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Landing craft used extensively in World War II

Landing Craft Assault (LCA) was a landing craft used extensively in World War II. Its primary purpose was to ferry troops from transport ships to attack enemy held shores. The craft derived from a prototype designed by John I. Thornycroft Ltd. of Woolston, Hampshire, UK. During the war it was manufactured throughout the United Kingdom in places as various as small boatyards and furniture manufacturers. Typically constructed of hardwood planking and selectively clad with armour plate, this shallow draft, barge like boat with a crew of four could ferry an infantry platoon of 31 and five additional specialist troops, to shore at 7 knots (13 km/h). Men generally entered the boat by walking over a gangplank from the boat deck of a troop transport as the LCA hung from its davits. When loaded, the LCA was lowered into the water. Soldiers exited by the boat's bow ramp. The LCA was the most common British and Commonwealth landing craft of World War II. Prior to July 1942, these craft were referred to as "Assault Landing Craft" (ALC), but "Landing Craft; Assault" (LCA) was used thereafter to conform with the joint US UK nomenclature system. The Landing Craft Assault's design's sturdy hull, load capacity, low silhouette, shallow draft, little bow wave, and silenced engines were all assets that benefited the occupants. The extent of its light armour, proof against rifle bullets and shell splinters with similar ballistic power recommended the LCA. Also, soldiers were able to sit, unlike other landing craft which required them to stand. Throughout the war in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean, the LCA was the most likely sea assault transport of British Commandos, United States Army Rangers, and other special forces.

For centuries the Royal Navy had been landing soldiers on hostile shores, prominent examples being Quebec 1759, Peking 1900, during the Dardanelles campaign 1915 16 and the Zeebrugge Raid 1918. During the inter war period, however, a combination of recent experience and economic stringency contributed to the delay in producing a modern infantry assault landing craft. The costly failure of the Gallipoli campaign during World War I coupled with the emerging potential of airpower satisfied many in naval and military circles that the age of amphibious operations had come to a close. Still, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, animated discussion in Staff Colleges in Britain and the Indian Army Staff College, Quetta surrounded the strategic potential of the Dardanelles campaign compared with the strategic stalemate of the Western Front. The economic austerity of the worldwide economic depression and the government's adoption of the Ten Year Rule assured that such theoretical talk would not result in the procurement of any equipment. The Munich Agreement of 1938 delayed the inevitable war between Britain and Germany. Munich also led to many changes in Imperial General Staff policies, among which was the acceptance of a proposal in November from the Inter Service Training and Development Centre (ISTDC) at Fort Cumberland for amphibious assault procedures and for a new type of landing craft. Up to this time the Landing Craft Committee had produced some Motor Landing Craft but had not formed procedures for the assault role of these boats. Now there were specifications for what the new boat must be able to do. It must weigh less than ten long tons, enabling lifting by passenger liner davits. The new craft also had to be built around the load apart from crew it should carry the thirty one men of a British Army platoon and five assault engineers or signallers – and be so shallow drafted as to be able to land them, wet only up to their knees, in eighteen inches of water. The troops had to unload quickly. All of these specifications made the LCA personnel carriers; a separate set of requirements were laid down for a vehicle and supplies carrier, although previously the two roles were combined in the Motor Landing Craft. When the ISTDC approached the Director of Naval Construction (DNC) at the Admiralty to design a craft to these specifications the DNC staff were urgently engaged in designing new ships to serve more immediate priorities. Germany's coastline was small and the army would be able to engage the enemy through France. Any urgent need for landing craft was not apparent and ISTDC were told it would take seven months to design what was required. The Board of Trade was therefore approached and asked to suggest a maritime architect. Mr. Fleming of Liverpool was proposed who soon came down to Fort Cumberland and the design of the first LCA began. Following many visits with new drawings and proposals, a plan was ready by November 1938. Approval was sought from the DNC to build a prototype Fleming LCA. A wooden mock up of the craft had been built in the model shed in Portsmouth dockyard. Fully equipped troops had practiced embarking and disembarking from it, and the design was altered to meet the practical difficulties discovered. The craft to be put into service was to be built of Birmabright, an aluminium alloy. A meeting with the DNC was convened to discuss the results. The Fleming craft had few friends in the DNC, though their criticisms were not specific. They introduced representatives of three shipbuilding firms. The ISTDC were only interested in the Fleming design submitted already, and in trying the craft at a landing on the east coast of England in a matter of months. The DNC accepted this, but asked ISTDC to give their specifications to the firms present so that they could also submit designs. Two of the firms were unable to tender, the third, Messrs Thornycroft, had a proposal on the drawing board in forty eight hours and ISTDC and the DNC agreed that construction of a prototype should be paid for. The craft might be constructed for experimental purposes on the understanding that the DNC held no responsibility. J. S. White of Cowes built a prototype to the Fleming design. Eight weeks later the craft was doing trials on the Clyde. The craft behaved admirably, though it tended to bury its nose in the sea at full throttle. Noise from the two 120 hp Chrysler engines was excessive, being amplified by the metal hull. Also, there remained the difficulty of applying armour plate to the hull. The sides were not flat, but rounded – a complicated shape for which to roll an armoured skin. The Birmabright alloy used also presented chemical and physical obstacles for the application of hardened steel plates. The Thornycroft design was being built at the same time with a hull of mahogany, the internal arrangements for the troops and exit being generally similar to the mock up that had been built in Portsmouth Dockyard. The power plant of two 65 hp Ford V8 engines would be much quieter. The Fleming won competitive trials at Langstone Harbour. Compared to the Thornycroft, the Fleming was superior in many areas. Troops disembarked in a quarter of the time. The silhouette and bow wave were smaller, qualities typically beneficial for surprise landings. However, the Fleming remained noisy. During trials on a misty morning the noisy approaching craft frightened civilians along the shore; tactical surprise was impossible. Afterwards, Thornycroft produced a prototype to a revised design based on a double diagonal mahogany hull. The silhouette and bow wave were small, and the twin engines could be made silent beyond 25 yards. Armour could replace the outer mahogany planking. Beaching qualities were satisfactory, something retained by the LCA. There was a lowerable ramp, but disembarkation speed remained unsatisfactory due to the narrowness. The revised Thornycroft became the basis for the LCA. DNC and Thornycroft collaborated to develop the design further, leading to a third prototype, ALC No 2.

