1967-1970 жылдар аралығындағы Израиль-Египет соғысы

1967–70 war between Israel and Egypt
the 1967–70 war between Israel and Egypt

The War of Attrition (حرب الاستنزاف; מלחמת ההתשה) involved fighting between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and their allies from 1967 to 1970. Following the 1967 Six Day War, no serious diplomatic efforts were made to resolve the issues at the heart of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The 1967 Arab League summit formulated in September the "three no's" policy, barring peace, recognition, or negotiations with Israel. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser believed that only military initiative would compel Israel or the international community to facilitate a full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, and hostilities soon resumed along the Suez Canal. These initially took the form of limited artillery duels and small scale incursions into Sinai, but by 1969, the Egyptian Army judged itself prepared for larger scale operations. On March 8, 1969, Nasser proclaimed the official launch of the War of Attrition, characterized by large scale shelling along the Suez Canal, extensive aerial warfare and commando raids. Hostilities continued until August 1970 and ended with a ceasefire. The frontiers remained the same as when the war began, with no real commitment to serious peace negotiations.

Israel's victory in the Six Day War left the entirety of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula up to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal under Israeli control. Egypt was determined to regain Sinai, and also sought to mitigate the severity of its defeat. Sporadic clashes were taking place along the cease fire line, and Egyptian missile boats sank the Israeli destroyer INS Eilat on October 21 of the same year. Egypt began shelling Israeli positions along the Bar Lev Line, using heavy artillery, MiG aircraft and various other forms of Soviet assistance with the hope of forcing the Israeli government into concessions. Israel responded with aerial bombardments, airborne raids on Egyptian military positions, and aerial strikes against strategic facilities in Egypt. The strategic bombing of Egypt had mixed military and political results. The international community and both countries attempted to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The Jarring Mission of the United Nations was supposed to ensure that the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 242 would be observed, but by late 1970, it was clear that this mission had been a failure. Fearing the escalation of the conflict into an "East vs. West" confrontation during the tensions of the mid Cold War, the American president, Richard Nixon, sent his Secretary of State, William Rogers, to formulate the Rogers Plan in view of obtaining a ceasefire. In August 1970, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt agreed to an "in place" ceasefire under the terms proposed by the Rogers Plan. The plan contained restrictions on missile deployment by both sides, and required the cessation of raids as a precondition for peace. The Egyptians and their Soviet allies rekindled the conflict by violating the agreement shortly thereafter, moving their missiles near to the Suez Canal, and constructing the largest anti aircraft system yet implemented at that point in history. The Israelis responded with a policy which their Prime Minister, Golda Meir, dubbed "asymmetrical response", wherein Israeli retaliation was disproportionately large in comparison to any Egyptian attacks. However, another source claims that an Israeli attack on Port Fuad was repulsed. July 2, 1967: The Israeli Air Force bombs Egyptian artillery positions that had supported the commandos at Ras Al 'Ish. July 4, 1967: Egyptian Air Force jets strike several Israeli targets in Sinai. An Egyptian MiG 17 is shot down. July 8, 1967: An Egyptian Air Force MiG 21 is shot down by Israeli air defenses while on a reconnaissance mission over el Qanatra. Two Su 7s equipped with cameras are then sent out to carry out the mission, and manage to complete several turns over Sinai without any opposition. Two other Su 7s are sent for another reconnaissance mission hours later, but are attacked by Israeli Air Force fighter jets. One Su 7 is shot down. July 14, 1967: Artillery exchanges and aerial duels erupt near the Suez Canal. Seven Egyptian fighter aircraft are shot down. July 15, 1967: An Israeli Air Force Mirage III is shot down by an Egyptian MiG 21. October 21, 1967: Two missile boats from the Egyptian Navy sink the Israeli destroyer INS Eilat with anti ship missiles, killing 47 sailors.

