1867-1918 жылдардағы Австро-Венгрия құрлық әскері

Land force of the Austro Hungarian Dual Monarchy from 1867 to 1918

The Austro Hungarian Army, also known as the Imperial and Royal Army, was the principal ground force of Austria Hungary from 1867 to 1918. It consisted of three organisations: the Common Army (Gemeinsame Armee, recruited from all parts of Austria Hungary), the Imperial Royal Landwehr (recruited from Cisleithania) and the Royal Hungarian Honvéd (recruited from Transleithania). In the wake of fighting between the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary and the subsequent two decades of uneasy co existence, Hungarian troops served either in ethnically mixed units or were stationed away from Hungarian regions. With the Austro Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the Austro Hungarian Army was brought into being. It existed until the disestablishment of Austria Hungary in 1918 following the end of World War I. Common Army units were generally poorly trained and had very limited access to new equipment, because the governments of the Austrian and Hungarian parts of the empire often preferred to generously fund their own units instead of outfitting all three army branches equally. All Landwehr and Honvéd regiments were composed of three battalions, while Common Army regiments had four. The long standing white infantry uniforms were replaced in the later half of the 19th century with dark blue tunics, which in turn were replaced by cadet grey uniforms during in the initial stages of World War I. In September 1915, field gray was adopted as the new official uniform colour. As the Common Army was plagued with supply shortages, when field gray uniforms were first introduced, remaining stocks of the preexisting cadet grey uniforms remained in use alongside the newer colour. The last known surviving member of the Austro Hungarian Army was Franz Künstler, who died in Bad Mergentheim in May 2008 at the age of 107.

The major decisions 1867–1895 were made by Archduke Albrecht, Duke of Teschen, who was the cousin of the Emperor Franz Joseph and his leading advisor in military affairs. According to historians John Keegan and Andrew Wheatcroft:
He was a firm conservative in all matters, military and civil, and took to writing pamphlets lamenting the state of the Army's morale as well as fighting a fierce rearguard action against all forms of innovation Much of the Austrian failure in the First World War can be traced back to his long period of power His power was that of the bureaucrat, not the fighting soldier, and his thirty years of command over the peacetime Habsburg Army made it a flabby instrument of war. In the wake of defeat in the 1866 Austro Prussian War Austria Hungary avoided major wars in the era between 1867 and 1914 but engaged in a number of minor military actions. Nevertheless, the general staff maintained plans for major wars against neighboring powers, especially Italy, Serbia and Russia. By contrast, the main enemies Russia and Serbia had engaged in large scale warfare in the decade before the First World War. In the late 19th century the army was used to suppress unrest in urban areas of the empire: in 1882 and 1887 in Vienna and notably against German nationalists at Graz and Czech nationalists in Prague in November 1897. Soldiers under the command of Conrad von Hotzendorf were also used against Italian rioters in Trieste in 1902. The most significant action by soldiers of the Dual Monarchy in this period was the Austro Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the summer of 1878. When troops under the command of Josip Filipović and Stjepan Jovanović entered the provinces expecting little or no resistance, they were met with ferocious opposition from elements of both Muslim and Orthodox populations there. Despite setbacks at Maglaj and Tuzla, Sarajevo was occupied in October. Austro Hungarian casualties amounted to over 5,000 and the unexpected violence of the campaign led to recriminations between commanders and political leaders.

In 1868, the number of active duty troops in the army was 355,000, and the total could be expanded to 800,000 upon mobilization. However, this was significantly less than the European powers of France, the North German Confederation and Russia, each of which could field more than one million men. Though the population of the empire had risen to nearly 50 million by 1900, the size of the army was tied to ceilings established in 1889. Thus, at the start of the 20th century, Austria Hungary conscripted only 0.29% of its population, compared to 0.47% in Germany, 0.35% in Russia, and 0.75% in France. The 1889 army law was not revised until 1912, which allowed for an increase in annual conscriptions. The ethnic make up of the enlisted ranks reflected the diversity of the empire the army served; in 1906, out of every 1000 enlisted men, there were 267 Germans, 223 Hungarians, 135 Czechs, 85 Poles, 81 Ruthenians, 67 Croats, 64 Romanians, 38 Slovaks, 26 Slovenes, and 14 Italians. To aid communication between the multitude of ethnicities, the army developed a simple language called Army Slavic, based primarily on Czech. From a religious standpoint, the Austro Hungarian army officer corps was dominated by Catholics. In 1896, out of 1000 officers, 791 were Catholics, 86 Protestants, 84 Jews, 39 Greek Orthodox, and one Uniate. Of the pre–World War military forces of the major European powers, the Austro Hungarian army was almost alone in its regular promotion of Jews to positions of command. While the Jewish population of the lands of the Dual Monarchy 4.4% including Bosnia and Herzegovina), Jews made up nearly 18% of the reserve officer corps. There were no official barriers to military service for Jews, but in later years this tolerance eroded to some extent, as important figures such as Conrad von Hötzendorf and Archduke Franz Ferdinand sometimes expressed anti Jewish sentiments. Franz Ferdinand was also accused (by Conrad) of discriminating against Protestant officers.

