Екінші дүниежүзілік соғысындағы британ армиясының шабуылы

British Army offensive during the Second World War

It was the first time during the war that a significant German force fought on the defensive. The British lost over half of their tanks on the first day and only one of three attacks succeeded. The British achieved mixed results on the second day, being pushed back on their western flank and repulsing a big German counter attack in the centre. On the third day, the British narrowly avoided disaster by withdrawing just ahead of a German encircling movement. The failure of Battleaxe led to the replacement of British General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander in Chief Middle East, by Claude Auchinleck; Wavell took Auchinleck's position as Commander in Chief, India.

In late March 1941, soon after the arrival of the Afrika Korps in Tripoli, Libya to reinforce the Italians, the Axis forces quickly captured the British front line position at El Agheila and by mid April, had reached as far as Sallum, Egypt. The British held the fortified port of Tobruk, which was besieged by the Axis. Having been informed by General Wavell that the Western Desert Force was vastly inferior to the Axis forces now in Africa, Churchill ordered that a convoy of tanks and Hawker Hurricanes, Operation Tiger (Convoy WS 58), be sailed through the Mediterranean instead of around the Cape of Good Hope to cut forty days off the journey. efn|The convoy comprised five merchant ships, , , , Empire Song and New Zealand Star. The ships carried 295 tanks and 53 Hurricane fighters.

Through Ultra intercepts, the British also received the report by Paulus. Churchill, believing that one strong push would dislodge German forces, began to increase the pressure on Wavell to attack. Brevity began on 15 May and Fort Capuzzo and Halfaya Pass were captured but next day William Gott, concerned that his 22nd Guards Brigade would be destroyed if caught in the open by Germans tanks, decided to pull almost the entire force back to Halfaya Pass. The operation ended on 17 May, with only the Halfaya Pass captured. The pass was retaken by a small German force on 27 May, in Operation Skorpion.

By the end of May, the Greek island of Crete had been captured in the Battle of Crete, providing the Luftwaffe with more airfields from which to attack Allied shipping and protect their supply convoys and troops in Cyrenaica; delaying Battleaxe could mean stronger Axis opposition. The British Chiefs of Staff stated that it was imperative that control be wrested in the area between Sollum and Derna and British air power be re established there. There were delays in unloading the tanks, which also had to be adapted for desert use, so Battleaxe was postponed until 10 June. The tanks were intended for the 7th Armoured Division, which had been out of action since February, after most of its tanks had worn out during Operation Compass.

On 28 May, Wavell gave his orders for Operation Battleaxe, an operation in three stages; the Axis forces were to be defeated on the frontier and the area of Halfaya, Sollum, Capuzzo and Sidi Aziez was to be secured. In the second phase, XIII Corps was to secure the area around Tobruk and El Adem, then the areas of Derna and Mechili were to be captured. The attack was originally scheduled for 7 June, but was pushed back at the insistence of General O'Moore Creagh, whose squadrons did not receive their tanks until 9 June. The new date was 15 June, giving Creagh five days for additional training. In the first stage, the British would advance in a three prong assault to clear the frontier region. Along the coast was Coast Force and inland was Escarpment Force. The former was responsible for capturing Halfaya Pass, while the latter was to capture the remainder of the frontier at Fort Capuzzo, Musaid and Sollum. The 7th Armoured Brigade Group and the artillery of the Support Group were to engage and destroy the German tanks, which were thought to be at Hafid Ridge. This would also trap Axis units on the frontier between themselves and the remainder of the British forces. After capturing the frontier, the brigades of the 7th Armoured Division would reform and continue north to relieve Tobruk. Once joined by the Tobruk garrison, the combined forces would press on to the west, driving the Germans as far back as possible. Three days prior to the start of Battleaxe, to help soften the Axis forces, the Royal Air Force was to bomb Benghazi while all aircraft capable of ground attack were to bomb Axis movement on the frontier. Beresford Peirse chose Sidi Barrani as, even though it was more than a five hour drive from the battlefield, it was equipped with the most advanced airfield for reconnaissance aircraft and was also the most forward position from which communications could be maintained with Maaten Baggush. The primary responsibility of the frontier defence was charged to the 15th Panzer Division, which had received a new commander, General Walter Neumann Silkow, on 8 June. Rommel sent the 5th Light Division to the south of Tobruk, ready to use it against either the Sollum area or on Tobruk and ordered a big artillery bombardment of Tobruk the night before the operation, to prevent the Allied garrison from breaking out. Unfortunately, our petrol stocks were badly depleted, and it was with some anxiety that we contemplated the coming British attack, for we knew that our moves would be decided more by the petrol gauge than by tactical requirements.|Rommel

