Введение
В начале 1942 года элементы Императорского японского флота (IJN) предложили вторжение в материковую Австралию. Этому предложению выступили против Императорская японская армия и премьер-министр Хидеки Тоджо, которые считали его невыполнимым, учитывая географию Австралии и силу обороны союзников. Вместо этого японские военные приняли стратегию изоляции материковой Австралии от Соединенных Штатов, продвигаясь через южную часть Тихого океана. Это наступление было прекращено после битвы в Коралловом море и битвы за Мидуэй в мае и июне 1942 года, и все последующие японские операции вблизи Австралии были предприняты для замедления продвижения сил союзников. Это произошло, несмотря на ключевые сражения, включая битву при Милне-Бей, где японцы потерпели первое поражение в наземном бою от австралийской бригады, и кампанию на Кокода, где австралийцы помешали японцам достичь Порт-Морсби, столицы Австралийской территории Папуа, в конце 1942 года. Австралийские города Дарвин и Брум несколько раз подвергались воздушным атакам, а тот факт, что гавань Сиднея также подверглась нападению двух карманных подводных лодок, безусловно, создал у австралийцев и американцев впечатление, что японцы рассматривают вторжение как вполне вероятный сценарий. Это также поддержало стратегическое планирование линии Брисбен. Бывший главный историк Австралийского военного мемориала, доктор Питер Стэнли, утверждает, что японская армия отвергла эту идею как «бессмыслицу», зная, что отправка войск дальше на юг ослабит Японию в Китае и в Маньчжурии перед советской угрозой. Японская армия не только осудила этот план, но и Генеральный штаб флота также его критиковал, не имея возможности выделить миллион тонн судоходства, который потребовало бы вторжение. После падения Сингапура в феврале 1942 года австралийское правительство, военные и народ были глубоко обеспокоены возможностью японского вторжения. Широко распространенный страх привел к расширению военной мощи и военной экономики Австралии, а также к укреплению связей с Соединенными Штатами.
In early 1942, elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) proposed an invasion of mainland Australia. This proposal was opposed by the Imperial Japanese Army and Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, who regarded it as being unfeasible, given Australia's geography and the strength of the Allied defences. Instead, the Japanese military adopted a strategy of isolating mainland Australia from the United States by advancing through the South Pacific. This offensive was abandoned following the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway in May and June 1942, and all subsequent Japanese operations in the vicinity of Australia were undertaken to slow the advance of Allied forces. This is all despite key battles, including the Battle of Milne Bay, where the Japanese suffered from the first defeat of a land battle at the hands of an Australian Brigade, and the Kokoda Campaign, where the Australians prevented the Japanese reaching Port Moresby, the capital of the Australian Territory of Papua, in late 1942. The Australian townships of Darwin and Broome were attacked by air a number of times, and the fact that Sydney Harbor was also attacked by two midget submarines certainly would have given the Australians and Americans the impression that the Japanese were considering invasion as a strong possibility. This also supported the strategic planning of the Brisbane Line. Former Australian War Memorial principal historian Dr Peter Stanley states that the Japanese "army dismissed the idea as 'gibberish', knowing that troops sent further south would weaken Japan in China and in Manchuria against a Soviet threat. Not only did the Japanese army condemn the plan, but the Navy General Staff also deprecated it, unable to spare the million tonnes of shipping the invasion would have consumed." After the fall of Singapore in February 1942, the Australian government, the military and the people were deeply alarmed by the possibility of a Japanese invasion. Widespread fear led to an expansion of Australia's military and war economy, as well as closer links with the United States.