The Austro Hungarian Empire often suffered from a lack of military interpreters, and this proved to be a major force in the partial dysfunctioning and blunders of the Austrian Hungarian Empire. Nearly all officers of the upper ranks spoke German (specifically Austrian German), and because only a fraction of soldiers spoke German, this produced a logistical obstacle for organizing the military. Likewise the lack of mutual intelligibility between speakers of Hungarian and German led to a feeling of resentment by many non Austrian soldiers. The delivery of orders was particularly ineffective, and the bureaucratic and dysfunctional system led to individual ethnic units becoming isolated from the overall high command. This in turn led ethnic tensions and political violence in the empire, as such language battalions began instigating mutinies and revolts against the Austrian commanders, whom they saw as out of touch. Desertions and revolts were most common amongst Slavic battalions, particularly the Czech Slovakian battalions; however, all battalions during the war suffered from these logistical challenges. The battalions' use of languages that were not understood by the Austrian commanders also led to it being extremely difficult to impossible to discover attempts at desertion or revolt.

Following the 1867 constitutional arrangements, the Reichsrat was dominated by German Liberals, who generally regarded the army as a relic of feudalism. In Budapest, legislators were reluctant to authorize funds for the joint army but were generous with the Hungarian branch of the army, the Honvédség. In 1867 the military budget accounted for about 25% of all government spending, but the economic crash of 1873 hit Austria Hungary hard and foreign observers questioned whether the Dual Monarchy could manage a major war without subsidies. Despite increases throughout the 1850s and 1860s, in the latter half of the century Austria Hungary was still spending less on its army than were other major European powers. While the budget continued to rise—from 262 million crowns in 1895 to 306 million in 1906—this was still far less per capita than for other major European states, including Italy, and about on par with Russia, which had a much larger population. Further contributing to the monarchy's military weakness was the low rate of conscription: Austria Hungary conscripted only 0.29% of its population annually, compared to 0.47% in Germany and 0.75% in France. Attempts to increase the yearly intake of recruits were proposed but repeatedly blocked by officials in Budapest until an agreement was reached in 1912. In the emerging field of military aviation, Austria Hungary lagged behind other European states. While balloon detachments had been established in 1893, they were mostly assigned to the fortress artillery, except for a brief period from 1909 to 1911 when they were under command of the multifaceted Verkehrs Brigade. Realization that heavier than air machines were necessary or useful came late, and Austria Hungary acquired only five airplanes by 1911. In 1914 the budget for military aviation was approximately 1/25th the amount spent by France. Austria Hungary entered the war with only 48 first line aircraft.

The Landsturm consisted of men aged 34 to 55 who belonged to the Austria k. k. Landsturm and the Hungarian k. u. Landsturm. The Landsturm formed 40 regiments totaling 136 battalions in Austria and 32 regiments totaling 97 battalions in Hungary. The Landsturm was a reserve force intended to provide replacements for the first line units. However, the Landsturm provided 20 brigades who took to the field with the rest of the army.

The Standschützen (singular: Standschütze) were originally rifle guilds and rifle companies that had been formed in the 15th and 16th centuries, and were involved time and again in military operations within the borders of the Austrian County of Tyrol. A Standschütze was a member of a Schützenstand ("shooting club"), into which he was enrolled, which automatically committed him to the voluntary, military protection of the state of Tyrol (and Vorarlberg). In effect they were a type of Tyrolean local militia or home guard.

Wandruszka Adam / Urbanitsch Peter. Hrsg. (1987) Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918. Bd.5. Die Bewaffnete Macht. Wien: ÖAW.