Исаак Халл: Американский военно-морской офицер и герой войны 1812 года.

United States Navy Commodore

Isaac Hull (March 9, 1773 – February 13, 1843) was a Commodore in the United States Navy. He commanded several famous U. S. naval warships including Constitution ("Old Ironsides") and saw service in the undeclared naval Quasi War with the revolutionary French Republic (France) 1796–1800; the Barbary Wars (1801–1805, 1815), with the Barbary states in North Africa; and the War of 1812 (1812–1815), for the second time with Great Britain. In the latter part of his career he was Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard in the national capital of Washington, D. C., and later the Commodore of the Mediterranean Squadron. For the infant U. S. Navy, the battle of USS Constitution vs HMS Guerriere on August 19, 1812, at the beginning of the war, was the most important single ship action of the War of 1812 and one that made Isaac Hull a national hero.

Hull was born in Derby, Connecticut (some sources say Huntington, now Shelton, Connecticut), on March 9, 1773. Early in life he joined his mariner father, Joseph, on local voyages and longer trips to the West Indies. After his father died while still young, Isaac was adopted by his uncle William Hull, a veteran of the American Revolutionary War. During the mid 1790s, the young Hull commanded several merchant vessels, losing some to French Republic privateers.

He was commissioned a lieutenant in the newly formed United States Navy on 9 March 1798 and distinguished himself during the next two years while serving on board the new heavy frigate Constitution in the undeclared naval Quasi War with France. During his time on USS Constitution, Hull served as first lieutenant and executive officer to Captain Silas Talbot. Talbot was in command from June 5, 1799 until September 8, 1801. Since Talbot was also a squadron commander, much of the everyday running of the ship fell to Hull and provided him invaluable experience managing a ship of war. Hull much admired Talbot, a hero of the American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), and learned a great deal from the older man. Hull's chief biographer Linda M. Maloney states Talbot "was undoubtedly the formative influence on Hull's naval career, the man he modeled himself after." From Talbot, Hull learned the lessons of naval leadership, moderation and to look out for the training of his junior officers and ship crew.

When troubles with the Barbary states heated up in 1802, he went to the Mediterranean Sea as first lieutenant of the frigate Adams. Hull later commanded the schooner Enterprise and the brig Argus, receiving promotion to the rank of master commandant in 1804 and to captain in 1806. During this time Hull made a reputation as an effective and reliable commander. Midshipman Henry Wadsworth, writing in his journal for August 10, 1803, noted: "This morning at day light the USS Enterprise being at a distance of several miles discovered a galley at long shot. Captain Hull fired on her & gave chase. She fired to leeward (signal for friend) but did not heave too. The Enterprise came near her & she hove too: proved to be a Sardinian Galley, last from Civita Vecchia on a cruise 25 oars on each side (Captain Hull imagined) carried about 300 hundred men had 2 eighteen pounders mounted forward & 2 smaller guns aft. A noble Galley!!!" During the next few years, he supervised the construction of gunboats and, in 1809 and 1810, was successively given command of the frigates Chesapeake, President and USS Constitution.

On 2 February 1809 Hull took command of USS Chesapeake with orders to enforce the trade embargo, but a month later the embargo was repealed and the vessel returned to Boston for minor repairs and filling out the crew. During this time Hull helped the recruiting service. Keeping ships manned was a source of major anxiety for Hull throughout his long career. Hull found it necessary on occasion to take drastic measures to prevent men lured by bounty money from deserting, as he explained in an April 16, 1810 letter to the Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton justifying his placing newly recruited men in irons and confinement prior to sailing. "With two months advance from the merchant ship, and advance and bounty from the recruiting officer and other expenses brought them in debt from fifty to eighty dollars." Having the full complement of men necessary to crew a frigate was a constant challenge. Exacerbating the challenge was a cold fact: recruitment was voluntary—there was no draft or impressment service as in the British navy. Poor pay and conditions of life on a warship in the pre 1815 U. S. Navy meant Hull and other commanding officers were plagued by expired enlistments and high rates of desertion. For naval enlisted men there was no fixed term of service, seamen served for a voyage or cruise on a particular ship, hence at the end of voyage, they felt free to leave and often did. For naval ships at every port call desertion was a reality. Despite extracting harsh penalties such as flogging, the problem persisted. While reliable data is scarce, one scholar notes the desertion rate for petty officers and enlisted men on board Hornet was 12.8%, and states the number one reason for enlisted courts martial was desertion. In all, Hull was in command of USS Chesapeake for seven months.

