Америка Азамат Соғысындағы Прайс экспедициясы

Military campaign during the American Civil War

Price's Missouri Expedition (August 29 – December 2, 1864), also known as Price's Raid or Price's Missouri Raid, was an unsuccessful Confederate cavalry raid through Arkansas, Missouri, and Kansas in the Trans Mississippi Theater of the American Civil War. Led by Confederate Major General Sterling Price, the campaign aimed to recapture Missouri and renew the Confederate initiative in the larger conflict. Despite several early victories, Price was ultimately defeated at the Battle of Westport by Union forces under Major General Samuel R. Curtis in late October. He suffered further reverses at the hands of Union cavalry under Major General Alfred Pleasonton at the Battle of Mine Creek, Kansas, forcing him to retreat back into Arkansas. Price's Missouri Expedition proved to be the last significant Southern operation west of the Mississippi River. Its failure bolstered confidence in an ultimate Union victory in the war, thereby contributing to President Abraham Lincoln's re election. It also cemented Federal control over the hotly contested border state of Missouri.

After three years of bloody fighting, Confederate authorities were becoming desperate as the U. S. presidential election approached during the fall of 1864. The Union controlled the key western rivers and cities, Sherman was moving through Georgia, and Lee was tied down to the defense of Richmond. With foreign recognition now hopeless, Abraham Lincoln's re election would be disastrous for their cause. Earlier that summer, the Confederacy had ordered General E. Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans Mississippi Department, to send a corps under Lieutenant General Richard Taylor across the Mississippi River to assist in the defense of Atlanta and Mobile. Such a crossing was impossible because of Union gunboat patrols on the river and Taylor was assigned to other duties. Inspired by preparations to divert Union attention from Taylor's crossing, Smith came up with another plan. He would recapture Missouri for the Confederacy, in the hope that it would help turn Northern opinion against Lincoln. He ordered Missouri native Sterling Price to invade his home state and advance on St. Louis, capturing the city and its military arsenals. If St. Louis was too heavily defended, Price was to turn west and capture Jefferson City, the state capital. Price was then told to cross into Kansas and turn south through the Indian Territory, "sweeping that country of its mules, horses, cattle, and military supplies".

Hoping to avoid Fort Smith, Arkansas, Price swung west into the Indian Territory and Texas before returning to Arkansas on December 2. He had lost more than half of his original force of 12,000, including thousands of the guerrillas who joined him. He reported to Kirby Smith that he "marched 1434 mile (2308 km), fought 43 battles and skirmishes, captured and paroled over 3,000 Federal officers and men, captured 18 pieces of artillery and destroyed Missouri property of $10,000,000 in value." Nevertheless, Price's Missouri Expedition was a total failure and contributed, together with Union successes in Virginia and Georgia, to the re election of President Lincoln. A second unintended consequence of Price's Missouri Expedition was that it had largely cleared Missouri of the pro Confederate guerrillas who belonged to no one's army, since almost all of those who had joined him were either killed or followed him out of the state. Price's Missouri Expedition proved to be the final Confederate offensive in the Trans Mississippi region during the war.

In his 2004 paper Assessing Compound Warfare During Price's Raid, written as a thesis for the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Major Dale E. Davis postulates that Price's Missouri Expedition failed primarily due to his inability to properly employ the principles of "compound warfare." This requires an inferior power to effectively use regular and irregular forces in concert (as was done by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong against the French and Americans during the Vietnam War) to defeat a superior army. He also blames Price's slow rate of movement during his campaign, and the close proximity of Confederate irregulars to his regular force, for this outcome. Major Davis observes that by wasting valuable time, ammunition and men in fairly meaningless assaults on Fort Davidson, Glasgow, Sedalia and Boonville, Price gave Union General Rosecrans time to organize an effective response he might not otherwise have had. Furthermore, he says, Price's insistence on guarding an ever growing wagon train of looted military supplies and other items ultimately became "an albatross to [his] withdrawal." Price, wrote Davis, ought to have used Confederate bushwhackers to harass Federal formations, forcing his Union foe to send large numbers of troops out to pursue them over wide ranges of territory. This would have reduced the number of effectives available to fight against Price's main force. Instead, Price kept many guerrillas close to his army and even incorporated some into his ranks, which sharply reduced the value of their mobility and small, independent formations. This allowed the Federal generals to concentrate a force large enough to trap and defeat Price at Westport, which ended his campaign, forced him to retreat, and crushed one of the Confederacy's last hopes in the Civil War.