Дебаты между армией и флотом
Успех Японии в первые месяцы Тихоокеанской войны побудил некоторые элементы Императорского японского флота предложить вторжение в Австралию. В декабре 1941 года флот предложил включить вторжение в Северную Австралию в качестве одной из военных целей Японии "второго этапа", после завоевания Юго-Восточной Азии. Наиболее активно это предложение продвигал капитан Садатоси Томиока, начальник отдела планирования Генерального штаба флота, мотивируя это тем, что Соединенные Штаты, вероятно, используют Австралию в качестве базы для контрнаступления в юго-западной части Тихого океана. Штаб-квартира флота утверждала, что вторжение может быть осуществлено небольшим десантным отрядом, поскольку эта часть Австралии была слабо защищена и изолирована от основных населенных пунктов. Однако в составе флота не было единодушной поддержки этой идеи, и командующий Объединенным флотом Исороку Ямамото последовательно выступал против нее. Японская армия отвергла предложение флота, посчитав его непрактичным. Армия была сосредоточена на обороне периметра своих завоеваний и полагала, что вторжение в Австралию чрезмерно растянет линии обороны. Кроме того, армия не хотела выделять большое количество войск, необходимых для такой операции, из Квантунской армии в Маньчжурии, опасаясь вступления Советского Союза в Тихоокеанскую войну и желая сохранить возможность вторжения в Сибирь. Премьер-министр Хидеки Тодзё также последовательно выступал против вторжения в Австралию, предпочитая политику принуждения Австралии к подчинению путем перерезания ее коммуникаций с США. В своем последнем интервью перед казнью за военные преступления Тодзё заявил:
We never had enough troops to [invade Australia]. We had already far out stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasion—no, at no time. In speeches before the Diet of Japan on 12 January and 16 February 1942, Tojo claimed Japanese policy was to "eradicate the British colonies at Hong Kong and in the Malay Peninsula as these were 'evil bases used against East Asia', and turn these places into strongholds for the defence of Greater East Asia. Burma and the Philippines would get independence if they co operated with Japan; the Netherlands East Indies and Australia would be crushed if they resisted; but if they recognised Japan's true intentions would receive help in promoting their welfare and development." The Army's and the Navy's calculations of the number of troops needed to invade Australia differed greatly and formed a central area of discussion. In December 1941 the Navy calculated that a force of three divisions (between 45,000 and 60,000 men) would be sufficient to secure Australia's north eastern and north western coastal areas. In contrast, the Army calculated that a force of at least ten divisions (between 150,000 and 250,000 men) would be needed. The Army's planners estimated that transporting this force to Australia would require 1.5 to 2 million tons of shipping, which would have required delaying the return of requisitioned merchant shipping. This invasion force would have been larger than the entire force used to conquer South East Asia. The Army also rejected the Navy's proposal of limiting an invasion of Australia to securing enclaves in the north of the country as being unrealistic given the likely Allied counter offensives against these positions. Due to its experience in China the Army believed that any invasion of Australia would have to involve an attempt to conquer the entire Australian continent, something which was beyond Japan's abilities. The possibility of invading Australia was discussed by the Japanese Army and Navy on several occasions in February 1942. On 6 February the Navy Ministry formally proposed a plan in which eastern Australia would be invaded at the same time other Japanese forces captured Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia, and this was again rejected by the Army. On 14 February, the day before Singapore was captured, the Army and Navy sections of the Imperial General Headquarters again discussed invading Australia and during this discussion Captain Tomioka argued that it would be possible to take Australia with a "token force". This statement was labelled "so much gibberish" in the Imperial General Headquarters' secret diary. General Tomoyuki Yamashita:
He said that after he had taken Singapore, he wanted to discuss with Tojo a plan for the invasion of Australia Tojo turned down the plan, making the excuse of lengthened supply lines, which would be precarious and open to enemy attack
The dispute between the Army and Navy was settled in late February with a decision to isolate rather than invade Australia. The Army continued to maintain its view that invading Australia was impractical, but agreed to extend Japan's strategic perimeter and cut Australia off from the US by invading Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia in the so called Operation FS. The question of whether to invade Australia was discussed by Imperial Headquarters for the last time on 27 February and in this meeting the Army stated that it believed that Australia was defended by a 600,000 strong military force. During a further meeting held on 4 March the Imperial Headquarters formally agreed to a "Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership" which relegated the option of invading Australia as a "future option" only if all other plans went well. This plan was presented to the Emperor by Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō and in effect ended discussion of invading Australia. The FS Operation was not implemented, however, due to Japan's defeats in the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway and was cancelled on 11 July 1942.