All landing craft designs (and landing ship designs for ships intended to beach) must find a compromise between two divergent priorities; the qualities that make a good sea boat are opposite those that make a craft suitable for beaching. The LCA keel was produced from Canadian rock elm which was treated with steam to make it pliable and then shaped using a keel block and wedges. Twenty four mahogany transverse frame pieces were joined to the keel providing the overall structure. The craft had a hull built of double diagonal mahogany planking. The sides were plated with "10lb. DIHT" armour, a heat treated steel based on D1 steel, in this case Hadfield's Resista ¼". Steps were taken to ensure that the boat would not sink when swamped. In the bow section between the armoured doors and the ramp, each bulkhead was packed with of Onazote (a type of vulcanised foam rubber) buoyant material. The same Onazote packing was placed along both hull sides for the length of the well, and filled the aft compartment. The LCA had a long central well section fitted with three benches, one centre, one each port and starboard, for seating troops. The side benches were covered by the top deck. The well was divided from the bow by a bulkhead fitted with two vertically hinged doors. This pair of forward opening armour plate doors led to the ramp, which was lowered and raised by a simple arrangement of pulleys and wire. Two rollers on the leading outboard edge providing some freedom of movement for the ramp when it was grounded. Over this ramp troops could come ashore in two to three minutes, or less if the soldiers and crews were well trained. Immediately behind the bulkhead were the steering shelter on the starboard, and the Lewis gun shelter on the port. The steering shelter was fitted with a telegraph and voice pipe for communication with the stoker, a featherspray control lever, and a fold up seat. The shelter was protected on all four sides by non magnetic bulletproof plate surmounted by a hinged double door roof. Most LCAs were fitted with a compass. Drive was by two shafts from the pair of Ford V8 engines to two 19 inch x 14 inch 2 bladed propellers. Fuel capacity was The craft were steered by twin rudders with steering wires that ran from the coxswain's shelter aft through the well and engine compartment, and the last three foot (unarmoured) buoyancy section in the stern. The LCA propulsion system was designed to be quiet. At low speeds the engines could not be heard at 25 yards. The LCA handled well enough in moderate seas when waves were but could make no speed against rough weather, demonstrated in the number of LCA hulled support craft that foundered in 6 feet (2 m) waves while on tow to Normandy (specifically LCA(HR)). The power plant, while quiet, has been criticized for being underpowered. Nevertheless, the bow lines and small ramp made the LCA a reasonably good sea boat.

