Екінші дүниежүзілік соғыстағы Қытай-Бирма-Үндістан театр операциясы

U. S. military designation during WWII for U. S. forces in East, Southeast, and South Asia

China Burma India Theater (CBI) was the United States military designation during World War II for the China and Southeast Asian or India–Burma (IBT) theaters. Operational command of Allied forces (including U. S. forces) in the CBI was officially the responsibility of the Supreme Commanders for South East Asia or China. In practice, U. S. forces were usually overseen by General Joseph Stilwell, the Deputy Allied Commander in China; the term "CBI" was significant in logistical, material and personnel matters; it was and is commonly used within the US for these theaters. U. S. and Chinese fighting forces in the CBI included the Chinese Expeditionary Force, the Flying Tigers, transport and bomber units flying the Hump, including the Tenth Air Force, the 1st Air Commando Group, the engineers who built the Ledo Road, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), popularly known as "Merrill's Marauders", and the 5332d Brigade, Provisional or 'Mars Task Force', which assumed the Marauders' mission.

Japanese policy towards China had long been a source of international controversy. Western powers had exploited China through the open door policy, advocated by United States diplomat William Woodville Rockhill, while Japan intervened more directly, creating the puppet state of Manchukuo. By 1937, Japan was engaged in a full scale war of conquest in China. The infamous Rape of Nanking galvanized Western opinion and led to direct financial aid for the Kuomintang (Nationalists) and increasing economic sanctions against Japan. In 1941, the U. S. made a series of decisions to support China in its war with Japan: Lend Lease supplies were provided after President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the defense of China to be vital to the defense of the United States. Over the summer, as Japan moved south into French Indo China, the U. S., Britain and the Netherlands instituted an oil embargo on Japan, cutting off 90% of its supplies. The embargo threatened the operations of the Kwantung Army, which had over a million soldiers deployed in China. Japan responded with a tightly co ordinated offensive on 7/8 December, simultaneously attacking Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, Guam, Wake Island, and Thailand. Japan cut off Allied supplies to China that had been coming through Burma. China could be supplied only by flying over the Himalaya mountains ("The Hump") from India, or capturing territory in Burma and building a new road—the Ledo Road.

In 1941 and 1942, Japan was overextended. Its naval base could not defend its conquests, and its industrial base could not strengthen its navy. To cut off China from Allied aid, it went into Burma and captured Rangoon on 8 March 1942, cutting off the Burma Road. Moving north, the Japanese took Tounggoo and captured Lashio in northern Burma on 29 April. The British, primarily concerned with India, looked to Burma as the main theater of action against Japan and wanted Chinese troops to fight there. The United States conjured up visions of millions of Chinese soldiers who would hold the Japanese then throw them back, while providing close in airbases for a systematic firebombing of Japanese cities. Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai shek realized it was all fantasy. On the other hand, there were vast sums of American dollars available if he collaborated. He did so and managed to feed his starving soldiers, but they were so poorly equipped and led that offensive operations against the Japanese in China were impossible. However, Chiang did release Chinese Expeditionary Force of two Chinese armies for action in Burma under Stilwell. Due to conflicts between Chiang, the British, Stilwell, and American General Claire Chennault, as well as general ill preparedness against the more proficient Japanese army, the Burma defense collapsed. Stilwell escaped to India, but the recovery of Burma and construction of the Ledo Road to supply China became a new obsession for him. "On April 14, 1942, William Donovan, as Coordinator of Information (forerunner of the Office of Strategic Services), activated Detachment 101 for action behind enemy lines in Burma. The first unit of its kind, the Detachment was charged with gathering intelligence, harassing the Japanese through guerrilla actions, identifying targets for the Army Air Force to bomb, and rescuing downed Allied airmen. Because Detachment 101 was never larger than a few hundred Americans, it relied on support from various tribal groups in Burma. In particular, the vigorously anti Japanese Kachin people were vital to the unit's success." Detachment 101's efforts opened the way for Stilwell's Chinese forces, Wingate's Raiders, Merrill's Marauders, and the counter attack against the Japanese Imperial life line.

US forces in the CBI were administered by General Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell. However, unlike other combat theaters, for example the European Theater of Operations, the CBI was never a "theater of operations" and did not have an overall operational command structure. Initially U. S. land units were split. Those in China were technically commanded by Generalissimo Chiang Kai shek, as Stillwell was Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander in China. When the GALAHAD force (later to become the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)) arrived in Bombay in October 1943, it came under the British led South East Asia Command (SEAC) and Admiral Lord Mountbatten. However, Stilwell often broke the chain of command and communicated directly with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on operational matters. When joint allied command was agreed upon, it was decided that the senior position should be held by a British officer because the British had the greatest number of forces in India and Burma (in much the same way as the US did in the Pacific War). Admiral Lord Mountbatten was appointed as the Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia forces in October 1943. Chiang however later objected to deferring to Mountbatten on matters related to operations in China. General Stilwell, who also had operational command of the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), a US Chinese formation, was to report in theory to Gen. George Giffard – commander of Eleventh Army Group – so that NCAC and the British Fourteenth Army, under the command of General William Slim, could be co ordinated. However, in practice, Gen. Stilwell never agreed to this arrangement. Stilwell was able to do this because of his multiple positions within complex command structures, including especially his simultaneous positions of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, and Chief of Staff to Chinese leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai shek. As SEAC's deputy leader, Stilwell was Giffard's superior, but as operational commander of NCAC, Giffard was Stilwell's superior. As the two men did not get on, this inevitably lead to conflict and confusion. Eventually at a SEAC meeting to sort out the chain of command for NCAC, Stilwell astonished everyone by saying "I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing". Although far from ideal, this compromise was accepted. Although Stilwell was the control and co ordinating point for all command activity in the theater, his assumption of personal direction of the advance of the Chinese Ledo forces into north Burma in late 1943 meant that he was often out of touch with both his own headquarters and with the overall situation. Not until late 1944, after Stilwell was recalled to Washington, was the chain of command clarified. His overall role, and the CBI command, was then split among three people: Lt Gen. Raymond Wheeler became Deputy Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia; Major General Albert Wedemeyer became Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai shek, and commander of US Forces, China Theater (USFCT). Lt Gen. Daniel Sultan was promoted, from deputy commander of CBI to commander of US Forces, India–Burma Theater (USFIBT) and commander of the NCAC. The 11th Army Group was redesignated Allied Land Forces South East Asia (ALFSEA), and NCAC was decisively placed under this formation. However, by the time the last phase of the Burma Campaign began in earnest, NCAC had become irrelevant, and it was dissolved in early 1945.

Ramgarh Training Center, in Bihar Province, India, an American staffed, American operated organisation, was established on 30 June 1942 by General Stilwell, the Commanding General, USAF, CBI, for the training of Chinese troops in India. The Supreme Commander, China Theater, General Chiang Kai Shek, had approved Ramgarh Cantonment, as the site for a training center to train, equip, and reinforce the Chinese troops that had retreated into India from Burma. The first Chinese troops arrived on 17 July 1942. Headquarters RTC and Hq Camp Ramgarh combined and CG RTC assumed command on 1 February 1943. (These two organizations and Hq Chinese Army in India were the three original command organizations at Ramgarh.) Headquarters Ramgarh Training Center was responsible for the training of Chinese Army in India, and Headquarters Chinese Army in India was responsible for the activation, organization, administration, and command of Chinese units.

Lee, Lloyd, ed. World War II in Asia and the Pacific and the War's aftermath, with General Themes: A Handbook of Literature and Research. (1998) online edition
Resor, Eugene. The China Burma India Campaign, 1931–1945: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography (1998) online