"У нас никогда не было достаточного количества войск для [вторжения в Австралию]. Мы уже сильно растянули наши линии коммуникаций. У нас не было достаточной военной мощи и снабжения для столь масштабного расширения наших и без того перегруженных и слишком рассредоточенных сил. Мы рассчитывали оккупировать всю Новую Гвинею, сохранить Рабаул в качестве опорной базы и совершать авиационные налеты на Северную Австралию. Но фактическое физическое вторжение – нет, никогда."
We never had enough troops to [invade Australia]. We had already far out stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasion—no, at no time. In speeches before the Diet of Japan on 12 January and 16 February 1942, Tojo claimed Japanese policy was to "eradicate the British colonies at Hong Kong and in the Malay Peninsula as these were 'evil bases used against East Asia', and turn these places into strongholds for the defence of Greater East Asia. Burma and the Philippines would get independence if they co operated with Japan; the Netherlands East Indies and Australia would be crushed if they resisted; but if they recognised Japan's true intentions would receive help in promoting their welfare and development." The Army's and the Navy's calculations of the number of troops needed to invade Australia differed greatly and formed a central area of discussion. In December 1941 the Navy calculated that a force of three divisions (between 45,000 and 60,000 men) would be sufficient to secure Australia's north eastern and north western coastal areas. In contrast, the Army calculated that a force of at least ten divisions (between 150,000 and 250,000 men) would be needed. The Army's planners estimated that transporting this force to Australia would require 1.5 to 2 million tons of shipping, which would have required delaying the return of requisitioned merchant shipping. This invasion force would have been larger than the entire force used to conquer South East Asia. The Army also rejected the Navy's proposal of limiting an invasion of Australia to securing enclaves in the north of the country as being unrealistic given the likely Allied counter offensives against these positions. Due to its experience in China the Army believed that any invasion of Australia would have to involve an attempt to conquer the entire Australian continent, something which was beyond Japan's abilities. The possibility of invading Australia was discussed by the Japanese Army and Navy on several occasions in February 1942. On 6 February the Navy Ministry formally proposed a plan in which eastern Australia would be invaded at the same time other Japanese forces captured Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia, and this was again rejected by the Army. On 14 February, the day before Singapore was captured, the Army and Navy sections of the Imperial General Headquarters again discussed invading Australia and during this discussion Captain Tomioka argued that it would be possible to take Australia with a "token force". This statement was labelled "so much gibberish" in the Imperial General Headquarters' secret diary. General Tomoyuki Yamashita:
He said that after he had taken Singapore, he wanted to discuss with Tojo a plan for the invasion of Australia Tojo turned down the plan, making the excuse of lengthened supply lines, which would be precarious and open to enemy attack
The dispute between the Army and Navy was settled in late February with a decision to isolate rather than invade Australia. The Army continued to maintain its view that invading Australia was impractical, but agreed to extend Japan's strategic perimeter and cut Australia off from the US by invading Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia in the so called Operation FS. The question of whether to invade Australia was discussed by Imperial Headquarters for the last time on 27 February and in this meeting the Army stated that it believed that Australia was defended by a 600,000 strong military force. During a further meeting held on 4 March the Imperial Headquarters formally agreed to a "Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership" which relegated the option of invading Australia as a "future option" only if all other plans went well. This plan was presented to the Emperor by Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō and in effect ended discussion of invading Australia. The FS Operation was not implemented, however, due to Japan's defeats in the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway and was cancelled on 11 July 1942.