From the start, the Inter Service Training and Development Centre intended to use armed versions of the LCA to provide close support to the troop carrying types. These variants were armed with heavy machine guns and smoke firing mortars. The two prototype LCA from 1938 were converted for this purpose, and other, similar, conversions became the Mkl LCS(M). The Mk1 had a centrally located armoured steering shelter just fore of the engine compartment, and was armed with two .50 inch machine guns, two .303 Lewis guns, and one 4 inch mortar or 20mm gun. The crew of 11 included one officer, three ratings to sail, and seven gun crew. The Mk2 was similarly armed on a standard LCA hull, except the two machine guns were in a twin turret rather than single mounts. These craft were not expected to beach and later in production boats were given a proper bow, making them more seaworthy. Thus the LCS(M)(3) was produced and stayed in production for the rest of the war. The LCS(M)(3) used Scripps marine conversions of the Ford V8 engine and had 98 gal. fuel tanks. Using this principle of 'counter mining' the explosions from mortar rounds setting off the mines both above and below the water's edge, proved very successful. They were used at Salerno and Normandy. Later in the war, the US built a similar craft the "Woofus" based on the LCM. One experiment was mounting a "flying hose" on an LCA as a mine clearing line charge device for clearing mines and obstacles on beaches. The LCA was fitted with a coil of hose, attached to a rocket. The rocket would carry the hose onto the beach, the crew would pump nitroglycerine into the hose, and then attach an explosive charge to the near end and throw it overboard. Fortunately, this system was never used operationally. The same concept was employed by the 79th Armoured Division (called "Congers"), using Universal Carriers. The nitroglycerin supply for the unit using them accidentally ignited causing great damage and loss of life. While not, perhaps, a variant, a field modification was developed by US Rangers with assistance from LCA crews and Commandos, for the famous Pointe du Hoc assault of 6 June 1944. Each of the 10 LCAs of Flotillas 510 and 522 which carried the 2nd Ranger Battalion to Pointe du Hoc was fitted with 3 pairs of rocket tubes, firing six tine grapnels. In addition, each craft carried a pair of small hand projector type rockets, which could be easily carried ashore and fired small 100 ft ropes. These could carry to full extension provided the line was dry and used in moderate weather conditions. Each craft also carried tubular steel extension ladders made up of light, four foot sections suitable for quick assembly. In July 1943 Royal Marines from the Mobile Naval Bases Defence Organization and other shore units were drafted into the pool to crew the expanding numbers of landing craft being gathered in England for the Normandy invasion. By 1944, 500 Royal Marine officers and 12,500 Marines had become landing craft crew. By 1945, personnel priorities had changed once more. Marines of landing craft flotillas were formed into two infantry brigades to address the manpower shortage in ending the war in Germany. In Royal Indian Navy (RIN) service, crewing LCAs followed somewhat similar lines. By mid 1941 members of the RIN Reserve and RIN Volunteer Reserve were being trained to operate LCA. In 1942, the RIN began receiving four battalions of Indian army troops to provide crews for landing craft. Seven hundred soldiers of the 9/1st Punjab Regiment volunteered for such a transfer in February 1943. The 15/13th Frontier Force Rifles Regiment voted similarly. These battalions were transferred despite the fact that few of the men had ever seen the sea. Their training suffered severely from lack of landing craft, spares, and trained instructors. From around mid 1943 there was also a Burma Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve in existence working closely among LCA and LCS crews. By 1945, the BRNVR seems to have been formed into the 59th Motor Launch Flotilla. In all likelihood, it had been put together at least partly from those with maritime experience escaping from the 1942 Japanese onslaught in Burma. A junior naval or Royal Marine officer commanded three LCAs and was carried aboard one of the craft. The officer relayed signals and orders to the other two craft in the group by signal flags in the earlier part of the war, but by 1944 many of the boats had been fitted with two way radios. On the wave leader's boat the Sternsheetsman was normally employed as the Signalman but flags, Aldis lamps, and loudhailers were sometimes more reliable than 1940s radio equipment. The communications equipment of the troops being ferried could sometimes prove helpful.

