Линия Бернхардта: Оборона Германии в Италии во время Второй мировой войны.

The Bernhardt Line, or Reinhard Line, was a German Army defensive line in Italy during the Italian Campaign of World War II. Having reached the Bernhardt Line at the start of December 1943, it took until mid January 1944 for the US Fifth Army to fight its way to the next line of defences, the Gustav Line. The Bernhardt Line was defended by XIV Panzer Corps (XIV Panzerkorps), part of the German Tenth Army (10. Armee). Unlike most of the other defensive lines, the Bernhardt Line did not run all the way across Italy but was merely a bulge in front of the main Gustav Line; ran over the massif of Monte Cassino; and enclosed the peaks of Monte Cassino (Monastery Hill), Monte la Difensa, Monte la Remetanea and Monte Maggiore, in the territory of Rocca d'Evandro, and Monte Sambucaro (or Sammucro), which stands at the border of the three regions (Lazio, Molise, and Campania). However, the defences of the Gustav Line on the Adriatic are sometimes referred to as the Bernhardt Line, and the battles for that part of the line are included in this entry. The Bernhardt Line was not as strong as the Gustav Line and was intended only to delay the Allies' arrival. Together with the Gustav Line and the Hitler Line, it made up the German Winter Line defences.

Following the Allied invasion of Italy in September 1943, the Italian government had surrendered, but the German Army continued to fight. The Allied 15th Army Group, commanded by General Sir Harold Alexander, conquered southern Italy, but by early October, it had come up against the Volturno Line, the first of two lines (the next being the Barbara Line) was used to delay the Allied advance to buy time to prepare the most formidable defensive positions, which formed the Winter Line. Alexander had three possible alternatives to reach the Italian capital of Rome. On the Adriatic Front, he could advance to Pescara and then use Highway 5 (the old Roman Via Valeria) which traversed the country to Rome on the other coast. Alternatively, on the other side of the Apennines, Highway 7 (the old Roman Appian Way) followed along the west coast but south of Rome ran into the Pontine Marshes, which the Germans had flooded. Finally, Highway 6 ran in the same direction, but further inland, through the Liri Valley.

The German forces in Italy were commanded by Field Marshal (Generalfeldmarschall) Albert Kesselring. The defence of the Winter Line was the task of the German 10th Army (10. Armee) under the temporary command of Lieutenant General (General der Panzertruppe) Joachim Lemelsen (in the absence of General (Generaloberst) Heinrich von Vietinghoff, who was in Germany on sick leave). The German 10th Army had Traugott Herr's LXXVI Panzer Corps (LXXVI Panzerkorps) deployed on the eastern side of Italy, from the Apennine Mountains to the Adriatic, and Frido von Senger und Etterlin's XIV Panzer Corps (XIV Panzerkorps) on the western side, from the mountains to the Tyrrhenian sea. The new Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) was General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, replacing General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had moved to command of the Allied forces preparing for Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Normandy. The Allied Armies in Italy (AAI), formerly designated the 15th Army Group, were commanded by General Alexander. Under his command were two field armies. To the left, on the western side of Italy, was the UD Fifth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark. To the right, on the eastern side, was the British Eighth Army, commanded by General Sir Bernard Montgomery. The Fifth Army consisted of American, British and French units. The Eighth Army, with British, Indian, New Zealand, Canadian and Polish units, was from early January 1944 commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese after General Montgomery was, along with General Eisenhower, also recalled to England to prepare for Operation Overlord.

On 3 October, a battalion of the British Eighth Army's 78th Infantry Division had crossed the Biferno river to confront the German Volturno Viktor Line defences. Two Commando battalions landed from the sea north of the river at Termoli, and a fiercely contested battle ensued which had hung in the balance when a ford became unusable after heavy rains and prevented Allied armour from moving forward. However, the British infantry reinforced from the sea by two brigades, had held out long enough against the tanks of 16th Panzer Division (16. Panzerdivision) for a Bailey bridge to be laid across the river, and the crisis passed with the arrival of elements of 1st Canadian Armoured Brigades. By 6 October, the Germans were withdrawing to new defensive positions behind the Trigno River, the "Barbara Line". At the Trigno, the Eighth Army were obliged to pause because it had outrun its supply chain which stretched back over poor roads to the main ports of Bari and Taranto, 120 mile (193 km) and 170 mile (274 km) to its rear. Port and transport capacity had also been affected by the logistic requirements of the Allied air force, which was establishing a large number of strategic bomber bases around Foggia. The Eighth Army attacked across the Trigno on 2 November. By the next day, the Germans' position had been turned, and they commenced a fighting withdrawal to the forward Winter Line positions that they were preparing on the ridges behind the Sangro River. Eighth Army also devised a deception scheme involving false troop movements and ammunition dumps to give the impression that the main attack would be through the British XIII Corps front. The deception was to be maintained by an earlier diversionary attack some 40 mile (64 km) inland by XIII Corps and a secondary attack at the same time as V Corps some 15 mile (24 km) inland by the New Zealanders. However, Kesselring guessed the Allies' intentions. On 18 November, Lemelsen had signaled Kesselring to the effect that the Allied concentrations on the coast led him to expect the main attack on his left wing. Then, heavy rain raised the river levels, which caused the postponement of the offensive to the night of 27 November and giving the Germans time to switch two divisions across the Apennines to the defending LXXVI Panzer Corps. That made three divisions on the coastal plain opposing V Corps: 65th Infantry Division (65. Infantriedivision), 90th Panzergrenadier Division (90. Panzergrenadierdivision) and 26th Panzer Division (26. Panzerdivision). 16th Panzer Division opposed the New Zealanders and the German 1st Parachute Division (1. Fallschirmjägerdivision) faced XIII Corps (1st Canadian Division and British 5th Infantry Division). In the early hours of 28 November, the Eighth Army attack went in supported by heavy artillery concentrations. The New Zealanders advanced steadily. Although the German defences had been well prepared, most of the New Zealanders' objectives were manned by 65th Division which was poorly equipped and untried in battle. The German Division was also hampered by the fact that its commande, Brigadier General (Generalmajor) G. H. von Ziehlberg, was severely wounded on the afternoon of 28 November. The 8th Indian Division, however, like the New Zealanders facing their first major combat action since arriving in Italy, experienced tougher opposition. Elements of 65th Infantry Division supported by an armoured battle group held tenaciously on to Mezzagrogna and the town was eventually taken on 29 November after tough, often hand to hand, fighting. On the morning of 29 November, 78th Infantry Division had joined the attack on the right of the Indian Division and had forced their way to Santa Maria by the evening, which created a base for their main attack the following day towards Fossacesia. By late on 30 November, 78th Division, supported by 4th Armoured Brigade, had taken Fossacesia and the whole ridge on the far bank of the Sangro. The main Bernhardt defences were under Eighth Army control. As the Eighth Army pushed forward over the next few days, the 65th Infantry Division crumbled to the extent that German 10th Army were later to order a court martial into its conduct. However, Herr introduced 90th Panzergrenadier Division into the line from his reserve and transferred reinforcements from the quieter sector inland in the form of elements of 1st Parachute Division. The complications of those manoeuvres introduced considerable confusion within the Germans' alignment, but they still managed a fighting withdrawal to the ridge on the far side of the Moro River. Unaware of the disorganisation in the German ranks, the New Zealanders failed on 2 December to exploit an opportunity to capture Orsogna, a key position near the headwaters of the Moro, which on that day was still only lightly held. It was only on the morning of 3 December that the New Zealand Division disputed possession of Orsogna, but the 26th Panzer had just enough breathing space to organise and repelled it. The 26th Panzer then proceeded to create a formidable defensive complex around the town and along the ridge towards Ortona on the coast, and Orsogna was not occupied by the Allies, despite a further two determined attempts during December, until the Germans withdrew after the Allied breakthrough at Monte Cassino in May 1944.

