Battle of Abu Tellul

UKGBI
British India
Australia
| combatant2 =
| commander1 = H. J. M. Macandrew Charles Cox Cyril Rodney Harbord
| commander2 =
| strength1 = 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade1st Light Horse Brigade B Battery, Honourable Artillery Company
| strength2 = Ottoman 24th Division (supported by two German battalions)
| casualties1 = 189 including 23 killed, 46 wounded Australian Light Horsemen
| casualties2 = about 1,000; 105 killed, 45 wounded, 425–540 captured) was fought on 14 July 1918 during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of World War I after German and Ottoman Empire forces attacked the British Empire garrison in the Jordan Valley. The valley had been occupied by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) from February 1918 when Jericho was captured. Following two raids east of the River Jordan by the EEF the first in March and second in April the defence of the valley became the responsibility of the Desert Mounted Corps. A German and Ottoman force attacked the Australian Light Horse units defending the heights at Mussallabeh and Abu Tellul on the edge of the Judean Hills, while a German force attacked those defending the Wadi Mellaha midway between Abu Tellul and the Jordan River. As these attacks were taking place on the western bank of the river, on the eastern side the Ottoman Caucasus Cavalry Brigade deployed two regiments, to attack the bridgeheads at the fords of El Hinu and Makhadet Hijla. However, the Ottoman formation was overwhelmed by a combined force of British and Indian troops before it could launch its attack. These were the last attacks against the British forces in this campaign.

Abu Tellul was a strategically important ridge located near the west bank of the Jordan river which, together with another ridge to the north called Mussallabeh, formed a salient in the British defensive line in the Jordan valley. A number of defensive posts were constructed by the Australian and New Zealand garrison which were often between and apart, consisting of either dug or built up stone sangars, while the ravines in between were covered with barbed wire. The British artillery batteries were concealed close behind the front line just south of the ridge. El Mussallabeh had been attacked on 11 April, between the first and second Transjordan raids. The attack had been launched by a composite force of four Ottoman infantry battalions and several batteries. Subsequently, defensive work was carried out. From early May, when the withdrawal of the forces involved in the second Transjordan attack was complete, the occupation of the Jordan Valley by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was unchallenged, except for the attacks on 14 July and shelling by long range Ottoman and German artillery. The Ottoman and German attack occurred on the front line protecting the garrison in the valley; the main focus being a salient in the wilderness to the north north west of the Wadi el Auja on the western side of the Jordan River. They sought to cut off the British force in the Jordan Valley from the infantry holding the front line in the Judean Hills by creating a wedge between the infantry and the mounted force in the valley. Such an action would, if successful, have destabilised British control of the Jordan and Dead Sea area, effectively ending the threat of a third Transjordan attack by pushing Lieutenant General Harry Chauvel's forces back out of the Jordan Valley. If the attack succeeded, the front line stretching from the Mediterranean Sea would have been considerably shortened and potentially destabilised. The Ottoman Eighth Army defending the coastal sector, the Seventh Army defending the Judean Hills and the Fourth Army defending the east would have been able to strengthen their considerably shorter line to threaten General Edmund Allenby's right flank making the attacks in September at Megiddo very difficult, if not virtually impossible.

Bad feelings between the two allies arose when it was believed by sections of the Ottoman Army in Palestine that some German units had been withdrawn and sent to the Caucasus. In fact, no units of the Ottoman Army were withdrawn from Palestine to support the Trans Caucasian campaigns, one infantry division and an infantry regiment were sent to eastern Anatolia in 1918 but from Constantinople. Indeed, considerable reinforcements arrived in Palestine from Caucasia in 1918 including the 2nd Caucasian Cavalry Division and the 37th Division. The cordial relations developed between Ottomans and Germans during three years of war in the Sinai and Palestine were, however, seriously undermined in May 1918 when Enver Pasha violated the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and aggressively expanded the Ottoman presence in Georgia. Included in this force was a group of 100 Germans who were armed with 42 automatic rifles.

