Дальневосточные военно-воздушные силы США в начале Второй мировой войны.

The Far East Air Force (FEAF) was the military aviation organization of the United States Army in the Philippines just prior to and at the beginning of World War II. Formed on 16 November 1941, FEAF was the predecessor of the Fifth Air Force of the United States Army Air Forces and the United States Air Force. Initially the Far East Air Force also included aircraft and personnel of the Philippine Army Air Corps. Outnumbered operationally more than three to one by aircraft of the Japanese Navy and Army,

The FEAF, with only 16 Curtiss P 40s and 4 Seversky P 35 fighters remaining of its original combat force, was broken up as an air organization and moved by units into Bataan 24–25 December. 49 of the original 165 pursuit pilots of FEAF's 24th Pursuit Group were also evacuated during the campaign, but of non flying personnel, only one of 27 officers and 16 wounded enlisted men escaped the Philippines. Nearly all ground and flying personnel were employed as infantry at some point during their time on Bataan, where most surrendered on 9 April 1942. The surviving personnel and a small number of aircraft received from the United States were re organized in Australia in January 1942, and on 5 February 1942 redesignated as "5 Air Force". With most of its aircraft based in Java, the FEAF was nearly destroyed a second time trying to stem the tide of Japanese advances southward.

The Philippine Department Air Force was formed on 6 May 1941 as the War Department hastily reversed course and attempted to upgrade its air defenses in the Philippines. The general officer requested by Philippine Department head Maj. Gen. George Grunert arrived on 4 May in the person of Brig. Gen. Henry B. Clagett , who had just completed a three week air defense course taught at Mitchel Field, New York, to familiarize him with the concepts of integrating Signal Corps radars, radio communications, and interceptor forces. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall had also given Clagett a top secret mission to go to China in mid May for a month of observation and assessment of Japanese tactics. The PDAF's only major unit, the 4th Composite Group, consisted of five squadrons based at two grass fields: Clark and Nichols. A third airfield, Nielson Field, lacked facilities and was used primarily as an administrative strip for nearby Fort McKinley. An isolated sod auxiliary strip at Iba on the west coast was used for gunnery training. PDAF's materiel was centrally located in the Philippine Air Depot at Nichols Field, easily targeted from the air and highly inflammable. The only existing antiaircraft defenses were a single battery of four 3 inch gun M1903 guns and a searchlight platoon at Fort Wint at the entrance to Subic Bay, which would only be marginally reinforced in September. In May 1941 its aircraft situation was only marginally better than a year before: only 22 P 26 fighters, 12 "utterly obsolete, ancient, vulnerable as pumpkins" B 10s, the 56 P 35As diverted from the sale to Sweden, 18 Douglas B 18 Bolos still in crates after disassembly and shipment from the Hawaiian Department in March, several Douglas C 39 transports, and a small number of varied observation planes. Its only modern aircraft were 31 Curtiss P 40B fighters earmarked for the 20th Pursuit Squadron. Although delivered in mid May, they were not operational for lack of antifreeze engine coolant. Except for one small commercial firm in Manila, no oxygen producing plants existed in the Philippines, severely limiting the service ceiling of all aircraft, but particularly the fighters. Clagett immediately undertook an administrative "shakeup" of the existing organization. He marginalized Col. Harrison H. C. Richards, the Philippine Department Air Officer, relieved Col. Lawrence S. Churchill of command of the 4th Composite Group (but retained him in the position of base commander of Nichols Field), created new channels of command, and because of a lack of qualified staff officers, drew senior (but administratively untrained) officers from the squadrons to fill his staff. The last move further aggravated a problem created when experienced pilots of both the 17th and 20th squadrons had been transferred to augment the understrength 4th Group. A lack of cohesion and confidence in command resulted that continued into the war. Richards and Churchill both responded with "obstructionist tactics" that exacerbated the already poor command situation. In July, the P 40s finally became operational, but Nichols Field was then closed to replace its east west runway with one made of concrete, and to regrade the north south runway, both measures taken to correct drainage deficiencies that made the field virtually inoperable in the wet season May through October. On the morning of 2 July (ironically, delayed five days by a typhoon), all three fighter squadrons transferred the FEAF's 39 P 35s and 20 P 26s to Clark and Iba, where the 17th Pursuit Squadron moved for gunnery training. Construction of two new fields intended to support heavy bomber operations, at Rosales on the Lingayen Plain and Del Carmen near Clark Field, proceeded slowly. On 26 July 1941, Gen. Douglas MacArthur was recalled to active duty from retirement and the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) was created by the War Department to reorganize the defenses of the Philippines against a Japanese invasion. The PDAF was renamed Air Force, USAFFE on 4 August 1941, and incorporated into its ranks the newly inducted Philippine Army Air Corps on 15 August 1941. Its headquarters moved to Nielson Field, and although the move had been made to increase the urgency of expanding air capabilities, precious time had been lost that was never re gained.