В своих выступлениях перед японским парламентом 12 января и 16 февраля 1942 года Тодзё утверждал, что политика Японии заключается в "уничтожении британских колоний в Гонконге и на Малайском полуострове, поскольку они являются 'злыми базами, используемыми против Восточной Азии', и превращении этих мест в плацдармы для обороны Великой Восточной Азии. Бирма и Филиппины получат независимость, если будут сотрудничать с Японией; Нидерландская Ост-Индия и Австралия будут разгромлены, если будут сопротивляться; но если они признают истинные намерения Японии, то получат помощь в продвижении своего благосостояния и развития". Расчеты армии и флота относительно необходимого количества войск для вторжения в Австралию значительно различались и стали центральным вопросом обсуждения. В декабре 1941 года флот оценил, что для обеспечения безопасности северо-восточных и северо-западных прибрежных районов Австралии будет достаточно трех дивизий (от 45 000 до 60 000 человек). В отличие от этого, армия оценила, что потребуется не менее десяти дивизий (от 150 000 до 250 000 человек). Армейские планировщики подсчитали, что для переброски этих сил в Австралию потребуется от 1,5 до 2 миллионов тонн грузов, что потребовало бы задержки возвращения реквизированных торговых судов. Эта ударная группировка была бы больше, чем все силы, использованные для завоевания Юго-Восточной Азии. Армия также отвергла предложение флота ограничить вторжение в Австралию захватом анклавов на севере страны, посчитав это нереалистичным, учитывая вероятные контрнаступления союзников против этих позиций. Основываясь на опыте в Китае, армия полагала, что любое вторжение в Австралию должно включать попытку завоевания всего австралийского континента, что было за пределами возможностей Японии. Возможность вторжения в Австралию неоднократно обсуждалась японской армией и флотом в феврале 1942 года. 6 февраля Министерство флота официально предложило план, предусматривающий вторжение в восточную Австралию одновременно с захватом Фиджи, Самоа и Новой Каледонии другими японскими силами, но армия вновь отклонила его. 14 февраля, за день до захвата Сингапура, армейские и военно-морские подразделения Генерального штаба вновь обсудили вторжение в Австралию, и в ходе обсуждения капитан Томиока утверждал, что Австралию можно захватить "небольшим отрядом". Это заявление было названо "полной бессмыслицей" в секретном дневнике Генерального штаба. Генерал Томоюки Ямасита:
We never had enough troops to [invade Australia]. We had already far out stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasion—no, at no time. In speeches before the Diet of Japan on 12 January and 16 February 1942, Tojo claimed Japanese policy was to "eradicate the British colonies at Hong Kong and in the Malay Peninsula as these were 'evil bases used against East Asia', and turn these places into strongholds for the defence of Greater East Asia. Burma and the Philippines would get independence if they co operated with Japan; the Netherlands East Indies and Australia would be crushed if they resisted; but if they recognised Japan's true intentions would receive help in promoting their welfare and development." The Army's and the Navy's calculations of the number of troops needed to invade Australia differed greatly and formed a central area of discussion. In December 1941 the Navy calculated that a force of three divisions (between 45,000 and 60,000 men) would be sufficient to secure Australia's north eastern and north western coastal areas. In contrast, the Army calculated that a force of at least ten divisions (between 150,000 and 250,000 men) would be needed. The Army's planners estimated that transporting this force to Australia would require 1.5 to 2 million tons of shipping, which would have required delaying the return of requisitioned merchant shipping. This invasion force would have been larger than the entire force used to conquer South East Asia. The Army also rejected the Navy's proposal of limiting an invasion of Australia to securing enclaves in the north of the country as being unrealistic given the likely Allied counter offensives against these positions. Due to its experience in China the Army believed that any invasion of Australia would have to involve an attempt to conquer the entire Australian continent, something which was beyond Japan's abilities. The possibility of invading Australia was discussed by the Japanese Army and Navy on several occasions in February 1942. On 6 February the Navy Ministry formally proposed a plan in which eastern Australia would be invaded at the same time other Japanese forces captured Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia, and this was again rejected by the Army. On 14 February, the day before Singapore was captured, the Army and Navy sections of the Imperial General Headquarters again discussed invading Australia and during this discussion Captain Tomioka argued that it would be possible to take Australia with a "token force". This statement was labelled "so much gibberish" in the Imperial General Headquarters' secret diary. General Tomoyuki Yamashita:
He said that after he had taken Singapore, he wanted to discuss with Tojo a plan for the invasion of Australia Tojo turned down the plan, making the excuse of lengthened supply lines, which would be precarious and open to enemy attack
The dispute between the Army and Navy was settled in late February with a decision to isolate rather than invade Australia. The Army continued to maintain its view that invading Australia was impractical, but agreed to extend Japan's strategic perimeter and cut Australia off from the US by invading Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia in the so called Operation FS. The question of whether to invade Australia was discussed by Imperial Headquarters for the last time on 27 February and in this meeting the Army stated that it believed that Australia was defended by a 600,000 strong military force. During a further meeting held on 4 March the Imperial Headquarters formally agreed to a "Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership" which relegated the option of invading Australia as a "future option" only if all other plans went well. This plan was presented to the Emperor by Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō and in effect ended discussion of invading Australia. The FS Operation was not implemented, however, due to Japan's defeats in the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway and was cancelled on 11 July 1942.
