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Foreign policy principles of US President George W. Bush

The Bush Doctrine refers to multiple interrelated foreign policy principles of the 43rd President of the United States, George W. Bush. These principles include unilateralism, preemptive war, and regime change. Charles Krauthammer first used the phrase in June 2001 to describe the Bush administration's "unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM treaty and rejecting the Kyoto protocol." After the 9/11 attack, the phrase described the policy that the United States had the right to secure itself against countries that harbor or give aid to terrorist groups, which was used to justify the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. The Bush Doctrine became strongly associated with the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Different pundits have attributed different meanings to the Bush Doctrine. It was used to describe specific policy elements, including a strategy of "preemptive strikes" as a defense against an immediate or perceived future threat to the security of the United States. This policy principle was applied particularly in the Middle East to counter international terrorist organizations and to justify the invasion of Iraq. Generally, the Bush Doctrine was used to indicate a willingness to unilaterally pursue U. S. economic interests. Some of these policies were codified in a National Security Council text entitled the National Security Strategy of the United States published on September 20, 2002. The phrase "Bush Doctrine" was rarely used by members of the Bush administration. The expression was used at least once, though, by Vice President Dick Cheney, in a June 2003 speech in which he said, "If there is anyone in the world today who doubts the seriousness of the Bush Doctrine, I would urge that person to consider the fate of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq."

The main elements of the Bush Doctrine were delineated in a document, the National Security Strategy of the United States, published on September 17, 2002. This document is often cited as the definitive statement of the doctrine. As updated in 2006, it states:

The Bush Doctrine is defined as "a collection of strategy principles, practical policy decisions, and a set of rationales and ideas for guiding United States foreign policy." Two main pillars are identified for the doctrine: 1.) preemptive strikes against potential enemies and 2.) promoting democratic regime change. The George W. Bush administration claimed that the US was locked in a global war; a war of ideology, in which its enemies are bound together by a common ideology and a common hatred of democracy. Out of the National Security Strategy, four main points are highlighted as the core to the Bush Doctrine: 1.) Preemption, 2.) Military Primacy, 3.) New Multilateralism, and 4.) the Spread of Democracy. The document emphasized preemption, stating, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few", and required "defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders." Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld remarked thus in 2006, in a statement taken to reflect his view of the Doctrine's efficacy: "If I were rating, I would say we probably deserve a D or D+ as a country as how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place. I'm not going to suggest that it's easy, but we have not found the formula as a country." There is some evidence that Bush's willingness for the US to act unilaterally came even earlier. The International Journal of Peace Studies 2003 article "The Bush administration's image of Europe: From ambivalence to rigidity" states:

Princeton University research fellow Dr. Jonathan Monten, in his 2005 International Security journal article "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U. S. Strategy", attributed the Bush administration's activist democracy promotion to two main factors: the expansion of material capabilities, and the presence of a nationalist domestic ideology. He claims that the Bush Doctrine's promotion of democracy abroad was held as vital by the Bush administration to the success of the United States in the "war on terror". It was also a key objective of the administration's grand strategy of expanding the political and economic influence of the United States internationally. He examines two contending approaches to the long term promotion of democracy: "exemplarism", or leadership by example, and "vindicationism", or the direct application of United States power, including the use of coercive force. Whereas exemplarism largely prevailed in the 20th century, vindicationism has been the preferred approach of the Bush administration.

The Bush Doctrine resulted in criticism and controversy. Peter D. Feaver, who worked on the Bush national security strategy as a staff member on the National Security Council, said he has counted as many as seven distinct Bush doctrines. One of the drafters of the National Security Strategy of the United States, which is commonly mistakenly referred to as the "Bush Doctrine", demurred at investing the statement with too much weight. "I actually never thought there was a Bush doctrine", said Philip D. Zelikow, who later served as State Department counselor under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. "Indeed, I believe the assertion that there is such a doctrine lends greater coherence to the administration's policies than they deserve." Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, said he thought there was no "single piece of paper" that represents the Bush Doctrine. Experts on geopolitical strategy note that Halford Mackinder's theories in "The Geographical Pivot of History" about the "Heartland" and world resource control are still as valid today as when they were formulated. In his 2007 book In the Defense of the Bush Doctrine, Robert G. Kaufman wrote: "No one grasped the logics or implications of this transformation better than Halford Mackinder. His prescient theories, first set forth in Geographical Pivot of History, published in 1904, have rightly shaped American grand strategy since World War II. Mackinder warned that any single power dominating Eurasia, "the World Island", as he called it, would have the potential to dominate the world, including the United States." Kaufman is a political scientist, public policy professor and member of The Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee. He said in an interview about the book: "I wrote this book because of my conviction that the Bush Doctrine has a more compelling logic and historical pedigree than people realize." The Bush Doctrine was polarizing both domestically and internationally.

Bush often talked about his belief in compassionate conservatism and liberty as "God's gift". Charles R. Kesler wrote, "As he begins his second term, the president and his advisors must take a hard, second look at the Bush Doctrine. In many respects, it is the export version of compassionate conservatism."

There is also criticism on Bush Doctrine practices related to their sociopsychological effects saying they create a culture of fear. Naomi Klein wrote in her book The Shock Doctrine about a recurrent metaphor of shock, and she claimed in an interview that the Bush administration continued to exploit a "window of opportunity that opens up in a state of shock", followed by a comforting rationale for the public, as a form of social control.

Some commentators argue that the Bush Doctrine has not aimed to support genuine democratic regimes driven by local peoples, but rather US friendly regimes installed by diplomats acting on behalf of the United States and intended only to seem democratic to U. S. voters. For example, in the case of Afghanistan, it is argued that parliamentary democracy was downplayed by the US and power concentrated in the hands of the Afghan president Hamid Karzai, a US ally. The election of Karzai has been described as the result of manipulation on the parts of the US government and US policy maker Zalmay Khalilzad. At the same time, these commentators draw attention to the number of unpopular (but US friendly) warlords achieving "legitimating" positions under US supervision of the elections. Some commentators interpreted voter turnout figures as evidence of "large scale fraud". Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls have written, "It remains to be seen if U. S. policymakers will ever allow anything approaching democracy to break out in Afghanistan and interfere with their plans." Of the elections in Afghanistan, Sima Samar, former Afghan Minister for Women's Affairs, stated, "This is not a democracy, it is a rubber stamp. Everything has already been decided by the powerful ones." Most studies of American intervention have been pessimistic about the history of the United States exporting democracy. John A. Tures examined 228 cases of American intervention from 1973 to 2005, using Freedom House data. While in 63 cases a country did become more democratic, in 69 instances the country became less democratic and the plurality of interventions, 96, caused no change in the country's democracy.