Montgomery now rested the tired 78th Division, which had been leading the V Corps advance since the Volturno Line offensive, and swapped with the 1st Canadian Infantry Division from the relatively quiet XIII Corps sector. The Canadians, with the 8th Indian Infantry Division on their left, led the main thrust across the Moro on 8 December aiming for Ortona. By 20 December, after a stubborn resistance first from elements of the German 90th Panzergrenadier Division and then elements of the 1st Parachute Division, which had relieved the Panzergrenadier Division, the Canadians had patrols on the outskirts of the town. However, the Battle of Ortona took another week of fierce house to house fighting as the German 3rd Parachute Regiment tenaciously held on before it withdrew to the other side of the Riccio River on 28 December. Meanwhile, inland V Corps, Orsogna had suffered three successive assaults, but XIII Corps spearheaded by the 2nd New Zealand Division, could not get past the defending 26th Panzer Division. After advancing a total of only 18 miles (29 km) and sustaining 6,500 casualties, blizzards, drifting snow and zero visibility in late December, jagged terrain caused Eighth Army's offensive on the Adriatic front to grind to a halt. As the New Year approached, it became clear that with no prospect of better weather until the spring since the Eighth Army did not have the strength to force its way to Pescara. Alexander called a halt to the offensive and instructed Montgomery to maintain sufficient activity to pin LXXVI Panzer Corps and to prevent troops from being sent across to reinforce XIV Corps facing the Fifth Army. The rest of the winter on the Adriatic front was spent in bitterly uncomfortable conditions with the opposing sides often in close proximity and engaged in night time patrolling and vicious skirmishing.

Even with the MAAF (Mediterranean Allied Air Forces) order going into effect on 20 December, the actions were the same as the days before. It would be on 1 January that operations would grind to a halt because of the official command changes. From 17 December to 15 January, the Allies also suffered very few scrubbed missions because of great weather, which permitted missions, unlike from November to December, when several days prevented any operational sorties by any air forces of the Allied forces. From 17 December to 15 January, the period between the interdiction of the Bernhardt Line, allowed for an in depth analysis for interdiction. The major targets included Rome, Pescara, Civitavecchia, Arezzo and Cassino. The area around Rome was often targeted by fighter bombers of the USAAF and RAF, and the towns of Arezzo and Civitavecchia, as well as the gun positions around the town, were also targeted by those fighter bombers. However, the railways in and around Pescara were targeted by Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force (MATAF) light and medium bombers. They were highly effective in damaging the marshalling yards and railways. At Cassino, both fighter bombers and medium bombers attacked and often tried to soften up the defences. That was especially common as the Fifth US Army approached the Rapido River near Cassino in early January to prepare for the first attack. Also, gun positions in the Mignano Gap and German troops on Mount Trocchio were also targeted on a handful of missions. Notably, the harbor facilities at Anzio were attacked as well. Unofficially, Operation Strangle would begin on 15 January as the Bernhardt Line fell as a major air interdiction campaign. The MATAF took advantage of the moment to harass the retreating Germans by attacking them directly and also by severing their supply line in the world’s first major and intentional air interdiction campaign. The planning for Operation Strangle ensured that it would be delayed as the mechanics of air interdiction could be studied, and units prepared and used to that form of combat.

It had taken the Fifth Army six weeks of intense combat and 16,000 casualties to advance the 7 miles (11 km) through the Bernhardt Line defences, including the action at San Pietro Infine, to take Monte Trocchio and to reach the positions facing the main Gustav defences on 15 January.