Теміржол қауіпсіздігі жүйелері: Автоматты пойыз бақылауы

Class of train protection systems for railways

Automatic train control (ATC) is a general class of train protection systems for railways that involves a speed control mechanism in response to external inputs. For example, a system could effect an emergency brake application if the driver does not react to a signal at danger. ATC systems tend to integrate various cab signalling technologies and they use more granular deceleration patterns in lieu of the rigid stops encountered with the older automatic train stop (ATS) technology. ATC can also be used with automatic train operation (ATO) and is usually considered to be the safety critical part of a railway system. There have been numerous different safety systems referred to as "automatic train control" over time. The first experimental apparatus was installed on the Henley branch line in January 1906 by the Great Western Railway, although it would now be referred to as an automatic warning system (AWS) because the driver retained full command of braking. The term is especially common in Japan, where ATC is used on all Shinkansen (bullet train) lines, and on some conventional rail and subway lines, as a replacement for ATS.

The accident report for the 2006 Qalyoub accident mentions an ATC system.

In 2017, Huawei was contracted to install GSM R partly to provide communication services to automatic train protection systems.

In Japan, the Automatic Train Control (ATC) system was developed for high speed trains like the Shinkansen, which travel so fast that the driver has almost no time to acknowledge trackside signals. Although the ATC system sends AF signals carrying information about the speed limit for the specific track section along the track circuit. When these signals are received on board, the train's current speed is compared with the speed limit and the brakes are applied automatically if the train is travelling too fast. The brakes are released as soon as the train slows below the speed limit. This system offers a higher degree of safety, preventing collisions that might be caused by driver error, so it has also been installed in heavily used lines, such as Tokyo's Yamanote Line and some subway lines. Although the ATC applies the brakes automatically when the train speed exceeds the speed limit, it cannot control the motor power or train stop position when pulling into stations. However, the
automatic train operation (ATO) system can automatically control departure from stations, the speed between stations, and the stop position in stations. It has been installed in some subways. and the Koumi Line in 2020. It is considered to be Japan's equivalent to ETCS Level 3.

Several subway lines in South Korea use ATC, in some cases enhanced with ATO.

All lines use ATC. All lines are enhanced with ATO.

Other than on Lines 1 and 2 (MELCO cars only), all lines use ATC. Line 2 (VVVF cars), Line 5 cars, Line 6 cars, Line 7 cars, and Line 8 cars have their ATC systems enhanced with ATO.

Denmark's system of ATC (officially designated ZUB 123) is different from that of its neighbours. From 1978 until 1987, the Swedish ATC system was trialled in Denmark, and a new Siemens designed ATC system was implemented between 1986 and 1988. In consequence of the Sorø railway accident, which occurred in April 1988, the new system was progressively installed on all Danish main lines from the early 1990s onwards. Some trains (such as those employed on the Øresundståg service and some X 2000 trains) have both the Danish and the Swedish systems,

Bane NOR—the Norwegian government's agency for railway infrastructure—uses the Swedish system of ATC. Trains can therefore generally cross the border without being specially modified. However, unlike in Sweden, the ATC system used in Norway differentiates between partial ATC (delvis ATC, DATC), which ensures that a train stops whenever a red signal is passed, and full ATC (FATC), which, in addition to preventing overshooting red signals, also ensures that a train does not exceed its maximum allowed speed limit. A railway line in Norway can have either DATC or FATC installed, but not both at the same time. ATC was first trialled in Norway in 1979, after the Tretten train disaster, caused by a signal passed at danger (SPAD), occurred four years earlier. DATC was first implemented on the section Oslo S Dombås Trondheim Grong between 1983 and 1994, and FATC was first implemented on the Ofoten Line in 1993. The high speed Gardermoen Line has had FATC since its opening in 1998. After the Åsta accident occurred in 2000, the implementation of DATC on the Røros Line was accelerated, and it became operational in 2001.

In Sweden the development of ATC started in the 1960s (ATC 1), and was formally introduced in the early 1980s together with high speed trains (ATC 2/Ansaldo L10000). As of 2008, 9,831 km out of the 11,904 km of track maintained by Swedish Transport Administration—the Swedish agency responsible for railway infrastructure—had ATC 2 installed. However, since ATC 2 is generally incompatible with ERTMS/ETCS (as in the case of the Bothnia Line which is the first railway line in Sweden to exclusively use ERTMS/ETCS), and with the aim of Trafikverket to eventually replace ATC 2 with ERTMS/ETCS over the next few decades, a Special Transmission Module (STM) has been developed to automatically switch between ATC 2 and ERTMS/ETCS.

In 1906, the Great Western Railway in the UK developed a system known as "automatic train control". In modern terminology, GWR ATC is classified as an automatic warning system (AWS). This was an intermittent train protection system that relied on an electrically energised (or unenergised) rail between, and higher than, the running rails. This rail sloped at each end and was known as an ATC ramp and would make contact with a shoe on the underside of the passing locomotive. The ramps were provided at distant signals. A development of the design, intended for use at stop signals, was never implemented. If the signal associated with the ramp was at caution, the ramp would not be energised. The ramp would lift the shoe on the passing locomotive and start a timer sequence at the same time sounding a horn on the footplate. If the driver failed to acknowledge this warning within a preset time, the brakes of the train would be applied. In testing, the GWR demonstrated the effectiveness of this system by sending an express train at full speed past a distant signal at caution. The train was brought safely to a stand before reaching the home signal. If the signal associated with the ramp was clear, the ramp was energised. The energized ramp would lift the shoe on the passing locomotive and cause a bell to sound on the footplate. If the system were to fail then the shoe would remain unenergised, the caution state; it therefore failed safe, a fundamental requirement of all safety equipment. The system had been implemented on all GWR main lines, including Paddington to Reading, by 1908. Work would however not begin until the delivery of brand new trains with ATC compatibility and the retirement of older rolling stock that was not compatible with the new system. ATC was introduced in phases, beginning with a test on November 4, 2017 during regular service between Dupont and Yorkdale stations. It was first introduced in a permanent manner with the opening of the Toronto–York Spadina subway extension on December 17, 2017, between and stations. Implementation of the system on to the remainder of the line was carried out during weekend closures and night time work when the subway would close. There were delays on the project, with deadlines for the complete conversion of Line 1 pushed back multiple times until 2022. ATC conversion was completed to Finch station on September 24, 2022. The TTC plans to convert Line 2 Bloor Danforth and Line 4 Sheppard to ATC in the future, subject to funding availability and being able to replace the current non ATC compatible fleet on Line 2 with trains that are, with an estimated date of completion by 2030.

ATC systems in the United States are almost always integrated with existing continuous cab signalling systems. The ATC comes from electronics in the locomotive that implement some form of speed control based on the inputs of the cab signalling system. If the train speed exceeds the maximum speed allowed for that portion of track, an overspeed alarm sounds in the cab. If the engineer fails to reduce speed and/or make a brake application to reduce speed a penalty brake application is made automatically. The Union Pacific system requires an immediate brake application that cannot be released until the train's speed has been reduced to (for any train traveling above that speed). Then, the train's speed must be further reduced to no more than within 70 seconds of the initial cab signal drop. Failure to apply the brakes for these speed reductions will result in a penalty application. All three freight ATC systems provide the engineer with a degree of latitude in applying brakes in a safe and proper manner, since improper braking can result in a derailment or a runaway. None of the systems are in effect in difficult or mountainous terrain.