"Он сказал, что после захвата Сингапура хочет обсудить с Тодзё план вторжения в Австралию. Тодзё отклонил этот план, сославшись на удлинение линий снабжения, которые были бы ненадежными и уязвимыми для атак противника."
We never had enough troops to [invade Australia]. We had already far out stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasion—no, at no time. In speeches before the Diet of Japan on 12 January and 16 February 1942, Tojo claimed Japanese policy was to "eradicate the British colonies at Hong Kong and in the Malay Peninsula as these were 'evil bases used against East Asia', and turn these places into strongholds for the defence of Greater East Asia. Burma and the Philippines would get independence if they co operated with Japan; the Netherlands East Indies and Australia would be crushed if they resisted; but if they recognised Japan's true intentions would receive help in promoting their welfare and development." The Army's and the Navy's calculations of the number of troops needed to invade Australia differed greatly and formed a central area of discussion. In December 1941 the Navy calculated that a force of three divisions (between 45,000 and 60,000 men) would be sufficient to secure Australia's north eastern and north western coastal areas. In contrast, the Army calculated that a force of at least ten divisions (between 150,000 and 250,000 men) would be needed. The Army's planners estimated that transporting this force to Australia would require 1.5 to 2 million tons of shipping, which would have required delaying the return of requisitioned merchant shipping. This invasion force would have been larger than the entire force used to conquer South East Asia. The Army also rejected the Navy's proposal of limiting an invasion of Australia to securing enclaves in the north of the country as being unrealistic given the likely Allied counter offensives against these positions. Due to its experience in China the Army believed that any invasion of Australia would have to involve an attempt to conquer the entire Australian continent, something which was beyond Japan's abilities. The possibility of invading Australia was discussed by the Japanese Army and Navy on several occasions in February 1942. On 6 February the Navy Ministry formally proposed a plan in which eastern Australia would be invaded at the same time other Japanese forces captured Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia, and this was again rejected by the Army. On 14 February, the day before Singapore was captured, the Army and Navy sections of the Imperial General Headquarters again discussed invading Australia and during this discussion Captain Tomioka argued that it would be possible to take Australia with a "token force". This statement was labelled "so much gibberish" in the Imperial General Headquarters' secret diary. General Tomoyuki Yamashita:
He said that after he had taken Singapore, he wanted to discuss with Tojo a plan for the invasion of Australia Tojo turned down the plan, making the excuse of lengthened supply lines, which would be precarious and open to enemy attack
The dispute between the Army and Navy was settled in late February with a decision to isolate rather than invade Australia. The Army continued to maintain its view that invading Australia was impractical, but agreed to extend Japan's strategic perimeter and cut Australia off from the US by invading Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia in the so called Operation FS. The question of whether to invade Australia was discussed by Imperial Headquarters for the last time on 27 February and in this meeting the Army stated that it believed that Australia was defended by a 600,000 strong military force. During a further meeting held on 4 March the Imperial Headquarters formally agreed to a "Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership" which relegated the option of invading Australia as a "future option" only if all other plans went well. This plan was presented to the Emperor by Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō and in effect ended discussion of invading Australia. The FS Operation was not implemented, however, due to Japan's defeats in the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway and was cancelled on 11 July 1942.