In July 1941, Chief of the Army Air Forces, Major General Henry H. Arnold, allocated 340 heavy bombers (not yet manufactured) and 260 modern fighter planes for future reinforcement of the Far East Air Force. Work at Nichols continued slowly in the second half of the year, but the 17th PS was forced to return there to accommodate the planned arrival of the heavy bombers, and the accident rate, already high, increased. By 1 October 50 P 40Es had also been shipped to the islands, and a new organization, the 24th Pursuit Group, stood up to control the three pursuit squadrons. Between 10 February and 20 November 1941 FEAF received 197 additional pilots, 141 of whom were or became pursuit pilots. All except 28 of the fighter pilots were fresh from flight schools and required further individual training, which cut into needed unit tactical training. Arrangements were made with the oxygen producing plant in Manila, which supplied the U. S. Navy's shipyard at Cavite, to buy any surplus for pursuit units, but output was so small that only the squadron at Nichols (which reopened on 17 October) could be supplied, and on a limited basis. were attached to the 19th BG and a total of 35 B 17 Flying Fortresses constituted the FEAF's heavy bombardment force. Arnold wrote on 1 December 1941, "We must get every B 17 to the Philippines as soon as possible." The War Department projected 165 heavy bombers and 240 fighters to be based in the Philippines by March 1942. B 17s of the 7th Bombardment Group based in Utah staged in California and its 88th Reconnaissance Squadron was in transit by air at the time the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The personnel of two squadrons of the 35th Pursuit Group (the 21st and 34th, their pilot rosters at half strength), and three of the 27th Bombardment Group (Light), moved by a convoy of two transports escorted by the cruiser Louisville, but without their airplanes, and disembarked at Manila on 20 November 1941. The pursuit squadrons were attached to the 24th Pursuit Group and acquired P 35s from the other squadrons for training purposes. A shipment of 24 crated P 40Es arrived in Manila by freighter on 25 November, the first of 50 intended for the 35th Pursuit Group, and were trucked to the Philippine Air Depot at Nichols Field for assembly. From a force of five squadrons (one bombardment, one observation and three pursuit) and 110 operational aircraft in May 1941, the Philippine Department now had thirteen squadrons and 195 combat aircraft. However, only ten squadrons had airplanes (four bombardment, five pursuit, and one observation), and although most of its new equipment was considered first line by the Army Air Forces, none of it was first rate by the standards of air forces already engaged in aerial combat. Further, the overwhelming majority of its fighter pilots were sorely lacking in meaningful flying experience.

MacArthur held the position that Japan would not attempt an invasion of the Philippines before April 1942. Clagett (described by one historian of the campaign as lacking "the necessary elasticity of mind and body for realistic preparation for total war") had twice been hospitalized during mid 1941 and was not meeting the demands of even this scenario. At the beginning of September Arnold met with Marshall to identify a replacement for Clagett who would infuse the necessary urgency into the Philippine buildup. Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton arrived in the Philippines to command FEAF on 4 November 1941. Bomber, fighter, and service commands for the FEAF were organized when it stood up on 16 November 1941; Clagett was placed in command of the provisional 5th Interceptor Command and Churchill made commander of Far East Air Service Command. When a war warning from Marshall was received in the Philippines on 28 November (Philippine time), FEAF began dispatching two B 17s daily on reconnaissance flights of the sea lanes north of Luzon, but with orders not to overfly Japanese territory on Formosa. Units worked to complete protective and dispersal measures, while interceptors were armed and placed on alert status. all escorted by the USS Pensacola. The remainder of the 35th Group (the remaining pilots, two pursuit squadrons, and group headquarters) sailed aboard the USAT President Garfield for Honolulu on 6 December to join another convoy.

