Влияние ядерного взрыва на электронное оборудование: электромагнитный импульс.

Effect of a nuclear explosion on electronic equipment
nuclear generated EMP

A nuclear electromagnetic pulse (nuclear EMP or NEMP) is a burst of electromagnetic radiation created by a nuclear explosion. The resulting rapidly varying electric and magnetic fields may couple with electrical and electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges. The specific characteristics of a particular nuclear EMP event vary according to a number of factors, the most important of which is the altitude of the detonation. The term "electromagnetic pulse" generally excludes optical (infrared, visible, ultraviolet) and ionizing (such as X ray and gamma radiation) ranges. In military terminology, a nuclear warhead detonated tens to hundreds of miles above the Earth's surface is known as a high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) device. Effects of a HEMP device depend on factors including the altitude of the detonation, energy yield, gamma ray output, interactions with the Earth's magnetic field and electromagnetic shielding of targets.

The fact that an electromagnetic pulse is produced by a nuclear explosion was known in the earliest days of nuclear weapons testing. The magnitude of the EMP and the significance of its effects were not immediately realized. During the first United States nuclear test on 16 July 1945, electronic equipment was shielded because Enrico Fermi expected the electromagnetic pulse. The official technical history for that first nuclear test states, "All signal lines were completely shielded, in many cases doubly shielded. In spite of this many records were lost because of spurious pickup at the time of the explosion that paralyzed the recording equipment." During British nuclear testing in 1952–53, instrumentation failures were attributed to "radioflash", which was their term for EMP. The first openly reported observation of the unique aspects of high altitude nuclear EMP occurred during the helium balloon lofted Yucca nuclear test of the Hardtack I series on 28 April 1958. In that test, the electric field measurements from the 1.7 kiloton weapon exceeded the range to which the test instruments were adjusted and was estimated to be about five times the limits to which the oscilloscopes were set. The Yucca EMP was initially positive going, whereas low altitude bursts were negative going pulses. Also, the polarization of the Yucca EMP signal was horizontal, whereas low altitude nuclear EMP was vertically polarized. In spite of these many differences, the unique EMP results were dismissed as a possible wave propagation anomaly. The high altitude nuclear tests of 1962, as discussed below, confirmed the unique results of the Yucca high altitude test and increased the awareness of high altitude nuclear EMP beyond the original group of defense scientists. The larger scientific community became aware of the significance of the EMP problem after a three article series on nuclear EMP was published in 1981 by William J. Broad in Science.

In July 1962, the US carried out the Starfish Prime test, exploding a bomb above the mid Pacific Ocean. This demonstrated that the effects of a high altitude nuclear explosion were much larger than had been previously calculated. Starfish Prime made those effects known to the public by causing electrical damage in Hawaii, about away from the detonation point, disabling approximately 300 streetlights, triggering numerous burglar alarms and damaging a microwave link. Starfish Prime was the first success in the series of United States high altitude nuclear tests in 1962 known as Operation Fishbowl. Subsequent tests gathered more data on the high altitude EMP phenomenon. The Bluegill Triple Prime and Kingfish high altitude nuclear tests of October and November 1962 in Operation Fishbowl provided data that was clear enough to enable physicists to accurately identify the physical mechanisms behind the electromagnetic pulses. The EMP damage of the Starfish Prime test was quickly repaired due, in part, to the fact that the EMP over Hawaii was relatively weak compared to what could be produced with a more intense pulse, and in part due to the relative ruggedness (compared to today) of Hawaii's electrical and electronic infrastructure in 1962. The relatively small magnitude of the Starfish Prime EMP in Hawaii (about 5.6 kilovolts/metre) and the relatively small amount of damage (for example, only 1% to 3% of streetlights extinguished) led some scientists to believe, in the early days of EMP research, that the problem might not be significant. Later calculations

In 1962, the Soviet Union performed three EMP producing nuclear tests in space over Kazakhstan, the last in the "Soviet Project K nuclear tests". Although these weapons were much smaller (300 kiloton) than the Starfish Prime test, they were over a populated, large landmass and at a location where the Earth's magnetic field was greater. The damage caused by the resulting EMP was reportedly much greater than in Starfish Prime. The geomagnetic storm–like E3 pulse from Test 184 induced a current surge in a long underground power line that caused a fire in the power plant in the city of Karaganda. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the level of this damage was communicated informally to US scientists. For a few years US and Russian scientists collaborated on the HEMP phenomenon. Funding was secured to enable Russian scientists to report on some of the Soviet EMP results in international scientific journals. As a result, formal documentation of some of the EMP damage in Kazakhstan exists, although it is still sparse in the open scientific literature. For one of the K Project tests, Soviet scientists instrumented a section of telephone line in the area that they expected to be affected by the pulse. The monitored telephone line was divided into sub lines of in length, separated by repeaters. Each sub line was protected by fuses and by gas filled overvoltage protectors. The EMP from the 22 October (K 3) nuclear test (also known as Test 184) blew all of the fuses and destroyed all of the overvoltage protectors in all of the sub lines.

