Введение
Сразу после падения Сингапура в 1942 году в определенных армейских кругах высказывалось мнение, что Японии следует воспользоваться своим преимуществом и стремиться к миру с Великобританией. Основой этого рассуждения был тот факт, что, судя по таким факторам, как национальная мощь и географическое положение, Япония не могла одержать победу и над Соединенными Штатами, и над Англией одновременно. Советская Армия оправилась от первых поражений в войне с союзником Японии – Германией, и вновь обрела боеспособность. В сложившейся ситуации Японии следовало планировать заключение так называемого компромиссного мира, воспользовавшись моментом после достижения своих военных целей. Однако это мнение придерживалось очень небольшое число людей, и большинство военных не обращали на него должного внимания. После этого началось планирование и ведение войны.
Immediately after the fall of Singapore in 1942 certain Army circles argued that Japan should exploit her advantage and seek peace with Great Britain. The heart of this reasoning was the fact that Japan could not knock out both the United States and England, judging from such factors as a national strength and geographical location. The Soviet Army had recovered from its initial setbacks in the war with Japan's ally Germany, and had regained its feet. Under the circumstances, Japan should plan to conclude a so called compromise peace, seizing the opportunity after attainment of her war objectives. This sentiment was held by very few people, however, and most of the military paid scant attention to it. Planning for and prosecution of war then followed.
Ожидаемые контратаки
В феврале-марте 1942 года Имперский генеральный штаб обеспокоился дальнейшими шагами после завершения первой фазы операций. При планировании операций второго этапа армейское оперативное управление оценило, что контрнаступления могут начаться в 1943 году. Два основных элемента легли в основу этого суждения. Что касается масштаба контратаки, оперативные работники не смогли дать точную оценку, поскольку не имели оснований для прогнозирования. Некоторые штабные офицеры полагали, что контрнаступление может быть сосредоточено вокруг соединения из нескольких дивизий Корпуса морской пехоты. Эти оценки оказались чрезмерно оптимистичными. Американское контрнаступление началось во второй половине 1942 года.
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
+ Оценки сил союзников, составленные разведкой Имперского генерального штаба (начало мая 1942 г.)
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Соединенные Штаты (Тихоокеанское побережье)
Сухопутные силы: 1 888 000 (43 полностью укомплектованные дивизии)
Самолеты: 3 650 единиц первой линии
Прогноз: К концу 1942 года численность наземных сил составит около 2 000 000; боевых самолетов первой линии – около 6 000
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Соединенные Штаты (Гавайи)
Сухопутные силы: 35 000
Военно-воздушные силы армии: 150
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Атолл Мидуэй
Сухопутные силы: 1 700
Военно-воздушные силы армии и флота: 59
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Западное Самоа
Сухопутные силы: 750
Военно-воздушные силы США: 20
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Фиджи
Сухопутные силы: 7 500 (США и Великобритания)
Военно-воздушные силы: 20
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Новая Каледония и Лояльность
Сухопутные силы: 3 000 (США и войска де Голля)
Самолеты: 10
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Австралия
Сухопутные силы: 350 000 (10 австралийских дивизий)
Самолеты: 500
Прогноз: Прибывают части армии США: 1 или 2 дивизии, а также части Новой Зеландии
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Новая Зеландия
Сухопутные силы: 70 000 (3 новозеландские дивизии)
Самолеты: 250
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Британская Индия
Сухопутные силы: 5 000 000 (7 дивизий британской армии, 23 дивизии индийской армии)
Самолеты: 350
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Цейлон
Сухопутные силы: 2 британские дивизии
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
Такое самоуспокоение наблюдалось не только в Токио, но и в Южной армии, что было вполне закономерно. Например, Южная армия объединила разведывательный отдел штаба с оперативным отделом после завершения первой фазы войны, утверждая, что разведывательный отдел потерял свою raison d'être на данном этапе. Это действие Южной армии, игнорировавшее разведывательную функцию, было предпринято без одобрения Имперского генерального штаба и свидетельствовало о пренебрежении к боевой мощи союзников. В результате не было возможности предвидеть крупномасштабные контрнаступления, предпринятые американцами и британцами в ближайшем будущем. Фактически, разведывательный отдел Южной армии был восстановлен только 6 февраля 1944 года.