The LCA's crew of four ratings included a Sternsheetsman, whose action station was at the stern to assist in lowering and raising the boat at the davits of the Landing Ship Infantry (LSI), a Bowman gunner, whose action station was at the front of the boat to open and close the armoured doors, raise and lower the ramp, and operate the one or two Lewis guns in the armoured gun shelter opposite the steering position, a stoker mechanic responsible for the engine compartment, and a Coxswain who sat in the armoured steering shelter forward on the starboard side. Though in control of the rudders, the coxswain did not have direct control of the engines and gave instructions to the stoker through voicepipe and telegraph. The craft relayed signals and orders to the other two craft in the group by signal flags in the earlier part of the war, but by 1944 many of the boats had been fitted with two way radios. The sternsheetsman and bowman were to be available to take over from the coxswain or stoker should they be killed or injured. On longer journeys they might relieve them to rest. They also manned any additional machine guns and operated the kedge anchor, if it was required. In mine fields and among anti invasion obstacles and rocks seaman would sit on the bow or stern or move about the sides of his boat piloting or preventing it from hitting the obstacles.

Normally, a flotilla comprised 12 boats at full complement, though this number was not rigid. The flotilla's size could alter to fit operational requirements or the hoisting capacity of a particular LSI. An infantry company would be carried in six LCAs. A flotilla was normally assigned to an LSI. These varied in capacity with smaller ones, such as the 3,975+ ton able to hoist 6 LCAs, and larger ones, such as the nearly 16,000 ton with room for 13 LCAs. The davits themselves provided a demarcation between the responsibilities of the LSI crew (either Royal Navy or Merchant Navy) and the members of the LCA Flotilla. The LCAs were swung down to the level of the loading decks and the crews climbed aboard. At this time the troops were assembled by platoons ready to cross gangways. When the coxswain gave the platoon commander the word, he took his men over and into the stern of the LCA and they filed forward. The platoon divided into three lines, one for each section of the platoon, the outboard two sections sitting under the protection of the troop well's armoured decks, the centre section crouched on the low seating bench down the middle. Despite the wires holding the craft to a fender, the LCA rolled with the motion of the ship. The coxswain would then call, 'Boat manned,' to the telephone operator at the loading station, who, in turn, reported to the 'LC' Control Room. The coxswain would then warn the troops to mind the pulleys at the ends of falls fore and aft, which could wave freely about when the craft had been set in the water. The task of hooking on and casting off from the ship required skill and seamanship from the coxswain, bowman, and sternsheetsman. The snatch blocks used were heavy steel and difficult to handle. The bowman and sternsheetsman stood by his respective block, as the craft was lowered into the water. At a time when there was sufficient slack in the falls both had to cast off at the same instant, and the blocks had to be released while there was slack in the falls. If the boat was not freed at both ends at once the rise and fall of the sea could cause the boat to tip, swamp, and perhaps capsize with loss of life. Casting off was done in all sorts of sea conditions, and the sea might be rising and falling a metre or more (6' swells were not uncommon on D Day). A combination of skill and luck could redeem a failure to cast off, nevertheless. On D Day, an LCA of Royal Marine 535 Flotilla, LSI Glenearn, released all but its after falls, which were jammed, and the craft tilted alarmingly to 45 degrees. The coxswain kept his head, calming the passengers, while seamen worked to free the falls. Once free, the coxswain needed to get the LCA away to prevent colliding with the towering side of the LSI as it rose and fell with the swells. Commonly, the LCAs of a flotilla would form line ahead behind a motor launch or Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB) that would guide them to their designated beach (it was not normal for LCAs to circle the landing ship as was USN and US Coast Guard practice). As the LCA approached the beach they would form line abreast for the final run in to the beach. When the front of the LCA came to ground on the beach it was called the 'touch down.'