The Abu Tellul sector was held by two regiments of the 1st Light Horse Brigade; the 2nd Light Horse Regiment held four posts; "Mussallabeh", "Maskera" "The Bluff" and "Vyse" while the 3rd Light Horse Regiment held the "Vale", "View", "Vaux", "Zoo" and "Zeiss" posts which surrounded the high plateau of Abu Tellul where the "Abu Tellul East" and "Abu Tellul West" posts were separated by a gully. Before the attacks began, the commander of the 3rd Light Horse Regiment was asked if he thought the front line could stop a determined attack at Abu Tellul –

The 1st Light Horse Regiment formed the brigade reserve. The defence of these Mussallabeh and Abu Tellul positions was supported by the 1/1st Nottinghamshire Royal Horse Artillery (RHA), 1/B Battery, Honourable Artillery Company (HAC), C/301 and C/303 Howitzer Batteries (60th (2/2nd London) Division), the 11th Mountain Battery and the Hong Kong Mountain Battery. By June work was continuing on the defences and the men worked hard to complete sangars, digging and wiring although the area was overlooked by the Ottomans and much of the work had to be done at night. Early in July the 1st Light Horse Regiment was in reserve while the 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Regiment held Vyse and Zeiss posts. On 13 July the section of the front line which passed through the Jordan Valley to the Dead Sea was commanded by Chauvel's Desert Mounted Corps. The Ghoraniyeh bridgehead and the area of the valley stretching south towards the Dead Sea was held by the 2nd Mounted Division with two Indian infantry battalions (Alwar Infantry (I. S.) and 1st Battalion, Patiala Infantry (I. S.) of 20th Indian Brigade). While the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (ANZAC Mounted Division) held the Auja and Mellaha areas including the Abu Tellul salient. This salient was difficult to defend, as the posts and sangars were isolated owing to the hilly terrain interspersed by rocky crevasses. Under orders, a series of posts and sangars were constructed at Abu Tellul and Mussallabeh which were designed for all round defence. Work to strengthen these defences included heavily wiring all the posts which were kept supplied with water, ammunition and food. After a few relatively cool days, around 7 August the temperature began to rise steadily and it was noticed that the Ottoman forces had increased their activities, in particular the shelling of Abu Tellul had greatly increased. On 14 July the maximum shade temperature was recorded at .

The attack commenced with long range artillery shelling from both sides throughout the night, then 17 German aircraft bombed the Jordan Valley garrison at 04:00 in the morning of Sunday 14 July, causing dozens of casualties.

Movements were heard between Vale and View posts defended by the 3rd Light Horse Regiment just after 01:00 when the regimental commander ordered an artillery barrage in front of Vale post. Ottoman artillery also started shelling Mussallabeh and Abu Tellul. This bombardment ceased about 02:30 when the movement of many Ottoman units was again heard by the defenders. These were the German 702nd and 703rd Battalions, one company of the 11 Regiment Jäger Battalion and one company of the 146th Regiment. This force was supported on the left by the 32nd Regiment attacking Mussallabeh, and on the right by the 163rd and 58th Regiments facing Abu Tellul, with 2nd Regiment forming a reserve in the rear. At 03:30 the Mussallabeh salient protecting the Wadi el Auja was attacked by 1,250 Germans in two and a half battalions. Just before the attack began, the regimental commander of 2nd Light Horse Regiment withdrew his headquarters, located just behind Vale position, which was the first position attacked, narrowly escaping capture to Abu Tellul West where they established and maintained their position throughout the attack. The 2nd Light Horse regimental commanding officer observed from his new position on Abu Tellul West, just before dawn, a large body of troops coming up the hill towards his twelve man post. At first he assumed they were some of his own men retiring from the outer posts, but when they reached the wire and began to cut it, he at once gave the order to open rapid fire. They were able to successfully defend their sangars and posts from whatever direction the attack came. Three attempts were made by the left of the attacking force on Mussallabeh, but were driven back each time with heavy loss by well placed machine gun fire leaving about 200 dead. The whole position was completely restored and 380 German and about 200 Ottoman prisoners were sent back to headquarters. Regardless, the attack by the Ottoman 163rd Regiment on Vaux post continued.

