Попытка государственного переворота в Венесуэле в 1992 году.
February 1992 Venezuelan coup attempt
Попытка переворота в Венесуэле 1992 года: Угон власти Уго Чавесом и МРБ-200. Экономические реформы, протесты, жертвы и выход Чавеса на политическую арену.
Сравнивайте с английским: нажмите на абзац — оригинал откроется в окне. Кнопка EN под абзацем показывает его прямо в тексте.
Содержание
Введение
Попытка государственного переворота в Венесуэле
Coup d'état attempt in Venezuela
Венесуэльская попытка государственного переворота в феврале 1992 года — это попытка захвата власти в Венесуэле, предпринятая Революционным боливарианским движением 200 (MBR 200) во главе с Уго Чавесом, произошедшая 4 февраля 1992 года. Переворот был направлен против президента Карлоса Андреса Переса и произошел в период экономических реформ, направленных на снижение уровня задолженности страны, которые вызвали массовые протесты и социальные волнения. Несмотря на неудачу в свержении правительства Карлоса Андреса, февральская попытка переворота выдвинула Чавеса на передний план общественной жизни. В ходе боев во время переворота погибли по меньшей мере 143 человека, возможно, до нескольких сотен. Венесуэла переживала период модернизации и имела один из самых высоких показателей ВВП на душу населения в своей истории при обменном курсе 4 боливара за 1 доллар США. Чрезмерные государственные расходы на программы привели к огромному долгу, росту бедности, инфляции и безработицы, в то время как доходы населения снижались.
The Venezuelan coup attempt of February 1992 was an attempt to seize control of the government of Venezuela by the Hugo Chávez led Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement 200 (MBR 200) that took place on 4 February 1992. The coup was directed against President Carlos Andrés Pérez and occurred in a period marked by economic liberalization reforms, which were attempted in order to decrease the country's level of indebtedness and had caused major protests and social unrest. Despite their failure to depose the government of Carlos Andrés, the February coup attempts brought Chávez into the national spotlight. Fighting during the coup resulted in the deaths of at least 143 people and possibly as many as several hundred. Venezuela experienced modernization and had one of the highest GDP per capita in its history, while also having an exchange rate of 4 bolivares per 1 US dollar. The government's overspending on programs caused massive levels of debt with poverty, inflation and unemployment rising while income declined.
Происхождение
Многие из участников переворотов были членами Партидо де ла Революсьон Венесолана (PRV) в 1970-х годах. PRV была создана бывшим коммунистом и партизаном Дугласом Браво, который после неудачного вооруженного восстания стремился внедриться в вооруженные силы Венесуэлы, чтобы прийти к власти. Таким образом, подготовка к перевороту началась более чем за десять лет до переизбрания Переса в 1988 году. Организаторы переворота отвергали правящую двухпартийную систему в Венесуэле между двумя политическими партиями, Демократическим Действием и COPEI, которую они считали коррумпированным и клиентелистским истеблишментом. Движение Боливарианская революционная партия 200 (MBR 200) было основано в 1982 году подполковником Уго Чавесом Фриасом, к которому позже присоединился Франсиско Ариас Карденас. Они использовали венесуэльского героя независимости Симона Боливара в качестве символа своей группы. Их основной жалобой была коррупция Карлоса Андреса Переса, а также продолжающиеся экономические трудности Венесуэлы и социальные потрясения. По мнению этих двух людей, для того чтобы произошли социальные перемены, необходимо было изменить всю политическую систему. В феврале 1989 года, незадолго до Каракасо, кубинский президент Фидель Кастро предположительно разместил спящих агентов в Венесуэле для создания беспорядков. Поскольку Куба недавно вступила в Специальный период и испытывала экономические трудности в результате перестройки Советского Союза, Кастро предположительно стремился установить союзника в Венесуэле, чтобы