Битва за Ленино: Октябрь 1943 года

World War II battle (October 1943)

The Battle of Lenino was a tactical World War II engagement that took place on 12 and 13 October 1943, north of the village of Lenino in the Mogilev region of Byelorussia. The battle itself was a part of a larger Soviet Spas Demensk offensive operation with the aims of clearing the eastern bank of the Dnieper River of German forces and piercing the Panther Wotan line of defences. The battle is prominent in Polish military history, as it was one of the first major engagements of Polish Armed Forces in the East. While the Polish and Soviet forces managed to break through the German defences and inflict heavy casualties on the Germans, they were unable to keep the advance. There was a failure in cooperation from other Red Army units, and a lack of artillery support or close air cover caused by the ongoing Wehrmacht panzer counter attack against the 10th Guards Army to the north of the 33rd Army. The division was forced to assume defensive positions, and was ordered to hold its ground due to the expected arrival in its sector of the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps, which was tasked with breaking through the German defensive position. The relief never arrived; after two days the Polish 1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division suffered 25% casualties and had to be withdrawn, while the remaining Soviet forces were too weak to widen the achieved breakthrough.

On the Soviet side of the front line, the main assault was to be carried out by the Polish 1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division, aided by tanks of the 1st Polish Tank Regiment, light artillery regiments from the Soviet 144th and 164th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 538th Mortar Regiment and the 67th Howitzer Brigade from the Army's reserves. Both flanks of the Polish division were to be secured by the Soviet 42nd (assaulting the village of Sukhino) and 290th Rifle Divisions (assaulting Lenino itself). However, the Polish division was seriously under equipped and inadequately trained, having been formed only four months prior to the battle. In addition, the Soviet divisions had been reduced to 4,000 men each by the start of the operation and their combat value was seriously limited. In addition to that, the morale of the Polish division was seriously undermined by the fact that most of its soldiers were former prisoners of the Soviet Gulag concentration camp system and joining the army for them was a way to escape the prisons rather than to fight for their homeland. The German side of the front was manned by elements of the 113th and 337th Infantry Divisions. The German units were battle hardened and, more importantly, entrenched. As the Germans were aware of the Polish and Soviet plans, they reinforced their lines in the area with elements of the 36th Infantry division under Gottfried Fröhlich just a day before the launch of the offensive. The main German line of defences was stretched between hills 217.6 near Sukhino to the north and hill 215.5 north of the town of Lenino. The swampy valley of the Mereya River (often written as Miereja in Polish historiography), lay in front of the German positions. While not much of an obstacle for infantry, it was uncrossable for Soviet tanks.

The main task of the Polish 1st Infantry Division was to break through the German defences on a two kilometre front in the vicinity of the village of Polzukhi and Hill 215.5. The gap was then to be further widened by the Soviet 42nd and 290th Rifle Divisions. In the second stage of the operation, Polish forces were to reach the line of the Pnevka river and then continue the assault towards Losiev and Churilov. Soviet forces were to assist the Poles in reaching the Dnieper River line.

Three days prior to the actual battle, on 9 October, General Zygmunt Berling, the commanding officer of the Polish 1st Division, ordered a force recon assault on the German lines. The assault failed due to a heavy German artillery barrage, yet alarmed the German HQ of possible offensive actions in this sector of the front. In addition, the Germans reported no less than 1,000 Polish and Soviet soldiers who crossed the lines prior to the battle for fear of being sent back to the Gulag when the war was over.

. The Polish division had held its sector for two days, despite sustaining heavy losses, after which it was returned to the second echelon of the Front for rebuilding. Altogether, the 1st Division lost roughly 25 33% of its personnel in one day. Losses reached almost 3,000 men: 502 killed in action, 1,776 wounded and 663 captured or missing. It was not until spring of the following year that the division could be used in combat again. Despite heavy losses, the Soviet Polish troops managed to keep the Lenino bridgehead, which later played a considerable role in Operation Bagration. German losses were heavy as well and were reported to reach 1,800, in addition to 326 German soldiers taken prisoner. The Wehrmacht also sustained heavy losses in equipment: 72 machine guns, 42 pieces of artillery, two tanks and five aeroplanes.