On 7 May 1810 Isaac Hull was ordered to assume command of the new frigate USS President, but his tenure was short. The reason for Hull's short stay was Commodore John Rodgers. Rodgers had almost simultaneously been ordered to USS Constitution. John Rodgers too had sailed Constitution from New York and did not like the way she sailed. The frigate had seen years of hard service, her bottom was fouled by mussels, barnacles and her sails worn, and Rodgers also objected to the way she handled. Rodgers made complaint to Secretary Hamilton that as ranking senior naval captain he should have had President. Hamilton agreed, and Hull apparently was only too happy to swap, for on 17 June 1810 Rodgers took President and Hull assumed command of Constitution.

Hull commanded the Portsmouth Navy Yard at Kittery, Maine, for the rest of the War of 1812. Hull assumed command of the Portsmouth Navy Yard on 9 April 1813 and remained until he was relieved by Commodore Thomas Macdonough on 1 July 1815. During Hull's tenure as commandant the primary focus was on the fitting out of Congress, construction of Washington and improvements to the defense of the navy yard One of the most important innovations during Hull's tenure at Portsmouth was the construction of a shiphouse. Hull, a Connecticut native, knew that in order for the shipyard to succeed, the workers and the vessels needed cover during the long and cold New England winters Writing to the Secretary of the Navy William Jones on 24 July 1813, Hull noted "As the Winters here are very cold and large quantities of Snow falls, may I be permitted to suggest the idea of covering the Ship after she is framed. The cost to build a permanent cover would probably be two thousand dollars, and I believe a greater part of it would be saved in building this ship and others could be built under it, so that by having one much would be saved in labor besides the injury to the Frame by being exposed to the winter and the sun the next summer." The ship house was completed in December 1813 and continued in use for the next four decades.

Hull then served on the Board of Navy Commissioners for the years 1815–1817 in Washington D. C. The law creating the Board gave it authority over procurement of naval stores, supplies and material as these related to the construction of naval vessels, outfitting of ships, armament and equipment plus oversight authority over naval shipyards, stations and drydocks. The BNC also regulated civilian employment and pay. Serving with Hull on the Board were Commodores David Porter and John Rodgers. The BNC found all current yards to have shortcomings. One of the most important recommendations the BNC made was that only Portsmouth and Boston Navy Yard were suitable for the building of large ships in all seasons. Though the BNC recommended Washington Navy Yard be retained, its report noted, "The Yard at Washington, when viewed as building yard only, would be less objectionable [than Baltimore] were the navigation deeper and the obstructions fewer. But it is the decided opinion of the Board, that the obstructions and its distance from the sea render it unsuitable for every other purpose." The Board recommended Baltimore, Norfolk and Charleston navy yards be closed. These recommendations were controversial and became the subject of considerable partisanship, with only Baltimore and Charleston eventually phased out of existence. The BNC final report was in fact, highly critical of the Washington Navy Yard and its business practices. Writing on 11 May 1815 to Commodore Thomas Tingey, the BNC stated, "The Board are about contracting for the repairs of the Black Smith shop in the Navy Yard under your command for the purpose of employing workmen to put in order for service & a state of preservation It is the intention of the Board of the Navy Commissioners, to reestablish the Navy Yard at this place, as a building Yard only, & while stating to you this intention, it may not be improper for them to make you acquainted with their views generally with respect to the establishment. They have witnessed in many of our Navy Yards & this particularly pressure in the employment of characters unsuited for the public service – maimed & unmanageable slaves for the accommodation of distressed widows & orphans & indigent families – apprentices for the accommodation of their masters – & old men & children for the benefit of their families & parents These practices must cease – none must be employed but for the advantage of the public, & this Yard instead of rendering the navy odious to the nation from the scenes of want & extravagance which it has too long exhibited must serve as a model on which to prefect a general system of economy. In making to you, Sir, these remarks the Navy Commissioners are aware that you have with themselves long witnessed the evils of which they complain, & which every countenance will be given to assist you in remedying them, they calculate with confidence on a disposition on your part to forward the public interests." Later in his career when Commodore Hull assumed command of the Washington Navy Yard (1829–1835), he attempted to right these alleged wrongs and implement necessary change.