Куба также могла пользоваться доходами от нефтяных прибылей. С началом революций 1989 года в советских государствах, Кастро предположительно начал организовывать переворот в конце 1989 года, который косвенно использовал бы спящих агентов, участвовавших в Каракасо. Кастро, который, как утверждается, был одним из главных организаторов, согласно венесуэльскому майору Орландо Мадрису Бенитесу, вместо этого использовал Чавеса в качестве лица гражданско-военной акции, чтобы избежать ответных действий со стороны Соединенных Штатов. Несмотря на то, что это официально не подтверждено, многочисленные источники утверждают, что Куба участвовала в попытках государственного переворота и содействовала им. Аналитик ЦРУ Брайан Латэлл предположил, что кубинское разведывательное агентство Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) могло использовать Чавеса для достижения кубинского стратегического доминирования в Венесуэле и ее нефтяных запасах. По мнению Лателла, DGI мог либо нанять Чавеса в качестве агента, либо оказать критическую помощь его заговорщикам. Лателл утверждает, что Куба ранее участвовала в усилиях по дестабилизации Венесуэлы, оказывая помощь партизанам в 1960-х годах. По словам генерала Карлоса Хулио Пеньялозы в его книге "El Delfín de Fidel", как Фидель Кастро, так и преемник президента Венесуэлы Рафаэль Кальдера знали о заговоре Чавеса. Кастро предположительно предоставил агентов, чтобы убедить президента Переса в отсутствии угрозы переворота. Первоначально запланированный на декабрь 1991 года, Чавес отложил переворот MBR 200 до ранних сумерек 4 февраля 1992 года. Чавес в то время имел поддержку около 10% военных сил Венесуэлы. В этот день пять армейских подразделений под командованием Чавеса вошли в городской Каракас, чтобы захватить ключевые военные и коммуникационные объекты по всему городу, включая президентскую резиденцию (Дворец Мирафлорес), министерство обороны, военный аэропорт Ла Карлота и Военный музей. Конечная цель Чавеса состояла в том, чтобы перехватить Переса, взять его под стражу и предположительно казнить его до возвращения в Мирафлорес из зарубежной поездки, планируя захватить президента в аэропорту Майкетия. Президент смог сбежать из дворца и позвонил генералу Очоа, сказав: "Никаких переговоров. Дайте им пули. Я хочу вернуться как можно скорее". Тем не менее, повстанческие силы в других частях Венесуэлы быстро продвинулись вперед и, при помощи спонтанной гражданской поддержки, взяли под контроль такие крупные города, как Валенсия, Маракайбо и Маракай. Однако войска Чавеса не смогли захватить Каракас, поскольку он оставался в Военном музее. Чавес вскоре сдался правительству. Ему было разрешено появиться на национальном телевидении, чтобы призвать все оставшиеся повстанческие отряды в Венесуэле прекратить боевые действия. Когда он это сделал, Чавес знаменито пошутил по национальному телевидению, что потерпел неудачу лишь "por ahora" ("пока"):
Many of the participants in the coups had been members of the Partido de la Revolución Venezolana (PRV) in the 1970s. The PRV was created by ex Communist and guerrilla fighter Douglas Bravo, who after failing in an armed insurrection, sought to infiltrate the Venezuelan armed forces to reach power. Thus, preparation for the coup began more than ten years before Pérez was re elected in 1988. The coup organizers rejected the ruling bipartisanship in Venezuela between the two political parties, Democratic Action and COPEI, which they saw as a corrupt and clientelist establishment. The Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR 200) was founded in 1982 by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías, who was later joined by Francisco Arias Cárdenas. They used the Venezuelan independence hero Simón Bolívar as their group's symbol. Their main complaint was the corruption of Carlos Andrés Pérez as well as Venezuela's ongoing economic difficulties and social turmoil. In the view of these two men, the entire political system had to be changed in order for social change to occur. In February 1989 shortly before the Caracazo, Cuban president