Аляска Мұнай Кірістерінің Тұрақты Қоры

Permanent fund of oil revenues managed by the State of Alaska

The Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) is a constitutionally established permanent fund managed by a state owned corporation, the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC). It was established in Alaska in 1976 by Article 9, Section 15 of the Alaska State Constitution under Governor Jay Hammond and Attorney General Avrum Gross. From February 1976 until April 1980, the Department of Revenue Treasury Division managed the state's Permanent Fund assets, until, in 1980, the Alaska State Legislature created the APFC. As of 2019, the fund was worth approximately $64 billion that has been funded by oil and mining revenues and has paid out an average of approximately $1,600 annually per resident (adjusted to 2019 dollars). The main use for the fund's revenue has been to pay out the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), which many authors portray as the only example of a basic income in practice.

Shortly after the oil from Alaska's North Slope began flowing to market through the Trans Alaska Pipeline System, the Permanent Fund was created by an amendment to the Alaska Constitution. It was designed to be an investment where at least 25% of the oil money would be put into a dedicated fund for future generations, who would no longer have oil as a resource. This does not mean the fund is solely funded by oil revenue. The Fund includes neither property taxes on oil company property nor income tax from oil corporations, so the minimum 25% deposit is closer to 11% if those sources were also considered. The Alaska Permanent Fund sets aside a certain share of oil revenues to continue benefiting current and all future generations of Alaskans. Many citizens also believed that the legislature too quickly and too inefficiently spent the $900 million bonus the state got in 1969 after leasing out the oil fields. This belief spurred a desire to put some oil revenues out of direct political control. The Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation manages the assets of both the Permanent Fund and other state investments, but spending Fund income is up to the Legislature. The corporation is to manage for maximum prudent return, and not—as some Alaskans at first wanted—as a development bank for in state projects. The Fund grew from an initial investment of $734,000 in 1977 to approximately $53.7 billion as of July 9, 2015. Some growth was due to good management, some to inflationary re investment, and some via legislative decisions to deposit extra income during boom years. Each year, the fund's realized earnings are split between inflation proofing, operating expenses, and the annual Permanent Fund Dividend. The fund is a member of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds and has therefore signed up to the Santiago Principles on best practice in managing sovereign wealth funds. The Fund's current chief investment officer is Marcus Frampton.

The Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation is a government instrumentality of the State of Alaska created to manage and invest the assets of the Alaska Permanent Fund and other funds designated by law. William G. Moran, Chair, reappointed 2018 by Gov. Walker
Steve Rieger, Vice Chair, reappointed 2020 by Gov. Dunleavy
Corri Feige, appointed 2018 by Gov. Dunleavy She holds the seat designated for the Commissioner of Natural Resources
Lucinda Mahoney, appointed 2019 by Gov. Dunleavy She holds the seat designated for the Commissioner of Revenue
Ethan Schutt, appointed 2020 by Gov. Dunleavy
Craig Richards, reappointed 2021 by Gov. Dunleavy

This is the fund's history of annual individual payouts, in USD. Year Dividend amount (USD) Inflation adjusted dividend amount ( USD) Notes 1982 1,000.00 1000.0 in 1982 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1983 386.15 386.15 in 1983 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1984 331.29 331.29 in 1984 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1985 404.00 404.0 in 1985 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1986 556.26 556.26 in 1986 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1987 708.19 708.19 in 1987 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1988 826.93 826.93 in 1988 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1989 873.16 873.16 in 1989 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1990 952.63 952.63 in 1990 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1991 931.34 931.34 in 1991 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1992 915.84 915.84 in 1992 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1993 949.46 949.46 in 1993 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1994 983.90 983.9 in 1994 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1995 990.30 990.3 in 1995 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 1996 1,130.68 1997 1,296.54 1998 1,540.88 1999 1,769.84 2000 1,963.86 2001 1,850.28 2002 1,540.76 2003 1,107.56 2004 919.84 919.84 in 2004 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 2005 845.76 845.76 in 2005 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 2006 1,106.96 2007 1,654.00 2008 2,069.00 Dividend came with a $1,200 Alaska Resource Rebate 2009 1,305.00 2010 1,281.00 2011 1,174.00 2012 878.00 878.0 in 2012 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 2013 900.00 900.0 in 2013 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 2014 1,884.00 2015 2,072.00 2016 1,022.00 Dividend was estimated to be $2,052 but Governor Bill Walker's veto reduced it 2017 1,100.00 Dividend was estimated to be over $2,300 however it was reduced by legislative action 2018 1,600.00 Dividend was estimated to be $2,700 however it was reduced by legislative action 2019 1,606.00 2020 992.00 992.0 in 2020 is equivalent to about <calculated amount> in recent years 2021 1,114.00 2022 3,284.00 $662 energy relief portion of dividend was deemed non taxable 2023 1,312.00

