Роберт Жорж Нивель: Француз артиллериясының генералы

French artillery general officer

Robert Georges Nivelle (15 October 1856 – 22 March 1924) was a French artillery general officer who served in the Boxer Rebellion and the First World War. In May 1916, he succeeded Philippe Pétain as commander of the French Second Army in the Battle of Verdun, leading counter offensives that rolled back the German forces in late 1916. During these actions he and General Charles Mangin were accused of wasting French lives. He gives his name to the Nivelle Offensive. Following the successes at Verdun, Nivelle was promoted to commander in chief of the French armies on the Western Front in December 1916, largely because of his persuasiveness with French and British political leaders, aided by his fluency in English. He was responsible for the Nivelle Offensive at the Chemin des Dames, which had aroused skepticism already in its planning stages. When the costly offensive failed to achieve a breakthrough on the Western Front, a major mutiny occurred, affecting roughly half the French Army, which conducted no further major offensive action for several months. Nivelle was replaced as commander in chief by Philippe Pétain in May 15, 1917.

Robert Georges Nivelle, born on 15 October 1856 in the French provincial town of Tulle in Corrèze, had a French father and an English Protestant mother. He began his service in the French Army in 1878 upon graduating from the École Polytechnique. Starting as a sub lieutenant with the French artillery, Nivelle became a colonel of artillery in December 1913. Nivelle is considered to have squandered the lives of his soldiers in wasteful counter attacks during the Battle of Verdun; only one fresh reserve brigade was left with the Second Army by 12 June. After the Germans captured Fleury on 23 June, Nivelle issued an Order of the Day which ended with the now famous line: Ils ne passeront pas! (They shall not pass!). Nivelle ordered the employment of a creeping barrage when the French made their initial counter stroke on 24 October. The artillery supporting the infantry focused more on suppressing German troops as opposed to destroying specific objects. These tactics proved effective: French troops re took Fleury on 24 October, as well as Fort Douaumont, whose capture by the Germans on 25 February 1916 had been highly celebrated in Germany. Nivelle's successful counter strokes were an important factor behind the decision to appoint him to become the commander in chief of the French armies on 12 December 1916.

Nivelle had less power than his predecessor Joffre. He was placed under the orders of the War Minister Hubert Lyautey and, unlike Joffre, Nivelle's authority did not extend over the Salonika front. Nivelle's slogan (also attributed to Petain) was: "the artillery conquers; the infantry occupies".

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the Western Front, had already agreed with Joffre that the British would launch wearing out attacks in 1917, but demanded (6 January) written confirmation of Nivelle's earlier assurance that if the plan did not succeed in forcing a general German withdrawal, Nivelle would take over British line to free up British reserves for his planned Flanders offensive. By Edward Spears' account Nivelle accused Haig of having "une idée fixe" about Flanders and of trying to "hog all the blanket for himself" rather than seeing the front as a whole. David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, backed Nivelle because he thought he had "proved himself to be a Man" at Verdun. Field Marshal Haig wanted to delay his attack until May to coincide with Italian and Russian attacks, but was told to be ready no later than 1 April, and to take over French line as requested. The British government ordered him to live up to both the "letter" and "spirit" of the agreement with Nivelle, and not cause delays, almost certainly a result of private lobbying by Nivelle. Lloyd George had a long conversation (15 February) with Major Berthier de Sauvigny, a French liaison officer in London, telling him that Haig needed to be subordinated to Nivelle for the offensive, as George Milne had been subordinated to Sarrail at Salonika, and if necessary he would be replaced. The British War Cabinet felt that the French generals and staff had shown themselves more skilled than the British in 1916, whilst politically Britain had to give wholehearted support to what would probably be the last major French effort of the war. Haig blamed the poor state of the railways, demanding twice the railway requirements for half as many troops as the French. At the Calais Conference the railway experts were soon sent away, and although Nivelle became embarrassed when Lloyd George asked him to criticise Haig, he agreed to draw up rules for the relations between the British and French armies, to be binding also on their successors going forward. He proposed that the British forces be placed under his direct command (via a British staff at French GQG), not just for operations but even logistics and food, with Haig sidelined and forbidden even to make direct contact with London. The British CIGS Robertson lost his temper when shown the proposals, and believed that Lloyd George, not the French, had originated them. Nivelle visited the British generals next morning, and professed astonishment that they had had no prior knowledge of the plan. As a compromise Haig was given right of appeal to the War Cabinet and retained tactical control of British forces, although Lloyd George insisted – lest the conference break up without agreement that he still be under Nivelle's orders for the duration of the offensive. The Germans had recently added 300 battalions to their forces by intensive mobilisation, and Haig claimed (3 March) that with the BEF spread more thinly by having taken over line to the south, these forces might be used to attack at Ypres and cut him off from the Channel Ports. Assuming Haig was inventing this threat, Nivelle wrote him a letter, addressing him as a subordinate, and revived the idea of a British staff at GQG, this time reporting to Robertson, but through whom Nivelle would issue orders to Haig. Nivelle now demanded that the BEF be split into two Army Groups or else that Haig be sacked and replaced by Gough. Nivelle also believed that Lloyd George hoped to become Allied Commander in Chief, a suggestion so absurd that it caused President Poincaré to laugh. After further lobbying from Robertson and intervention by King George V, Lloyd George lost the support of the British War Cabinet and had to back down. At another conference in London (12 13 March) Lloyd George stressed that the BEF must not be "mixed up with the French Army", and Haig and Nivelle met with Robertson and Lyautey to settle their differences.

