Суреттер арқылы барлау өнері

Intelligence gathered by means of imagery

Imagery intelligence (IMINT), pronounced as either as Im Int or I Mint, is an intelligence gathering discipline wherein imagery is analyzed (or "exploited") to identify information of intelligence value. Imagery used for defense intelligence purposes is generally collected via satellite imagery or aerial photography. As an intelligence gathering discipline, IMINT production depends heavily upon a robust intelligence collection management system. IMINT is complemented by non imaging MASINT electro optical and radar sensors.

Although aerial photography was first used extensively in the First World War, it was only in the Second World War that specialized imagery intelligence operations were initiated. High quality images were made possible with a series of innovations in the decade leading up to the war. In 1928, the RAF developed an electric heating system for the aerial camera. This allowed reconnaissance aircraft to take pictures from very high altitudes without the camera parts freezing. In 1939, Sidney Cotton and Flying Officer Maurice Longbottom of the RAF suggested that airborne reconnaissance may be a task better suited to fast, small aircraft which would use their speed and high service ceiling to avoid detection and interception. They proposed the use of Spitfires with their armament and radios removed and replaced with extra fuel and cameras. This led to the development of the Spitfire PR variants. These planes had a maximum speed of 396 mph at 30,000 feet with their armaments removed, and were used for photo reconnaissance missions. The aircraft were fitted with five cameras which were heated to ensure good results. The systematic collection and interpretation of the huge amounts of aerial reconnaissance intelligence data soon became imperative. Beginning in 1941, RAF Medmenham was the main interpretation centre for photographic reconnaissance operations in the European and Mediterranean theatres. The Central Interpretation Unit (CIU) was later amalgamated with the Bomber Command Damage Assessment Section and the Night Photographic Interpretation Section of No 3 Photographic Reconnaissance Unit, RAF Oakington, in 1942. During 1942 and 1943, the CIU gradually expanded and was involved in the planning stages of practically every operation of the war, and in every aspect of intelligence. In 1945, daily intake of material averaged 25,000 negatives and 60,000 prints. Thirty six million prints were made during the war. By VE day, the print library, which documented and stored worldwide cover, held 5,000,000 prints from which 40,000 reports had been produced. According to R. V. Jones, photographs were used to establish the size and the characteristic launching mechanisms for both the V 1 flying bomb and the V 2 rocket.

Immediately after World War II, long range aerial reconnaissance was taken up by adapted jet bombers – such as the English Electric Canberra, and its American development, the Martin B 57 – capable of flying higher or faster than the enemy. Highly specialized and secretive strategic reconnaissance aircraft, or spy planes, such as the Lockheed U 2 and its successor, the SR 71 Blackbird were developed by the United States. Flying these aircraft became an exceptionally demanding task, as much because of the aircraft's extreme speed and altitude as the risk of being captured as spies. As a result, the crews of these aircraft were invariably specially selected and trained. There are claims that the US constructed a hypersonic reconnaissance aircraft, dubbed the Aurora, in the late 1980s to replace the Blackbird. Since the early 1960s, in the United States aerial and satellite reconnaissance has been coordinated by the National Reconnaissance Office.

Early photographic reconnaissance satellites used photographic film, which was exposed on orbit and returned to earth for developing. These satellites remained in orbit for days, weeks, or months before ejecting their film return vehicles, called "buckets." Between 1959 and 1984 the U. S. launched around 200 such satellites under the codenames CORONA and GAMBIT, with ultimate photographic resolution (ground resolution distance) better than The first successful mission concluded on 1960 08 19 with the mid air recovery by a C 119 of film from the Corona mission code named Discoverer 14. This was the first successful recovery of film from an orbiting satellite and the first aerial recovery of an object returning from Earth orbit. Because of a tradeoff between area covered and ground resolution, not all reconnaissance satellites have been designed for high resolution; the KH 5 ARGON program had a ground resolution of 140 meters and was intended for mapmaking. Between 1961 and 1994 the USSR launched perhaps 500 Zenit film return satellites, which returned both the film and the camera to earth in a pressurized capsule. The U. S. KH 11 series of satellites, first launched in 1976, was made by Lockheed, the same contractor who built the Hubble Space Telescope. HST has a 2.4 metre telescope mirror and is believed to have had a similar appearance to the KH 11 satellites. These satellites used charge coupled devices, predecessors to modern digital cameras, rather than film. Russian reconnaissance satellites with comparable capabilities are named Resurs DK and Persona.

Low and high flying planes have been used all through the last century to gather intelligence about the enemy. U. S. high flying reconnaissance planes include the Lockheed U 2, and the much faster SR 71 Blackbird, (retired in 1998). One advantage planes have over satellites is that planes can usually produce more detailed photographs and can be placed over the target more quickly, more often, and more cheaply, but planes also have the disadvantage of possibly being intercepted by aircraft or missiles such as in the 1960 U 2 incident. Unmanned aerial vehicles have been developed for imagery and signals intelligence. These drones are a force multiplier by giving the battlefield commander an "eye in the sky" without risking a pilot.

The value of IMINT reports are determined on a balance between the timeliness and robustness of the intelligence product. As such, the fidelity of intelligence that may be gleaned from imagery analysis is a traditionally perceived by intelligence professionals as a function of the amount of time an imagery analyst (IA) has to exploit a given image or set of imagery. As such, the United States Army field manual breaks IMINT analysis into three distinct phases, based upon the amount of time expended in exploiting any given image.

First phase imagery analysis is deemed "time dominant." This means that given imagery must be rapidly exploited in order to satisfy an immediate requirement for imagery sourced intelligence from which a leader may make an educated political and/or military decision. Due to the need to produce near real time intelligence assessments based upon collected imagery, first phase imagery analysis is rarely compared to collateral intelligence.

Second phase imagery analysis is centered on the further exploitation of recently collected imagery to support short to mid term decision making. Like first phase imagery analysis, second phase imagery analysis is generally catalyzed by a local commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements, at least in the context of a military operational setting. Whereas first phase imagery analysis may depend on the exploitation of a relatively small repository of imagery, or even a single image, second phase imagery analysis generally mandates a review of a chronological set of imagery over time, so as to establish a temporal understanding of objects and/or activities of interest.

Third phase imagery analysis is generally conducted in order to satisfy strategic intelligence questions or to otherwise explore existing data in the search of "discovery intelligence." Third phase imagery analysis hinges on the use of a large repository of historical imagery as well as access to a variety of sources of information. Third phase imagery analysis incorporates supporting information and intelligence from other intelligence gathering disciplines and is, therefore, generally conducted in support of a multi source intelligence team. The exploitation of imagery at this level of analysis is typically conducted with the intention of producing Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT).