Surinam Airways Flight 764

1989 aviation accident

Surinam Airways Flight 764 was an international scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam Airport Schiphol in the Netherlands to Paramaribo Zanderij International Airport in Suriname on a Surinam Airways DC 8 62. On Wednesday 7 June 1989, the flight crashed during approach to Paramaribo Zanderij, killing 176 of the 187 on board. It is the deadliest aviation disaster in Suriname's history. Investigation revealed significant deficiencies in the crew's training and judgement. They knowingly attempted to land using an inappropriate navigation signal and ignored alarms warning them of an impending crash. The safety issues stemming from the incident were of such concern that the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

The aircraft (named Anthony Nesty in honor of the Olympic swimmer) was a four engined McDonnell Douglas DC 8 62 passenger jet which had first flown in 1969 as part of the air fleet of Braniff International Airways. An NTSB brief shows that while the aircraft was owned by Braniff it was involved in a minor accident in 1979 in which there were no fatalities. The aircraft was sold to Surinam Airways shortly afterwards. The official report into the crash of Flight 764 made no indication that this previous incident contributed in any way to the subsequent fatal crash. The flight crew consisted of Captain Wilbert "Will" Rogers (66), First Officer Glyn Tobias (34) and Flight Engineer Warren Rose (65). Captain Rogers had a total of 19,450 flight hours, including 8,800 hours on the DC 8. The first officer and flight engineer had 6,600 flight hours and 26,600 flight hours respectively. The flight engineer also had 720 flight hours on the DC 8. There were six flight attendants on board. The team was an initiative of Dutch Surinamese social worker Sonny Hasnoe who worked with underprivileged children in disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Amsterdam. Many people of Surinamese origin lived in the city's Bijlmer district and were isolated from mainstream Dutch society. Hasnoe often found that he could engage the youngsters socially if they saw positive role models that had the same background as they did. He encouraged young boys to join football clubs and noted an improvement in their behaviour when they were playing sports as it gave them an opportunity to interact with their white contemporaries and so helped speed up the process of social integration. In 1986, Sonny Hasnoe organised the first match between a star selection of Surinamese Dutch professionals and SV Robinhood, champions of the domestic Surinamese competition. The match was a great success and further contests were arranged. The Colourful 11 were to play a match in Suriname in June 1989, however a number of players were denied permission to travel by their Dutch professional clubs. A group of eighteen "second stringers" travelled to Suriname instead.

A commission was set up by the Surinamese government to investigate the accident. The results of that investigation are described below. The final weather report sent to the aircraft accurately stated that there was visibility of 900 meters in dense fog, 1/4 cloud cover with a cloud base at 400 feet (122 m), and calm winds. This surprised the flight crew because previous weather information had given visibility of As a result, although the aircraft was cleared for a VOR/DME (VHF omnidirectional range/distance measuring equipment) approach, the crew initiated an ILS/DME approach. ILS navigational equipment is normally more accurate than VOR/DME equipment, but in this case, the ILS equipment at Zanderij airport, though transmitting signals, was not suitable nor available for operational use. The investigation showed that the crewmembers were aware of this. The cockpit voice recorder captured the first officer saying, "I don't trust that ILS", but the captain chose to use it regardless. He did instruct the first officer to tune the required navigational equipment for the functional VOR/DME approach, most likely for use as a gross error check. Because of the unreliability of the ILS signal, the aircraft descended too low, triggering several audible and visual warning signals. The crew ignored these warnings and also descended below the minimum altitude allowed for both the VOR/DME and ILS approaches without positive visual contact with the runway. The crew may have been motivated by the aircraft's low fuel state. The aircraft crashed at 04:27. The NTSB investigation also discovered that captain Rogers, at age 66, was over the maximum age (60) allowed for a captain on this flight. Additionally, he was not properly approved for operating the aircraft type, as his most recent check had been on a small, piston drive, twin engine aircraft instead of the DC 8. Partly as a result of name confusion in his check paperwork, this incorrect check went unnoticed by the airline. The co pilot had false identity papers. Perform ramp and en route inspections of air carriers operating aircraft under 14 CFR part 129 that are registered in the United States. Require air carriers operating into the United States under part 129 to provide the FAA with a list of the names, dates of birth, and certificate number of all captains and first officers operating airplanes into the United States. If pilots are found to have reached their 60th birthday, inform the air carrier that these pilots are not authorized to operate as either captain or copilot under the terms of the operations specifications issued in accordance with Part 129. (Class 11, Priority Action) (A 90 52)
Promulgate rules to regulate United States companies that provide pilots by contract to international air carriers. (Class 11, Priority Action) (A 90 53)