Throughout the Second World War, LCAs were used for landing Allied forces in almost every Commando operation, major and minor, in the European theatre. They also saw service in North Africa and the Indian Ocean. They saw a little service in the Pacific close to the end of the war. Below are operations involving LCA and LCA variants, and descriptions of how the attributes of the craft, good or ill, suited operational circumstances.

The first four LCAs used in an opposed landing disembarked 120 French Foreign Legionnaires of the 13th Demi Brigade (13e DBLE) on the beach at Bjerkvik, 8 mile (13 km) north of Narvik, on 13 May during the Norwegian Campaign. The army commander, General Antoine Béthouart, responsible for capturing the area north of Rombaks, realized that a landing behind German lines in the Herjangsfjord was required to force the enemy to retire. To assure that plans he made with the Royal Navy were understood by the Legionnaires, a meeting took place aboard The plan agreed involved the LCAs making the 20 mile (32 km) approach journey under their own power, a pre landing bombardment by ships, followed by the landing of three tanks one from a new LCM (Mk. I), and two from the older Motor Landing Craft (MLC), then the landing of an initial wave of infantry from LCAs, and then a follow on force carried in barges towed by motor torpedo boats. On 12 May, at about 23:40, Royal Navy destroyers commenced a bombardment of the town intended to destroy all buildings on the foreshore. The LCAs landed soon after 01:00, when the LCM (Mk. I) had delivered a tank to the beach (the other tanks in MLCs were delayed). The LCA crews manoeuvered their craft to the left of the village of Bjerkvik, the intended landing place, and under a slight rise in the ground in order to spare the soldiers casualties from opposing machine gun fire. Though touchdown was in the early hours of the new day the midnight sun illuminated the battle. Once ashore, the 13e DBLE's companies deployed and moved to seize the high ground to the north and south of the town. This debut of the new LCA was seen, from a distance, by Admiral L. E. H. Maund, who had done much work in its development: The LCAs, along with towed ship's boats and other landing craft types, then turned to landing the rest of 13e DBLE and its supporting elements. Maund was most pleased with the efficiency with which the Legionnaires disembarked from the LCA. The small flotilla of LCAs, MLCs, and an LCM (Mk. I) had added greatly to the Allies' tactical latitude. No LCAs were lost to enemy action during these operations in Norway. One craft was lost, sometime before 27 May, being burned out by accident while lying up on the east shore of the Herjangsfjord. The three LCAs surviving could not be hoisted on available ships when the decision was made to evacuate. An attempt was made to tow them home behind trawlers, but the sea became too rough and the LCAs had to be cut adrift and sunk.

More than a dozen LCAs were used in evacuating the BEF from Dunkirk (Operation Dynamo). Eight LCAs were sent to Dunkirk on a merchant ship, SS Clan MacAlister. Designed to be hoisted on the standard passenger liner davits used for the 99 man lifeboats, the LCA could be carried and launched from a large number of Merchant Navy vessels. Clan MacAlister began hoisting out LCAs upon arriving off Dunkirk, 29 May, but was attacked and sunk before releasing half the craft. Five LCAs were lost with Clan MacAlister. The remaining eight began taking soldiers off the beaches at La Panne and Dunkirk. One became stranded on the beach and was set afire by its crew. The balance returned to England "in a bad way" after taking some 2,000 soldiers directly off the beaches.

Though the LCA had been designed around the most common likely load, a British infantry platoon, the original war establishment of a commando (a headquarters and 10 troops) was formed without reference to this fact. Early in 1941, each Commando unit's establishment was changed to consist of a Headquarters and six troops. Each troop would comprise three officers and 62 other ranks; this number was set so each troop would fit into two LCA.