Fidel Castro allegedly placed sleeper agents in Venezuela to create unrest. With Cuba recently entering its Special Period and experiencing economic difficulties as a result of the Soviet Union's Perestroika, Castro allegedly sought to establish an ally in Venezuela so Cuba could also enjoy funds from oil profits. As the Revolutions of 1989 occurred in Soviet states, Castro had allegedly began to organize a coup in late 1989 that would indirectly use sleeper agents who participated in the Caracazo. Castro, who was allegedly one of the main organizers according to Venezuelan Major Orlando Madriz Benítez, would instead use Chávez as the face of a civil military action in order to avoid retaliatory actions from the United States. While officially unconfirmed, Cuban involvement in and facilitation of the coup attempts was alleged by multiple sources. CIA analyst Brian Latell suggested that the Cuban intelligence agency, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), may have utilized Chávez to fulfill Cuban strategic dominance of Venezuela and its oil reserves. In Latell's view, the DGI may have either hired Chávez as an agent or provided critical aid to his coup plots. Latell claims Cuba had previously engaged in efforts to destabilize Venezuela by aiding guerrillas in the 1960s. According to General Carlos Julio Peñaloza in his book El Delfín de Fidel, both Fidel Castro and the succeeding President of Venezuela, Rafael Caldera, knew of Chávez's coup plot. Castro allegedly provided agents to convince President Pérez that there was no threat of a coup. Initially planned for December 1991, Chávez delayed the MBR 200 coup until the early twilight hours of 4 February 1992. Chávez at the time held the loyalty of some 10% of Venezuela's military forces. On that date, five army units under Chávez's command moved into urban Caracas to seize key military and communications installations throughout the city, including the presidential residence (Miraflores Palace), the defense ministry, La Carlota military airport, and the Military Museum. Chávez's ultimate goal was to intercept Pérez, take custody of him and allegedly execute him before he returned to Miraflores from an overseas trip, planning to capture the president at Maiquetía airport. The president was then able to escape from the palace and then called General Ochoa saying, "No negotiations. Give them bullets. I want to be back in soon". Nevertheless, rebel forces in other parts of Venezuela made swift advances and took control of such large cities as Valencia, Maracaibo, and Maracay with the help of spontaneous civilian aid. Chávez's forces, however, had failed to take Caracas since he remained inside the Military Museum. Chávez soon gave himself up to the government. He was then allowed to appear on national television to call for all remaining rebel detachments in Venezuela to cease hostilities. When he did so, Chávez famously quipped on national television that he had only failed "por ahora" ("for now"):
blockquote|Comrades: Unfortunately, for the moment, the objectives that we had set for ourselves have not been achieved in the capital. That's to say that those of us here in Caracas have not been able to seize power. Where you are, you have performed well, but now is the time for a rethink; new possibilities will arise again, and the country will be able to move definitively toward a better future. Despite Chávez's military failure, he was immediately catapulted into the national spotlight due to his action, with many poor Venezuelans seeing him as a figure who had stood up against government corruption and kleptocracy. Afterward, Chávez was imprisoned at the San Carlos military stockade.
"Товарищи: К сожалению, на данный момент цели, которые мы перед собой поставили, не достигнуты в столице. То есть, те из нас, кто находится здесь, в Каракасе, не смогли захватить власть. Там, где вы находитесь, вы справились хорошо, но сейчас пришло время переосмыслить ситуацию; новые возможности вновь возникнут, и страна сможет окончательно двигаться к лучшему будущему."
