Ізілдік дилеммалар: философиялық талдау

Type of dilemma in philosophy
In philosophy, an ethical dilemma, also called an ethical paradox or moral dilemma, is a situation in which two or more conflicting moral imperatives, none of which overrides the other, confront an agent. A closely related definition characterizes an ethical dilemma as a situation in which every available choice is wrong. The term is also used in a wider sense in everyday language to refer to ethical conflicts that may be resolvable, to psychologically difficult choices or to other types of difficult ethical problems. This article concerns ethical dilemmas in the strict philosophical sense, often referred to as genuine ethical dilemmas. Various examples have been proposed but there is disagreement as to whether these constitute genuine or merely apparent ethical dilemmas. The central debate around ethical dilemmas concerns the question of whether there are any. Defenders often point to apparent examples while their opponents usually aim to show their existence contradicts very fundamental ethical principles. Ethical dilemmas come in various types. An important distinction concerns the difference between epistemic dilemmas, which give a possibly false impression to the agent of an unresolvable conflict, and actual or ontological dilemmas. There is broad agreement that there are epistemic dilemmas but the main interest in ethical dilemmas takes place on the ontological level. Traditionally, philosophers held that it is a requirement for good moral theories to be free from ethical dilemmas. But this assumption has been questioned in contemporary philosophy.

A person is in an ethical dilemma if they stand under several conflicting moral obligations and no obligation overrides the others. Two ethical requirements are conflicting if the agent can do one or the other but not both: the agent has to choose one over the other. Two conflicting ethical requirements do not override each other if they have the same strength or if there is no sufficient ethical reason to choose one over the other. Only this type of situation constitutes an ethical dilemma in the strict philosophical sense, often referred to as a genuine ethical dilemma. In this example, the duty to keep a promise stands in conflict with the duty to prevent that others are harmed. It is questionable whether this case constitutes a genuine ethical dilemma since the duty to prevent harms seems to clearly outweigh the promise. Another well known example comes from Jean Paul Sartre, who describes the situation of one of his students during the German occupation of France. This student faced the choice of either fighting to liberate his country from the Germans or staying with and caring for his mother, for whom he was the only consolation left after the death of her other son. The conflict, in this case, is between a personal duty to his mother and the duty to his country. In it, a Nazi guard forces Sophie to choose one of her children to be executed, adding that both will be executed if she refuses to choose. This case is different from the other examples in which the conflicting duties are of different types. This type of case has been labeled symmetrical since the two duties have the same type. Many decisions in everyday life, from a trivial choice between differently packaged cans of beans in the supermarket to life altering career choices, involve this form of uncertainty. But unresolvable conflicts on the epistemic level can exist without there actually being unresolvable conflicts and vice versa. The main interest in ethical dilemmas is concerned with on the ontological level: whether there actually are genuine dilemmas in the form of unresolvable conflicts between moral requirements, not just whether the agent believes so. Utilitarians, for example, could argue that this depends on which broken promise results in the least harm to all concerned.

An obligation is an ethical requirement to act in a certain way while a prohibition is an ethical requirement to not act in a certain way. Most discussions of ethical dilemmas focus on obligation dilemmas: they involve two conflicting actions that the agent is ethically required to perform. Prohibition dilemmas, on the other hand, are situations in which no course of action is allowed. It has been argued that many arguments against ethical dilemmas are only successful in regard to obligation dilemmas but not against prohibition dilemmas.

Ethical dilemmas involve two courses of action that are both obligatory but stand in conflict with each other: it is not possible to perform both actions. In regular single agent cases, a single agent has both conflicting obligations. In multi agent cases, the actions are still incompatible but the obligations concern different people. These cases of conflicts between different types of duties can be contrasted with conflicts in which one type of duty conflicts with itself, for example, if there is a conflict between two long term obligations. Such cases are often called symmetric cases.

The problem of the existence of ethical dilemmas concerns the question of whether there are any genuine ethical dilemmas, as opposed to, for example, merely apparent epistemic dilemmas or resolvable conflicts. Support for it comes from the fact that the consequence of even simple actions are often too vast for us to properly anticipate. According to this interpretation, we mistake our uncertainty about which course of action outweighs the other for the idea that this conflict is not resolvable on the ontological level. Opponents can respond by arguing that the appropriate response is not guilt but regret, the difference being that regret is not dependent on the agent's previous choices. By cutting the link to the possibly dilemmatic choice, the initial argument loses its force. But without a further argument, this line of thought just begs the question against the defender of ethical dilemmas, who may simply deny the claim that all conflicts can be resolved this way. A different type of argument proceeds from the nature of moral theories. According to various authors, it is a requirement for good moral theories that they should be action guiding by being able to recommend what should be done in any situation. But this is not possible when ethical dilemmas are involved. So these intuitions about the nature of good moral theories indirectly support the claim that there are no ethical dilemmas.