Кеңес маршалы Александр Василевский өмірі мен әскери жолы

Marshal of the Soviet Union

Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Vasilevsky (lang ru ) (30 September 1895 – 5 December 1977) was a Soviet career officer in the Red Army who attained the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1943. He served as the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces (1942–1945) and Deputy Minister of Defense during World War II, and as Minister of Defense from 1949 to 1953. As the Chief of the General Staff from 1942 to 1945, Vasilevsky became involved in planning and coordinating almost all the decisive Soviet offensives in World War II, from the Operation Uranus of November 1942 to the assaults on East Prussia (January–April 1945), Königsberg (January–April 1945) and Manchuria (August 1945). Vasilevsky began his military career during World War I, earning the rank of captain by 1917. After the October Revolution of 1917 and the start of the Civil War of 1917–1922 he was conscripted into the Red Army, taking part in the Polish Soviet War of 1919–1921. In peacetime he quickly rose through the ranks, becoming a regimental commander by 1930. In this position he showed great skill in organizing and training his troops. Vasilevsky's talent was noticed, and in 1931 he was appointed a member of the Directorate of Military Training. In 1937, following Stalin's Great Purge, he was promoted to become a General Staff officer. At the start of the 1943 Soviet counteroffensive of World War II, Vasilevsky coordinated and executed the Red Army's offensives on the upper Don, in the Donbas, Crimea, Belarus and the Baltic states, ending his war in Europe with the capture of Königsberg in April 1945. In July 1945 he was appointed Commander in Chief of Soviet forces in the Far East. He executed the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation (August 1945). After the war he became the Soviet Defense Minister from 1949 to 1953, a position he held until after Stalin's death in 1953. With Nikita Khrushchev's rise to pre eminence in the mid 1950s, Vasilevsky began losing power and was eventually pensioned off. After his death he was buried in the Kremlin Wall necropolis in recognition of his past service and contributions to his country.

Vasilevsky was born on September 30, 1895, in Novaya Golchikha in the Kineshma Uyezd (now part of the city of Vichuga, Ivanovo Oblast) in a family of Russian ethnicity. Vasilevsky was the fourth of eight children. His father, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Vasilevsky, was a priest to the nearby St. Nicholas Church. His mother, Nadezhda Ivanovna Sokolova, was the daughter of a priest in the nearby village of Ugletz. Vasilevsky reportedly broke off all contact with his parents after 1926 because of his Communist Party membership and his military duties in the Red Army; three of his brothers did so also. However, the family resumed relations in 1940, following Joseph Stalin's suggestion that they do so. According to Vasilevsky, his family was extremely poor. His father spent most of his time working to earn money, while the children assisted by working in the fields. In 1897, the family moved to Novopokrovskoe, where his father became a priest to the newly built Ascension Church, and where Aleksandr began his education in the church school. In 1909, he entered Kostroma seminary, which required considerable financial sacrifice on the part of his parents. The same year, a ministerial directive preventing former seminarists from starting university studies initiated a nationwide seminarist movement, with classes stopping in most Russian seminaries. Vasilevsky, among others, was expelled from Kostroma, and only returned several months later, after the seminarists' demands had been satisfied.