Between 16 March and 20 March 1917, the Germans withdrew from the Noyon salient and a smaller salient near Bapaume. The French General Franchet d'Esperey, commander of the Northern Army Group, asked Nivelle if he could attack the Germans as they withdrew. Nivelle believed that that action would disrupt his operational plan, and refused d'Esperey's request as a result. The British CIGS "Wully" Robertson described Nivelle as a commander "with a rope round his neck". Painlevé argued that the Russian Revolution meant that France shouldn't expect any major help from Russia, and that the offensive should be delayed until American forces were available and could get involved. Micheler and Petain said that they doubted the French force allocated to the attack could penetrate beyond the second line of the German defences, and suggested a more limited operation. Poincaré, summing up the discussions, said that the offensive should proceed, but that it should be halted if it failed to rupture the German front. At this point, Nivelle threatened to resign if his plan was not accepted but the politicians declared their complete confidence in him. Thus Nivelle's plan went unchanged despite the doubts expressed by the other generals and he was under greater pressure to achieve decisive results. Prime Minister Ribot said, "Our hand has been forced: It is too late to go back". On 4 April, during a German attack south of the Aisne, the secret plans of the French assault were captured but Nivelle did not alter his course. Edmonds claimed Nivelle said "The German Army will run away; they only want to be off". Nivelle had said there would be about 10,000. Nivelle had promised the Government that the attack would either be a success or be stopped. But obviously he did not have the same interpretation of 'success' as them; he ordered the attacks to continue. On the 19th, Minister Paul Painlevé came to see him to get the offensive stopped; but Nivelle was convinced that the attacks must continue. Gradually the whole thing had developed into the Somme like action that all had feared. (Griffiths, p. 39)

By 20 April, the French took 20,000 prisoners and 147 guns, which was considered to be "impressive results by the standards of previous years." However, a decisive breakthrough on the Aisne had not been achieved. The offensive had led to a shell shortage in France, the French medical services broke down, and the delay of transporting French wounded from the front line was demoralising. By the end of its first week, the attack was stalled, and Nivelle was losing control. Micheler convinced Nivelle to reduce the scope of the offensive, with the goal now only to secure all of the Chemin des Dames and push the Germans back from Reims. Nivelle became increasingly depressed over the course of the offensive as his orders were under a great degree of scrutiny by the French government. On 29 April, Nivelle's authority was undermined by the appointment of Pétain as Chief of the General Staff, and thus the main military adviser to the government. Although the French captured parts of the Chemin des Dames on 4–5 May, this was not sufficient to "repair Nivelle's crumbling reputation."

In 1993, botanists published Nivellea nivellei , a flowering plant from Morocco, belonging to the family Asteraceae, with the two names in his honour.