In March, LCAs carried the first British Commando raid of the war, directed at Norway. Operation Claymore was conducted by men of No. 3 and No. 4 Commandos. The landing force were to destroy the fish oil producing facilities in the ports of Stamsund, Hennmgsvaer, Svolvaer, and Brettesnes. The six LCAs and 2 LCM(1)s of the newly converted Landing Ship Infantry carried men of 4 Commando, as well as Royal Engineer demolition experts and a contingent of men from the Royal Norwegian Navy in a raid on the Lofoten Islands. , also new and with a similar flotilla of landing craft, landed No. 3 Commando. The two LSIs, in company with five destroyers, entered the Vestfjorden before 04:00 on 4 March, and launched their attack. The morning weather was clear, cold, and calm, and the landing craft approached all four landing points more or less simultaneously in broad daylight (sunrise was approximately 06:20). The LCAs were crowded with raiders; one craft ferrying 41 officers and men in addition to the four man crew. In December there were two raids. The first was Operation Anklet, a raid on the Lofoten Islands by No. 12 Commando on 26 December. The German garrison was in the midst of their Christmas celebrations and was easily overcome; the Commandos re embarked after two days. Operation Archery was a larger raid at Vågsøy Island. This raid involved men from Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 6 Commandos, a Royal Navy flotilla, and limited air support. The raid caused significant damage to factories, warehouses, and the German garrison, and sank eight ships. After this the Germans increased the garrison in Norway by an extra 30,000 troops, upgraded coastal and inland defences, and sent a number of capital ships to the area.

In the Mediterranean, LCAs from carried No. 7 Commando (designated A battalion Layforce, 6th Infantry Division at the time) in their raid on Bardia in April. The objective was to silence a coastal defence battery atop 300 ft high cliffs on a rocky coast. Here the sturdy hull of the LCA, coupled with the skill of the crews allowed many of the Commandos to land almost dry shod. Later that month, following the successful German intervention, LCAs were involved in the evacuation of Greece, where in hastily organized operations some 50,000 troops were embarked from ports including Porto Rafti, Argos, and Kalamata. In May LCAs ferried many of these troops to Crete, and days later, LCAs from Glengyle and HMT Cameronia evacuated 6,000 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders during the evacuation of Crete.

Operation Biting, between 27–28 February (also known as the Bruneval Raid), targeted a German coastal radar installation atop 300 feet (91 m) cliffs. The raiding party itself was dropped by parachute at night and following the raid was taken back to England by sea. The naval force under Commander F. N. Cook, Royal Australian Navy, departed earlier, during the afternoon of the 27th, for the journey across the Channel. Motor Gun Boats (MGBs) towed LCAs across the Channel (LCA crews manned their craft during such tows) and carried detachments from No. 12 Commando who would provide fire support for the raiding party when they reached the evacuation beach. To accomplish this task each LCA had sandbags laid down its decks as parapets for Boys anti tank rifles and Bren guns fitted with high volume drum magazines. When close to the coast the commandos climbed into the LCAs, the crews cast off, and the craft made for the beach under their own power. Meanwhile, on land, having accomplished their objectives the airborne raiders withdrew through a gully in the cliffs to the evacuation beach. By this time, it was 02:15, a sea mist prevented the naval force from seeing paratrooper's signals to evacuate them. The raiders fired off an emergency Very light seen by three LCA crews who soon approached accompanied by three MGBs. The original plan for the operation had called for two LCAs to land on the beach at a time, but this had never been satisfactorily achieved during the training manoeuvres. Instead, as the other three LCAs caught up, all six landed at the same time. One, LCA 125, dropped its kedge anchor just prior to beaching, but the anchor line played out and ran off the drum. Troops in the landing craft opened fire on German troops gathering by the top of the cliff. With all the craft beached at once, and enemy fire causing considerable confusion on the beach, some LCAs left over crowded, whilst others left half empty. The coxswain of LCA 125 was able to reverse his engines quickly and prevent the craft from being stranded. The entire raiding force was taken off the beach and soon transferred to MGBs for more comfortable transport back to England. Communications had failed; the naval force had received no signals apart from the Very light, and had spent much of the time hiding from a German naval patrol that had nearly discovered them. The journey back to Britain was uneventful, with the MGBs, LCAs in tow, being escorted by four destroyers and a flight of Spitfires. This raid with its dramatic embarkation from the base of a cliff occupied by enemy soldiers demonstrated the need for deck armour on LCA. Production of new craft soon incorporated 1/4 inch armour for the decks over the hold and the stoker's position. In April two troops of No. 4 Commando and eight officers and 43 other ranks of the Carleton and York Regiment (1st Canadian Infantry Division) took part in Abercrombie, a raid on Hardelot, France, near Boulogne. The LCAs of transported the party. This raid also marked the first operational use of the new LCS. The raid set out on the night of 19 April with the LCAs towed by MGBs. The plan was for the party to travel to within 2 mile (3 km) of the French coast on the MGBs and then transfer to the LCA for the landing. Due to high seas and strong winds, which swamped and sank LCA 211, the raid was stopped with the loss of two naval ratings. The raid was remounted two nights later in calmer seas, but the period of optimum tide, moon, and darkness had past. The raid became uncoordinated, and whilst the commandos got ashore and began their mission, the boats with the regular infantry became lost. Soon a German E Boat was engaged by the MGBs. The army officers in the LCA conferred and decided not to disembark. Aboard the LCS, the senior naval officer's compass failed, and the flotilla only returned to England steered by Lt. Groom's army compass.