When it was found that the Germans had advanced between the 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Regiments and reached the centre of the advanced Light Horse position, the reserve; the 1st Light Horse Regiment launched a counter attack at 04:30. When the alarm had first been raised, the commander of the 1st Light Horse Brigade had sent forward one squadron of the reserve regiment; with four machine guns to reinforce the 2nd Light Horse Regimental headquarters on Abu Tellul West and at 03:40 sent a second squadron forward which attacked Abu Tellul East. The Germans were caught scattered and disorganised; the light horse posts had prevented them digging in and they were quickly swept from their position retreating back into the valley to the north where they were fired on from Mussallabeh posts. Two hours later at 08:00 the same officer went forward with twenty men to within bombing distance and charged throwing bombs and bayoneting many of the Ottomans. One officer and two light horsemen were slightly wounded, while they killed twenty five, wounded thirty and captured thirty to forty five, the remainder escaping to their rear position behind.

While the attacks on Mussallebeh and Abu Tellul on the western side of the Jordan River were in progress, an Ottoman cavalry force was seen massing for an attack on the east bank of the river. The cavalry were advancing towards El Hinu ford, between the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead and the Dead Sea. The Jodhpur and Mysore Lancers from the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade galloped out from the fords, while the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry and the 34th Prince Albert Victor's Own Poona Horse, from the 14th Cavalry Brigade moved out from the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead to attack the Ottoman cavalry. At 03:30 a squadron of the Jodhpore Lancers crossed the Jordan at the El Hinu ford and a squadron of the Mysore Lancers crossed at Makhadet Hijla to discover the Ottoman cavalry force on a 2 mile (3 km) long front with its right flank just north of the Wadi er Rame 1.5 mile (2 km) east of Makhadet Hijla. Two armoured cars of No. 1 Australian Light Car Patrol supported the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade in their successful counterattack. After seeing the advance of the Jodhpore Lancers, at 13:15 the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry and Mysore Lancers advanced on the Ottoman cavalry; the Mysore Lancers attacking and spearing around thirty Ottoman soldiers before retiring from the open ground to the bank of the Wadi er Rame. The Jodhpore and Mysore Lancers and the Poona Horse commanded by Major General H. J. M. Macandrew took 100 prisoners, killing more than ninety Ottomans with the lance, but suffered the loss of eighty troopers. Between 14 and 15 July the 4th Light Horse Field Ambulance evacuated a total of 278 men; eighty five of whom were wounded and forty four sick Light Horsemen, twenty four were wounded Lancers, 111 were wounded German prisoners and fourteen were wounded Ottoman prisoners. Many casualties came in to the 4th Light Horse Field Ambulance soon after the long range artillery shelling commenced; the numbers increasing when bombing and machine gun attacks by the aircraft followed. Stretcher bearers collected the wounded from the front line and brought them to waiting ambulances which transported them back to the tent division of the field ambulance. At the tent division all wounded were attended, receiving emergency treatment from the medical officers and hospital staff before being loaded on the ambulances again by the stretcher bearers and evacuated by road to the casualty clearing stations in Jerusalem. Cars and extra men came from the 2nd Light Horse Field Ambulance to help the 4th Light Horse Field Ambulance as speedy evacuation was of major importance. The defeat was a severe blow to German prestige. An Ottoman artillery attack began at 01:00 on Tuesday 16 July and the 1st Light Horse Brigade, still in position on Abu Tellul and Mussallabeh, was heavily shelled. Over 1,500 shells were fired at their positions, causing heavy casualties, especially among the horses, who were not well protected against shell fire or bomb attacks. The accuracy of the Ottoman artillery was enhanced by spotter planes and accurate distance observation posts. In the afternoon when the 3rd Light Horse Brigade moved to relieve the 1st Light Horse Brigade; their advance guard was so heavily shelled that the main body of brigade did not take over until after dark.