For the RAF, everything went according to plan on the first day. Axis supply columns and airfields had been hit repeatedly up to the start of the attack and once the operation began, and British columns were able to move unmolested from their starting points at Sofafi and Buq Buq to their destinations covered by RAF fighters. Axis aircraft managed only six attacks that day. On the eastern side, at 05:15, Coast Force—commanded by Brigadier Reginald Savory and charged with capturing Halfaya Pass, started to move on to their objective. On the escarpment was the Halfaya Group, composed of the 2nd Battalion Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, the 13 tanks (twelve Matildas and one light tank) of C Squadron, 4th Royal Tank Regiment (which had captured Halfaya Pass during Operation Brevity) and an artillery battery from the 31st Field Regiment. To their east and below the lip of the escarpment were the 1st Battalion 6th Rajputana Rifles and 2nd Battalion 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, two troops of A Squadron, 4th Royal Tank Regiment and a few 25 pounder guns. At 05:40, British artillery for the Halfaya Group was scheduled to open fire on the German and Italian forces in Halfaya, to cover the tanks and infantry but the battery had become bogged down by soft sand. After waiting until 06:00, 15 minutes after the fighting began to the west below the escarpment, the commander of C Squadron ordered his tanks to attack at the top of the pass; soon after, the anti tank guns of the defenders opened fire and within a few hours all but one light tank and one of the Matildas had been destroyed, including Miles' own. Below the escarpment four of the Matildas were disabled by anti tank mines which were supposed to have been cleared; this blocked the path of the remaining two and reduced the small tank force to acting in a pillbox capacity. In the centre, the 7th Royal Tank Regiment reached Fort Capuzzo by noon and scattered the defenders, who retreated north to join the 15th Panzer Division, between them and Bardia. Soon afterwards, they faced several counter attacks by a battalion from the 8th Panzer Regiment of the 15th Panzer Division. After being joined by the 22nd Guards Brigade, they faced the final and largest counter attack at 18:30 but managed to repulse it. These were not serious assaults, as Rommel would not commit the 15th Panzer Division to battle without more information on the situation. The 8th Panzer Regiment skirmished briefly and then feigned a disorderly retreat to lure Matilda tanks into a chase into range of concealed anti tank guns. Neither side took much damage from these actions. In response to the British capture of Capuzzo and concerned with a possible attack on Sollum and Bardia, Rommel ordered the 5th Light Division to Sidi Azeiz ready for a possible counter attack. The rest of the 4th Royal Tank Regiment had been used as a flank guard for the 7th Royal Tank Regiment. While B Squadron was kept in reserve, the three remaining troops of A Squadron (12 tanks) had initial success against Battle Position (B. P.) 38, capturing 200 Axis prisoners and eight field guns with virtually no loss. These gains were lost when A Squadron were repelled at Point 206 and German forces counter attacked at B. P. 38. In the evening, after A Squadron was down to only one remaining tank, the sixteen tanks of B Squadron were brought into action and Point 206 was captured. That night, the 2nd Scots Guards—a battalion of the 22nd Guards Brigade—were able to advance further eastward and capture an outpost at Musaid. On the western side, the 7th Armoured Brigade had placed the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, equipped with older cruiser tanks, in front of the 6th Royal Tank Regiment to use their new Crusader tanks as a surprise. The force reached Hafid Ridge (which actually consisted of three ridges) by about 09:00. After 2nd Royal Tank Regiment had crossed over the first ridge, they were attacked at near point blank range by dug in anti tank guns, destroying two A9 cruiser tanks before the rest could retreat. It was decided to attempt a flanking attack while waiting for the artillery to arrive. A small force of tanks from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment was sent to the western part of the Hafid Ridge, with orders to turn into the first valley. The attack went well at first, as the tanks caught the Axis forces unaware and were able to strafe along their trenches with their machine guns, losing only one tank in the process. Soon, reports came in from Allied aircraft that German tanks were approaching and the order was given to clear the ridges to use the advantageous terrain for the upcoming tank battle. The Axis infantry and anti tank guns, bereft of entrenchments, also took significant casualties. German panzer losses were trifling, though there had been many casualties among the garrisons at Hafid Ridge, Point 206 and Fort Capuzzo. Beresford Peirse planned to have the 11th Infantry Brigade continue its attack next day on Halfaya Pass, the 22nd Guards Brigade to hold their position and for the 4th Armoured Brigade to reinforce the 7th Armoured Brigade for a combined attack on the outnumbered 5th Light Division. Through the wireless intelligence service, Rommel had a fairly clear picture of the British situation, including their losses, problems and the new orders issued by Beresford Peirse. Rommel was concerned for the forces at Halfaya Pass, which were trapped by the 22nd Guards Brigade on one side and the 11th Infantry Brigade on the other and running low on supplies. His plan was to have the 5th Light Division, which by midnight had almost fully reached Sidi Azeiz, drive south towards Sidi Omar and then east towards Sidi Suleiman and then north east to Halfaya Pass, approaching the 11th Infantry Brigade from the rear. To prevent the re deployment of Matildas, either to reinforce the 7th Armoured Brigade as Beresford Peirse planned or to assist the British forces at Halfaya, Neumann Silkow was ordered to attack Capuzzo. He ordered the attacks to begin while still dark, as the British intended to start their operations shortly after dawn.