January 31, 1968: Five Israeli soldiers were wounded and one Israeli and two Egyptian tanks were destroyed in a clash in the canal zone. Israeli and Jordanian forces also exchanged fire without known casualties. March 21, 1968: In response to persistent PLO raids against Israeli civilian targets, Israel attacks the town of Karameh, Jordan, the site of a major PLO camp. The goal of the invasion was to destroy Karameh camp and capture Yasser Arafat in reprisal for the attacks by the PLO against Israeli civilians, which culminated in an Israeli school bus hitting a mine in the Negev. However, plans for the two operations were prepared in 1967, one year before the bus incident. When Jordan saw the size of the raiding forces entering the battle it was led to the assumption that Israel had another goal of capturing Balqa Governorate to create a situation similar to the Golan Heights. Israel assumed that the Jordanian Army would ignore the invasion, but the latter fought alongside the Palestinians and opened heavy fire that inflicted losses upon the Israeli forces. This engagement marked the first known deployment of suicide bombers by Palestinian forces. The Israelis were repelled at the end of a day's battle, having destroyed most of the Karameh camp and taken around 141 PLO prisoners. Both sides declared victory. On a tactical level, the battle went in Israel's favor, and the destruction of the Karameh camp was achieved. However, the relatively high casualties were a considerable surprise for the IDF and was stunning to the Israelis. June 1968: The war "officially" begins, with sparse Egyptian artillery bombardment of the Israeli front line on the east bank of the Suez Canal. More artillery bombardments in the following months cause Israeli casualties. September 8, 1968: An Egyptian artillery barrage kills 10 Israeli soldiers and injures 18. Israel responds by shelling Suez and Ismailia. November 3, 1968: Egyptian MiG 17s attack Israeli positions, and are met by Israeli interceptors. One Israeli plane is damaged. September 9, 1969: Operation Raviv – Israeli forces raided Egypt's Red Sea coast. The raid was preceded by Operation Escort, with Shayetet 13 naval commandos infiltrating the Egyptian Navy anchorage at Ras Sadat with Maiale manned torpedoes and sinking a pair of Egyptian torpedo boats with limpet mines to prevent them from interfering with the operation. As they made their getaway, the self destruct mechanism on one of the Maiales accidentally detonated. Three Israeli Navy landing craft then landed the raiding force on the coast, with the Israelis wearing Egyptian uniforms and using captured Arab T 55 tanks and BTR 50 armored personnel carriers painted in Egyptian colors. The Israeli force, backed by air support, destroyed 12 Egyptian military outposts. Israeli A 4 Skyhawks backing up the operation attacked an Egyptian radar site, during which one of the Skyhawks was shot down. After nine hours of operating unhindered in enemy territory, the raiding force withdrew and rendezvoused with the landing craft and returned to Israeli held territory in the Sinai, having suffered only one light injury during the mission. The Egyptians suffered 100–200 casualties. Two Soviet military advisors including a colonel were killed. September 11, 1969: Sixteen Egyptian aircraft carry out a strike mission. Eight MiGs are shot down by Israeli Mirages and a further three Su 7s are lost to Israeli anti aircraft artillery and HAWK surface to air missiles. October 17, 1969: The United States and Soviet Union begin diplomatic talks to end the conflict. October 27, 1969: Over the previous days, air and artillery duels took place in the canal zone. One Israeli soldier was killed and ten wounded in a surprise Egyptian air attack. One Egyptian MiG 17 was shot down by an Israeli Hawk missile. Israeli aircraft also raided Egyptian positions along the canal. On the Jordanian front, one Israeli soldier was killed and two wounded in the Beisan valley in mortar attacks from Jordan. Four Arab guerrillas were killed in a clash with an Israeli patrol along the Jordan River and Israeli jets attacked Arab guerrilla positions in Jordan, striking targets in the suburbs of Amman. December 9, 1969: Egyptian aircraft, with the assistance of newly delivered P 15 radars, defeat the Israelis in an aerial engagement, shooting down two Israeli Mirages. Later in the evening, an Egyptian fighter flown by Lt. Ahmed Atef shot down an Israeli F 4 Phantom II, making him the first Egyptian pilot to shoot down an F 4 in combat. The same day, the Rogers Plan is publicized. It calls for Egyptian "commitment to peace" in exchange for the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Both parties strongly reject the plan. Nasser forestalled any movement toward direct negotiations with Israel. In dozens of speeches and statements, Nasser posited the equation that any direct peace talks with Israel were tantamount to surrender. President Nasser instead opts to plead for more sophisticated weaponry from the Soviet Union to withstand the Israeli bombings. The Soviets initially refuse to deliver the requested weapons. December 26–27, 1969: Israel launches Operation Rooster 53. As Israeli aircraft attack Egyptian positions along the canal, Israeli paratroopers ferried by Super Frelon helicopters, which use the noise of the air attacks as cover, land at Ras Ghareb and capture an Egyptian P 12 radar facility, overwhelming its light security contingent. Two Egyptian personnel are killed and four captured. The paratroopers then take apart the radar, with the radar's pieces being ferried away by two Israeli Sikorsky CH 53 Sea Stallion helicopters. The operation enabled Israeli and American learning of the latest Soiviet radar technology, and caused a huge morale impact on the Egyptians.