Разногласия между армией и флотом были разрешены в конце февраля решением не вторгаться в Австралию, а изолировать ее. Армия продолжала придерживаться точки зрения, что вторжение в Австралию непрактично, но согласилась расширить стратегический периметр Японии и отрезать Австралию от США, вторгнувшись на Фиджи, Самоа и Новую Каледонию в рамках так называемой операции FS. Вопрос о вторжении в Австралию был в последний раз обсужден в штабе Императора 27 февраля, и в ходе этой встречи армия заявила, что считает, что Австралия защищена 600 000-й армией. Во время дальнейшей встречи, состоявшейся 4 марта, штаб Императора официально утвердил "Основные направления рекомендаций по будущему военному руководству", в которых возможность вторжения в Австралию была отнесена к "будущим вариантам", только в случае успеха всех остальных планов. Этот план был представлен Императору премьер-министром Хидеки Тодзё и фактически положил конец обсуждению вторжения в Австралию. Операция FS не была реализована из-за поражений Японии в сражениях у Кораллового моря и Мидуэя и была отменена 11 июля 1942 года.
We never had enough troops to [invade Australia]. We had already far out stretched our lines of communication. We did not have the armed strength or the supply facilities to mount such a terrific extension of our already over strained and too thinly spread forces. We expected to occupy all New Guinea, to maintain Rabaul as a holding base, and to raid Northern Australia by air. But actual physical invasion—no, at no time. In speeches before the Diet of Japan on 12 January and 16 February 1942, Tojo claimed Japanese policy was to "eradicate the British colonies at Hong Kong and in the Malay Peninsula as these were 'evil bases used against East Asia', and turn these places into strongholds for the defence of Greater East Asia. Burma and the Philippines would get independence if they co operated with Japan; the Netherlands East Indies and Australia would be crushed if they resisted; but if they recognised Japan's true intentions would receive help in promoting their welfare and development." The Army's and the Navy's calculations of the number of troops needed to invade Australia differed greatly and formed a central area of discussion. In December 1941 the Navy calculated that a force of three divisions (between 45,000 and 60,000 men) would be sufficient to secure Australia's north eastern and north western coastal areas. In contrast, the Army calculated that a force of at least ten divisions (between 150,000 and 250,000 men) would be needed. The Army's planners estimated that transporting this force to Australia would require 1.5 to 2 million tons of shipping, which would have required delaying the return of requisitioned merchant shipping. This invasion force would have been larger than the entire force used to conquer South East Asia. The Army also rejected the Navy's proposal of limiting an invasion of Australia to securing enclaves in the north of the country as being unrealistic given the likely Allied counter offensives against these positions. Due to its experience in China the Army believed that any invasion of Australia would have to involve an attempt to conquer the entire Australian continent, something which was beyond Japan's abilities. The possibility of invading Australia was discussed by the Japanese Army and Navy on several occasions in February 1942. On 6 February the Navy Ministry formally proposed a plan in which eastern Australia would be invaded at the same time other Japanese forces captured Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia, and this was again rejected by the Army. On 14 February, the day before Singapore was captured, the Army and Navy sections of the Imperial General Headquarters again discussed invading Australia and during this discussion Captain Tomioka argued that it would be possible to take Australia with a "token force". This statement was labelled "so much gibberish" in the Imperial General Headquarters' secret diary. General Tomoyuki Yamashita:
He said that after he had taken Singapore, he wanted to discuss with Tojo a plan for the invasion of Australia Tojo turned down the plan, making the excuse of lengthened supply lines, which would be precarious and open to enemy attack
The dispute between the Army and Navy was settled in late February with a decision to isolate rather than invade Australia. The Army continued to maintain its view that invading Australia was impractical, but agreed to extend Japan's strategic perimeter and cut Australia off from the US by invading Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia in the so called Operation FS. The question of whether to invade Australia was discussed by Imperial Headquarters for the last time on 27 February and in this meeting the Army stated that it believed that Australia was defended by a 600,000 strong military force. During a further meeting held on 4 March the Imperial Headquarters formally agreed to a "Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership" which relegated the option of invading Australia as a "future option" only if all other plans went well. This plan was presented to the Emperor by Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō and in effect ended discussion of invading Australia. The FS Operation was not implemented, however, due to Japan's defeats in the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway and was cancelled on 11 July 1942.
