1915 жылғы Тигр өзені шайқасы

A battle in 1915 during the First World War

British India
| combatant2 = Ottoman Empire
| commander1 = Charles Townshend
| commander2 = Khalil Pasha Nur ud Din Pasha
| strength1 =
| strength2 =
| casualties1 = 4,600
| casualties2 = 6,200 to 9,500 They were made up of a mixture of active and reserve soldiers. The Ottoman artillery was centrally located where it could support his left flank or the central part of his line. The artillery was ordered to fire first on the British gunboats, and then shift fire to support the Ottoman reserves.

Townshend, intending to copy his success at the Battle of Es Sinn, ordered a night march in the closing hours of 21 November 1915, with the aim of attacking at dawn on the 22 November. The attack happened on schedule but due to poor ground conditions on the west bank the British ended up attacking the much stronger east bank positions. The advance was supposed to be supported by river gunboats, however two things prevented the gun boats from becoming a factor in the battle. First, the Ottoman guns on the west bank rained fire upon them. Secondly, the Tigris was extensively mined and several river obstructions made navigation difficult. At the beginning of the battle, C Column, the one closest to the river bank came under heavy small arms and artillery fire and failed to reach the first trench line. A Column, in the middle, was also halted short of the trench line. On the right, B Column (mainly Punjabis and Gurkhas) reached the first line of trenches, forced the Ottoman forces to retreat and pursued the retreating enemy towards the second line of trenches. Lieutenant General Nureddin committed the reserve regiments of the 45th Division and brought the unengaged 35th Division from the other side of the river to reinforce his lines, and the British Indian forces were stopped. Townshend then ordered C Column to fall back, and try and exploit the breakthrough. This movement was rather complicated and the task was made difficult by Ottoman forces firing into their flank. Meanwhile, the flying column bogged down in inconclusive fighting against Turkish and Arab Cavalry. Here again Nureddin committed his reserves, in this case the 51st Division, to great effect, halting Townshend's flanking attack. By the end of the day the 6th (Poona) Division had captured the first line of trenches, but the British sustained heavy casualties. The Ottoman forces had also taken heavy casualties but held their position.

On the second day, Townshend again attempted to break through, with a supporting flank attack. The Ottoman forces again stopped it. They then counter attacked the British positions with all available forces. The fight was hard, but the British line held. Both armies had taken heavy casualties and all troops had endured two days of intense combat and were exhausted. The 51st Division lost 12%, the 35th Division lost 25%, and the 45th Division, which bore the brunt of the British attacks, lost 65% of its strength. The Ottoman Army had sustained casualties of 6,188, but they had short supply lines and were able to get reinforcements from Baghdad and the northern provinces. Lieutenant General Nureddin, learning that the British were also retreating, turned his army around and pursued the British. The Ottoman forces under the command of Nureddin followed the British to Kut. Ctesiphon and its aftermath revealed a key British weakness in this campaign: an inadequate supply line. The British troops were under supplied, and their medical corps was understaffed, considering the number of troops and rate of casualties (both from battle and disease). In the later campaign which led to the capture of Baghdad by General Maude, logistics were much better dealt with. The battle also demonstrated that the Ottoman Army could fight well on its own. Lieutenant General Nureddin had taken an army that had been beaten a number of times, put it in a carefully prepared defensive position, and held off the British and Indian forces. He also did this without any German advisors.