After completing his studies in the seminary and spending a few years working as a teacher, Vasilevsky intended to become an agronomist or a surveyor, but the outbreak of the First World War changed his plans. According to his own words, he was "overwhelmed with patriotic feelings" and decided to become a soldier instead. Vasilevsky took his exams in January 1915 and entered the Alexander Military Law Academy in February. As he recalls, "I did not decide to become an officer to start a military career. I still wanted to be an agronomist and work in some remote corner of Russia after the war. I could not suppose that my country would change, and I would." After four months of courses that he later considered to be completely outdated, theoretical, and inappropriate for modern warfare, he was sent to the front with the rank of praporshchik, the highest non commissioned rank in the Russian infantry, in May 1915. From June to September, Vasilevsky was assigned to a series of reserve regiments, and finally arrived at the front in September as a half company commander (polurotny) in the 409th Novokhopersky regiment, 109th division, 9th Army. In the spring of 1916, Vasilevsky took command of a company, which eventually became one of the most recognized in the regiment. In May 1916, he led his men during the Brusilov offensive, becoming a battalion commander after heavy casualties among officers, and gaining the rank of captain by age 22. In November 1917, just after the Russian Revolution, Vasilevsky decided to end his military career. As he wrote in his memoirs, "There was a time when I led soldiers to battle, thinking I was doing my duty as a Russian patriot. However, I understood that we have been cheated, that people needed peace Therefore, my military career had to end. With no remorse, I could go back to my favorite occupation, working in the field." He travelled from Romania, where his unit was deployed in 1917, back to his own village. In December 1917, while back at home, Vasilevsky learned that the men of the 409th regiment, which had been relocated to Ukraine, had elected him as their commander (at the start of the Russian Revolution, commanders were elected by their own men). However, the local military authorities recommended that he decline the proposal because of the heavy fighting taking place in Ukraine between pro Soviet forces and the pro independence Ukrainian government (the Central Rada). He followed this advice and became a drill instructor in his own Kineshma uezd. He retired in September 1918 and became a school teacher in the Tula Oblast. In April 1919, Vasilevsky was again conscripted into the Red Army and sent to command a company fighting against peasant uprisings and assisting in the emergency Soviet policy of prodrazvyorstka, which required peasants to surrender agricultural surplus for a fixed price. Later that year, Vasilevsky took command of a new reserve battalion, and, in October 1919, of a regiment. However, his regiment never took part in the battles of the Russian Civil War, as Anton Denikin's troops never got close to Tula. In December 1919, Vasilevsky was sent to the Western front as a deputy regimental commander, participating in the Polish Soviet War. As deputy regimental commander of the 427th regiment, 32nd brigade, 11th division, Vasilevsky participated at the battle of Berezina, pulling back as the Polish forces had been slowly but steadily advancing eastward, and in the subsequent counterattack that began on May 14, 1920, breaking through Polish lines before being stopped by cavalry counterattacks. Later, starting from July 4, 1920, he took part at the Soviet offensive towards Wilno, advancing to the Neman River despite heavy Polish resistance and German fortifications erected in the region during World War I. Vasilevsky's regiment arrived near Wilno by mid July and stayed there on a garrison duty until the Treaty of Riga.