Many of the participants in the coups had been members of the Partido de la Revolución Venezolana (PRV) in the 1970s. The PRV was created by ex Communist and guerrilla fighter Douglas Bravo, who after failing in an armed insurrection, sought to infiltrate the Venezuelan armed forces to reach power. Thus, preparation for the coup began more than ten years before Pérez was re elected in 1988. The coup organizers rejected the ruling bipartisanship in Venezuela between the two political parties, Democratic Action and COPEI, which they saw as a corrupt and clientelist establishment. The Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR 200) was founded in 1982 by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías, who was later joined by Francisco Arias Cárdenas. They used the Venezuelan independence hero Simón Bolívar as their group's symbol. Their main complaint was the corruption of Carlos Andrés Pérez as well as Venezuela's ongoing economic difficulties and social turmoil. In the view of these two men, the entire political system had to be changed in order for social change to occur. In February 1989 shortly before the Caracazo, Cuban president Fidel Castro allegedly placed sleeper agents in Venezuela to create unrest. With Cuba recently entering its Special Period and experiencing economic difficulties as a result of the Soviet Union's Perestroika, Castro allegedly sought to establish an ally in Venezuela so Cuba could also enjoy funds from oil profits. As the Revolutions of 1989 occurred in Soviet states, Castro had allegedly began to organize a coup in late 1989 that would indirectly use sleeper agents who participated in the Caracazo. Castro, who was allegedly one of the main organizers according to Venezuelan Major Orlando Madriz Benítez, would instead use Chávez as the face of a civil military action in order to avoid retaliatory actions from the United States. While officially unconfirmed, Cuban involvement in and facilitation of the coup attempts was alleged by multiple sources. CIA analyst Brian Latell suggested that the Cuban intelligence agency, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), may have utilized Chávez to fulfill Cuban strategic dominance of Venezuela and its oil reserves. In Latell's view, the DGI may have either hired Chávez as an agent or provided critical aid to his coup plots. Latell claims Cuba had previously engaged in efforts to destabilize Venezuela by aiding guerrillas in the 1960s. According to General Carlos Julio Peñaloza in his book El Delfín de Fidel, both Fidel Castro and the succeeding President of Venezuela, Rafael Caldera, knew of Chávez's coup plot. Castro allegedly provided agents to convince President Pérez that there was no threat of a coup. Initially planned for December 1991, Chávez delayed the MBR 200 coup until the early twilight hours of 4 February 1992. Chávez at the time held the loyalty of some 10% of Venezuela's military forces. On that date, five army units under Chávez's command moved into urban Caracas to seize key military and communications installations throughout the city, including the presidential residence (Miraflores Palace), the defense ministry, La Carlota military airport, and the Military Museum. Chávez's ultimate goal was to intercept Pérez, take custody of him and allegedly execute him before he returned to Miraflores from an overseas trip, planning to capture the president at Maiquetía airport. The president was then able to escape from the palace and then called General Ochoa saying, "No negotiations. Give them bullets. I want to be back in soon". Nevertheless, rebel forces in other parts of Venezuela made swift advances and took control of such large cities as Valencia, Maracaibo, and Maracay with the help of spontaneous civilian aid. Chávez's forces, however, had failed to take Caracas since he remained inside the Military Museum. Chávez soon gave himself up to the government. He was then allowed to appear on national television to call for all remaining rebel detachments in Venezuela to cease hostilities. When he did so, Chávez famously quipped on national television that he had only failed "por ahora" ("for now"):
blockquote|Comrades: Unfortunately, for the moment, the objectives that we had set for ourselves have not been achieved in the capital. That's to say that those of us here in Caracas have not been able to seize power. Where you are, you have performed well, but now is the time for a rethink; new possibilities will arise again, and the country will be able to move definitively toward a better future. Despite Chávez's military failure, he was immediately catapulted into the national spotlight due to his action, with many poor Venezuelans seeing him as a figure who had stood up against government corruption and kleptocracy. Afterward, Chávez was imprisoned at the San Carlos military stockade.
Несмотря на военный провал, Чавес немедленно оказался в центре внимания благодаря своим действиям, и многие бедные венесуэльцы видели в нем человека, который выступил против коррупции и злоупотреблений властью в правительстве. После этого Чавес был заключен в тюрьму в военном лагере Сан-Карлос.
