Austrian Army during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

The Imperial Royal or Imperial Austrian Army (Kaiserlich königliche Armee, abbreviated k. k. Armee) was the armed force of the Habsburg monarchy under its last monarch, the Habsburg Emperor Francis II, composed of the Emperor's army. When the Holy Roman Empire was dissolved in 1806, it assumed its title of the troops of the Austrian Empire under the same monarch, now known as Emperor Francis I of Austria.

The name "Imperial Royal Army" was used from 1745, as "Imperial" referred until 1804 to the Holy Roman Empire and from 1804 1867 to the Austrian Empire. "Royal" referred to the Kingdom of Bohemia (not to be confused with "Imperial and Royal" used after 1867 where "Royal" referred to the Kingdom of Hungary). The key feature of the Austrian Army during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815) was that, due to the multi national nature of the territories, regiments were split into German units (which included Czech troops recruited from Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, Polish and Ruthenian units recruited from the territory of Galicia, Flemings and Walloons from the territory of the former Austrian Netherlands, and Italians) and Hungarian units (which included troops from Croatia, Serbia and Transylvania). Conscription resulted in elements of untrained men in every battalion, a problem exacerbated by incoherent training across the regions. The army was beset by constant government frugality and several reorganisations. A Militär Hof Commission sat for six years from 1795 (known as the Nostitz Rieneck commission and from 1798, Unterberger) to overhaul the kit, producing the simpler 1798 pattern uniform, the famous crested helmet and a standard musket, copied from the French 1777 pattern. Although some regiments were disbanded in 1809 following the loss of their recruiting grounds, others were allocated new areas yet kept their old designations; for example, the Walloon regiments whose recruiting areas were transferred to Galicia. Key victories over the French were won at Neerwinden, Würzburg, Stockach, Caldiero, Aspern Essling and Leipzig, while major defeats were suffered at Jemappes, Fleurus, Rivoli, Marengo, Hohenlinden, Ulm, Austerlitz and Wagram. The most powerful individual in the Imperial Austrian Army during the period was Archduke Charles, who implemented wide ranging and modernising reforms, particularly following the crushing defeat at Austerlitz. Charles was responsible for the severe check Napoleon suffered at the Battle of Aspern Essling, but after the subsequent defeat at Wagram retired from active command. The Austrian Army also played a significant role in the Neapolitan War of 1815 by defeating Murat's regime, and beat a vastly bigger Neapolitan army at the Battle of Tolentino.