January 7, 1970: Israel launched Operation Priha, a series of air raids against military targets in the Egyptian heartland, as far as 100 miles from the canal. A total of 118 sorties were ultimately undertaken between January 7 and April 13. Also on January 7, a Soviet adviser to an Egyptian infantry brigade was killed in an Israeli attack. January 12, 1970: Two Egyptian Sukhoi Su 7 fighters were shot down by Israeli Hawk missiles while attacking an Israeli base near Ras Sudar. Israel also reported that in the past days, Israeli forces killed 12 Arab guerrillas and captured four in a series of clashes in the Arabah region and Jordan Valley. January 22, 1970: With Egypt's air defense system having largely been devastated and the deep penetration bombing raids hitting further into Egypt, President Nasser secretly flew to Moscow to discuss the situation. His request for new SAM batteries (including the 2K12 Kub and Strela 2) was approved. Their deployment requires qualified personnel along with squadrons of aircraft to protect them. Thus, he needed Soviet military personnel in large numbers, something the Kremlin did not want to provide. Nasser then threatens to resign, implying that Egypt might turn to the United States for help in the future. The Soviets had invested heavily in President Nasser's regime, and so, the Soviet leader, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, finally obliged. The Soviet Union, which had already been increasing its military presence in Egypt from the summer of 1969 and deployed its first fighter jets in December of thar year, decided to greatly increase its military presence, deploying additional air defense units alongside fighter aircraft. The Soviet military intervention was codenamed Operation Kavkaz. The Soviet presence increased from 2,500 to 4,000 in January to 10,600–12,150 ground personnel plus 100–150 pilots by June 30. January 22, 1970: Operation Rhodes. Israeli paratroopers and naval commandos are transported by IAF Super Frelon helicopters to Shadwan Island where they capture the island and dismantle a British made Egyptian Decca radar and other military equipment for transport back to Israel before withdrawing. Meanwhile, Israeli fighter jets provide close air support and sink two Egyptian P 183 torpedo boats approaching the island. An estimated 70 Egyptian soldiers were killed and 62 more were taken prisoner while the Israelis lost 3 killed and 7 wounded. January 26, 1970: Israeli aircraft attacked an Egyptian auxiliary ship in the Gulf of Suez, damaging it and causing it to ground on a reef. January 28, 1970: Israeli bombing was reported to have killed six Soviet personnel, three in an attack on a building in a suburb of Cairo that housed Soviet advisors and three in a SAM complex at Dashur. Two months later, US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger told Israeli ambassador to the US Yitzhak Rabin that 40 Soviet personnel had been killed in the bombing at Dashur. February 1970: Two Israeli auxiliary vessels were sabotaged by Egyptian frogmen in Eilat harbor. A supply ship sank while a coastal landing craft sustained damage but was beached by its crew before sinking. There were no casualties. In response, Israeli warplanes sank an Egyptian minelayer in the Gulf of Suez, carried out raids against Egyptian military positions in the canal zone, and struck two military targets deeper into Egyptian territory. Egyptian aircraft also raided Israeli positions along the Suez Canal, injuring three Israeli soldiers. Four days of fighting took place between Israeli and Syrian forces as well. Israeli fighter jets accidentally struck an industrial plant at Abu Zaabal, killing 80 workers. February 1970: An Egyptian commando platoon attempts to set up an ambush in the vicinity of the Mitla Pass but is discovered. The entire unit is either killed or captured. February 9, 1970: An air battle between Israeli and Egyptian warplanes takes place, with each side losing one plane. This incident put a definite end to Operation Priha, and the Israelis instead then concentrated on attacking Canal side installations. The respite gave the Egyptians time to reconstruct their SAM batteries closer to the canal. Soviet MiG fighters provided the necessary air cover. Soviet pilots also began approaching IAF aircraft during April 1970, but