Операция «Возмездие»: убийство адмирала Ямамото

U. S. operation to kill Admiral Yamamoto, 18 April 1943

Operation Vengeance was the American military operation to kill Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto of the Imperial Japanese Navy on 18 April 1943 during the Solomon Islands campaign in the Pacific Theater of World War II. Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy, was killed near Bougainville Island when his transport aircraft was shot down by United States Army Air Forces fighter aircraft operating from Kukum Field on Guadalcanal. The mission of the U. S. aircraft was specifically to kill Yamamoto, made possible because of United States Navy intelligence decoding transmissions about Yamamoto's travel itinerary through the Solomon Islands area. The death of Yamamoto reportedly damaged the morale of Japanese naval personnel, raised the morale of the Allied forces, and was intended as revenge by U. S. leaders, who blamed Yamamoto for the attack on Pearl Harbor that initiated the war between Imperial Japan and the United States. The U. S. pilots claimed to have shot down three twin engine bombers and two fighters during the mission, but Japanese records show only two bombers were shot down. There is a controversy over which pilot shot down Yamamoto's plane, but most modern historians credit Rex T. Barber.

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy, scheduled an inspection tour of the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. He planned to inspect Japanese air units participating in Operation I Go that had begun 7 April 1943; in addition, the tour would boost Japanese morale following the disastrous Guadalcanal campaign and its subsequent evacuation during January and February.

On 14 April the U. S. naval intelligence effort code named "Magic" intercepted and decrypted orders alerting affected Japanese units of the tour. The original message, NTF131755, addressed to the commanders of Base Unit No. 1, the 11th Air Flotilla, and the 26th Air Flotilla, was encoded in the Japanese Naval Cipher JN 25D, and was picked up by three stations of the "Magic" apparatus, including Fleet Radio Unit Pacific Fleet. The message was then deciphered by Navy cryptographers (among them future Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens); it contained time and location details of Yamamoto's itinerary, as well as the number and types of planes that would transport and accompany him on the journey. The decrypted text revealed that on 18 April Yamamoto would fly from Rabaul to Balalae Airfield, on an island near Bougainville in the Solomon Islands. He and his staff would fly in two medium bombers (Mitsubishi G4M Bettys of the Kōkūtai 705), escorted by six navy fighters (Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters of the Kōkūtai 204), to depart Rabaul at 06:00 and arrive at Balalae at 08:00, Tokyo time. The U. S. Army Military Intelligence Service (MIS) was made up mostly of Nisei (second generation Japanese Americans). They were trained in interpretation, interrogation, and translation of Japanese materials ranging from standard textbooks to captured documents. Information leading to Yamamoto's ambush was a significant MIS contribution in the Solomons campaign. MIS Technical Sergeant Harold Fudenna translated an intercepted radio message indicating the itinerary of Yamamoto. President Franklin D. Roosevelt may have authorized Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox to "get Yamamoto", but no official record of such an order exists, and sources disagree whether he did so. Knox essentially let Admiral Chester W. Nimitz make the decision. The specially fitted P 38s took off from Kukum Field on Guadalcanal beginning at 07:25 on 18 April. Two of the Lightnings assigned to the killer flight dropped out of the mission at the start, one with a tire flattened