Смоленская битва 1941 года: Окружение и контрнаступления

Battle on the Eastern Front of World War II

The first Battle of Smolensk (Kesselschlacht bei Smolensk, 'Cauldron battle at Smolensk'; Lang ru) was a battle during the second phase of Operation Barbarossa, the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, in World War II. It was fought around the city of Smolensk between 10 July and 10 September 1941, about west of Moscow. The Ostheer had advanced into the USSR in the 18 days after the invasion on 22 June 1941. The Soviet 16th, 19th and the 20th armies were encircled and destroyed just to the east of Smolensk, though many of the men from the 19th and 20th armies managed to escape the pocket. While the battle was a stunning operational success for the Germans, the rapid advances into Soviet territory led to supply and logistics crises of increasing severity, as German supply lines were stretched to their limit. Following the Smolensk encirclement, much of Army Group Centre became mired in positional warfare, suffering significant losses in defensive battles throughout the late summer of 1941. These factors seriously depleted the offensive strength of the German divisions, and contributed to the disastrous setbacks later suffered in the Battle of Moscow in December 1941.

Prior to the German attack, the Soviets launched a counter offensive; on 6 July, the 7th and 5th Mechanized Corps of the Soviet 20th Army attacked with about 1,500 tanks near Lepiel. The result was a disaster, as the offensive ran directly into the anti tank defenses of the German 7th Panzer Division and the two Soviet mechanized corps were virtually wiped out. On 10 July, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group began a surprise attack over the Dnieper, his forces overran the weak 13th Army and by 13 July, Guderian had passed Mogilev, trapping several Soviet divisions. His spearhead unit, the 29th Motorised Division, was already within of Smolensk. The 3rd Panzer Group had attacked, with the 20th Panzer Division establishing a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dvina river, threatening Vitebsk. As both German panzer groups drove east, the 16th, 19th and 20th armies faced the prospect of encirclement west of Smolensk. From 11 July, the Soviets tried a series of concerted counter attacks. The Soviet 19th Army and 20th Army struck at Vitebsk, while the 21st and the remnants of the 3rd Army attacked against the southern flank of 2nd Panzer Group near Bobruisk. Several other Soviet armies also attempted to counter attack in the sectors of the German Army Group North and Army Group South. This effort was apparently part of an attempt to implement the Soviet prewar general defense plan. The Soviet attacks managed to slow the Germans but the results were so marginal that the Germans barely noticed them as a large coordinated defensive effort and the German offensive continued. Hoth's 3rd Panzer Group drove north and then east, parallel to Guderian's forces, taking Polotsk and Vitebsk. The 7th Panzer Division and 20th Panzer Division reached the area east of Smolensk at Yartsevo on 15 July. At the same time, the 29th Motorized Division, supported by the 17th Panzer Division broke into Smolensk, captured the city except for the suburbs and began a week of house to house fighting against counter attacks by the 16th Army. Guderian expected that the offensive would continue towards Moscow as its main focus and sent the 10th Panzer Division to the Desna River to establish a bridgehead on the east bank at Yelnya and cleared that as well by the 20th. This advanced bridgehead became the center of the Yelnya Offensive, one of the first big coordinated Soviet counter offensives of the war. This objective (Yelnya) was south of