEB. Starting on 17 April, HMH 362 moved from Al Asad to Kandahar Air Base. To prepare for the massive influx of aircraft Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 and Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 began expanding the small airfield at Camp Bastion with AM 2 matting. Throughout May, the ramp space at the field was increased by 2.2 million square feet, which was the largest ever in a combat zone. Once the ramp was completed, HMH 362 moved along with HMH 772 from Kandahar to Camp Bastion. HMH 463 continued the campaign of disrupting insurgent intimidation and violence ahead of the elections participating in Operation Eastern Resolve II located at Nowzad, an insurgent hotbed located north of Camp Bastion. Towards the end of HMH 463s rotation, on 13 February 2010, Pegasus participated in Operation Moshtarak, which was the largest joint operation in Afghanistan to that point occurring in Marjah and Nawa. In March 2010, HMH 363 "the Lucky Red Lions," relieved Pegasus and concentrated on General Support in support of the MEF battling the small lift capacity caused by the high summer temperatures and relatively high altitude found throughout the Helmand. During September, HMH 362 returned to Camp Bastion for the second time to relieve HMH 363. Additionally, in September 3rd Battalion 7th Marines (3/7) replaced the British in the Sangin area northeast of Camp Bastion. Both of these movements represented expansion into the previously held insurgent territory as the fighting in the central Helmand and the Garmsir district essentially ended with Operation Godfather on 14 January 2011. Operations within the Helmand continued regularly with continued pressure in the "Fishhook," near Khan Neshin castle and minor skirmishes in Nowzad. Following the death of Osama Bin Laden, on 22 June 2011, then president Obama announced the planned withdrawal of 33,000 troops from Afghanistan by the summer of 2012. Pegasus deployment passed more or less without fanfare as Marines continued operations in the "Fishook." The Lucky Red Lions of HMH 363 relieved Pegasus on 17 September 2011. Unfortunately, on 19 January 2012, HMH 363 lost six Marines in a helicopter crash resulting from a catastrophic rotor blade failure. During the early part of 2012, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines pushed out from Sangin to clear Musa Qala while 3rd Battalion 7th Marines continued to work the Sangin area. HMH 362 arrived for their third rotation at Camp Leatherneck on 2 March 2012. The Ugly Angels of HMH 362 continued providing general support in the Area of Operations and direct support of the Battalions throughout the Helmand. On 11 September 2012, the Ugly Angels departed the Helmand Valley and Afghanistan. All of the HMH 362 CH 53Ds were transported to Davis Monthan Air Force Base and decommissioned. HMH 362 was deactivated as an HMH squadron on 30 November 2012.