The "Warning Service" of the Philippine Department was directed by Lt. Col. Alexander H. Campbell, who had originally transferred to the Philippines in October 1939 to command a battalion of the 60th Coast Artillery (AA). Functioning as an office of the Intelligence Section (G 2) of the department headquarters, the Warning Service operated an interim "Information and Operation Center" at Nielson Field that included an electrically lighted map to plot sightings that indicated origins of reports with twinkling lights. In lieu of working detection equipment and trained personnel, the Warning Service maintained a primitive system of 509 observation posts manned by 860 civilian watchers, unschooled in aircraft identification, who would report airplane movements by five radio, two telegraph, and ten telephone networks manned by members of all three U. S. military services, the Philippine Army and constabulary, the Philippine postal system, and civilian companies in the provinces. Interpreters were required for the many dialects used by the observers. Message processing encountered significant delays between the time of observation and time of report. On 4 May 1941, the Warning Service was shifted to the new PDAF as the "Air Warning Service". A newly trained 194 man Signal Corps air warning company arrived by transport on 1 August to operate two SCR 271C fixed location air tracking radars planned for deployment on Luzon, each with a range of 150 mile (241 km). Campbell immediately prepared a study for Clagett recommending 24 hour operations and modern aircraft detection equipment, specifically two mobile SCR 270B units and nine SCR 271s, allotting eight units to Luzon and three to Mindanao, and expanding the force to a 915 man battalion. He also suggested that radars be established at some future time on the islands of Lubang, Samar, Palawan, Jolo, Basilan, Tablas, Panay, and Negros. His specific recommendation was in line with the one SCR 270/seven SCR 271 recommendation of the Air Defense Board just received by the War Department, and was endorsed by MacArthur on 8 September with a recommendation for funds. MacArthur was notified by wire the next day that an SCR 270 and two SCR 271s were already in transit to the Philippines by ship for use by the air warning company, with three more SCR 270s to follow in October. The 557th Air Warning Battalion was designated to provide the expanded early warning defense, and was at its port of embarkation at San Francisco on 6 December. Three Army detachments with mobile units and the Marine detachment were ordered into the field on 3 December with instructions to be in operation by 10 December. Of the Army detachments, at the onset of hostilities one had just reached position at Burgos, Ilocos Norte, in northwest Luzon; another was at Tagaytay, Cavite, with a damaged set; and the third was newly established at Paracale, Camarines Norte, in southeastern Luzon, where it had just completed calibration tests. The two fixed location SCR 271s were in storage. USAFFE also received 11 sets of SCR 268 antiaircraft radars, a searchlight control radar that could also be used for gun laying of AA weapons. After the FEAF was forced to withdraw into Bataan to continue operations, its primitive fields were subject to frequent attack from Luzon based aircraft of the Japanese Army. An SCR 268 of the 200th Coast Artillery was placed in operation on the hillside above Cabcaben Airfield. Used in conjunction with the sole surviving SCR 270B unit, hidden in the jungle a mile from Bataan Field, it served as an early warning system and was linked to headquarters of the 5th Interceptor Command at Mariveles. Takeoffs and landings by the Bataan Field Flying Detachment required towing of P 40s off the runways to and from hidden revetments, and were vulnerable to strafing. The ad hoc system facilitated coordination of field operations, and while imperfect, no aircraft were lost during takeoffs or landings.