At Charlestown Navy Yard, known as Boston Navy Yard, Hull's tenure as commandant was marred and hindered by his lack of familiarity with the administration of a large shore installation, the management of the civilian workforce and by the moves to dislodge him by some of his senior and junior naval officers. A number of these officers and senior civilians made public accusations questioning Hull's command. In view of the serious nature of their charges a Naval Court of Inquiry met in Charlestown during August 1822 to consider the accusations brought against Hull. On 15 October 1822 the court found Hull had acted properly and within his scope of authority and in his official duties had been "correct and meritorious." Nevertheless, the court cautioned Hull regarding placing his personal property in public stores and the employment of navy yard mechanics and laborers for private purposes. But the bitterness of the affair never really left Hull for as he wrote "This yard is much improved and in fine order for whoever may take it. I am tired of this kind of life and particularly of this place, and have nothing but constant quarrels with the Charleston people." During 1823–1827, he commanded the Pacific Squadron operating out of South America aboard United States.

Commodore Hull's next assignment was as Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard (WNY), 1829–1835. The Washington Navy Yard, station log, recorded that Hull "assumed command on Saturday 11 April 1829 at 11.00 with a thirteen gun salute." During Hull's five year tenure, shipbuilding on the Potomac River dramatically fell as the yard built just one naval vessel; the aptly named and ill fated schooner, Experiment. As early as 1815 the Navy Department had decided the shallowness of the Anacostia River channel made Washington DC less than an ideal port and consequently approved the shift to ordnance production. Shipwrights and carpenters, the elite trades of the wooden–hulled navy, felt especially threatened as the navy yard focused on metal trades manufacturing and proved extremely reluctant to abandon their time honored practices. On taking command Hull was mindful of the Board of Navy Commissioners' 1815 critical report and attempted to fix the problems the BNC noted. Hull's new command however once again involved managing a large and restless workforce, but at WNY one composed of white civilian mechanics, laborers and enslaved and free blacks. At WNY he quickly discovered a violation of navy regulations; the employment of slaves by naval yard officers. When ordered to discharge all slaves in the anchor shop, though he protested to the Board of Navy Commissioners "I fear we could not find a set of men white or black, or even slaves to now do in the anchor shop." "Competition for jobs on the navy yard was constant white workers feared that competition from enslaved and even free blacks dragged down the wage scale." Hull was often conflicted in matters of race, when newly arrived in Washington DC he had purchased an enslaved black man John Ambler, from a fellow officer for his "servant", yet when leaving the navy yard, he manumitted Ambler on 17 October 1835 and later intervened to get Ambler a discharge from a naval vessel. African American diarist Michael Shiner on the other hand remembered Hull fondly for his assistance in securing the release of his wife and children from a slave dealer. Shiner wrote "i am under Great oblagation to Comodore isaac Hull for the time my Wife wher Sold to george he had command of the washington navy yard foer his kindness to me" Hull's taciturn management style quickly aroused the resentment of his white workforce. After his arrival Hull had made efforts to check what he perceived as the unwarranted independence of some of his senior civilian managers, to improve the unkempt appearance of navy yard grounds and control the loss of government property. Hull's strict management combined with long simmering disputes over pay, working hours and the employment of blacks quickly came to a head the summer of 1835.