Many of the participants in the coups had been members of the Partido de la Revolución Venezolana (PRV) in the 1970s. The PRV was created by ex Communist and guerrilla fighter Douglas Bravo, who after failing in an armed insurrection, sought to infiltrate the Venezuelan armed forces to reach power. Thus, preparation for the coup began more than ten years before Pérez was re elected in 1988. The coup organizers rejected the ruling bipartisanship in Venezuela between the two political parties, Democratic Action and COPEI, which they saw as a corrupt and clientelist establishment. The Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR 200) was founded in 1982 by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías, who was later joined by Francisco Arias Cárdenas. They used the Venezuelan independence hero Simón Bolívar as their group's symbol. Their main complaint was the corruption of Carlos Andrés Pérez as well as Venezuela's ongoing economic difficulties and social turmoil. In the view of these two men, the entire political system had to be changed in order for social change to occur. In February 1989 shortly before the Caracazo, Cuban president Fidel Castro allegedly placed sleeper agents in Venezuela to create unrest. With Cuba recently entering its Special Period and experiencing economic difficulties as a result of the Soviet Union's Perestroika, Castro allegedly sought to establish an ally in Venezuela so Cuba could also enjoy funds from oil profits. As the Revolutions of 1989 occurred in Soviet states, Castro had allegedly began to organize a coup in late 1989 that would indirectly use sleeper agents who participated in the Caracazo. Castro, who was allegedly one of the main organizers according to Venezuelan Major Orlando Madriz Benítez, would instead use Chávez as the face of a civil military action in order to avoid retaliatory actions from the United States. While officially unconfirmed, Cuban involvement in and facilitation of the coup attempts was alleged by multiple sources. CIA analyst Brian Latell suggested that the Cuban intelligence agency, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), may have utilized Chávez to fulfill Cuban strategic dominance of Venezuela and its oil reserves. In Latell's view, the DGI may have either hired Chávez as an agent or provided critical aid to his coup plots. Latell claims Cuba had previously engaged in efforts to destabilize Venezuela by aiding guerrillas in the 1960s. According to General Carlos Julio Peñaloza in his book El Delfín de Fidel, both Fidel Castro and the succeeding President of Venezuela, Rafael Caldera, knew of Chávez's coup plot. Castro allegedly provided agents to convince President Pérez that there was no threat of a coup. Initially planned for December 1991, Chávez delayed the MBR 200 coup until the early twilight hours of 4 February 1992. Chávez at the time held the loyalty of some 10% of Venezuela's military forces. On that date, five army units under Chávez's command moved into urban Caracas to seize key military and communications installations throughout the city, including the presidential residence (Miraflores Palace), the defense ministry, La Carlota military airport, and the Military Museum. Chávez's ultimate goal was to intercept Pérez, take custody of him and allegedly execute him before he returned to Miraflores from an overseas trip, planning to capture the president at Maiquetía airport. The president was then able to escape from the palace and then called General Ochoa saying, "No negotiations. Give them bullets. I want to be back in soon". Nevertheless, rebel forces in other parts of Venezuela made swift advances and took control of such large cities as Valencia, Maracaibo, and Maracay with the help of spontaneous civilian aid. Chávez's forces, however, had failed to take Caracas since he remained inside the Military Museum. Chávez soon gave himself up to the government. He was then allowed to appear on national television to call for all remaining rebel detachments in Venezuela to cease hostilities. When he did so, Chávez famously quipped on national television that he had only failed "por ahora" ("for now"):
blockquote|Comrades: Unfortunately, for the moment, the objectives that we had set for ourselves have not been achieved in the capital. That's to say that those of us here in Caracas have not been able to seize power. Where you are, you have performed well, but now is the time for a rethink; new possibilities will arise again, and the country will be able to move definitively toward a better future. Despite Chávez's military failure, he was immediately catapulted into the national spotlight due to his action, with many poor Venezuelans seeing him as a figure who had stood up against government corruption and kleptocracy. Afterward, Chávez was imprisoned at the San Carlos military stockade.
Попытка государственного переворота в ноябре 1992 года
27 ноября 1992 года была предпринята вторая попытка государственного переворота. Возглавили её офицеры военно-воздушных сил и военно-морского флота, в том числе пилоты. Группа поддерживала связь с Чавесом, находившимся в тюрьме, и учла ошибки февральской попытки, включая начало действий в 4:30 утра вместо полуночи, а также приобретение средств связи, чтобы избежать ситуации, когда они останутся без них.
On 27 November 1992, a second coup attempt was launched. It was led by officers from the air force and navy, including pilot The group had contacts with Chávez in prison and had learned some lessons from the February coup's errors, including launching at 4:30 am instead of midnight, and obtaining communications equipment to ensure they would not be stranded without it.