Japanese air operations against FEAF airfields on Luzon were scheduled to take off from their Formosan bases beginning at 1:30 am on 8 December, with attacks to commence 21 minutes after dawn (and approximately four hours after offensive operations began in Hawaii), at 6:30 am. However, reconnaissance flights dispatched to check weather conditions between Formosa and Luzon neither returned nor reported as launch time approached, and a thick fog over southern Formosa set back the timetable by 90 minutes. The commanders of Japanese units were disturbed when monitoring of American radio traffic indicated that the weather flights had been detected despite the darkness and attempts were made by Iba based P 40s to intercept. Although all the interceptions failed, Iba Field was then substituted as a target in place of Nichols (where it was assumed that two squadrons of B 17s had dispersed) to deal with the new interceptor threat. Further radio monitoring revealed to the Japanese that the U. S. Asiatic Fleet had been alerted at 4:00 am of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and they expected attacks on their own bases by B 17s (bombing through the fog undercast) at any time after 7:00 am. The air defense weaknesses of the FEAF were mirrored by those of the Japanese, who had prepared only for offensive operations, but no attack came before a final revised plan was issued at 7:50 am, ordering the main attack force of Japanese land based aircraft to launch at 9:15 am and attack at 12:30 pm

Brereton attempted in person to obtain authorization for attacks on Formosa soon after word of events in Hawaii reached Manila, but was twice prevented from speaking with MacArthur by Sutherland. The authorization was refused, apparently a misinterpretation of standing orders not to make "the first overt act." The P 40 squadrons at Clark, Iba, and Nichols moved to alert takeoff positions at 6:00 am as news of war spread among the units. A large force of aircraft was detected flying south towards Luzon, prompting the takeoff at 8:30 am of 15 of the 19 B 17s at Clark with orders to patrol within communications range of its control tower, while the 24th Pursuit Group launched its three P 40 squadrons and the P 35 squadron at Del Carmen to patrol central Luzon for intruders. At 8:50 am and 10:00 am, telephone attempts to obtain authorization from USAFFE headquarters for a B 17 attack was also rebuffed by Sutherland. However MacArthur himself called Brereton at 10:15 am and released the bomber force to employ at his discretion. Brereton immediately ordered two bombers to conduct reconnaissance flights and recalled the rest to prepare for a late afternoon bombing mission. The B 17s and the fighters, which were low on fuel, all landed by 11:00 am to refuel and prepare for afternoon operations. Japanese naval bombers and fighters took off according to their revised schedule and approached Luzon in two well separated forces, both of which were detected by the Iba radar detachment just before 11:30 am. Despite an hour's warning, only the P 40 squadron at Iba took off, and it ran low on fuel in futile response to confusing instructions from the 24th PG that resulted from changing analyses of Japanese intents. The Iba P 40s were in their landing pattern when the Japanese struck. The aircraft at Clark and Iba were caught on the ground when the attack began at 12:35 pm. One hundred and seven two engined bombers divided into two equal forces bombed the airfields first, after which 90 Zero fighters conducted strafing attacks until 1:25 pm (the fighters strafing Iba concluded at 1:05 pm, after which they flew to Clark and resumed attacks). Nearly the entire B 17 force at Clark, one third of the U. S. fighters and its only operational radar unit were destroyed. The Japanese lost only seven fighters and a single bomber to combat. Follow up attacks on Nichols and Del Carmen fields, which were not targeted on 8 December, followed two days later, completing the destruction of AAF offensive and defensive opposition to the Japanese in the Pacific. A decision was made late that day to save the surviving fighters for reconnaissance use by avoiding direct combat. Fourteen surviving B 17s, after just two days of small and unsuccessful attacks on Japanese amphibious forces, were transferred to Batchelor Field, Australia, for maintenance between 17 and 20 December, bringing Clagett with them. They resumed bombing missions from Australia against Japanese shipping in the Philippines, landing at Del Monte, beginning 22 December and continuing through 25 December. On 1 January 1942, the remaining ten operational bombers forward located to Java. Brereton evacuated FEAF headquarters on 24 December to Darwin, Northern Territory by way of the Netherlands East Indies, leaving the new head of the 5th Interceptor Command, Col. Harold H. George (promoted to brigadier general 25 January 1942) in command of units in the Philippines. Reduced to a single squadron sized composite force, his pursuit fighters were carefully husbanded for reconnaissance duties and forbidden to engage in combat until forced to evacuate to fields hurriedly built on the Bataan peninsula, to which USAFFE and FEAF were ordered to withdraw on 24 December, the last aircraft arriving on 2 January 1942.

