Fukuda Doctrine

Japanese foreign policy doctrine

The Fukuda Doctrine (福田 赳夫) is a Japanese foreign policy doctrine, based on a 1977 speech by Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, stating that Japan would never become a military power. On the contrary, the policy proposes to enhance relations with Southeast Asian countries in wide ranging fields, as well as to increase cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member countries. The Fukuda Doctrine serves as the foundation of Japanese diplomacy toward the rest of Asia.

Takeo Fukuda was an expert in economics. He took on the role of an ‘economic prime minister’ under Miki's administration from 1974 to 1976. During this time, he established the Ministerial Conference on Economic Measures, enabling cross ministry and agency talks on finance, wage and labor issues. Fukuda subsequently became the 67th prime minister of Japan, lasting for only one term from 1976 to 1978. However, he was not forced out of office before he had gotten two major diplomatic reforms executed. Under Fukuda cabinet, Japan conducted an omnidirectional peace diplomacy, and signed Japan China Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. He pushed forward Japan's pacifistic position while making an effort to strengthen relations with Asian countries.

After the Second World War, Japan's policies towards Southeast Asia, can be divided into two distinct phases a period of reparations (1952 1964) and a period of regional economic development (1965 1975). The historic events and the features of those periods have contributed to the development of Fukuda Doctrine and the subsequent policies towards the region.

The first period in the relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia, can be characterized by Shigeru Yoshida’s “Economic Diplomacy”, officially promulgated in 1957. The so called “Yoshida Doctrine” put high priority on development and aimed at peaceful expansion of Japan's economic power in foreign markets, in order to rebuild the economy and raise the living standards of the Japanese population. As a part of this policy, Japan sought to improve ties with the Southeast Asian region. Reparations settlements between Japan and Southeast Asian countries played a significant role in such environment as they served as a tool which provided a ground for rebuilding of the relations, severed by Japanese aggression during the war. During this period, Japan paid reparations to Burma, Philippines, Indonesia, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Other than reparations in the strict sense, Japan also provided “quasi reparations” in the form of grants and aid to Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore. This way, reparation payments paved the way for Japan's economic involvement in Southeast Asia, allowing it to pursue economic interest in the region.

Japan initially viewed ASEAN as economically strategic, but remained insouciant to the association until the early 1970s. Prior to 1975, conflict between East and West defined the security of ASEAN in purely military terms, which also meant the insignificant role of Japan in the view of ASEAN nations. After the liberation of Vietnam and the fall of Kampuchea government to the communists, combined with the declining presence of American forces in Southeast Asia, ASEAN nations began to perceive their own security in terms of raising the standard living of their people. The recognition that military power alone could not secure ASEAN interests gave way to a new priority of economic well being. This change in priority led to a redefinition of security from that of a military perspective to one that was economic, wherein Japan could play a decisive role in contributing to ASEAN economic development and political stability.

Source: This approach, manifested by the rejection of military force and emphasis on economic power, demonstrated Japan's belief in the use of soft power. It was for this very reason that Japan was so keen on encouraging the development of multilateralism in Southeast Asia. This approach to foreign policy in a sense was intended to establish a ‘political coordination’ between Japan and ASEAN as a regional actor. At the end of 1978, however, Japan's current policy towards Vietnam could no longer continue, as Vietnam invaded Cambodia an act widely condemned by the international community, including US, China and most of ASEAN members. In April 1979 Japan notified, unofficially, Vietnam the freeze of all assistance and made renewal contingency upon Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. In addition, following the US stance on the issue, Japan continued to see the Government of Democratic Kampuchea as the legitimate government of Cambodia and refused to recognize the Government set by Vietnam in Phnom Penh. It may be argued that it would have been more beneficial to Japan to have a softer stance to Vietnam and keep the channels of dialogue open, however it was not ready to assume such political role and part ways with the US. This showed that even after the Fukuda Doctrine, there was still a large discrepancy between Japan's economic power and its political role in the international arena. Over 30% of the total Japanese ODA by 1980 was directed to Southeast Asia, with the main recipient being Indonesia, followed by Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia. The move was going to make the Japanese development projects accessible to other companies, especially allowing US companies to compete for Japanese aid funded contracts. The process of untying continued during the 1980s and 1990s with the levels of untied loans increasing from 65.2% in 1980 to 97.7 in 1995. In regards to the shaping of “special” relationship with ASEAN, Japan engaged with the organization in many ways, including negotiations to establish the Common Fund, the International Tin Agreement, rubber and sugar agreements. And although all of these agreements were implemented in the following years (except STABEX), economic cooperation between Japan and ASEAN did not progress significantly, leading to ASEAN's dissatisfaction. Even after Japan's reduction of tariffs in 1978 on a number of products, including coconut oil, palm oil, bananas, shrimps, and canned pineapples, ASEAN still demanded much larger concessions. It can be argued that in a sense, Fukuda's aspirations for "heart to heart" relations had unexpectedly raised ASEAN's hopes for Japan's economic offers to the region. These sentiments had an influence in the way Japan established its future policies. The country decided to project its soft power as a mean to broaden its relations beyond the economic field, further contributing to long term stable ties with Southeast Asia. The Japanese strategy was adopted based on two main factors: Japan becoming the second biggest world economy and model for Asian countries; the inability of other Asian countries to utilize soft power in the same manner.