during takeoff (McLanahan) and the second when its drop tanks would not feed fuel to the engines (Moore). In Rabaul, despite urgings by local Japanese commanders to cancel the trip for fear of ambush, Yamamoto's airplanes took off as scheduled for the trip of 315 mile (507 km). They climbed to 6500 feet (1981 m), with their fighter escort at their 4 o'clock position and 1500 feet (457 m) higher, split into two V formations of three planes. Mitchell's flight of four led the squadron at low altitude, with the killer flight, consisting of Lanphier, Barber, and spares Besby F. Holmes and Raymond K. Hine, immediately behind. Mitchell, fighting off drowsiness, navigated solely by dead reckoning (speed and compass heading). This has been called the longest distance fighter intercept mission of the war. Mitchell and his force arrived at the intercept point one minute early, at 09:34, just as Yamamoto's aircraft descended into view in a light haze. The P 38s jettisoned the auxiliary tanks, turned to the right to parallel the bombers, and began a full power climb to intercept them. The tanks on Holmes's P 38 did not detach, and his two man element turned back toward the sea. Mitchell radioed Lanphier and Barber to engage, and they climbed toward the eight aircraft. The nearest escort fighters dropped their own tanks and dived toward the pair of P 38s. Lanphier immediately turned head on and climbed towards the escorts while Barber chased the diving bomber transports. Barber banked steeply to turn in behind the bombers and momentarily lost sight of them, but when he regained contact, he was immediately behind one and began firing into its right engine, rear fuselage, and empennage. When Barber hit its left engine, the bomber began to trail heavy black smoke. The Betty rolled violently to the left, and Barber narrowly avoided a mid air collision. Looking back, he saw a column of black smoke and assumed the Betty had crashed into the jungle. Barber headed towards the coast at treetop level, searching for the second bomber, not knowing which one carried the targeted high ranking officer. Barber spotted the second bomber—carrying Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki and part of Yamamoto's staff—low over the water off Moila Point, trying to evade an attack by Holmes, whose wing tanks had finally come off. Holmes damaged the right engine of the Betty, which emitted a white vapor trail, but his closure speed carried him and his wingman Hine past the damaged bomber. Barber attacked the crippled bomber, and his bullet strikes caused it to shed metal debris that damaged his own aircraft. The bomber descended and crash landed in the water. Ugaki and two others survived the crash and were later rescued. Barber, Holmes and Hine were attacked by Zeros, with Barber's P 38 receiving 104 hits. Holmes and Barber each claimed a Zero shot down during this melee, although Japanese records show that no Zeros were lost. The top cover briefly engaged reacting Zeros without making any kills. Mitchell observed the column of smoke from Yamamoto's crashed bomber. Hine's P 38 had disappeared by this point, presumably crashed into the water. Running close to minimum fuel levels for return to base, the P 38s broke off contact, with Holmes so short of fuel that he was forced to land in the Russell Islands. Hine was the only American pilot who did not return. Lanphier's actions during the battle are unclear as his account was later disputed by other participants, including the Japanese fighter pilots. As he approached Henderson Field, Lanphier radioed the fighter director on Guadalcanal that "That son of a bitch will not be dictating any peace terms in the White House", breaching security and endangering the code breaking program. Upon landing, one engine quit from fuel starvation. He immediately put in a claim for shooting down Yamamoto.

