Плотина Манантали: История дорогостоящего и проблемного проекта

The Manantali Dam (French: Barrage de Manantali) is a multi purpose dam on the Bafing river in the Senegal River basin, to the south east of Bafoulabé, in Mali's Kayes Region.

Early planning for the dam began in 1972 when the Organization for the Development of the Senegal River (Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal, or OMVS) was set up by Mali, Mauritania and Senegal to develop the agricultural and hydropower potential of the basin. The World Bank declined to fund the dam in 1979, considering it an unreasonable investment. However, financing was secured mainly from Europe and construction on the dam began in 1982. It was completed in 1988, but without the hydropower plant. In 1989 the Mauritania–Senegal Border War stopped all work on the project. A Swiss journalist who visited Manantali in 1988 described the project as a "luxury car without a motor". In 1993 Carl–Dieter Spranger, then Germany's minister for development assistance, called Manantali an "act of economic and environmental nonsense". When the conflict subsided in 1991 the OMVS sought a new loan package for the hydropower plant, which was finally put together in 1997. Citing "contractual difficulties in executing the contract", Eskom has entered into an agreement with SOGEM to terminate it as of 1 October 2011, according to the company's 2011 financial report.

The total cost of the dam, its associated hydropower plant, the deforestation of the future reservoir, studies and "complementary measures" was 1.02bn Euro. The construction cost of the related Diama Dam further downstream was an additional 50m Euro. The dam was jointly financed by 16 donors, including German (14%) and French (13%) development cooperation, the African Development Bank, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Nations Development Program. The three benefiting African countries also contributed to the financing. 64% of the foreign financing was through soft loans and 36% through grants. The European Community, the Islamic Development Bank, the West African Development Bank, and the Nordic Development Fund also contributed to the financing. The government of Norway had declined to finance the dam because of concerns about its health impact. A World Bank evaluation even calculated an economic rate of return of 12 to 24%. The plant load factor of the planned hydro power plant the expected electricity production divided by the potential production if the power plant was utilized permanently at full capacity, is 42% compared to 45 60% for other hydro power plants. However, these economic benefits did not translate into financial benefits for two reasons: First, bulk electricity tariffs were set at only about half of production costs (4.7 Euro Cents/kWh compared to 8.8 Cents). Second, the national power utilities of the three countries that buy the electricity in bulk regularly pay only about half their bills.

The dam has proved controversial for its displacement of 10,000 people from the flooded area, and for its environmental and health related impacts. In the irrigated areas the incidence of water borne diseases such as bilharzia increased substantially, while local fisheries declined sharply. The annual flood of the Senegal river had been the basis of flood recession agriculture, fishing, and cattle grazing. With the Manantali dam, the annual flood has been reduced to an artificial two–week flood. Traditionally, the Senegal river inundated about 150,000 hectares on average, and up to 350,000 hectares in high–flow years. In 1999,this was expected to be reduced to between 30,000 and 50,000 hectares in an average year, and much less in a dry year. It has been estimated that about 370,000 people had lived from flood recession agriculture in the Senegal river valley before the dam was built. Flood recession agriculture has now completely disappeared. Only a small share of the farmers affected was compensated with land irrigated from the Manantali reservoir.