"Америка Азаматтық Соғысы алдындағы "Мақта Королі" слоганы"

Slogan of the pre Civil War American South

"King Cotton" is a slogan that summarized the strategy used before the American Civil War (of 1861–1865) by secessionists in the southern states (the future Confederate States of America) to claim the feasibility of secession and to prove there was no need to fear a war with the northern states. The theory held that control over cotton exports would make a proposed independent Confederacy economically prosperous, would ruin the textile industry of New England, and—most importantly—would force the United Kingdom and perhaps France to support the Confederacy militarily because their industrial economies depended on Southern cotton. By 1861, many of the most powerful governments, now including the North of the United States, had made commitments against slavery, and for this reason, the Confederacy realised that they had to use cotton as the "selling point" of their new republic and not slavery. From an economical standpoint, the emancipation in the West Indies and the general abolishment of slavery was a failure for Britain, and this was one of the reasons why southerners believed that they were susceptible to changing their minds regarding anti slavery policies, and thus intervene on their behalf. The slogan, widely believed throughout the South, helped in mobilizing support for secession: by February 1861, the seven states whose economies were based on cotton plantations had all seceded and formed the Confederacy. Meanwhile, the other eight slave states, with little or no cotton production, remained in the Union. To demonstrate the alleged power of King Cotton, Southern cotton merchants spontaneously refused to ship out their cotton in early 1861; it was not a government decision. This did not just include holding back the exportation of cotton, but the burning of cotton too, authorised by the Confederate Congress in 1862, in circumstances where there was a danger of the Union gaining Southern territory and taking the cotton. By summer 1861, the Union Navy blockaded every major Confederate port and shut down over 95% of exports. However, the British were able to acquire cotton from alternative sources such as India, Egypt and Brazil. Britain had already abolished slavery, and the public would not have tolerated the government militarily supporting a sovereignty upholding the ideals of slavery. Consequently, it proved a failure for the Confederacy, as the strategy did not succeed in making the new Confederate polity economically prosperous. The blockade prevented the earning of desperately needed gold. Most importantly, the false belief led to unrealistic assumptions that the war would be won through European intervention if only the Confederacy held out long enough.

When war broke out, the Confederate people, acting spontaneously without government direction, held their cotton at home, watching prices soar and an economic crisis hit Britain and New England, causing a backlash with British public opinion. Around one quarter of the British population at the time depended on the cotton textile industry for their income, and so the nation needed ways to survive the South's cotton withholding without intervening, which meant having alternative access to raw cotton. Due to this reliance on the South's cotton, the South viewed Britain as jealous of the economic progression of the slave states, increasing tensions between the two. Even if Britain did intervene, it would mean war with the United States, as well as loss of the American market, loss of American grain supplies, risk to Canada, and much of the British merchant marine, all in the slim promise of getting more cotton. During the 19th century, Britain had tried to reduce their dependence on cotton produced in the American South, however, the success of these attempts were limited for a variety of reasons, such as transportation difficulties and costs. In Britain there had been a much bigger anti slavery movement, and therefore the prospect of supporting the American slave states was not ideal. Besides that, in the spring of 1861, warehouses in Europe were bulging with surplus cotton, which later soared in price. So the cotton interests made their profits without a war. The Union imposed a naval blockade, closing all Confederate ports to normal traffic; consequently, the South was unable to move 95% of its cotton. Yet, some cotton was slipped out by blockade runners, or through Mexico. Cotton diplomacy, advocated by the Confederate diplomats James M. Mason and John Slidell, completely failed because the Confederacy could not deliver its cotton, and the British economy was robust enough to absorb a depression in textiles from 1862–64. As Union armies moved into cotton regions of the South in 1862, the U. S. acquired all the cotton available, and sent it to Northern textile mills or sold it to Europe. Meanwhile, cotton production increased in British India by 70% and also increased in Egypt. Between 1860 and 1870, Brazilian annual cotton exports rose 400%, from 12,000 to 60,000 tonnes.

When war broke out, the Confederates refused to allow the export of cotton to Europe. The idea was that this cotton diplomacy would force Europe to intervene. However, European states did not intervene, and following Abraham Lincoln's decision to impose a Union blockade, the South was unable to market its millions of bales of cotton. The production of cotton increased in other parts of the world, such as India and Egypt, to meet the demand, and new profits in cotton were among the motives of the Russian conquest of Central Asia. A British owned newspaper, The Standard of Buenos Aires, in cooperation with the Manchester Cotton Supply Association succeeded in encouraging Argentinian farmers to greatly increase production of cotton in Argentina and export it to the United Kingdom. Surdam (1998) asks, "Did the world demand for American grown raw cotton fall during the 1860s, even though total demand for cotton increased?" Previous researchers have asserted that the South faced stagnating or falling demand for its cotton. Surdam's more complete model of the world market for cotton, combined with additional data, shows that the reduction in the supply of American grown cotton induced by the Civil War distorts previous estimates of the state of demand for cotton. In the absence of the drastic disruption in the supply of American grown cotton, the world demand for such cotton would have remained strong. Stanley Lebergott (1983) shows the South blundered during the war because it clung too long to faith in King Cotton. Because the South's long range goal was a world monopoly of cotton, it devoted valuable land and slave labor to growing cotton instead of urgently needed foodstuffs. In the end, "King Cotton" proved to be a delusion that misled the Confederacy into a hopeless war that it ended up losing.