In response to the dramatic Japanese advances in early 1942, Combined Operations landing craft were shipped to the Indian Ocean for Operation Ironclad, the invasion of the Vichy French colony of Madagascar on 5 May. Following the assault, it was intended that the craft would be sent on to India and Burma. The initial target was the naval base at Diégo Suarez. The harbor entrance faced east and was well defended with gun batteries, but a neck of land wide separated Diégo Suarez from good landing beaches, in Courrier Bay and Ambararata Bay, on the northwest coast. The Joint Planners decided in favour of these western beaches as opposed to a direct approach. This decision had a definite effect on the employment of the LCAs. Despite the advantages of the western approach the LCAs and other vessels would have to contend with rocks, reefs, and mines.

Ironclad was Britain's longest range amphibious operation of the war. The landing ships were the LSIs HMS Winchester Castle with 14 LCAs, HMS Royal Ulsterman, Keren, and Karanja each carrying 6 LCAs, Sobieski with LCP(L)s, RFA Derwentdale carrying 15 LCM(Mk. 1)s to land tanks and other vehicles, and HMS Bachaquero, the world's first operational LST. Few could sleep between supper and midnight 4 May because of the turgid tropical heat and the noise from preparing the LCAs. Across the boat decks of the LSIs, all sorts of stores were being manhandled into the LCAs. Because of the long journeys which the landing craft had to make from the parent ships to the landing beaches in Courrier Bay and Ambararata Bay, the landing craft crews ate breakfast at midnight on 4/5 May. At 02:00 the convoy had reached the outer anchorage, and the minesweepers were clearing the 8 mile (13 km) lanes to the main anchorage. The five blacked out LSIs sailed towards the coast proceeding slowly in line ahead. The assault troops gathered by platoon at their assigned gangways and clambered into the LCAs. Orders were given to lower all assault craft to within 6 feet (2 m) of the waterline. The electric motors of ships' davits accomplished this with soldiers (and vehicles, in the case of LCMs) aboard. Each LSI could just see the faint outline of the nearest ship ahead, as the convoy furtively sailed forwards. Navigation marker lights appeared marking the swept channel. The night was silent save the low throb of ships' engines, the churning of water, and the explosion of two swept mines (one at 03:00 and the other at 03:15). At 04:30, the Royal Ulstermans LCA touched down at the base of a 50 feet (15 m) cliff, which the commandos then proceeded to scale achieving complete surprise over the two Vichy gun crews. The landings in Courrier Bay were designated Red North, Red Centre, Red South, and in addition to No. 5 Commando, LCAs also landed a company of the East Lancashire Regiment. A small force of corvettes proceeded the LCAs to their landing beaches in Ambararata Bay, sweeping mines clear and placing navigational lights to mark safe passage through the rocks, enabling the flotillas to land 29th Brigade without casualties. But by this time, no one thought to delay operations for better weather. Thus, LCAs were required to make long and frequent journeys from ship to shore with supplies and reinforcements in worsening sea conditions. Originally, the Joint Planners had limited Ironclad to the capture of Diego Suarez, after which the LCAs and other amphibious assets would travel on to India. With the naval base now in British control the Admiralty gave orders 16 May that further operations in Madagascar were to be abandoned. The ships and craft assembled for Ironclad were assigned to other pressing duties. However, South African prime minister Smuts insisted on further Madagascan ports being captured. This, along with a Vichy decision to fight on, kept LCAs employed in Madagascar through the end of September.

