Акциялық премия жұмбағы

Economics concept

The equity premium puzzle refers to the inability of an important class of economic models to explain the average equity risk premium (ERP) provided by a diversified portfolio of equities over that of government bonds, which has been observed for more than 100 years. There is a significant disparity between returns produced by stocks compared to returns produced by government treasury bills. The equity premium puzzle addresses the difficulty in understanding and explaining this disparity. The risk premium represents the compensation awarded to the equity holder for taking on a higher risk by investing in equities rather than government bonds.

The term was coined by Rajnish Mehra and Edward C. Prescott in a study published in 1985 titled "The Equity Premium: A Puzzle". An earlier version of the paper was published in 1982 under the title "A test of the intertemporal asset pricing model". The authors found that a standard general equilibrium model, calibrated to display key U. S. business cycle fluctuations, generated an equity premium of less than 1% for reasonable risk aversion levels. This result stood in sharp contrast with the average equity premium of 6% observed during the historical period. In 1982, Robert J. Shiller published the first calculation that showed that either a large risk aversion coefficient or counterfactually large consumption variability was required to explain the means and variances of asset returns. Azeredo (2014) shows, however, that increasing the risk aversion level may produce a negative equity premium in an Arrow Debreu economy constructed to mimic the persistence in U. S. consumption growth observed in the data since 1929. The intuitive notion that stocks are much riskier than bonds is not a sufficient explanation of the observation that the magnitude of the disparity between the two returns, the equity risk premium (ERP), is so great that it implies an implausibly high level of investor risk aversion that is fundamentally incompatible with other branches of economics, particularly macroeconomics and financial economics. The process of calculating the equity risk premium, and selection of the data used, is highly subjective to the study in question, but is generally accepted to be in the range of 3–7% in the long run. Dimson et al. calculated a premium of "around 3–3.5% on a geometric mean basis" for global equity markets during 1900–2005 (2006). However, over any one decade, the premium shows great variability—from over 19% in the 1950s to 0.3% in the 1970s. In 1997, Siegel found that the actual standard deviation of the 20 year rate of return was only 2.76%. This means that for long term investors, the risk of holding the stock of a smaller than expected can be derived only by looking at the standard deviation of annual earnings. For long term investors, the actual risks of fixed income securities are higher. Through a series of reasoning, the equity premium should be negative. To quantify the level of risk aversion implied if these figures represented the expected outperformance of equities over bonds, investors would prefer a certain payoff of $51,300 to a 50/50 bet paying either $50,000 or $100,000. The puzzle has led to an extensive research effort in both macroeconomics and finance. So far a range of useful theoretical tools and numerically plausible explanations have been presented, but no one solution is generally accepted by economists.

Much data exists that says that stocks have higher returns. For example, Jeremy Siegel says that stocks in the United States have returned 6.8% per year over a 130 year period. Proponents of the capital asset pricing model say that this is due to the higher beta of stocks, and that higher beta stocks should return even more. Others have criticized that the period used in Siegel's data is not typical, or the country is not typical.

Azeredo (2014) showed that traditional pre 1930 consumption measures understate the extent of serial correlation in the U. S. annual real growth rate of per capita consumption of non durables and services ("consumption growth"). They hypothesized that extreme economic events such as the Great Depression, the World Wars and the Great Financial Crisis resulted in equity holders demanding high equity premiums to account for the possibility of the significant loss they could suffer if these events were to materialise. As such, when these extreme economic events do not occur, equity holders are rewarded with higher returns. However, Julliard and Ghosh concluded that rare events are unlikely to explain the equity premium puzzle because the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model was rejected by their data and much greater risk aversion levels were required to explain the equity premium puzzle. They rely on two assumptions about decision making to support theory; loss aversion and mental accounting. A problem for this model is the lack of a general model of portfolio choice and asset valuation for prospect theory. A second class of explanations is based on relaxation of the optimization assumptions of the standard model. The standard model represents consumers as continuously optimizing dynamically consistent expected utility maximizers. These assumptions provide a tight link between attitudes to risk and attitudes to variations in intertemporal consumption which is crucial in deriving the equity premium puzzle. Solutions of this kind work by weakening the assumption of continuous optimization, for example by supposing that consumers adopt satisficing rules rather than optimizing. An example is info gap decision theory, based on a non probabilistic treatment of uncertainty, which leads to the adoption of a robust satisficing approach to asset allocation.