Nuclear EMP is a complex multi pulse, usually described in terms of three components, as defined by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). The three components of nuclear EMP, as defined by the IEC, are called "E1", "E2", and "E3". The three categories of high altitude EMP are divided according to the time duration and occurrence of each pulse. E1 is the fastest or "early time" high altitude EMP. Traditionally, the term "EMP" often refers specifically to this E1 component of high altitude electromagnetic pulse. The E2 and E3 pulses are often further subdivided into additional divisions according to causation. E2 is a much lower intensity "intermediate time" EMP, which is further divided into E2A (scattered gamma EMP) and E2B (neutron gamma EMP).]] E1 is produced when gamma radiation from the nuclear detonation ionizes (strips electrons from) atoms in the upper atmosphere. This is known as the Compton effect and the resulting current is called the "Compton current". The electrons travel in a generally downward direction at relativistic speeds (more than 90 per cent of the speed of light). In the absence of a magnetic field, this would produce a large, radial pulse of electric current propagating outward from the burst location confined to the source region (the region over which the gamma photons are attenuated). The Earth's magnetic field exerts a force on the electron flow at a right angle to both the field and the particles' original vector, which deflects the electrons and leads to synchrotron radiation. Because the outward traveling gamma pulse is propagating at the speed of light, the synchrotron radiation of the Compton electrons adds coherently, leading to a radiated electromagnetic signal. This interaction produces a large, brief, pulse. Several physicists worked on the problem of identifying the mechanism of the HEMP E1 pulse. The mechanism was finally identified by Conrad Longmire of Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1963. Secondary collisions cause subsequent electrons to lose energy before they reach ground level. The electrons generated by these subsequent collisions have so little energy that they do not contribute significantly to the E1 pulse.

The E2 component is generated by scattered gamma rays and inelastic gammas produced by neutrons. This E2 component is an "intermediate time" pulse that, by IEC definition, lasts from about one microsecond to one second after the explosion. E2 has many similarities to lightning, although lightning induced E2 may be considerably larger than a nuclear E2. Because of the similarities and the widespread use of lightning protection technology, E2 is generally considered to be the easiest to protect against. According to the United States EMP Commission, the main problem with E2 is that it immediately follows E1, which may have damaged the devices that would normally protect against E2. The EMP Commission Executive Report of 2004 states, "In general, it would not be an issue for critical infrastructure systems since they have existing protective measures for defense against occasional lightning strikes. The most significant risk is synergistic because the E2 component follows a small fraction of a second after the first component's insult, which has the ability to impair or destroy many protective and control features. The energy associated with the second component thus may be allowed to pass into and damage systems."

The E3 component is different from E1 and E2. E3 is a much slower pulse, lasting tens to hundreds of seconds. It is caused by the nuclear detonation's temporary distortion of the Earth's magnetic field. The E3 component has similarities to a geomagnetic storm. Like a geomagnetic storm, E3 can produce geomagnetically induced currents in long electrical conductors, damaging components such as power line transformers. Because of the similarity between solar induced geomagnetic storms and nuclear E3, it has become common to refer to solar induced geomagnetic storms as "Solar EMP". "Solar EMP" does not include E1 or E2 components.

Factors that control weapon effectiveness include altitude, yield, construction details, target distance, intervening geographical features, and local strength of the Earth's magnetic field.

Typical nuclear weapon yields used during Cold War planning for EMP attacks were in the range of This is roughly 50 to 500 times the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. Physicists have testified at United States Congressional hearings that weapons with yields of or less can produce a large EMP. The EMP at a fixed distance from an explosion increases at most as the square root of the yield (see the illustration to the right). This means that although a weapon has only 0.7 of the energy release of the Starfish Prime test, the EMP will be at least as powerful. Since the E1 component of nuclear EMP depends on the prompt gamma ray output, which was only 0.1% of yield in Starfish Prime but can be 0.5 of yield in low yield pure nuclear fission weapons, a bomb can easily be as powerful as the Starfish Prime at producing EMP.

In nuclear EMP all of the components of the electromagnetic pulse are generated outside of the weapon. These weapons capitalize on the E1 pulse component of a detonation involving gamma rays, creating an EMP yield of potentially up to 200,000 volts per meter. For decades, numerous countries have experimented with the creation of such weapons, most notably China and Russia.

According to a statement made in writing by the Chinese military, the country has super EMPs and has discussed their use in attacking Taiwan. Such an attack would debilitate information systems in the nation, allowing China to move in and attack it directly using soldiers. The Taiwanese military has subsequently confirmed Chinese possession of super EMPs and their possible destruction to power grids. In addition to Taiwan, the possible implications of attacking the United States with these weapons was examined by China. While the United States also possesses nuclear weapons, the country has not experimented with super EMPs and is hypothetically highly vulnerable to any future attacks by nations. This is due to the country's reliance on computers to control much of the government and economy., and proposals have been made by Russia to develop satellites supplied with EMP capabilities. This would call for detonations up to above the Earth's surface, with the potential to disrupt the electronic systems of U. S. satellites suspended in orbit around the planet, many of which are vital for deterrence and alerting the country of possible incoming missiles. The earlier PRC 25, nearly identical except for a vacuum tube final amplification stage, was tested in EMP simulators, but was not certified to remain fully functional.