The reactions of ASEAN countries shifted from being cautious but optimistic in August, to openly hostile at the end of 1977. If the promises could be fulfilled, the Doctrine was welcomed. In fact, The ASEAN members, regretting America's withdrawal, initially encouraged Japan to play a bigger role as long as Japan doesn't become a military threat. Nonetheless, the feeling of suspicion that Japan would not fulfill the promise of the doctrine was prevalent among these countries due to Japan's past of not delivering its promises. Additionally, the fact that Japanese visible trade surplus for July was as much as US$2.05 billion added to the extant feeling of suspicion. The reaction gradually turned inimical, which could be perceived to be Japanese ‘foot dragging’. There was caution, for example on Japanese credibility, with no aid to ASEAN being made. China's reaction, on the other hand, was more complex. It supported Japan's effort for a larger influence, in that Japan was strengthening its defensive power in the region. This was due to China's intention to minimize the influence of the Soviet Union, which was identified as China's primary enemy. However, simultaneously, it was not delighted to see a U. S. ally exercising influence on Southeast Asia. The United States's response was positive. Present American policy in Southeast Asia take root in July 1973 with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine. As a consequence of this doctrine, America pulled its land forces out of Asia. Following the Nixon doctrine, America espoused another major set of beliefs. The Ford Doctrine, announced in 1975, called for the normalization of relations with China. These elements, along with the collapse of the three Indochinese countries to communism, shaped American policy towards ASEAN countries, with the key determination being the protection of the non communist countries while maintaining good relations with China and withdrawing from the region. Thus, America, as well as China, was supportive of Japan's new advance in the region. The reaction of Vietnam, the most powerful Indochinese communist state, changed before and a while after the Fukuda visit. Its attitude went from being hostile to a more benign one. At first, Vietnam viewed Japan as a supporter of capitalist interest due to Japan U. S. alliance and ASEAN as a hostile military alliance. However, the growing hostility resulting from a war with Kampuchea in 1978, and the need for outside funding for its ambitious five year economic development plan left Vietnam little choice but to seek for financial support from Japan. Despite Japanese conditionality, the full repayment of outstanding debts of South Vietnam's, Fukuda made an extraordinary statement that moved the stalled negotiations forward, which received a positive reaction from Vietnam. Overall, the Doctrine was perceived as a promise of a strengthening of political and economic bonds, however, over time, the reversal of the trend could be depicted. This reversal was due to the fear that Japan would be less focused on ASEAN. Japan's external and internal policies in the last quarter of 1978, was affected by the development of Sino Japanese relations, the change of leadership from pro ASEAN leader Fukuda to pro China leader Ohira, the competition for the “China market” among OECD countries, the uncertainty in the Southeast Asia region with the influx of refugees into ASEAN from the conflicts in Indochina.

Domestic views of the government's new policy towards ASEAN were diverse. Views of press, the bureaucracy, the business community and opposition (political) parties were different, but essential. The press, in spite of being criticized for sympathizing with the Liberal Democratic Party, exercised great influence over national consensus on Japan's new role in Southeast Asia. Journal articles published during and after the visit predominantly argued in favor of the Fukuda doctrine. If any criticism were visible, it would only be in the area concerning the articulation of the doctrine. The press demanded that the doctrine does better to change Japan's narrow attitude towards foreign nations and improving its cultural ties with other countries, particularly Southeast Asia, as well as refining the educational system to one that puts greater emphasis on foreign languages.

The Doctrine continues to be significant for Japan's policy towards Southeast Asia relations in the post Cold War era. The doctrine served as “the blueprint of Japan’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia", and established new norms with its three principles. The Fukuda Doctrine survived the Cold War, unlike the Brezhnev Doctrine, or the Nixon Doctrine that disappeared under it. Rather, it strengthened the discourse about the Japan Southeast Asian relations into the 21st century. Thus, there is an expectation that it'll evolve and remain relevant.

References to the Doctrine are still being made. The son of Fukuda Takeo, Fukuda Yasuo, made a reference to it when he became Prime Minister in 2007. Although he did not update the Doctrine as anticipated, he declared that ASEAN and Japan would be ”partners thinking together, acting together and sharing a future vision.”

This was later highlighted in ASEAN Chairman's Statement on the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC) + 1 Sessions in Singapore in 2008. It read; “The Meeting welcomed the “New Fukuda Doctrine,” in which Prime Minister of Japan Yasuo Fukuda declared that ASEAN and Japan would be partners thinking together, acting together and sharing a future vision.” Other than diplomats, journalists and scholars also made reference to the Doctrine in major conferences held in Japan and Southeast Asia in 2007, to mark the 30th anniversary for the doctrine.

According to Tadokoro Masayuki’s argument in 2010, the principles of the Doctrine are relevant not only for Southeast Asia, but also for Africa today. He argues that “given the amicable relations that have developed between Japanese and the people in ASEAN countries since then, we should not be too cynical about the roles played by such political initiatives,” and that “For Japan, Africa represents neither an object of pity nor a security threat nor a mere supplier of natural resources nor a giant zoo, but rather a partner with whom Japanese should be willing to work together.”

However, the principles of the Doctrine are considered not enough to articulate the current relationship and to enhance it. In the post Cold War era, ASEAN has expanded its functions to include strengthening the security for regional peace and stability. ASEAN's importance has increased due to the strategic uncertainty by the power shift to China. Japan has advanced “de facto regional integration” with ASEAN through aid, trade, investment and cultural exchanges. ASEAN, as a result, has gained the dominant position in the region. Japan Southeast Asia relations are now at a point where they can help shape and direct the region. Japan and ASEAN are both pursuing goals to better the issues of human rights, the rule of law, and other democratic principles. Kei Koga argues that there is an opportunity to enhance their political cooperation that transcends the Fukuda Doctrine, in pursuing these shared goals.