Another explanation of the equity premium puzzle focuses on the characteristics of equity that cannot be captured by typical models but are still consistent with optimisation by investors. The most significant characteristic that is not typically considered is the requirement for equity holders to monitor their activity and have a manager to assist them. Therefore, the principal agent relationship is very prevalent between corporation managers and equity holders. If an investor was to choose to not have a manager, it is likely costly for them to monitor the activity of the corporations that they invest in and often rely heavily on auditors or they look to the market hypothesis in which information about asset values in the equity markets are exposed. This hypothesis is based on the theory that an investor who is inexperienced and uninformed can bank on the fact that they will get average market returns in an identifiable market portfolio, which is questionable as to whether or not this can be done by an uninformed investor. Although, as per the characteristics of equity in explaining the premium, it is only necessary to hypothesise that people looking to invest do not think they can reach the same level of performance of the market. Another explanation related to the characteristics of equity was explored by a variety of studies including Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Bansal and Coleman (1996) and Palomino(1996)and was in relation to liquidity. Palomino described the noise trader model that was thin and had imperfect competition is the market for equities and the lower its equilibrium price dropped the higher the premium over risk free bonds would rise. to be a result of variations over time of taxes and particularly its effect on interest and dividend income. It is difficult however to give credibility to this analysis due to the difficulties in calibration utilised as well as ambiguity surrounding the existence of any noticeable equity premium before 1945. Even given this, it is evident that the observation that equity premium changes arising from the distortion of taxes over time should be taken into account and give more validity to the equity premium itself. Related data is mentioned in the Handbook of the Equity Risk Premium. Beginning in 1919, it captured the post World War I recovery, while omitting wartime losses and low pre war returns. After adding these earlier years, the arithmetic average of the British stock premium for the entire 20th century is 6.6%, which is about 21/4% lower than the incorrect data inferred from 1919 1999.

Graham and Harvey have estimated that, for the United States, the expected average premium during the period June 2000 to November 2006 ranged between 4.65 and 2.50. They found a modest correlation of 0.62 between the 10 year equity premium and a measure of implied volatility (in this case VIX, the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index). Dennis, Mayhew & Stivers (2006) find that changes in implied volatility have an asymmetric effect on stock returns. They found that negative changes in implied volatility have a stronger impact on stock returns than positive changes in implied volatility. The authors argue that such an asymmetric volatility effect can be explained by the fact that investors are more concerned with downside risk than upside potential. That is, investors are more likely to react to negative news and expect negative changes in implied volatility to have a stronger impact on stock returns. The authors also find that changes in implied volatility can predict future stock returns. Stocks that experience negative changes in implied volatility have higher expected returns in the future. The authors state that this relationship is caused by the association between negative changes in implied volatility and market downturns. Yan (2011) presents an explanation for the equity premium puzzle using the slope of the implied volatility smile. The implied volatility smile refers to the pattern of implied volatilities for options contracts with the same expiration date but different strike prices. The slope of the implied volatility smile reflects the market's expectations for future changes in the stock price, with a steeper slope indicating higher expected volatility. The author shows that the slope of the implied volatility smile is a significant predictor of stock returns, even after controlling for traditional risk factors. Specifically, stocks with steeper implied volatility smiles (i. e., higher jump risk) have higher expected returns, consistent with the equity premium puzzle. The author argues that this relationship between the slope of the implied volatility smile and stock returns can be explained by investors' preference for jump risk. Jump risk refers to the risk of sudden, large movements in the stock price, which are not fully captured by traditional measures of volatility. Yan argues that investors are willing to accept lower average returns on stocks that have higher jump risk, because they expect to be compensated with higher returns during times of market stress.

The simplest scientific interpretation of the puzzle suggests that consumption optimization is not responsible for the equity premium. More precisely, the timeseries of aggregate consumption is not a leading explanatory factor of the equity premium. The human brain is (simultaneously) engaged in many strategies. Each of these strategies has a goal. While individually rational, the strategies are in constant competition for limited resources. Even within a single person this competition produces a highly complex behavior which does not fit any simple model. Nevertheless, the individual strategies can be understood. In finance this is equivalent to understanding different financial products as information derivatives i. e. as products which are derived from all the relevant information available to the customer. If the numerical values for the equity premium are unknown, the rational examination of the equity product would have accurately predicted the observed ballpark values. These include costs to acquire information, broker fees, taxes, load fees and the bid ask spread. As such, when shareholders attempt to capitalise on the equity premium by adjusting their asset allocation and purchasing more stocks, they incur significant trading costs which eliminate the gains from the equity premium. The justification here is that over half of the stock exchanges that were operating in early 1900s were discontinued, and the equity risk premium calculated does not account for this. Note however that most mainstream economists agree that the evidence shows substantial statistical power. Benartzi & Thaler analyzed the equity returns over a 200 year period, between 1802 and 1990 and found that whilst equity returns were remained stable between 5.5% and 6.5%, return on government bonds fell significantly from around 5% to 0.5%. Moreover, analysis of how faculty members funded their retirement showed that people who had invested in stocks received much higher returns than people who had invested in government bonds. Therefore essentially, a large risk premium in society where asset prices are a reflection of consumer preferences, implies that the cost of welfare is also large. It also means that in recessions, welfare costs are excessive regardless of aggregate consumption. As the equity premium rises, recession state income marginal values steadily increase also thus further increasing the welfare costs of recessions. This also brings about questions regarding the need for microeconomic policies that operate by way of higher productivity in the long run by trading off short term pain in the form of adjustment costs. Given the impact on welfare through recessions and the large equity premium, it is evident that these short term trade offs as a result of economic policy are likely not ideal, and would be preferred to take place in times of normal economic activity. and may also link to another implication being trends in the equity premium. Some claims have been made that the equity premium has declined over time in the past few years and may be supported by other studies claiming that tax declines may also continue to reduce the premium and the fact that transaction costs in securities markets decline this is consistent with a declining premium. The trend implication is also supported by models such as 'noise traders' that create a cyclical premium due to noise traders being excessively optimistic thus declining the premium, and vice versa when the optimism is replaced with pessimism, this would explain the constant decline of equity premium as a stock price bubble.