Америка Құрама Штаттарының баллистикалық ракетаға қарсы қорғаныс жүйесі

United States anti ballistic missile defense for intercepting warheads in space

Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), previously National Missile Defense (NMD), is an anti ballistic missile system implemented by the United States of America for defense against ballistic missiles, during the midcourse phase of ballistic trajectory flight. It is a major component of the American missile defense strategy to counter ballistic missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carrying nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional warheads. As of 2018, the system is composed of two interceptor staging bases in the states of Alaska and California, with 40 staged in the former, 4 staged in the latter, for a total of 44 interceptors, as well as the component early warning and targeting sensors based on land, sea, and in orbit. As of 2019, a Missile Defense Review has requested 20 additional interceptors to be based in Fort Greely, Alaska, though their delivery has not materialized. GMD is administered by the U. S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), while operational control is provided by the U. S. Army, with support functions provided by the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Space Force.

GMD after its renaming in 2002 remains a limited defense system, intended to protect the continental United States from limited launches of ballistic missiles. Examples given in the past have included countries such as North Korea. GMD has undergone some controversy over its operational lifetime, such as with a study in 2000 by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology concluding that "[a]ny country capable of deploying a long range missile would also be able to deploy countermeasures that would defeat the planned NMD system." Countermeasures studied in detail were bomblets containing biological or chemical agents, aluminized balloons to serve as decoys and to disguise warheads, and cooling warheads to reduce the kill vehicle's ability to detect them. Currently, the Union of Concerned Scientists maintains that GMD is "unproven, unaccountable, and unhelpful for reducing the nuclear threat." More recently, questions have been asked about the Pentagon characterizing the January 28 test in 2016 as a success, when LA Times reported that the EKV suffered a fault in its reaction control system thrusters, which resulted in "a distance 20 times greater than what was expected" according to an anonymous Pentagon scientist. Under the Missile Defense Agency, GMD has conducted multiple test exercises, with mixed results. Early testing revealed deficiencies in the Ground Based Interceptor missile, as well as the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle. However, with time, success rates increased, marred by the occasional technical failure such as in 2010's FTG 06 (Flight Test Ground Based Interceptor) where the Sea based X Band Radar failed to perform as expected, and Vandenberg Space Force Base, California. A third site was planned for a proposed US missile defense complex in Poland, but was canceled in September 2009. In December 2008, the U. S. Missile Defense Agency awarded Boeing a $397.9 million contract to continue development of the program. In March 2013, the Obama administration announced plans to add 14 interceptors to the current 26 at Fort Greely in response to North Korean threats. The deployment of a second TPY 2 radar to Japan was announced at the same time. While President Obama said that the additional deployment was a hedge against unexpected capabilities, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Hong Lei complained that the additional defenses would affect the global strategic balance and strategic trust. In late 2013, there were plans for a proposed Eastern United States missile defense site to house a battery of these missiles. On 30 April 2014, the Government Accountability Office issued a report stating that the system may not be operational any time soon because "its development was flawed". It said the GBI missile was at that point "capable of intercepting a simple threat in a limited way". On 12 August 2015, Lt. General David L. Mann (commanding general USASMDC/ARSTRAT) characterized GMD as the nation's only ground based defense against limited ICBM attacks. In 2019, the government issued a stop work order for the RKV after recent test results indicated that the current RKV plan is not viable. The government "initiated an analysis of alternative courses of action"; on 21 August the MDA cancelled the $5.8 billion contract for the RKV. The current GMD programs continue per plan, with up to 64 GBIs (meaning an additional 20) in the missile fields for 2019.

Expenditures on the Ground Based Midcourse Defense program were estimated to be US$30.7 billion by 2007. In 2013, it was estimated that the program would cost $40.926 billion from inception through fiscal year 2017; in 2013–17 spending was to total $4,457.8M, an average of $892M per year.