On 10 September, LCAs landed the lead elements of the 29th Brigade at Majunga, in north western Madagascar, to re launch offensive operations ahead of the rainy season. Though zero hour was supposed to be before dawn some of the landing craft broke down. The landings took place later in the day without the cover of darkness. As machine guns began firing on the landing craft, the support vessels fired on the shore providing cover to the assaulting troops, who suffered casualties as they stormed the quayside. During the Madagascar operations it became obvious that the LCA design was not ideal for utility and supply purposes and future expeditions were allotted more LCMs and LCVs. LCAs were used in additional landings during the campaign before Madagascar surrendered in September.

Sixty LCAs were involved in Operation Jubilee at Dieppe in August and carried the assault infantry of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, A Commando Royal Marines, and No. 4 Commando. Eight LCS(M)(Mk I)s were among the fire support craft. The plan for this large scale raid was for the force to stay ashore for two tides and re embark on the rising tide before dark. The operation included landings on beaches designated (west to east) Orange, Green, White, Red, Blue, and Yellow. Until Dieppe, LCAs had only been used in small numbers. The part of the naval plan, 'Outline for Operation' (JNO 1), for the Dieppe Raid that involved LCAs, and other minor landing craft, was much more complicated than any previous combined operations plan. In all other sizable raids beforehand coxswains had groped in the darkness and spent extra time while finding the correct landing beaches. Now a large number of flotillas of various landing craft types needed to coordinate their activities. The endless working up practices and landing exercises carried out prior to the Dieppe assault were not confined to training infantry; they were also designed to shake down the crews of the landing craft flotillas. This was necessary because officers and ratings with LCA experience were not left idle after operations, but were reassigned to other pressing duties throughout the Navy. This massive raid required more trained crews and more flotilla coordination. The few experienced LCA hands available had to be supplemented by dozens of new crewmen collected by the RNVR. These had to learn how to approach a beach, ground on it, disembark troops, ease off the beach, and remain off shore within instant call, ready to come when necessary. In the Jubilee plan, the LCAs for 2nd Division were to touch down just before dawn. The lowering point for the landing ships was 10 mile (16 km) from the shore. Here too was an added complication, because naval planners wished to avoid the danger of flotillas colliding, becoming mixed together and confused. Therefore, zero hour was to be half an hour later for the inner than the outer beaches. At about 03:00 the LCAs were to be lowered from their landing ships. Once the LCAs were away, the ships would then sail back to England. The LCAs would make the two hour journey to the shore. On 19 August, Nautical Twilight was 04:31 and sunrise 05:50. The four outer landings would touch down at 04:50 and the two inner flotillas of LCAs would touch down half an hour later. After disembarking their troops the LCAs, along with other landing craft types, were to withdraw away from the coast a few miles to an area protected by a smoke screen designated as the "boat pool." Here the landing craft would wait until ordered to re embark the assault force at the end of the operation. The LCAs were to make their own way back. Despite the plan, the raid soon began to go wrong. At 03:47, while approximately seven miles from the French coast, the 1st and 24th Flotillas (LCP(L)), some craft crewed by RCNVR, carrying No. 3 Commando, were illuminated by star shells fired from a group of German armed trawlers. The element of surprise was lost.

The first amphibious craft of the Navy of the Federal Republic of Germany were 10 LCAs obtained from Britain in October 1958. These boats were viewed as well built by the German Navy, and were fitted with a machine gun and carried 25 soldiers. Though well regarded, they were small for the tactical plans of the time and sometime about 1967 they were retired. Perhaps the last operational use of LCAs by the Royal Navy was in 1967 when boats from supported operations in Aden; an LCA being the last craft to carry British personnel away from Aden.