Combat and accidents reduced but did not eliminate the P 40 complement, and a group of pursuit pilots, called the "Bataan Field Flying Detachment," continued to fly missions until the last day of the campaign, employing mainly 30 pound fragmentation bombs and machine gun fire as ordnance. Four of the six P 40s sent to Del Monte on 8 January were recalled to Bataan two weeks later, but only three arrived, leaving the detachment still with just seven P 40Es and two P 40Bs. The small detachment, gradually attrited, had a few notable successes:
26 January 1942, morning missions strafed boats attempting to reinforce Japanese landings behind the USAFFE lines on the west coast of Bataan, and shot down three Mitsubishi Ki 30 (Army Type 97) "Ann" dive bombers trying to support the landings. That night the detachment conducted a successful attack on Japanese aircraft at Nielson Field, then shot up a truck convoy on the north shore of Manila Bay. 1–2 February 1942, a night attack by four P 40s flying two sorties each bombed and strafed a 13 barge convoy attempting to delivery 700 reinforcements to the Japanese beachheads, destroying nine and killing approximately half the troops aboard, confirmed later by Japanese records. 2 March 1942, an all day attack on shipping in Subic Bay and supply dumps on Grande Island resulted in 12 sorties. Claims included total destruction of an ammunition ship, but Japanese records could not be located to corroborate more than a subchaser sunk. However apparently extensive damage to at least four large ships was made. Four of the five remaining P 40s were used in the attacks, with one shot down and its pilot killed, and two others destroyed in landing accidents at Mariveles. A single flyable P 40E remained at Bataan Field, although by 5 March mechanics had repaired the damaged P 40B at Cabcaben using P 40E parts, facetiously calling the composite a "P 40 something". Occasional individual reconnaissance flights were made in the following month by the two craft. Brig. Gen. George was evacuated by PT boat on 11 March, ending the effective usefulness of the detachment, whose pilots were severely debilitated by starvation and disease. Churchill eventually succeeded to nominal command 12 days before the surrender, but was unable to evacuate and became a prisoner of war. Accidents put all three P 40s based on Mindanao out of commission by 9 February, leaving just two P 35s that had escaped from Bataan. Transfer of a propeller put a P 40 back in commission two days later, and shipment to Cebu by submarine of parts taken from wrecks on Bataan put another back in operation by mid March, when a fire destroyed one of them on the ground. Three new P 40Es, still in crates, were shipped from Brisbane, Australia, by blockade runner on 22 February but ran aground on 9 March on a reef between Bohol and Leyte. Carefully hidden and moved by barge at night, the crates reached Mindanao on 26 March, where a makeshift air depot had been established in a coconut grove at Buenavista Airfield using mechanics of the 19th Bomb Group and the 440th Ordnance Company. By 2 April, all three P 40s were assembled and flight tested, making the Mindanao P 40 force twice as large as that on Bataan. The two P 40s on Bataan both flew out on 8 April, the P 40E to Iloilo City on Panay, where it landed wheels up, and the P 40B to Cebu. The two P 35s on Mindanao flew back to Bataan Field on 4 April and evacuated three pursuit pilots in their baggage compartments. A Navy Grumman J2F Duck that the 20th Pursuit Squadron raised from Mariveles Bay and placed in service again on 24 March evacuated five officers. Bataan surrendered the next morning. The P 40B reached Mindanao but crashed on 14 April trying to land at Dalirig in a heavy rain. Although FEAF no longer existed as a command, its P 40s and service troops on Mindanao supported the final offensive air operations of the campaign. Early on 11 April ten B 25 Mitchell medium bombers of the 3rd Bomb Group and three B 17Es of the 40th Reconnaissance Squadron took off from Batchelor Field and arrived that evening at Del Monte. The small task force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce, had originally planned to break the Japanese blockade of Luzon long enough for supplies to be delivered by sea to Bataan. However its surrender obviated that mission and instead the aircraft flew up for two days of attacks against the landing forces at Cebu City and Davao on 12 and 13 April. The three new P 40Es and the sole remaining P 35 operated out of Maramag Field until 3 May. The P 35 was transferred to the Philippine Army Air Corps and two surviving P 40Es were ultimately captured intact by the Japanese army on 12 May. Against the loss from all causes of 108 P 40s and 25 P 35s (25 in air to air combat), FEAF pilots were credited by USAF Historical Study No. 85, USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II, with 35 aerial victories between 8 December 1941 and 12 April 1942. 33 pursuit pilots were killed in the campaign and 83 surrendered to become prisoners of war, 95% of enlisted men became POWs, and 61% of those died before they could be repatriated.