Последующие японские операции в юго-западной части Тихого океана
Поскольку возможность вторжения в Австралию была отклонена в феврале 1942 года и больше не рассматривалась, японские атаки на Австралию во время войны не были прелюдией к вторжению, как иногда утверждают. Крупный воздушный налет на Дарвин 19 февраля 1942 года и атака на Брум 3 марта были предприняты, чтобы не допустить использования этих городов союзниками в качестве баз для противодействия вторжению в Нидерландскую Ост-Индию и не были связаны с планами вторжения. По словам Фрея: более того, попытка японцев захватить Порт-Морсби в Новой Гвинее путем продвижения по тропе Кокода и высадки в заливе Милне с июля по сентябрь 1942 года была направлена на захват города для завершения японского оборонительного периметра в регионе. После захвата Порт-Морсби он должен был использоваться в качестве базы, с которой японская авиация могла бы доминировать в Торресовом проливе и Коралловом море, а не для поддержки вторжения в Австралию. Небольшой японский разведывательный отряд совершил кратковременную высадку на австралийском материке в январе 1944 года. Подразделение "Мацу Кикан" ("Сосновое дерево"), совместная разведывательная группа армии и флота, высадилась для оценки сообщений о том, что союзники начали строительство крупных новых баз на крайнем севере региона Кимберли в Западной Австралии, выходящего к Тиморскому морю. Покинув базу в Купанге (Западный Тимор), отряд, состоящий из 10 японских военнослужащих на реквизированном рыболовецком судне, которым управляли гражданские лица с Западного Тимора, совершил кратковременные визиты на необитаемые рифы Эшмор и остров Брауз. 19 января "Мацу Кикан" вошел в залив Йорк на материке. Хотя на востоке в холмах виднелся дым, японское судно было закреплено и замаскировано ветвями деревьев. Высадочные группы высадились недалеко от устья реки Ро. Они разведали окрестности в течение примерно двух часов и сняли их на 8-миллиметровую камеру. На следующий день личный состава "Мацу Кикан" снова разведал район, прежде чем вернуться в Купанг. "Мацу Кикан" не обнаружил признаков недавней человеческой деятельности, и миссия не принесла значимой военной информации. Сообщается, что один из офицеров, участвовавших в миссии, вскоре после этого вернулся в Японию, где предложил высадить 200 японских заключенных в Австралии для организации партизанской войны. Однако это предложение не было принято. По словам историка Питера Стэнли, "ни один уважаемый историк не верит, что у японцев был план вторжения в Австралию, нет абсолютно никаких доказательств".
Австралийцы боятся вторжения
После падения Сингапура премьер-министр Австралии Джон Кертин сравнил его потерю с битвой за Дюнкерк. Битва за Британию произошла после Дюнкерка; "падение Сингапура открывает битву за Австралию", – сказал Кертин, которая угрожала Содружеству, Соединенным Штатам и всему англоязычному миру. Не зная, что Япония не планировала вторжение в Австралию и в феврале 1942 года не имела возможности успешно его осуществить, австралийское правительство и народ ожидали вторжения в ближайшее время. Страх был наиболее сильным до июня 1942 года. 16 февраля Кертин заявил:
Защита этой страны – это больше не вклад в мировую войну, а сопротивление врагу, угрожающему вторгнуться на наши берега. Теперь это работа или бой, как мы никогда раньше не работали и не сражались. От того, что мы делаем сейчас, зависит все, что мы сможем сделать после этого кровавого испытания. Бывший глава Центра исторических исследований Национального музея Австралии доктор Питер Стэнли критиковал часто повторяемый и широко распространенный миф о том, что Япония намеревалась вторгнуться в Австралию, отметив, что "миф о вторжении помогает оправдать узкое видение австралийцами их военных усилий". В альтернативно-историческом романе Джона Бирмингема "Определенные цели" (2004) Имперская Япония начинает вторжение в северную Австралию. В сборнике эссе по альтернативной истории "Восходящее солнце победитель" (2001) под редакцией Питера Г. Цураса есть глава "Самураи в Австралии" Джона Гилла, в которой описывается кратковременно успешное японское вторжение на побережье Квинсленда в районе Кейп-Йорк, Кэрнса и Таунсвилла.