In military aspect, the plan to capture the bridgehead base of Lenino was reasonable, but the timing of the offensive was not suitable. At the end of the Smolensk Offensive, the Red Army at this sector was exhausted: total remaining manpower of two Soviet divisions at Lenino was only 9,126 personnel, about 2/3 of the 1st Polish Division's strength. The Polish force, despite their high morale and strong willpower, was poorly experienced and inadequately trained. Various Polish scouting actions also allowed the Germans to predict the targets and goals of the Lenino offensive. V. N. Gordov's stubbornness also contributed to the high casualties of the Soviet and Polish troops. At the end of 12 October, casualties of the Soviet and Polish troops had already been unacceptable, and the important Hill 217.6 height could not be taken although the last reserved force had already been used up. At that time, Gordov should have suspended the offensive in order to reorganize and resupply his depleted troops, but he did not. Gordov's grave faults were violently criticized by the Berling—commander of the Polish forces—and even by Stalin. The German front line was not strong; however, they had considerable reserve forces and a deep system of defense. The bunkers, firepoints and trenches were organized carefully. Hence, the Germans managed to quickly stabilise the situation and conduct effective counter strikes. Furthermore, the German commander Robert Martinek also recognized the importance of Hill 217.6: from this hill the Germans could cover a large area and directly strike the whole town of Lenino using artillery. Hill 217.6 would later give the Soviets many difficulties and hardships until its bombardment by a large Katyusha barrage in June 1944.

Although a tactical and strategic failure, the battle was presented as a success by Soviet propaganda, as it was the first battle of the Soviet backed Polish forces. In fact, the battle, while bloody, proved a political victory to the Soviet created Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) whose aim was to present itself as a true authority of a future Poland, an alternative to the legitimate Polish government in exile. The ZPP leaders wanted to prove before the Tehran conference took place that Polish units in the USSR could take an active role in the fight against the Germans. In this light, the use of a barely trained division in fruitless assaults was often described as a political demonstration rather than a military operation. The battle was depicted as a victory, a "great and meaningful event in Polish history", a "milestone in the Polish struggle against fascism" and a "seal on the Polish Soviet brotherhood of arms" by Soviet propaganda. Some authors go as far as to suggest that the decision was a deliberate attempt to further exterminate Poles in the Soviet Union, akin to the Katyn massacre, but this time by German hands. After the victory of the Czechoslovak troops at the Battle of Sokolovo, this was the second time that a foreign force trained by the Soviet Union participated in the Soviet German front. In comparison, the circumstance of the Polish force was quite different from their Czechoslovak comrades. In mid 1941, the Soviet Union also agreed to help form Anders' Army, a Polish force formed under general Władysław Anders from the Polish citizens taken captive by the Soviets in 1939–1941 and released after the Soviets were attacked by their former German allies. However, due to differences in opinions and due to the reluctance of Anders to put his malnourished, untrained and unequipped troops into battle, these Polish forces did not take part in the fight on Soviet territory. Finally, in early 1942, Anders' troops were evacuated to Iran, becoming the Polish Armed Forces in the West to fight alongside the British forces in Europe. Many of those freed prisoners who were unable to join Anders in the evacuation, joined the Polish force formed under general Zygmunt Berling, who had defected from Anders' Army. These became the Polish First Army and Polish Second Army under Soviet command. This Polish force, sometimes called "Berling's Army", played an important role in the fight against Nazi Germany and the capture of Berlin.

After the war, the village of Trigubovo was renamed Kostyushko, a Russian language rendering of the name of Tadeusz Kościuszko, the name sake of the Polish division. On 7 October 1950, the anniversary of the battle was declared the official "Day of the Polish Army" by the authorities of the People's Republic of Poland. In 1989, when Poland quit the Warsaw Pact and Soviet sphere of influence, the day was replaced by the pre war Day of the Polish Army date of 15 August, which commemorates the Battle of Warsaw in 1920.