Ответ правительства
В процессе подавления попыток государственного переворота, по сообщениям, правительственные агенты убили 40 человек, включая гражданских лиц и сдавшихся повстанцев, либо в результате внесудебных казней, либо с применением несоразмерной силы. Произвольные задержания исчислялись сотнями, продолжались некоторое время после событий и затронули студенческих лидеров и других общественных деятелей, не имевших отношения к попыткам переворота. Помимо этого, свобода выражения мнений была приостановлена на два месяца в феврале и на три недели в ноябре, сопровождаясь цензурой средств массовой информации. Серия демонстраций в марте/апреле с требованием отставки президента Переса и восстановления конституционных гарантий была встречена государственным насилием, включая беспорядочную стрельбу полиции по толпе, в результате чего погибло тринадцать человек.
In the process of resisting the coup attempts, government agents were reported to have killed 40 people, both civilians and surrendered rebels, either as extrajudicial executions or with disproportionate force. Arbitrary detentions numbered in the hundreds, continued for some time after the events, and included student leaders and other civic leaders not connected with the coup attempts. In addition, freedom of expression was suspended for two months in the February case and three weeks in the November case, with censorship of the media. A series of demonstrations in March/April calling for the resignation of President Pérez and the restoration of constitutional guarantees were met with state violence, including indiscriminate police firing into crowds, with a total of thirteen deaths.
Последствия
С ростом непопулярности Переса, вызванной реформами либерализации и попытками государственного переворота, двупартийная система в стране ослабла. Беспорядки и провалившиеся перевороты были использованы бывшим президентом Рафаэлем Кальдерой, который, по некоторым сведениям, должен был прийти к власти в случае успеха переворота. Благодаря умелым политическим маневрам Кальдера выиграл президентские выборы 1993 года, заручившись поддержкой разношерстной и нетрадиционной группы небольших независимых политических партий, объединенных под названием "Национальное единство". В ходе своей предвыборной кампании Кальдера обещал амнистировать участников заговоров, и впоследствии выполнил это обещание, что позволило Уго Чавесу принять участие (и победить) на президентских выборах 1998 года. Некоторые из лидеров переворотов впоследствии играли заметную роль в политической жизни Венесуэлы, наиболее ярким примером стали президентские выборы 2000 года, на которых губернатор штата Сулия и лидер партии "Радикальное дело" Франсиско Ариас Карденас, командовавший в Маракайбо во время попытки переворота 4 февраля, выступил кандидатом от оппозиции, бросив вызов действующему президенту Чавесу, стремящемуся к переизбранию. Карденас и Чавес вместе набрали 97% всех голосов избирателей.
With Pérez's growing unpopularity due to liberalization reforms and the coup attempts, the bipartisanship system in the country weakened. The turmoil and failed coups were used by former president Rafael Caldera, who according to some versions was supposed to take power following the coup. Swift political maneuvering allowed Caldera to win the 1993 presidential election with a heterogeneous and non traditional group of small independent political parties, named "National Convergence". As part of his campaign Caldera promised to pardon the coup plotters and later did so, which allowed Hugo Chávez to participate in (and win) the 1998 presidential election. Some coup leaders later dominated the political scenario in Venezuela, most notable case was the 2000 presidential election, in which Zulia governor and Radical Cause leader, Francisco Arias Cárdenas, commandant in Maracaibo during February 4 coup d'état attempt, was the opposition candidate, challenging president Chávez who sought re election. Both Cárdenas and Chávez monopolized 97% of all votes cast.
Медиа
В декабре 1992 года газета Los Angeles Times обратила внимание на возможные причины попыток государственных переворотов в Венесуэле, указав на рецессию в Латинской Америке и коррупцию в правительстве. Los Angeles Times предположила, что эти попытки переворота могли быть также предприняты коррумпированными венесуэльскими офицерами с целью захвата власти и получения прибыли от наркоторговли.
In December 1992, the Los Angeles Times focused on the possible causes of the attempted coups in Venezuela, noting the recession in Latin America and corruption in the government. The Los Angeles Times stated that the coup attempts could also be the efforts of corrupt Venezuelan officers seeking take over the government and make money from drugs.