the Dnieper and well clear of the objective of liquidating the armies trapped at Smolensk. Under Fuhrer Directive 33 issued on 14 July, the main effort of the Wehrmacht was re orientated away from Moscow towards a deep encirclement of Kiev in Ukraine and Bock was becoming impatient, wanting Guderian to strike north and link up with Hoth's Panzer Group so resistance in the city could be mopped up. On 27 July, Bock held a conference at Novy Borisov, which was also attended by Commander in Chief Walther von Brauchitsch, the head of the OKH, the High Command of the Army. The generals were required to sit without an opportunity to comment, while a memorandum was read to them by one of Brauchitsch's aides, instructing them that they were to strictly follow Fuhrer Directive 33 and were under no circumstance to try to push further east. They were ordered to concentrate on mopping up, refurbishing equipment, restocking supplies and straightening the German front line, which had become more of an "S" shape, due to the advances of Guderian and Hoth. Coming away from this meeting, Hoth and Guderian were angry and frustrated. Guderian wrote in his journal that night that Hitler "preferred a plan by which small enemy forces were to be encircled and destroyed piecemeal and the enemy thus bled to death. All the officers who took part in the conference were of the opinion that this was incorrect". Whether or not this was true, it was this meeting that some have pointed to that marked a critical point where the Wehrmacht leadership broke trust with Hitler. After returning to his post, Guderian conspired with Hoth and Bock to "delay the implementation" of Directive 33, in defiance of the orders of the Fuhrer and OKH. Guderian hastily put together a plan of attack for his and Hoth's forces for 1 August, the Roslavl Novozybkov Offensive Operation. In the north, the 3rd Panzer Group was moving much more slowly. The terrain was swampy, made worse by rain and the Soviets were fought to escape the trap. On 18 July, the armored pincers of the two panzer groups came within of closing the gap. Timoshenko put newly promoted Konstantin Rokossovsky, who had just arrived from the Ukrainian front, in charge of assembling a stopgap force, which held the attack of the 7th Panzer Division and with continuous reinforcements, temporarily stabilized the situation. The open gap allowed Soviet units to escape that were then pressed into service, holding the gap open. The Soviets transferred additional troops from newly formed armies into the region around Smolensk, namely the 29th, 30th, 28th, and 24th Armies. These newly built formations would, immediately upon arrival, start a heavy counter attack against the German forces around the Smolensk area from 21 July on. This put a heavy strain on the overextended Panzer forces, which had to cover a large area around the perimeter. However, poor coordination and logistics on the part of the Soviets allowed the Germans to successfully defend against these offensive efforts, while continuing to close the encirclement. The Soviet attacks would last until 30 July, when the Germans finally repelled the last of them. Finally, on 27 July, the Germans were able to link up and close the pocket east of Smolensk, trapping large portions of 16th, 19th, and 20th Armies. Under the leadership of 20th Army, Soviet troops managed to break out of the pocket in a determined effort a few days later, assisted by the Soviet offensive efforts along the Smolensk front line. On 5 August von Bock reported that a total of 309,000 prisoners had been captured during the Battle of Smolensk at all. This number later increased to 350,000. Thus, only about 50,000 people from the encircled 16th and 20th armies escaped from the "cauldron" by 7 August.