On 29 December 1941, Brereton and his staff arrived in Darwin and reestablished FEAF headquarters. His only combat forces were 14 B 17s of the 19th Bomb Group sent south from Del Monte. By 1 January 1942, ten of the bombers had been shifted northwest to Singosari Airfield on Java, from which the 19th BG flew its next combat mission on 4 January against Japanese shipping off Davao City, using Samarinda Airfield on Borneo as a staging base. On 11 January the first aircraft of the 7th Bomb Group arrived via India and from that date on FEAF conducted its operations solely for the defense of the Netherlands East Indies. FEAF became a part of the American British Dutch Australian Command (ABDA) created to unify forces in the defense of the NEI. On 18 January, FEAF headquarters moved to Bandoeng. The Pensacola convoy for the Philippines was diverted on 13 December to Brisbane, where it disembarked its Air Corps personnel and the crated A 24 dive bombers on 23 December, then continued to Darwin with field artillery reinforcements on 29 December. The pursuit and partially trained pilots began training as assembly of the crated aircraft went forward at Archerfield and Amberley airdromes. 21 pilots of the 27th Bomb Group and 17 from the 24th Pursuit Group were flown to Australia in the last two weeks of December to ferry back the assembled aircraft, but no engine coolant had been sent with the fighters and the guns of the dive bombers were missing key electrical and mounting components, hampering not only reinforcement of FEAF but limiting flight training of the new pilots. The President Garfield, 500 miles at sea en route to Honolulu, The President Polk embarked the ground echelons of two squadrons of the 7th Bomb Group (based at Jogjakarta) and continued to Java, escorted by the heavy cruiser USS Houston, arriving in Surabaya on 28 January. By mid January, Japanese advances southward cut the anticipated aircraft ferry routes to the Philippines and reinforcement was no longer feasible. Instead, using aircraft as their assembly was completed and assigning personnel at hand, provisional fighter squadrons were organized in Brisbane to assist the Royal Netherlands Indies Air Force (ML KNIL) in defending the NEI. The 17th Pursuit Squadron (Provisional) was established on 14 January, and 13 of its 17 pilots had previously been with the 24th PG. With 17 P 40s delivered by the Pensacola convoy (assembly of the 18th could not be completed because of a lack of parts), it flew across northern Australia from Brisbane to Darwin, then to Java via Penfoie Airdrome at Koepang and Den Pasar Field on Bali between 16 and 25 January. Only 12 Warhawks arrived at the designated FEAF fighter base at Ngoro Field, the others lost to accidents, combat, and pilot illness. The 20th Pursuit Squadron (Provisional), incorporating pilots of the 35th PG, took off from Darwin in 25 P 40s on 2 February, but only 17 reached Java, the remainder shot down over Bali or damaged on the ground by air raids. Likewise, 25 P 40s of the 3rd Pursuit Squadron (Provisional) departed Brisbane, but because of accidents involving novice pilots, only 18 reached Darwin on 8 February. Just nine eventually reinforced Ngoro; an entire flight of eight was lost when it exhausted its fuel after its LB 30 navigation guide aircraft became lost in a storm trying to find Koepang. Survivors of both the 3rd and 20th provisional squadrons were integrated into the 17th PS. The 33rd Pursuit Squadron (Provisional) was en route to Java at Darwin when it was nearly annihilated by a Japanese air raid on 19 February. Of 83 P 40s assembled and flown from Brisbane, only 37 arrived at Ngoro Field, and by 15 February less than 20 could be mustered for operations. The 91st Bombardment Squadron was re manned in Brisbane with pilots from the 27th BG, and dispatched eleven A 24s to Java on 11 February, but the Japanese threat to Timor prevented the other two squadrons of the 27th from following. Inadequate facilities at its new airfield near Malang delayed maintenance of the dive bombers and prevented their operational use until 19 February. 