Israeli pilots were given orders not to engage these aircraft and break off whenever Soviet piloted MiGs appeared. April 1970: the Kuwaiti Armed Forces suffered their first Kuwaiti fatality on the Egyptian front. May 1970: An Israeli fishing boat was sunk by the Egyptian Navy, killing two of its crew. The Israeli Air Force launched a heavy series of bombing raids against Egyptian targets throughout the canal zone and shot down five Egyptian warplanes. Israeli aircraft sank an Egyptian destroyer and minelayer. Two Israeli soldiers were killed by Egyptian shelling and a civilian Israeli frogman was also killed by explosives planted by Egyptian frogmen while removing underwater wreckage at the port of Eilat. During the final days of the month, the IAF launched major air raids against Port Said, believing a large amphibious force is assembling in the town. On the 16th an Israeli aircraft was shot down in air combat, probably by a MiG 21. May 3, 1970: Twenty one Palestinian guerrillas were killed by Israeli troops in the Jordan Valley. May 30, 1970: 15 Israeli soldiers were killed, 8 were wounded, and 2 were presumed captured on the same day in three separate ambushes. Israeli armored patrols were ambushed twice on the Suez Canal by Egyptian troops, resulting in 13 Israeli soldiers dead, 4 wounded, and 2 missing and presumed taken prisoner. In the Jordan Valley, north of Jericho, an army patrol was ambushed by Arab guerillas, resulting in 2 dead and 4 wounded. It was not known whether the clashes resulted in any Arab casualties. In response, Israeli warplanes launched a massive bombing campaign against the Port Said area. Soviet warships were present and some fired on the Israeli planes. Several Soviet naval personnel were killed when shrapnel from the bombing hit a Soviet warship. June 1970: An Israeli armored raid on Syrian military positions resulted in "hundreds of Syrian casualties." June 27, 1970: The EAF continued to launch air raids across the canal. On June 27 around eight Egyptian Su 7s and MiG 21s attacked Israeli rear areas in Sinai. According to Israel, two Egyptian aircraft were shot down. An Israeli Mirage was shot down, and the pilot was captured. June 1970: The Kuwaiti Armed Forces suffered sixteen fatalities on the Egyptian front. July 30, 1970: A large scale dogfight occurred between Israeli and Soviet aircraft, codenamed Rimon 20, involving 12 to 24 Soviet MiG 21s (besides the initial 12, other MiGs were "scrambled", but it is unclear if they reached the battle in time), and 12 Israeli Dassault Mirage IIIs and four F 4 Phantom II jets. The engagement took place west of the Suez Canal. After luring their opponents into an ambush, the Israelis shot down five of the Soviet MiGs. Four Soviet pilots were killed, while the IAF suffered no losses except a damaged Mirage. August 3, 1970: The Soviets responded by luring Israeli fighter jets into a counter ambush. Dummy missile batteries had been set up to lure Israeli fighter jets in while the real missiles were concealed. When the Israeli attack came, one Israeli F 4 Phantom was shot down and another was hit but managed to return to base. Early August, 1970: Despite their losses, the Soviets and Egyptians managed to press the air defenses closer to the canal. The batteries allowed the Egyptians to move in artillery which in turn threatened the Bar Lev Line. Following the Soviets' direct intervention, known as "Operation Kavkaz", Ze'ev Schiff notes that though Israel suffered losses, she was still able to preserve her military accomplishments of 1967 and that despite increased Soviet involvement, Israel had stood firm. Simon Dunstan wrote that Israel was successful in continuing to hold the Bar Lev Line and forcing the Egyptians to come to the negotiating table, although the war had sapped Israeli morale. However, he claimed that the war's conclusion "led to a dangerous complacency within the Israeli High Command about the resolve of the Egyptian armed forces and the strength of the Bar Lev Line" while the Egyptians saw the war as a great victory in spite of their heavy casualties and the mauling their air defenses had sustained, becoming confident in their ability to counter Israel's air power. Soviet born Israeli researcher Boris Dolin also considers the war to have been an Israeli defeat due to the effectiveness of Soviet