After the battle for encirclement near Smolensk ended on 5 August, the opponents drew different conclusions. The Soviet command was satisfied that they managed to restore the front line on the road to Moscow and save part of the encircled armies. It was decided to continue to strike at the opposing German forces, despite high losses. Thus, from their point of view, the battle was just beginning. In the following month, there were two major Soviet offensives: 6–24 August and 29 August – 12 September 1941. Soviets did make progress and pushed Germans back, but movement forward was rather slow. The main reason for this was the quality of German defense. Soviets small unit tactics were implemented with depleted companies even before the operation began, as seen on the example of the 900th Rifle Regiment, which was part of the 242nd Rifle Division. Rifle Regiment attacking village of Svity was composed of 79 rifles (soldiers able to attack the enemy). Staying on small unit tactics, switch to night operations yielded good results and Soviets were not only able to close in on enemy positions but to push the Germans back in close combat. Clandestine movement to get as close as possible to the German positions, quiet sprint to the positions, and engagement, including rifle fire and bayonet attack. Attacks on this sector would be supported by artillery, both anti aircraft used in ground role and divisional level support in the form of Artillery Support Group (ASG) 900. German small unit opposing the 900th Rifle Regiment at this time were the elements of the 240th Infantry Regiment of the 106th Infantry Division, and 900 Mechanized Lehr Brigade and its Panzerjäger 1 tank destroyers. After initial night attack described above, the Germans adjusted and began counterattacking and winning the ground they would lose earlier in the night, inflicting heaviest casualties in 25 July to 5 August. Heavy casualties were by Soviet small unit leader's assessments, not by current assessments of Western historians. Specifics: 200 Soviet soldiers involved in the night attack which was not successful. 5th Rifle Company (of 2nd Rifle Battalion, 900th Rifle Regiment) reported 18 MIA, 11 wounded. The 519th Anti Aircraft Artillery Battalion which was attacking the German positions with it reported 4 KIA, 7 WIA from that one attack. Total 7 KIA, 18 MIA, 18 WIA. This is radically different than assessments made before about the methodology of Soviet attacks and how the casualties were sustained versus Germans in general. Lets look at this in detail. First reason for this discovery may be in that the Soviet regimental, company, and personal documents of soldiers are not usually examined, and the small unit losses would be extrapolated from divisional level, at best. Most quality authors would be doing small unit combat loss assessments from statistical analysis of Krivosheev's work on Soviet combat losses, which is a very large data set Front, STAVKA and above level. Extrapolations from large data sets led them to the conclusion that the attacks themselves were a lot bloodier than they actually were due to losses sustained from bombings and artillery bombardments, or many other scenarios which caused legitimate Soviet divisional level losses, for example. Another reason still, is the fact that same Soviet units would be attacking over the span of days, resulting in accumulation of losses over time, and not sustaining it in a single attack. In other words, tip of the Soviet spear may of been being blunted at a slower rate, while casualties around the would be attained by other means as well. Soviet small unit attack methodologies may of not been as ignorant or casualty producing as originally thought. Back to the operational level. On the part of the Germans, opinions were divided: von Bock believed that the battle was over, and after rest and replenishment, the troops of Army Group Center could continue their successful offensive against Moscow. However, Hitler was preoccupied with the stubborn defense of the Soviet Southwestern Front near Kiev and the increasing resistance of the Soviet troops of Zhukov and Timoshenko in the Moscow direction. On the other hand, Guderian's victory at Roslavl, on the right flank of Army Group Center, opened up the possibility of an attack to the south and a gigantic encirclement of Soviet troops near Kiev. Gradually, OKH leaned towards Hitler's opinion. However, neither Bock nor Hitler planned an immediate offensive directly on Moscow, and the need to constantly repel Soviet strikes exhausted the troops. Von Bock wrote: "I was now forced to commit all of my combat capable divisions from the army group’s reserve into combat We needed every man forward In spite of huge losses the enemy attacked daily in several sectors so that, up to this time, it has not been possible to regroup forces and bring up reserves." Thus, in the next month after the elimination of the "cauldron" near Smolensk, von Bock's armies defended themselves in the center and attacked with limited forces on the flanks. In the south, Guderian won the battles near Gomel and Krichev, and in the north, Group Stumme captured Velikiye Luki and advanced further to the east to Andreapol. Most of the attacks of the Soviet troops were successfully repelled, but the Germans had to be withdrawn from the salient near Yelnya.

During the battle, the German army captured the Archives of Smolensk Oblast Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a large amount of documents about local history from 1917 to 1941. The Germans used the document for propaganda about Soviet repression and transported them back to Germany. The Battle of Smolensk was another severe defeat for the Red Army in the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa. For the first time, the Soviets tried to implement a coordinated counter attack against a large part of the front; although this counter attack turned into a military disaster, the stiffening resistance showed that the Soviets were not yet defeated and that the Blitzkrieg towards Moscow was not going to be an easy undertaking. Dissent within the German high command and political leadership was exacerbated. The leaders of the General Staff, Franz Halder and Brauchitsch and commanders like Bock, Hoth and Guderian counselled against dispersing the German armoured units and to concentrate on Moscow. Hitler reiterated the lack of importance of Moscow and of strategic encirclements and ordered a concentration on economic targets such as Ukraine, the Donets Basin and the Caucasus, with more tactical encirclements to weaken the Soviets further. The German offensive effort became more fragmented, leading to the Battle of Kiev and the Battle of Uman. The battles were German victories but costly in time, men and equipment on their approach towards Moscow, allowing the Soviets time to prepare the defenses of the city.