32 assembled P 40s were collected at Maylands Airfield near Perth, Western Australia, towed to Fremantle on the night of 19–20 February, and loaded on the flight deck of the seaplane tender USS Langley. The Langley sailed at noon 23 February in convoy for Burma but was immediately diverted for Java, as was the freighter MS Sea Witch soon after, carrying 27 unassembled and crated P 40s destined for the 51st Pursuit Group in China. All of the aircraft aboard Langley were lost when it was sunk on 27 February. 31 of the 33 pilots of the 13th and 33rd Pursuit Squadrons (Provisional) perished in the attack. The Sea Witch reached Tjilatjap harbor the next day but destroyed its cargo to keep the P 40s from being captured by the Japanese.

On 3 February the Japanese opened a series of air attacks on ABDA bases on Java, and the 19th BG was again caught on the ground, losing five of its B 17s in a raid on Singosari, four of them on the ground. On 20 February, just back from a mission to bomb the invasion force at Bali, seven B 17s of the 19th BG were caught on the ground at Pasirian Field in southeastern Java by Zero strafers while re arming and five more were destroyed. Although 38 of the more capable B 17E Flying Fortresses and a dozen LB 30 Liberators incrementally reinforced both heavy bombardment groups of the FEAF, losses were severe and the slow rate of reinforcement was unable to keep pace. Despite dispersal and elaborate camouflage, a lack of antiaircraft artillery and poor warning/communication systems resulted in the loss of 65 FEAF aircraft on the ground alone. Evacuations of personnel from Java and diversion of resources to India and Australia began 20 February. By 24 February only ten heavy bombers, four A 24 dive bombers, and 13 P 40 fighters remained flyable against Japanese forces. ABDA Command was officially dissolved the next day. The ground echelons of both heavy bomb groups began evacuation by sea on 25 February, while the bombers, carrying up to 20 passengers each, made daily six hour flights to Broome, Western Australia, an intermediate evacuation point for all aircraft fleeing Java. Malang/Singosari closed on 28 February and Jogjakarta the next night, following the final bomber sorties. 260 men, including the remnants of the 17th Pursuit Squadron, were evacuated by five B 17s and three LB 30s. 35 passengers crammed the final LB 30 that took off at 12:30 am of 2 March. On 3 March, nine Japanese fighters attacked Broome, destroying two of the evacuated B 17s. Of 61 heavy bombers based on Java, only 23 escaped: 17 B 17Es, three LB 30s, and three of the original B 17Ds of the 19th BG. Only six had been lost in aerial combat, but at least 20 were destroyed on the ground by Japanese attacks. Heavy bombers had flown over sixty missions and at least 300 bomber sorties, but 40% of the bombers turned back or otherwise failed to find their targets. Brereton's evacuation to India on 23 February 1942 effectively ended existence of the Far East Air Force, which had been re designated "5 Air Force" on 5 February. Its headquarters was not re manned until 18 September 1942 in Australia, when it was designated Fifth Air Force. Fifth Air Force along with Thirteenth Air Force in the Central Pacific and Seventh Air Force in Hawaii was subsequently assigned to a higher echelon on 3 August 1944, the newly created United States Far East Air Forces also with the acronym FEAF. This FEAF was subordinate to the U. S. Army Forces Far East and served as the headquarters of Allied Air Forces Southwest Pacific Area.