Қысқа мерзімдік келісімдер мен стратегиялық байланыс: АҚШ-тың «байланыс» саясаты (Qysqa merzimdi kelisimder men strategiyalyq baylanys: AQSh-tyń «baylanys» sayasaty)

Cold War era American policy
Linkage was a foreign policy that was pursued by the United States and championed by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the 1970s détente, during the Cold War. The policy aimed to persuade the Soviet Union to co operate in restraining revolutions in the Third World in return for concessions in nuclear and economic fields. Soviet interventions occurred in various conflicts such as the Angolan Civil War, the Mozambican Civil War, and the Ogaden War, while many revolutions still occurred in Third World countries, undermining the policy. The premise behind linkage, as a policy, was to connect political and military issues. This established a relationship making progress in area "A" dependent on progress in area "B." An important aspect of the policy was that deviations from respecting the rights and interests would be punished. The intent of this retaliatory action was to highlight to the offending state the limitations of acceptable international behaviour and demonstrate that attempts at expansion and upsetting international stability would not be accepted. This meant that conflict itself would contribute to stabilising the international order. The Nixon Kissinger approach did not link foreign and domestic areas. Selective relaxation of tensions is an opposing policy to linkage. In that case, an issue of arms control could be addressed and tension diminished, with the status quo being maintained in other strategic areas.

There have been different uses of the term ‘linkage’ in reference to both domestic and international policy making. There is often debate over the true meaning of the term. Historians and academics have portrayed the meaning of ‘linkage’ in different lights. Common understandings of the term are that linkage means leverage – the linking of one event to another in order to maintain bargaining power or pressure on the opposing party involved. Another description of linkage comes from Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb. They describe linkage as "an up to date application of [Henry] Kissinger’s theories about balance of power." Specific types of linkages can be coercive or cooperative. They can also be prospective, such as promises or threats, and they can be retrospective, such as rewards or retaliation.

There are multiple theories behind linkage politics. The basic differences behind these theories are that the parties involved are either different or similar – with respect to their issue positions. For those parties that are different, the politics of linkage are based on the assumption that governments or parties involved make decisions as trade offs. Linkage is "established by the players’ beliefs that cooperative behaviour in one setting influences the prospects for cooperation in other settings." By connecting events or issues that are not necessarily connected in a particular way, governments can boost their political and economic situations by surrendering less important issues for those that have a greater, all round importance. For those parties that are similar, linkage politics are based on the observation that mutually beneficial exchange is more prevalent between similar countries. With similar issues, it becomes more about bargaining power and convincing the other country involved that they are receiving something worthwhile in return.

Linkage policy became significant during the time of détente during the Cold War. This meant a relaxing of tensions, mainly between the East and the West. By 1971, the newly established Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was ready to accept US ideas about relaxing tensions. This was for a number of reasons. The Soviet Union had issues with the Czechoslovakian Communist party in 1968 when their leader, Alexander Dubček, created reforms encouraging free speech and democracy.

During the Presidencies of both Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, linkage diplomacy was used as a key foreign policy measure. It was particularly aimed at the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger, who was Nixon's National Security Advisor, said that the aim of this policy was to "free [American] foreign policy from oscillations between overextension and isolation and to ground it in a firm conception of the national interest." Following the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement in 1972, both the US and the Soviet Union agreed to practise mutual restraint. The terms of the agreement were vague. This meant that Nixon and Kissinger interpreted it as a justification of their own actions. As a result of this, part of this administrations perception of linkage was to convince Soviet leaders that they would have motivation for moderation, and also punishment for a contradiction of the previous agreements they had signed. Kissinger objected the intervention from Congress as he believed foreign issues are better resolved quietly than publicly in Congress. In 1978 Brzezinski strove to link developments in the SALT II negotiations to revised Soviet behaviour in Africa. The Soviets had recently started constructing a military presence in Ethiopia, despite the US’ previously established relationship. After efforts of mediation from the Soviet Union failed, Somalia cut all ties and its friendship treaty with the USSR in 1977. The Soviet Union increased its presence by sending 10,000 soldiers into the country by early 1978. Another concern was the fall of the Shah in Iran in early 1979, and the perceived inability of the Carter administration to free the American hostages held there. This largely affected US policy and according to Brzezinski, led to the demise of détente. But when the Soviets wanted ‘unilateral advantage’ in Africa, the US wanted to punish them.

The US wanted to link their own issues with Soviet domestic policies. The SALT I agreement between the US and the Soviet Union in 1972 and the Basic Principles Agreement did not involve issues related to domestic policies. When the US did attempt to affect domestic policy in the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders regarded it as interfering in their internal affairs in an attempt to undermine their leadership.

The US had disenchanted some countries in its attempt to deal with Soviet aggressiveness and expansion. For example, Ethiopia became disenchanted after developments in the Ogaden War. Angola also became disenchanted because they could not get US support due to their ideological inclinations. This meant that Soviet intervention in Africa was partly because these disenchanted countries invited them.