After the Treaty of Riga, Vasilevsky fought against remaining White forces and peasant uprisings in Belarus and in the Smolensk Oblast until August 1921. By 1930, he had served as the regimental commander of the 142nd, 143rd, and 144th rifle regiments, and Boris Shaposhnikov. Shaposhnikov, in particular, would become Vasilevsky's protector until the former's death in 1945. Vasilevsky's connections and good performance earned him an appointment to the Directorate of Military Training in 1931. While at the Directorate of Military Training, Vasilevsky supervised the Red Army's training and worked on military manuals and field books. He also met several senior military commanders, such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Georgy Zhukov, then the Deputy Cavalry Inspector of the Red Army. Zhukov would later characterize Vasilevsky as "a man who knew his job as he spent a long time commanding a regiment and who earned great respect from everybody." In 1934, Vasilevsky was appointed to be the Senior Military Training Supervisor of the Volga Military District (Privolzhsky voyenny okrug). where he studied important aspects of military strategy and other topics under experienced generals, including Mikhail Tukhachevsky. By mid 1937, Stalin's Great Purge eliminated a significant number of senior military commanders, vacating a number of positions on the General Staff. To his amazement, Vasilevsky was appointed to the General Staff in October 1937 and held "responsible for operational training of senior officers." As a senior officer, Vasilevsky met frequently with Joseph Stalin. During one of these meetings, Stalin asked Vasilevsky about his family. Since Vasilevsky's father was a priest and thus a potential "enemy of the people", Vasilevsky said that he had ended his relationship with them in 1926. Stalin, surprised, suggested that he reestablish his family ties at once, and help his parents with whatever needs they might have. making him one of the key figures in the Soviet military leadership. At the end of September 1941, Vasilevsky gave a speech before the General Staff, describing the situation as extremely difficult, but pointing out that the northern part of the front was holding, that Leningrad still offered resistance, and that such a situation would potentially allow some reserves to be gathered in the northern part of the front. In October 1941, the situation at the front was becoming critical, with German forces advancing towards Moscow during Operation Typhoon. As a representative of the Soviet General Staff (Stavka), Vasilevsky was sent to the Western Front to coordinate the defense and guarantee a flow of supplies and men towards the region of Mozhaisk, where Soviet forces were attempting to contain the German advance. During heavy fighting near the outskirts of Moscow, Vasilevsky spent all of his available time both in the Stavka and on the front line trying to coordinate the three fronts committed to Moscow's defense. When most of the General Staff (including its chief Marshal Shaposhnikov) was evacuated from Moscow, Vasilevsky remained in the city as liaison between the Moscow Staff and the evacuated members of the General Staff. In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev described Vasilevsky as an "able specialist" even so early in the war. On October 28, 1941, Vasilevsky was promoted to Lieutenant General. The Battle of Moscow was a very difficult period in Vasilevsky's life, with the Wehrmacht approaching close enough to the city for German officers to make out some of Moscow's buildings through their field glasses. As he recalls, his workday often ended at 4 a. m. Moreover, with Marshal Shaposhnikov having fallen ill, Vasilevsky had to make important decisions by himself. On October 29, 1941, a bomb exploded in the courtyard of the General Staff. Vasilevsky was slightly wounded but continued working. The kitchen was damaged by the explosion, and the General Staff was relocated underground without hot food. Nevertheless, the Staff continued to function. In December 1941, Vasilevsky coordinated the Moscow counteroffensive, and by early 1942, the general counteroffensive in the Moscow and Rostov directions, further motivated in his work by the return of his evacuated family to Moscow. In April 1942, he coordinated the unsuccessful elimination of the Demyansk pocket, the encirclement of the German 2nd Army Corps near Leningrad. On April 24, with Shaposhnikov seriously ill again, Vasilevsky was appointed as acting Chief of Staff and promoted to Colonel General on April 26.

In May 1942 one of the most controversial episodes in Vasilevsky's career occurred: the Second Battle of Kharkov, a failed counteroffensive that led to a stinging Red Army defeat, and ultimately to a successful German offensive (Operation Blue) in the south. After repelling the enemy from Moscow, Soviet morale was high and Stalin was determined to launch another general counteroffensive during the summer. However, Vasilevsky recognized that "the reality was more harsh than that." Following Stalin's orders, the Kharkov offensive was launched on May 12, 1942. When the threat of encirclement became obvious, Vasilevsky and Zhukov asked for permission to withdraw the advancing Soviet forces. Stalin refused, leading to the encirclement of the Red Army forces and a total defeat. In his memoirs, Khrushchev accused Vasilevsky of being too passive and indecisive, as well as being unable to defend his point of view in front of Stalin during that particular operation. In June 1942, Vasilevsky was briefly sent to Leningrad to coordinate an attempt to break the encirclement of the 2nd Shock Army led by General Andrei Vlasov. On June 26, 1942, Vasilevsky was appointed Chief of the General Staff, and, in October 1942, Deputy Minister of Defense. Two months later, on November 19, with Stalingrad still unconquered, Operation Uranus was launched. Since Zhukov had been sent to near Rzhev to execute Operation Mars (the Rzhev counteroffensive), Vasilevsky remained near Stalingrad to coordinate the double pincer attack that ultimately led to the German defeat This plan sparked some debate between Vasilevsky and Rokossovsky, who wanted an additional army for clearing Stalingrad, which Rokossovsky continued to mention to Vasilevsky even years after the war. The army in question was Rodion Malinovsky's 2nd Guards' which Vasilevsky committed against a dangerous German counter attack launched from Kotelnikovo by the 57th Panzer corps that was designed to deblockade the Stalingrad pocket.