A labor strike which began on 29 July 1835 was a response to Hull's orders limiting the workers' lunch period and what they were allowed to bring on the navy yard. After Hull's hard experience with the Boston inquiry, he was particularly sensitive to any hint of misappropriation. When he learned of alleged thefts of government property, he promptly issued an order limiting workers' lunch privileges, and in response, the workers went on strike. Hull was aware that his workers were ostensibly striking over more than his newly imposed restrictions. He speculated that "the mechanics have been acted on by other causes," Hull was concerned that the ten hour day movement and the Board of Navy Commissioners resistance to reducing the workweek was the actual cause of the strike, and that the calls for general strike that summer by the Philadelphia shipyard workers had found an attentive audience. To Hull's chagrin the strikers were encouraged by Naval Constructor William Doughty to hold out for higher wages. The workers felt Hull often treated them with "silent contempt" which was probably the result of his deafness." In Hull's report to the Secretary of the Navy, Mahlon Dickerson, he stated that 175 white mechanics and workers had joined the strike. Their walkout also immediately exposed longstanding racial discord in the Yard. The strike quickly morphed into the infamous Snow Riot as many angry white workers now out of employment took out their resentments on the black community, their anger fanned by the false rumor that free black restaurant owner Beverley Snow had disparaged their wives. Josephine Seaton, the wife of the publisher of the National Intelligencer, William Seaton, expressed alarm in a letter regarding the strike and riot: "Snow will certainly be torn to pieces by the mechanics if he be caught, and they are in full pursuit of him. Unfortunately, several hundred mechanics of the navy yard are out of employment, who, aided and abetted by their sympathizers, create the mob, and it is truly alarming." As the riot spread the city government became alarmed, the strikers had sent a delegation to President Andrew Jackson, who was sympathetic, pleading their case for his intervention and referring to Commodore Hull's order as "despotic". The strike and subsequent riot after nearly two weeks left the navy yard workers with no pay and collapsing public support. A mediator Dr. Alexander A. McWilliams was brought into arrange a compromise, wherein the strikers after withdrawing their charges against Hull were allowed to return to work. The strike officially ended on Saturday August 15, 1835 and the workers returned to the Yard that Saturday morning. Although Hull and the mechanics attempted to smooth over their differences by noting they derived from "a misunderstanding", both parties had lost much in the course of the strike. The workers, though allowed to return to their jobs, had lost financially. Most importantly for the workers, the strike revealed the weakness and tenuous nature of their bargaining situation. As per diem labor in a protracted dispute, and absent effective organization, they inevitably suffered. The strike also revealed the corrosive effects of racism on the workforce as white workers sought to blame their own precarious economic situation on free and enslaved African Americans. Further, the strike left as part of its legacy a deep and abiding racial mistrust, which would linger. For the next century, the history of the strike and subsequent race riot remained an embarrassment to be glossed over and disassociated from the Washington Navy Yard's official history. Hull too received an object lesson in the limits of power; he could order but could not compel. The whole event left Hull offended deeply by the strikers' conduct and to some degree by the strong suggestion of the Secretary of the Navy Dickerson to accept the mediated compromise. On 10 September 1835 Isaac Hull requested and received a year's leave of absence. He never returned to Washington Navy Yard.

From 1839 to 1841 Commodore Hull was in command of Ohio the flagship and the European squadron. The European squadron included the frigate Brandywine and sloops of war Preble and Cyane.

Rendered unfit for further service by age and ill health, he spent the next two years on leave. Commodore Isaac Hull died at the age of 69 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and was interred in Laurel Hill Cemetery. The U. S. Navy named five ships in honor of Isaac Hull, including: Commodore Hull, Hull, Hull, Hull, and Hull. The Commodore Isaac Hull Memorial Bridge spanning the Housatonic River between Derby and Shelton is named after him. Hull Avenue in the Bronx, New York is named in honor of Hull. Hull Street in Richmond, Virginia is named in honor of Hull. Hull Street in Montgomery, Alabama is named in honor of Hull. It runs parallel to streets named after other Barbary War/War of 1812 naval heroes. Fort Hull, a fort built along the Federal Road during the Creek War, was named in honor of Hull. Hull Street in Savannah, Georgia, is also named for him.