The crash site and body of Yamamoto were found on 19 April, the day after the attack, by a Japanese search and rescue party led by army engineer Lieutenant Tsuyoshi Hamasuna. The crash site was located in the jungle north of the coastal site of the former Australian patrol post and Catholic mission of Buin (which was re established after the war several kilometers inland). The retrieval party noted Yamamoto had been thrown clear of the plane's wreckage, his white gloved hand grasping the hilt of his katana, his body still upright in his seat under a tree. Hamasuna said Yamamoto was instantly recognizable, his head tilted down as if deep in thought. A post mortem of Yamamoto indicated two bullet wounds, one to the back of his left shoulder, and a separate wound to his left lower jaw that appeared to exit above his right eye. The Japanese navy doctor examining Yamamoto's body determined the head wound killed Yamamoto. These more violent details of Yamamoto's death were hidden from the Japanese public, and the medical report whitewashed, this secrecy "on orders from above" according to biographer Hiroyuki Agawa. In Japan, Yamamoto's killing became known as the "Navy A (kō) incident". It raised morale in the United States and shocked the Japanese, who were officially told about the incident only on 21 May. The announcement said that the admiral was killed in April while directing strategy on the front lines and had "engaged in combat with the enemy and met gallant death on a war plane." Norman Lodge, an Associated Press correspondent in the South Pacific, found out what had happened and filed a detailed story about the mission on 11 May which said the United States had been tracking Yamamoto for five days before the shoot down, but U. S. military censors prevented the story from going out. At this point, U. S. officials had not disclosed anything about the operation, and the American public first learned of Yamamoto's death when the 21 May Japanese statement was covered in the news. Over the next couple of days there were stories in the U. S. press speculating that the Japanese announcement was a cover for Yamamoto having committed hara kiri because the war was not going well for the Japanese. Then on 31 May Time magazine ran separate stories several pages apart, one which reported the Japanese announcement and one which related how Lanphier and his P 38 pilots on Guadalcanal had shot down three Japanese bombers over Bougainville and then flown home wondering if they had killed "some Jap bigwig" in the bombers. However, the Japanese did not draw any conclusions from this. Even then U. S. intelligence was frustrated because they wanted to keep the secret longer as they were still debriefing Japanese intelligence officers and feared knowledge of the code breaking would rush those officers into shame driven suicide. The crash site is around an hour's walk from the nearest road. Although the aircraft wreckage has been heavily scavenged by souvenir hunters, parts of the fuselage remain where it crashed. The site is on private land. Access was previously difficult as the ownership of the land was disputed. However, as of 2015, it is possible for visitors to gain access to the site by prior arrangement. Part of one wing has been removed and is displayed, on permanent loan, at the Isoroku Yamamoto Family Museum in Nagaoka, Japan. One of the aircraft's doors is at the Papua New Guinea National Museum and Art Gallery. Military historian Daniel L. Haulman, who was a member of the US Air Force panel that reviewed the case in 1985, stated in 2024 that after reviewing new evidence, "I have become convinced that, despite the panel decision and the subsequent Rice decision, credit for shooting down Yamamoto's plan really should go to Rex Barber." In May 2006, Air Force Magazine published a letter by Doug Canning, a former pilot of the 347th Fighter Group who flew on Operation Vengeance (he escorted Holmes back to the Russell Islands). Canning, who was friends with both Lanphier and Barber, stated that Lanphier had written the official report, medal citations, and several magazine articles about the mission. He also claimed Barber had been willing to share the half credit for shooting down Yamamoto until Lanphier had given him an unpublished manuscript he had written, claiming he alone had shot down Yamamoto's plane. Canning agreed that Barber had a strong case for his claim citing the testimony of Yanagiya who saw Yamamoto's "Betty" crash 20 to 30 seconds after being hit from behind by fire from a P 38. Likewise, the second Betty carrying Ugaki crashed 20 seconds after being struck by aircraft fire. Canning stated categorically that the P 38Gs flown that day did not have aileron boost to assist in turning (as did later models), making it physically impossible for Lanphier's aircraft to have made the 180 degree turn fast enough to intercept Yamamoto's plane in less than 30 seconds. The Air Force later disqualified Lanphier's claim for shooting down a Zero in the battle, meaning that Lanphier lost his "ace" status as his total number of air to air kills dropped from five to four. In spite of criticism from Barber and other surviving pilots from the mission, Lanphier continued to claim credit for downing Yamamoto until his death in 1987. Most newspaper obituaries reporting Lanphier's death credited him with killing Yamamoto. Barber continued to contest Lanphier's claim, mainly in military circles and publications, until his death in 2001. Lieutenant Julius Jacobson, another pilot on the mission, remarked in 1997, "There were 15 of us who survived, and as far as who did the effective shooting, who cares?" Rice commented in 1993, "Historians, fighter pilots and all of us who have studied the record of this extraordinary mission will forever speculate as to the exact events of that day in 1943. There is glory for the whole team."

The Yamamoto killing has been the subject of extensive historical and legal discussion in military, political and academic circles. Following the 2020 killing of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, the Yamamoto killing was cited by senior U. S. officials as a precedent. Various major media and noted pundits also singled out the Yamamoto killing as the relevant comparison, including The New York Times, who reported that the Yamamoto killing was "the last time the United States killed a major military leader in a foreign country" prior to the Soleimani killing.