The 11th Infantry Brigade renewed their attack on Halfaya Pass, but met with same failure as the day prior. Bach's forces—though outnumbered and running low on supplies—were now totally surrounded, and thus could not retreat even if they were inclined to do so. Messervy saw this lack of progress and disregarded Beresford Peirse's orders to release his tanks and decided to retain the few remaining Matildas he had until some breach of the Axis defences could be made. Neumann Silkow began his attack on British held Fort Capuzzo at 06:00. He organised the 80 tanks under his command into two columns and attacked Capuzzo from either side. would open fire while still well out of the roughly range of the 2 pounder guns found on British tanks. Rommel—who had seen several of the engagements between the 7th Armoured Brigade and 5th Light Division—decided to attempt a full thrust against the 7th Armoured Brigade. At 16:00, he ordered the 15th Panzer Division to leave only minimal elements at its position north of Fort Capuzzo and make all haste to the northern flank of the 5th Light Division, which was pressing eastward to Sidi Suleiman. He hoped to cut off the majority of the British forces, encircling and then eliminating them. During the afternoon, Wavell had flown to Beresford Peirse, to simplify the making of decisions. When he arrived, Beresford Peirse was away, meeting with Messervy and Creagh, where he reconfirmed his orders for the infantry to maintain its attack on Halfaya and hold Capuzzo, while the 4th Armoured Brigade was to join the 7th Armoured Brigade, to confront the 5th Light Division to the west. The 4th Armoured Brigade had been reduced to 17 Matildas.

At 04:30, Rommel's panzers began their advance. The 5th Light Division encountered the 7th Armoured Brigade at 06:00 and began pushing them back. By 08:00 that morning, they had reached Sidi Suleiman. At Capuzzo, the early morning movements of the 15th Panzer Division led Messervy to believe another attack was imminent, and he thus cancelled Beresford Peirse's orders for the 4th Armoured Brigade to reinforce the 7th so that they could be retained. The combination of the two events caused serious alarm to Creagh, who then sent a message to Beresford Peirse, requesting his presence for instruction; At 10:00, as the Panzer divisions pushed eastward, they ran into the remaining Matildas of the 4th Armoured Brigade, joined on the flank by the remaining cruisers and artillery of the 7th Armoured Brigade and 7th Support Group. The tanks formed a screen to protect the 22nd Guards Brigade and 11th Indian Infantry Brigade as they retreated toward Halfway House. At 10:45, Messervy contacted Creagh over the radio and, speaking Hindustani for security, informed him that he had ordered a retreat of his infantry from Capuzzo and Halfaya, to begin at 11:00. Along with Wavell went Michael O'Moore Creagh, who was replaced by Gott. Beresford Peirse was criticised for both his plan and control of the operation and on 4 October was sent to Sudan with the position of General Officer Commanding, Sudan. Beresford Peirse took the place of William Platt, who had been promoted to Commander in Chief of the newly created East Africa Command. Beresford Peirse was replaced as commander of XIII Corps by Lieutenant General Reade Godwin Austen, who had been promoted from command of the 12th (African) Division in the East African Campaign.

The Allies had 969 casualties, with 122 killed, 588 wounded and 259 missing. The Germans had 678 casualties, with 93 killed, 350 wounded and 235 missing and the Italians suffered 592 casualties. The British lost 98 tanks (3 light, 30 cruisers and 65 Matildas) and the Axis had roughly 50 disabled, excluding tanks which had been knocked out and repaired during the battle. The Axis held the battlefield and recovered disabled vehicles; only 12 tanks were written off.