SAM batteries against Israel's Phantom fleet: "Contrary to the official version, the ceasefire was not an Israeli victory over Egypt. Quite the opposite, it was an expression of Israeli defeat at the hands of an effective and determined Soviet force. Facing the crushing power of the Soviet Union, Israel could only display relatively limited capabilities. We found ourselves up against a giant, and without a real military solution." US diplomat David A. Korn, who served as political officer and chief of the political section at the US embassy in Tel Aviv during the war, considers the war to have ended in a stalemate, with no clear victor or vanquished on either side, but claimed that "this fact was poorly understood in Israel, where the war was retrospectively deemed a success for Israeli arms." He wrote that Israel's failure to acknowledge that the war was not an Israeli victory led it into a false sense of security, which resulted in opportunities for an interim peace with Egypt being neglected. However, he also claimed that it is a matter of speculation as to whether the Yom Kippur War could have been avoided had the outcome been analyzed more realistically by Israel and the United States. Howard Sachar notes that Israel accepted the ceasefire because it was clear that the war was developing into a Soviet Israeli confrontation, the Israeli military had taken significant casualties, and because the United States offered additional sales of F 4 Phantoms to induce Israel into accepting it, while Egypt accepted it because it was desperate for a break in the wake of its heavy casualties and the near depopulation of the cities in the canal zone. After Egypt violated the ceasefire by moving forward its SAM batteries, the United States offered additional F 4 Phantoms after Israel considered retaliation. Although the ceasefire was set to last three months, in practice it continued after that. Israeli military historian Yaniv Friedman claimed that Israel's aggressive policy in directly striking Soviet troops was a success, in that it helped persuade the Soviets to push for a ceasefire: "The Russians understood well that the conflict is not worth it. Humiliations, loss of prestige, and the understanding that just because Israel isn't currently revealing to the world that it shoots down Russians doesn't mean that it will always keep quiet. Further escalation could also bring the US into the theater, something that scared the Russians." He credited Israel with successfully asserting itself against a global power. According to Friedman, even though Israeli decision makers recognized the disparity in strength, the war involved a core Israeli national security interest while to the Soviet Union it was one theater among many. Chaim Herzog notes a slightly lower figure of just over 600 killed and some 2,000 wounded while Netanel Lorch states that 1,424 soldiers were killed in action between the period of June 15, 1967 and August 8, 1970. Avi Kober estimated Israel's total military and civilian dead at 726, of whom 367 were soldiers killed on the Egyptian front between June 1967 and August 1970 and 359 were soldiers and civilians killed along the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. and 26 Israeli aircraft were shot down. A Soviet estimate notes aircraft losses of 40. One destroyer, the INS Eilat, was sunk. As with the previous Arab–Israeli wars of 1956 and 1967, Arab losses far exceeded those of Israel, but precise figures are difficult to ascertain because official figures were never disclosed. The lowest estimate comes from the former Egyptian Army Chief of Staff, Saad el Shazly, who notes Egyptian casualties of 2,882 killed and 6,285 wounded. Historian Benny Morris states that a more realistic figure is somewhere on the scale of 10,000 soldiers and civilians killed. Ze'ev Schiff notes that at the height of the war, the Egyptians were losing some 300 soldiers daily and aerial reconnaissance photos revealed at least 1,801 freshly dug graves near the Canal zone during this period. Among Egypt's war dead was the Egyptian Army Chief of Staff, Abdul Munim Riad. In August 1970, the French newspaper Le Figaro reported that 100 Soviet military personnel had been killed in Egypt over the past year. Five Soviet MiG 21 aircraft were shot down in aerial combat during Operation Rimon 20.