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Leader in an electoral race

In politics, a front runner (also spelled frontrunner or front runner) is a leader in an electoral race. While the front runner in athletic events (the namesake of the political concept) is generally clear, a political front runner, particularly in the presidential primary process, is less so as a potential nominee may lead in the polls, have the most name recognition, the most funds raised, or a combination of these. The front runner is most often declared by the media who are following the race and is written about in a different style than his or her challengers.

The word front runner originated in the United States. The term emerged from foot racing. It was used by 1914. However the Dictionary of American Slang says it meant "the leader in a contest, election, etc." by that year. By the 1980s a new definition for front running emerged from the commodities market in which the word was also used as a noun. The definition was used to describe "a type of fraud in which a trader withholds a large customer order so that he can personally profit from its effect on the market." It is a combination of frontrunner and –itis, a suffix frequently used informally to describe a tendency or mood that is comparable to a disease. The term was used by that time to describe "the condition of being a leading candidate." However Safire says the modern usage of the word front runner has "ominous overtones" of being likely to eventually lose. As an example he references Franklin D. Roosevelt's receiving a letter from Robert W. Woolley about Roosevelt's front runner status early in his 1932 presidential campaign: "Herein lies the danger automatically you become the target of the other candidates, real and potential. There isn't a single favorite son whose delegation won't be held out of the Roosevelt column so long as there is a reasonable chance of getting something for that favorite son, even at your expense." Safire gives another example when he quotes Ted Sorensen's thoughts about John F. Kennedy's front runner status during his 1960 presidential campaign: "There were disadvantages in being the 'front runner.' The Senator's critics became more open and vocal and his every word was politically interpreted." Safire argues that the front runner "must come thundering into the convention increasing his speed and with enough 'kick' left for a final spurt" to be successful. He quotes Thomas E. Dewey writing about his losing the 1940 Republican presidential nomination as an example: "When the balloting starts, every candidate wants to show enough strength to be one of the leaders on the first ballot. He also wants to have enough strength in reserve so he can gain on the psychologically important second ballot. For example, in 1940, I led on the first three ballots out of six—the wrong three. I lost ground on the second ballot. That was the beginning of the end and everybody knew it."

David Greenberg, associate professor of History and of Journalism and Media Studies at Rutgers University, states that front runners decided by early polls often do not win the nomination. Greenberg notes that early polls decided Birch Bayh in the 1976 Democratic primary, Ted Kennedy in the 1980 Democratic primary, Jesse Jackson in the 1988 Democratic primary, Jerry Brown in the 1992 Democratic primary, Howard Dean in the 2004 Democratic primary and Herman Cain in the 2012 Republican primary as front runners, all of whom lost the nomination. Greenberg suggests that the futility of most early front runners reflects early polls' unreliability and in particular, their respondents' indifference to the candidates. He notes that indifference is especially justified for electorates whose state primary runs during the later stages of the race. He cites David Karol, a political scientist, who says that "[t]he media don't always report the numbers that say 'not sure' or 'don't know enough.'" Debate analysts and scholars recognize that the front runner is often attacked more frequently by the other candidates. It is a common strategy of the front runner's opponents, especially for long shot candidates. During the December 2, 1999 Republican primary debate, almost all attacks were directed against the front runner George W. Bush. Long shot candidates Gary Bauer, Orrin Hatch and Alan Keyes significantly contributed to the mass attack. In a debate featuring the 1988 Democratic primary candidates, long shot candidates "gang[ed] up" on the front runner. Analysis on a 1992 primary debate showed that the front runner received the most attacks. However, excessively attacking the front runner can hurt one's image and support from viewers. In the December 2, 1999 Republican primary debate, all 10 of Steve Forbes' attacks were made against George W. Bush, contributing to over half of the total attacks that targeted Bush. Steve Forbes experienced a negative effect on his image and lost all support he had from a sample of 91 viewers before the debate. Although reasons other than excessive attacking may have contributed to Forbes' decline, viewers had "a clear negative reaction to his constant attack of Bush." John McCain, who made no attacks, had his image improved and his support from the viewers increased. This suggests that a front runner's opponent may be more successful if they "attack in moderation." It may also suggest that if the opponent is recognized by viewers as a "legitimate contender," they can benefit from refraining from attacks and "permitting the larger field of [long shot candidates] to do the dirty work of attacking a front runner." This would allow the opponent to project "a more positive message" about their ideas.