After the FTG 12 test on 11 December 2023, 12 of the 21 (57%) hit to kill intercept tests have succeeded. No flight intercept tests from 2010 to 2013 were successful. In response the Pentagon asked for a budget increase and another test for the fielded program. The successful intercept FTG 15 was accomplished by an operational team of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade using their standard operating procedures (round the clock 24/7). Name date ResultDescriptionIFT 3format=dmyThis was an element test of the EKV that relied on a surrogate booster vehicle. Because the Inertial Measurement Unit malfunctioned, the EKV used a backup acquisition mode to acquire the target. IFT 4format=dmyThis was the first end to end system test, again relying on a surrogate booster vehicle. The test was designed to target a mock warhead, transmitting its location by GPS, and ignore a single large decoy balloon. The failure to intercept was traced to an obstructed cooling line on the EKV that disrupted the IR sensors' ability to cool down to their operating temperatures in time, leaving the EKV unable to detect its target. IFT 5format=dmyThis was the second end to end system test. The test was designed to target a mock warhead, transmitting its location by C band, and ignore a single large decoy balloon. The failure to intercept occurred because the EKV did not separate from the boost vehicle due to an apparent failure of the 1553 data bus in the booster. IFT 6format=dmyThis test repeated IFT 5. The prototype X Band radar falsely reported a missed target but was confirmed by a satellite, jet, and ground stations. IFT 7format=dmyThis test repeated IFT 6 except that the target booster used Orbital's Target Launch Vehicle instead of Lockheed Martin's Multi Service Launch System. IFT 8format=dmyThe test was designed to target a mock warhead, transmitting its location by C band, and ignore both a large decoy balloon and two small decoy balloons. IFT 9format=dmyTwice delayed from August, this was the first test to use the Aegis SPY 1 radar, although it was not used to achieve the intercept. After the classification of decoys since May 2002, no information is known on their details. IFT 10format=dmyThe failure to intercept occurred because the EKV did not separate from the boost vehicle because a pin broke that should have activated a laser to release the boost vehicle's restraining units. IFT 13Cformat=dmyDelayed several times from December 2003 due to bad circuitry, this test was designed to use the Orbital Sciences booster from Kwajalein to hit a target from Kodiak, Alaska. The target flew as planned but the booster failed to leave the ground. The failure was traced to a software problem on the 1553 communications data bus, which may be incapable of processing messages at a rate that is fast enough for the GMD system to work effectively. IFT 14format=dmyThis test repeated IFT 13C, with a booster from Kwajalein designed to hit a target from Kodiak, Alaska. Again, the target flew as planned but the booster failed to leave the ground. The failure was traced to the arms that hold the interceptor up in the silo. When they failed to fully retract, the launch was automatically aborted. FTG 02format=dmyThis test involved the first ground based interceptor launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base to intercept a "threat representative" target from Kodiak, Alaska. This was the first time that operational radar was used to capture targeting information. Not officially an intercept test, this was originally designed to collect data on the phenomenology of the intercept and act as a radar certification test. No decoys were used. FTG 03format=dmyWith the same setup as FTG 02, the test target flew off course and an intercept did not occur. FTG 03Aformat=dmyThis test was scheduled in response to the failure of FTG 03, this time with a successful intercept. FTG 05format=dmyThis test launched a threat representative mock warhead from Kodiak Launch Complex, Alaska followed by a Ground Based Interceptor from Vandenberg AFB. All components performed as designed. FTG 06format=dmyThis test was to be the first to assess both a CE II EKV and a complex target scene and the first test to use a newly developed FTF LV 2 target. While the target missile and interceptor launched and performed nominally, the Sea Based X Band Radar did not perform as expected, and an investigation will explain the failure to intercept. FTG 06aformat=dmyThis test was similar to FTG 06, over a distance of 4,200 miles. While the Sea Based X Band radar and all sensors performed as planned, the test was unable to achieve the planned intercept of a ballistic missile target. FTG 07format=dmyThis intercept test used an improved CE I EKV. FTG 06bformat=dmyThis test is designed to demonstrate an intercept and meet the unmet objectives of FTG 06a. The test involved the new CE II Block I version of the EKV, which executed a direct collision with the ICBM target. FTG 1125 Mar 2019This test used two interceptors, one to crash into a dummy target representing an incoming ICBM and another to use sensors to detect another ICBM or other countermeasures. FTG 1211 Dec 2023This test used a CE II EKV and was the first test of a three stage GBI operating in a two stage mode—releasing its kill vehicle earlier by not igniting the GBI's third stage.

The system has a "single shot probability of kill" of its interceptors calculated at 56%, with the total probability of intercepting a single target, if four interceptors are launched, at 97%. Each interceptor costs approximately $75 million.