The Constitutional Budget Reserve (CBR) is a companion fund to the Permanent Fund which was established in 1991 to ease problems from the variability of oil revenue, which vary depending upon the price of oil in the market. Deposits into the CBR consist of settlements of back taxes and other revenues owed to the state. Draws from the CBR into the general fund require a 3/4 vote of each house of the legislature and must be repaid. To date, the general fund has amassed a debt of approximately $4 billion to the CBR to maintain a stable level of public spending. The size of the debt owed to the CBR has raised doubts over repayment. The CBR is based on the assumption that the general fund deficit will remain constant over time (allowing paybacks to balance draws). Believing this to be mistaken, critics allege the state uses resources from the CBR to avoid reducing the budget, acknowledging debt, or increasing taxes. According to them, falling oil revenues and growing spending requirements will leave paybacks consistently lower than draws, causing the CBR to fail. Former state senator Dave Donley (R Anchorage) recognized that the high vote requirement to spend CBR money (¾ of each house) had a perverse and unintended consequence. The high vote requirement was meant to ensure that draws from the CBR would be rare, but in fact such draws are common. Donley explained that the high vote requirement really empowers the minority party (in the 2000–2007 era, the Democratic Party), who can then get what they want in a Christmas tree bill (presents for everyone, both majority and minority) in exchange for their votes (which minority votes would not be needed with the usual 51% voting rule). Donley thus explains why both parties can and do use the higher voting rule requirement to more frequently spend from the CBR.

While the Permanent Fund generally generated large surpluses even after payment of the Dividend [PFD], the state general fund operated at a substantial deficit. However, the consolidated account of both General and Permanent Funds usually shows a surplus. The Funds' ultimate uses were never clearly spelled out at its inception, leaving no current consensus over what role Fund earning should play in the current and expected state budget shortfalls. However, some people argue that the original intent was to fund state government after the temporary oil riches ceased, while others note that the Fund's intent changed from its 1976 origin when in 1982 the Dividend program began. Public opinion strongly favors the Dividend program. Indeed, in 1999, with oil prices going as low as $9 per barrel and Alaska's oil consultant Daniel Yergin forecasting low prices "for the foreseeable future", the State put an advisory vote before Alaskans, asking if government could spend "some" part of Permanent Fund earning for government purposes. Gov. Knowles, Lt. Gov. Ulmer, and many other elected officials urged a "yes" vote. Campaign spending greatly favored the "yes" side. Despite this, the public voted "no" by nearly 84%. (Oil prices rose dramatically, starting about two weeks after Yergin's prediction, to above $60 per barrel, though the quantity produced continues to fall.) Perceived support of the dividend program is so universally strong that it ensures the dividend's continuity and the protection of the Fund's principal, since any measure characterized as negatively impacting dividend payouts represents a loss to the entire populace. That is, legislators willing to appropriate the Fund's annual earnings are constrained by the high political costs of any measures leading to a decrease in the public's dividend.

In 2000, the APFC Board of Trustees proposed changing the Permanent Fund's management system to a Percent of Market Value (PoMV) approach which would require an amendment to the state constitution. The PoMV proposal would limit withdrawals to five percent of the fund's value each year, to be spent at the discretion of the Legislature. Currently the Legislature has authority to appropriate all of the fund's realized earnings. Tentative, unapproved proposals indicate that half of this five percent withdrawal would go to the dividend and half to government spending—but POMV died in the Legislature because most there saw POMV as unambiguously tied to such politically unpopular spending proposals. Most Alaskans (84% in 1999) disapprove of allowing the government to tamper with the fund, especially if that means government might spend Fund income. Again in 2015–2017, a POMV approach was considered. The market price for North Slope oil fell from an average $107.57 per barrel in FY2014 to $50.05 per barrel in FY2017. This price shift caused an 80 percent decline in state revenue and resulted in a multibillion dollar budget gap. Both bodies of the legislature have passed a bill that provides for an annual draw of 5.25% of the average balance of the Permanent Fund (average of the first 5 of the last six years). Since the formula is based on an average, rather than a single year, the effective draw is only about 4.2%—enough to preserve the real value of the fund considering that the fund has returned close to 9% annually. The legislature carefully vetted this percentage over the course of two sessions and has come to a consensus. This draw is projected to produce $2.7 billion in FY2019 and grow with the balance of the Permanent Fund. The major point of disagreement, however, is the size of the dividend: The House of Representatives version of the bill uses 5.25% draw for government (33% for Dividends and 67% for government services) and an additional 0.25% draw for Permanent Fund inflation proofing. This produces $2.7 billion ($1.8 billion for government use, net of a $900.9 million dividend—about $1,250.00 per Alaskan—growing with the value of the fund). The Senate version of the bill uses the same 5.25% draw as the House, but directs only 25% of the draw to dividends. This produces the same $2.7 billion but government services receive $2.0 billion while the dividend receives just under $700 million—about $1,000.00 per person—growing with the value of the fund. Oil revenues are forecast (by the state Department of Revenue) to remain stagnant through FY2027, and traditional budget reserves may be empty by FY2019 but with a Permanent Fund value in excess of $60.0 billion, the budget gap can be reduced significantly. Since this POMV proposal does not close the gap entirely, members of the legislature are considering a tax bill as well.

A 2018 paper found that the Alaska Permanent Fund "dividend had no effect on employment, and increased part time work by 1.8 percentage points (17 percent) our results suggest that a universal and permanent cash transfer does not significantly decrease aggregate employment." A 2019 study found "a 14% increase in substance abuse incidents the day after the [Alaska Permanent Fund] payment and a 10% increase over the following four weeks. This is partially offset by a 8% decrease in property crime, with no changes in violent crimes. On an annual basis, however, changes in criminal activity from the payment are small. Estimated costs comprise a very small portion of the total payment, suggesting that crime related concerns of a universal cash transfer program may be unwarranted."