Between February and March 1942, Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first phase operations. In planning second phase operations, the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter offensives could be expected to start in 1943. Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment. As for the scale of counterattack, the operations people could make no definitive estimate, because they had no basis for forecasting. Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions. The estimates proved overly optimistic. The American counter assault began in the latter half of 1942. + Imperial General Headquarters Intelligence Estimates of Allied Strength (Early May 1942)United States (Pacific Coast)Land Forces: 1,888,000 (43 fully equipped divisions)Aircraft: 3,650 first line operativesForecast: Towards end of 1942, ground forces will number about 2,000,000; first line warplanes will reach about 6,000United States (Hawaii)Land Forces: Land Forces: 35,000 Army Aircraft: 150Midway AtollLand Forces: 1,700 Army & Navy Aircraft: 59West SamoaLand Forces: 750 U. S. Navy Aircraft: 20FijiLand Forces: 7,500 U. S. & British Army Aircraft: 20New Caledonia and LoyaltyLand Forces: 3,000 U. S. & De Gaullist Army Airplanes: 10AustraliaLand Forces: 350,000 (10 Australian Divisions)Aircraft: 500Forecast: U. S. Army now arriving: 1 or 2 Divisions plus New Zealand UnitsNew ZealandLand Forces: 70,000 (3 New Zealand divisions) Aircraft: 250British IndiaLand Forces: 5,000,000 (7 Divisions British Army,23 Divisions Indian Army)Aircraft: 350CeylonLand Forces: 1 2 British divisions
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well which was perhaps only natural. The Southern Army, for example, united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war, alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d'etre at that stage. This action of the Southern Army, ignoring the intelligence function, was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies. There was consequently an inability to forecast the large scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future. Indeed, the Southern Army's Intelligence Section was not re activated until February 6, 1944.
17-я армия и операции на Гуадалканале
Между тем на острове Гуадалканал разгорелись бои. 13 августа 17-й армии (с отрядом Ичики на усилении) было приказано продолжить операцию в Восточной Новой Гвинее, одновременно захватить Гуадалканал совместно с флотом.
Fighting had meanwhile erupted on Guadalcanal Island. On August 13, the Seventeenth Army (with the Ichiki Detachment in support) was ordered to continue the Eastern New Guinea Operation, while simultaneously recapturing Guadalcanal in concert with the Navy.
Последствия потерь в Мидуэе
Провал операции "Мидуэй" был вызван незначительной небрежностью, но последствия оказались настолько катастрофическими, что коренным образом подорвали операции японской армии в Тихом океане. В результате этого поражения японский флот навсегда утратил своё превосходство, поскольку быстрое восстановление после сокрушительного удара по авианосной группировке было невозможно. Японии было сложно в короткие сроки построить новые крупные авианосцы или подготовить квалифицированных лётчиков.
The failure of the Midway Operation was caused by slight negligence, but the effects were so tremendous that Japanese Army operations in the Pacific were shaken to their very roots. Because of the failure, the Japanese Navy also lost its mastery forever, since a quick recovery from the smashing blow to the carrier fleet was impossible. It was difficult for Japan either to build large aircraft carriers or to train skilled airmen overnight.
Июньские высадки
6 июня 1942 года Северноморский отряд высадился на Киске, а на следующий день – на Атту, не встретив сопротивления. Высадки в Адаке не производилось, и задача по оккупации этого острова была отменена 25 июня. Штаб Императорской армии (24 октября) усилил Северноморский отряд и одновременно переименовал его в Северноморский гарнизонный отряд. Под командованием генерал-майора Джуичиро Минеки, соединение состояло преимущественно из трех пехотных батальонов и находилось в оперативном подчинении главнокомандующего 5-м флотом. Армия США построила авиабазы в Адаке (примерно к концу августа 1942 года) и в Амчитке, недалеко от Киски (около февраля 1943 года). 26 марта 1943 года у Командорских островов, в пределах советских территориальных вод, произошло морское сражение, однако обе стороны не понесли серьёзных потерь.
On June 6, 1942, the North Seas Detachment landed on Kiska, and the next day upon Attu, without meeting resistance. No landings were made, in Adak and the mission of occupying that island was canceled on June 25. IGHQ (on October 24) reinforced the North Seas Detachment and also changed its name to the North Seas Garrison Unit. Commanded by Major General Juichiro Mineki, the force was primarily composed of three infantry battalions and was under the operational control of the Commander in Chief of the Fifth Fleet. The United States Army constructed air bases at both Adak (about the end of August 1942) and at Amchitka, near Kiska (around February 1943). On March 26, 1943, a naval battle occurred near the Komandorski Islands, within Soviet territorial waters, but neither side suffered serious losses.