Рабаул шабуылы: 1943 жылғы жапондық базаға одақтастардың әуе шабуылы

The bombing of Rabaul in November 1943 was an air attack conducted by the Allies of World War II upon a cruiser force at the major Japanese base of Rabaul. In response to the Allied invasion of Bougainville, the Japanese had brought a strong cruiser force down to Rabaul from Truk, their major naval base in the Caroline Islands about 800 miles north of Rabaul in preparation for a night engagement against the Allied supply and support shipping. Allied carrier and land based planes attacked the Japanese ships, airfields, and port facilities on the island of New Britain to protect the Allied amphibious invasion of Bougainville. As a result of the Rabaul raids, the Japanese naval forces could no longer threaten the landings. The success of the raid began to change the strongly held belief that carrier based air forces could not challenge land based air forces.

In early 1943, Rabaul had been distant from the fighting. However, the Allied grand strategy in the South West Pacific Area—Operation Cartwheel—aimed to isolate Rabaul and reduce it by air raids. Japanese ground forces were already retreating in New Guinea and in the Solomon Islands, abandoning Guadalcanal, Kolombangara, New Georgia and Vella Lavella. Rabaul—on the island of New Britain—was one of two major ports in the Australian Territory of New Guinea. It was the main Japanese naval base for the Solomon Islands campaign and New Guinea campaign. Simpson Harbour—captured from Australian forces in February 1942—was known as "the Pearl Harbor of the South Pacific" and was well defended by 367 anti aircraft guns and five airfields. Lakunai and Vunakanau airfields were pre war Australian strips. Lakunai had an all weather runway of sand and volcanic ash, and Vunakanau was surfaced with concrete. Rapopo—14 mile (23 km) to the southeast—became operational in December 1942 with concrete runways and extensive support and maintenance facilities. Tobera—completed in August 1943 halfway between Vunakanau and Rapopo—also had concrete strips. The four airfields had 166 protected revetments for bombers and 265 for fighters, with additional unprotected dispersal parking areas. A fifth airfield protecting Rabaul was Borpop airfield, completed in December 1942 across the St. Georges Channel on New Ireland. The anti aircraft defenses were well coordinated by army and naval units. Naval guns guarded Simpson Harbor and its shipping and the three airfields of Tobera, Lakunai, and Vunakanau. The army units defended Rapopo airfield, supply dumps and army installations; and assisted the navy in defending Simpson Harbor. An effective early warning radar system provided 90 mile (145 km) coverage from Rabaul, and extended coverage with additional radars were on New Britain, New Ireland, and at Buka. These sets provided from 30 to 60 minutes' early warning of an attack. On the night of 1/2 November the screening naval unit succeeded in defending the landing (the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay), but Admiral Mineichi Koga responded quickly. Within a few days the local cruiser force had been augmented with reinforcements from Truk. The Japanese had been conserving their naval forces over the past year, but in the face of the imminent threat to Rabaul they committed substantial resources in hopes of crushing the newly landed force and its naval support. The force refueled at Rabaul in preparation for the coming battle. Halsey lacked comparable surface forces to oppose this fresh challenge. His main surface strength, two battleships and a number of cruisers, had been transferred to the Central Pacific to support the upcoming invasion of Tarawa. The only forces at hand were the carrier airgroups of Saratoga and Princeton. These would have been considered a potent force for a battle at sea, but Rabaul was a heavily fortified port with five airfields and extensive anti aircraft batteries. Navy aviators had termed it "a hornet's nest". With the exception of the surprise raid at Pearl Harbor, no attack against such a formidable land target had been attempted by carrier aircraft. As such it was considered a highly dangerous mission for the aircrews and also placed the carriers at risk. Halsey later said the threat that the Japanese cruiser force at Rabaul posed to his landings at Bougainville was "the most desperate emergency that confronted me in my entire term as ComSoPac (Commander of the South Pacific Area)."

With the fate of the landing in the balance, Halsey ordered his carriers, under command of Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman, to steam north through the night of 4/5 November to get within range of Rabaul for a daybreak raid on the base. Approaching behind the cover of a weather front, Sherman launched all 97 of his available aircraft against the target, leaving no aircraft behind for combat air patrol over his ships. The aircrews were ordered to damage as many warships as possible, rather than attempting to achieve a sinking. Aircraft from airfields on Barakoma and the recently captured Vella Lavella were sent out to sea to rendezvous with the carrier force to provide it with some measure of protection. The daybreak Navy air bombing of Rabaul was followed up an hour later with an Army Air Force raid by 27 B 24 Liberator heavy bombers of the Fifth Air Force, escorted by 58 P 38s. Japanese cruiser Maya was hit by one bomb above one of her engine rooms, causing heavy damage and killing 70 crewmen. Japanese cruiser Mogami was hit by one 500 lb bomb and set afire, causing heavy damage and killing 19 crewmen. Japanese cruiser Takao was hit by two 500 lb bombs, causing heavy damage and killing 23 crewmen. Japanese cruiser Chikuma was slightly damaged by several near misses. One bomb struck near Japanese cruiser Agano, which damaged an anti aircraft gun and killed one crewman. Three destroyers were also lightly damaged. The strike had been a stunning success, effectively neutralizing Koga's cruisers as a threat to the Bougainville mission. Under the threat of additional airstrikes, most of the Japanese warships departed for Truk the next day, practically ending Japanese naval presence in the area. Losses among the attacking aircraft were light. Two days later an additional carrier unit, Task Group 50.3 of the U. S. 5th Fleet, reached Halsey, arriving on 7 November. These ships were among the first wave of newly built U. S. Navy warships and had only recently become operational. Commanded by Rear Admiral Alfred E. Montgomery, the task group consisted of the fleet carriers Essex and Bunker Hill and the light carrier Independence. Halsey used Montgomery's ships as well as Task Force 38 (TF 38) in a combined strike against Rabaul on 11 November. Sherman launched his strike from near Green Island, northwest of Bougainville, which attacked in bad weather at about 08:30. After its return, TF 38 retired to the south without being detected. Montgomery launched from the Solomon Sea 160 mile (257 km) southeast of Rabaul.

Agano—which had remained at Rabaul after the 5 November strike—was torpedoed and heavily damaged in these attacks. The destroyer Japanese destroyer Suzunami reportedly suffered a direct bomb hit while loading torpedoes near the mouth of Rabaul Harbor. She blew up and sank, killing 148 of her crew. In the wake of the raids the Japanese launched a series of counterattacks involving 120 aircraft against the U. S. carriers, but the force was intercepted and lost 35 planes without inflicting damage on Montgomery's ships. The raids succeeded in protecting the Allies' recent gains, leaving Rabaul as an increasingly isolated outpost, difficult to supply and posing little danger to accelerating Allied operations in the region. The capture of Bougainville and Buka brought Rabaul into range of land based US Navy and Marine Corps tactical bombers for the first time, setting the stage for the pacification campaign intended to neutralize Rabaul that began on 17 December 1943.