Equipment that is running at the time of an EMP is more vulnerable. Even a low energy pulse has access to the power source, and all parts of the system are illuminated by the pulse. For example, a high current arcing path may be created across the power supply, burning out some device along that path. Such effects are hard to predict and require testing to assess potential vulnerabilities.

Many nuclear detonations have taken place using aerial bombs. The B 29 aircraft that delivered the nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not lose power from electrical damage, because electrons (ejected from the air by gamma rays) are stopped quickly in normal air for bursts below roughly , so they are not significantly deflected by the Earth's magnetic field. If the aircraft carrying the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs had been within the intense nuclear radiation zone when the bombs exploded over those cities, then they would have suffered effects from the charge separation (radial) EMP. But this only occurs within the severe blast radius for detonations below about altitude. During Operation Fishbowl, EMP disruptions were suffered aboard a KC 135 photographic aircraft flying from the detonations at burst altitudes. The vital electronics were less sophisticated than today's and the aircraft was able to land safely. Modern aircraft are heavily reliant on solid state electronics which are very susceptible to EMP blasts. Therefore, airline authorities are creating high intensity radiated fields (HIRF) requirements for new air planes to help prevent the chance of crashes caused by EMPs or electromagnetic interference (EMI). To do this all parts of the airplane must be conductive. This is the main shield from EMP blasts as long as there are no holes for the waves to penetrate into the interior of the airplane. Also, insulating some of the main computers inside the plane adds an extra layer of protection from EMP blasts.

An EMP would probably not affect most cars, despite modern cars' heavy use of electronics, because cars' electronic circuits and cabling are likely too short to be affected. In addition, cars' metallic frames provide some protection. However, even a small percentage of cars breaking down due to an electronic malfunction would cause traffic jams. However, this would be in extreme cases like being near the center of the blast and being exposed to a large amount of radiation and EMP waves. A study found that exposure to 200–400 pulses of EMP caused the leaking of vessels in the brain, leakage that has been linked to small problems with thinking and memory recollection. These effects could last up to 12 hours after the exposure. Due to the long exposure time needed to see any of these effects it is unlikely that anyone would see these effects even if exposed for a small period of time. Also, the human body will see little effect as signals are passed chemically and not electrically making it hard to be affected by EMP waves.

The United States EMP Commission was created by the United States Congress in 2001. The commission is formally known as the commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. The Commission brought together notable scientists and technologists to compile several reports. In 2008, the Commission released the "Critical National Infrastructures Report". The United States EMP Commission did not look at other nations. In 2011, the Defense Science Board published a report about the ongoing efforts to defend critical military and civilian systems against EMP and other nuclear weapons effects. The United States military services developed, and in some cases published, hypothetical EMP attack scenarios. In 2016, the Los Alamos Laboratory started phase 0 of a multi year study (through to phase 3) to investigate EMPs which prepared the strategy to be followed for the rest of the study. In 2017, the US Department of Energy published the "DOE Electromagnetic Pulse Resilience Action Plan", Edwin Boston published a dissertation on the topic and the EMP Commission published "Assessing the threat from electromagnetic pulse (EMP)". The EMP commission was closed in summer 2017. They found that earlier reports had underestimated the effects of an EMP attack on the national infrastructure, highlighted issues with communications from the DoD due to the classified nature of the material, and recommended that the DHS instead of going to the DOE for guidance and direction should directly cooperate with the more knowledgeable parts of the DOE. Several reports are in process of being released to the general public.

The problem of protecting civilian infrastructure from electromagnetic pulse has been intensively studied throughout the European Union, and in particular by the United Kingdom. As of 2017, several power utility companies in the United States had been involved in a three year research program on the impact of HEMP to the United States power grid led by an industry non profit organization, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). In 2018, the US Department of Homeland Security released the Strategy for Protecting and Preparing the Homeland against Threats from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and Geomagnetic Disturbance (GMD), which was the department's first articulation of a holistic, long term, partnership based approach to protecting critical infrastructure and preparing to respond and recover from potentially catastrophic electromagnetic incidents. Progress on that front is described in the EMP Program Status Report. NuScale, the small modular nuclear reactor company from Oregon, US, has made their reactor resistant to EMP.

By 1981, a number of articles on nuclear electromagnetic pulse in the popular press spread knowledge of the nuclear EMP phenomenon into the popular culture. EMP has been subsequently used in a wide variety of fiction and other aspects of popular culture. The popular media often depict EMP effects incorrectly, causing misunderstandings among the public and even professionals, and official efforts have been made in the United States to set the record straight. The video is not available to the general public.