In a great irony of history, it was the French attaché to the Austrian court, Montazet, whose memorandum was used by Count Leopold Joseph von Daun in January 1758 in a letter to the Empress Maria Theresa to press for a more important role for the Generalquartiermeister (Chief of Staff). The failures in the army, especially at the Battle of Leuthen made it clear that Austria had no “great brain” and the command needed to spread the workload to allow the commander in chief the time to consider the strategic picture. The 1757 regulations had created the Grosse Feldgeneralstab and Kleine Generalstab and after changes in 1769, a permanent staff of 30 officers was established under the director, Franz Moritz von Lacy, which would be expanded in wartime with junior officers. The Grosse staff was divided into three: First, the intrinsecum, which handled internal administration and directing operations; secondly, external activities, including the pioneers; thirdly, the inspection service, which handled the issuing of orders and prisoners of war. Alongside the general staff was the general adjutant, who led a group of adjutant staff selected by the army commanders to handle the details of internal administration and collating intelligence, and answered to the commander in chief. The Chief of Staff became the chief adviser to the commander in chief and, in a fundamental move away from the previous administrative role, the chief of staff now undertook operational planning, while delegating the routine work to his senior staff officers. Staff officers were drawn from line units and would later return to them, the intention being that they would prove themselves as leaders during their time with the staff. In a battle or when the army had detached corps, a small number of staff would be allocated to the column commander as a smaller version of headquarters. The senior man, usually a major, would be the chief of the column staff and his principal task would be to help the commander to understand what was intended. When Karl Mack von Leiberich became chief of staff of the army under Prince Josias of Saxe Coburg Saalfeld in the Netherlands, he issued the Instruktionspunkte fur die gesamte Herren Generals, the last of 19 points setting out the roles of staff officers, dealing with offensive and defensive operations, while helping the commander in chief. In 1796, Archduke Charles, Duke of Teschen augmented these with his own Observationspunkte, writing of the chief of staff: “he is duty bound to consider all possibilities related to operations and not view himself as merely carrying out those instructions”. On 20 March 1801, Feldmarschalleutnant Peter Duka von Kadar became the world's first peacetime Generalquartiermeister at the head of the staff and the wartime role of the chief of staff was now focused on planning and operations to assist the commander. Archduke Charles, Duke of Teschen himself produced a new Dienstvorschrift on 1 September 1805, which divided the staff into three; 1) political correspondence; 2) the operations directorate, dealing with planning and intelligence; 3) the service directorate, dealing with administration, supply and military justice. The Archduke set out the position of a modern chief of staff: “The chief of staff stands at the side of the commander in chief and is completely at his disposal. His sphere of work connects him with no specific unit”. “The commander in chief decides what should happen and how; his chief assistant works out these decisions, so that each subordinate understands his allotted task”. With the creation of the korps in 1809, each had a staff, whose chief was responsible for directing operations and executing the overall headquarters plan. The staff on the outbreak of war in 1809 numbered over 170. Finally in 1811, Joseph Radetzky von Radetz produced his Uber die bessere Einrichtung des Generalstabs, which prioritised the chief of staff's managerial and supervisory role with the departments (political correspondence, operations and service) under their own directors, effectively merging the adjutants and general staff officers. In this system lay the beginnings of a formal staff corps, whose members could specialise in operations, intelligence and logistics.

Recruitment in the German areas was by voluntary enlistment and a scheme of conscription, which was for lifetime service before 1802, ten years thereafter. All able bodied men between 17 and 40 were liable, although the many exemptions for the nobility, skilled trades, most townsfolk and married men, meant the bulk were drawn from the younger sons of rural peasants and the urban proletariat. Recruits for Hungarian regiments were organised by the Diet of Hungary by quotas in each county. Each regiment had its own zone of recruitment within the Empire. The only exception to this was the Poles of Galicia, who were initially recruited in Aushilfsbezirke (supplementary recruitment districts, before being organised into proper recruitment districts from 1808).

All regiments had an honorary colonel in chief, the 'Inhaber', whose title the regiment bore, but he only exercised a formal authority to confirm the appointment of junior officers within that regiment. Contrary to French revolutionary propaganda that Austrian officers were largely from the lesser aristocracy, most officers were recruited as cadets or appointed from within the regiments.

At the outset of war in 1793, the army numbered fifty seven line regiments, including two grenadier companies each. Seventeen Grenzer light infantry regiments, three garrison regiments and the Stabs Infanterie Regiment for HQ duties. In addition, irregular Frei Corps light infantry battalions were raised in wartime.

From 1768 until 1805, a line regiment typically consisted of two field battalions – Leib and Oberst battalions – each of six fusilier companies; also, a grenadier division of two companies, which were normally detached to form composite grenadier battalions with those of two other regiments. In addition, it included one garrison battalion (Oberstleutnant – Battalion) composed of four companies which served as a source for reserves at the regiment depot. The established strength of a 'German' line regiment in theory was 4,575 men, though this number was rarely above 2–3,000, especially in peacetime. With three battalions, 'Hungarian' regiments had a nominal strength of 5,508.

The Grenzers formed the basis of the light infantry. In 1808, IR64 was broken up and its nine divisions formed the rifle armed cadre divisions (two companies), which were each augmented by two divisions of carbine armed troops to form the nine new Jäger battalions.