In January 1943, Vasilevsky coordinated the offensives on the upper Don River near Voronezh and Ostrogozhsk, leading to decisive encirclements of several Axis divisions. Vasilevsky's car rolled over a mine during an inspection of Sevastopol after the fighting ended on May 10, 1944. He received a head wound, cut by flying glass, and was evacuated to Moscow for recovery. During Operation Bagration, the general counteroffensive in Belarus, Vasilevsky coordinated the offensives of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts. When Soviet forces entered the Baltic states, Vasilevsky assumed complete responsibility for all the Baltic fronts, discarding the 3rd Belorussian. On July 29, 1944, he was made Hero of the Soviet Union for his military successes. For the brilliant successes at Königsberg and in Eastern Prussia, Vasilevsky was awarded his second Order of Victory.

During the 1944 summer offensive, Stalin announced that he would appoint Vasilevsky Commander in Chief of USSR Forces in the Far East once the war against Germany ended. Vasilevsky began drafting the war plan for Japan by late 1944 and began full time preparation by April 27, 1945. In June 1945, Stalin approved his plan. Vasilevsky then received the appointment of Commander in Chief of USSR Forces in the Far East and travelled by armoured train to Chita to execute the plan. During the preparation phase, Vasilevsky further rehearsed the offensive with his army commanders and directed the start of Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, also known as the Battle of Manchuria. In twenty four days, from August 9 to September 2, 1945, Japanese armies in Manchukuo were defeated, with just 37,000 casualties out of 1,600,000 troops on the USSR side. For his success in this operation, Vasilevsky was awarded his second Hero of the Soviet Union decoration on September 8. Vasilevsky later re married to Ekaterina Vasilievna Saburova, with whom he had a son named Igor (born 1935). Igor went on to become a well known architect, and was recipient of the title of Honored Architect of the Russian Federation and the State Prize of Czechoslovakia. Igor is married to the daughter of Soviet statesman Ivan Tevosian. Vasilevsky's actions and personality were sometimes the object of dispute, while less controversial than those of Zhukov. In particular, Nikita Khrushchev defined Vasilevsky in his memoirs as a passive commander completely under the control of Stalin, and blamed him for the Kharkov failure in Spring 1942. Among Vasilevsky's strongest critics was Rokossovsky, who criticized Vasilevsky's decisions during the Stalingrad counteroffensive, especially his refusal to commit the 2nd Army to the annihilation of the encircled German divisions, and for general interference with his own work. Rokossovsky even wrote in his memoirs: "I do not even understand what role could Zhukov and Vasilevsky play on Stalingrad front." In fairness to Vasilevsky it needs noting that he diverted the 2nd army from the assault on the Stalingrad pocket only in order to commit it against a dangerous German counter attack from Kotelnikovo, designed to deblockade the pocket, which was enjoying great numerical superiority. Vasilevsky, it seems, was dismayed by Rokossovsky's opposition to the transfer. On the other hand, the writer Victor Suvorov held up Vasilevsky over Zhukov. According to him, Vasilevsky was the only officer responsible for the successful planning and execution of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad, and Zhukov played no role whatsoever in it. He claimed that Vasilevsky was the best Soviet military commander and that Soviet victory was mainly due to his actions as the Chief of Staff. According to Suvorov, Zhukov and the Soviet propaganda machine tried, after the war, to reduce the role of the General Staff (and thus Vasilevsky's importance) and to increase the role of the Party and Zhukov. A post 1991 view on Vasilevsky was elaborated by Mezhiritzky in his book, Reading Marshal Zhukov. Mezhiritzky points out Vasilevsky's timidity and his inability to defend his opinions before Stalin. Reportedly, Vasilevsky was appointed to such high military positions because he was easy to manage. However, Mezhiritzky recognizes Vasilevsky's intelligence and assumes that Vasilevsky was indeed the main author of the Stalingrad counteroffensive. He also points out that Vasilevsky and Zhukov probably deliberately under reported the estimated strength of the 6th Army to gain Stalin's approval for that risky operation.