Әскери доктрина: стратегия мен тактика негіздері

Codified expression of how fighters conduct campaigns, operations, battles and engagements

Military doctrine is the expression of how military forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. A military doctrine outlines what military means should be used, how forces should be structured, where forces should be deployed, and the modes of cooperation between types of forces. "Joint doctrine" refers to the doctrines shared and aligned by multinational forces or joint service operations. There are three broad categories of military doctrines: (1) Offensive doctrines aim to disarm an adversary, (2) Defensive doctrines aim to deny an adversary, and (3) Deterrent doctrines aim to punish an adversary. Different military doctrines have different implications for world politics. For example, offensive doctrines tend to lead to arms races and conflicts. A U. S. Air Force Air University staff study in 1948 defined military doctrine functionally as "those concepts, principles, policies, tactics, techniques, practices, and procedures which are essential to efficiency in organizing, training, equipping, and employing its tactical and service units". A U. S. Army essay written in 2016 similarly defined military doctrine as "consist[ing] of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)". In 2005 Gary Sheffield of the Defence Studies Department of King's College London/JSCSC quoted J F C Fuller's 1923 definition of doctrine as the "central idea of an army". In 1965 the Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms defined military doctrine as "a state's officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed forces in them. Military doctrine has two aspects: social political and military technical." The social political side "encompasses all questions concerning methodology, economic, and social bases, the political goals of war. It is the defining and the more stable side." The other side, the military technical, must accord with the political goals. It includes the "creation of military structure, technical equipping of the armed forces, their training, definition of forms and means of conducting operations and war as a whole".

Before the development of separate doctrinal publications, many nations expressed their military philosophy through regulations.

Field Service Regulations were issued by the War Office in 1909, 1917, 1923, 1930, and 1935. Similar publications under various names were subsequently published. Formal British Military Doctrine was first published in 1988 and in 1996 became British Defence Doctrine applicable throughout the armed forces.

The development of military doctrine in France came about in the aftermath of the nation's defeat during the Franco Prussian war. The École supérieure de guerre, under the direction of its commandant, Ferdinand Foch, began developing a consistent doctrine for handling armies, corps, and divisions. Foch's 1906 work, Des principes de la guerre (translated by Hilaire Belloc as The Principles of War) expressed this doctrine.

Prussian doctrine was published as Regulations for the Instruction of the Troops in Field Service and the Exercises of the larger Units of the 17th June, 1870. The doctrine was revised in 1887 and published in English in 1893 as The Order of Field Service of the German Army, by Karl Kaltenborn und Stachau, and once again in 1908 as Felddienst Ordnung ("Field Service Regulations").

Chinese military doctrine is influenced by a number of sources including an indigenous classical military tradition characterized by strategists such as Sun Tzu and modern strategists such as Mao Zedong, along with Western and Soviet influences. One distinctive characteristic of Chinese military science is that it places emphasis on the relationship between the military and society and views military force as merely one part of an overarching grand strategy. According to French newspaper Le Monde, the Chinese nuclear doctrine is to maintain a nuclear force allowing it to deter and respond to a nuclear attack. However, new evolutions show that China could allow use of its nuclear arsenal in more situations.

Following the defeat of the French Army in the Franco Prussian War, the French military, as part of its movements to increase professionalism, emphasized officer training at the École de Guerre. Ferdinand Foch, as an instructor, argued against the concept of a commander moving units without informing subordinates of his intentions. In doing so, a common doctrine served as a point of training. We have then, a doctrine. All the brains have been limbered up and regard all questions from an identical point of view. The fundamental idea of the problem being known, each one will solve the problem in his own fashion, and these thousand fashions, we may very well be sure, will act to direct all their efforts to a common objective. Prior to WWI, France had an offensive military doctrine. In the aftermath of WWI, France adopted a defensive military doctrine where the Maginot Line played a central role in its deterrence of Germany.

Prior to WWI, Germany had an offensive military doctrine exemplified by the Schlieffen Plan. Germany also devoted considerable resources to building a fleet of battleships, which provoked fears among European powers. During World War II, Germany deployed an operational strategy sometimes referred to as Blitzkrieg in its offensives against Poland and France. German military doctrine incorporates the concept of Auftragstaktik (Mission type tactics), which can be seen as a doctrine within which formal rules can be selectively suspended in order to overcome "friction". Carl von Clausewitz stated that "Everything in war is very simple but the simplest thing is difficult". Problems will occur with misplaced communications, troops going to the wrong location, delays caused by weather, etc., and it is the duty of the commander to do his best to overcome them. Auftragstaktik encourages commanders to exhibit initiative, flexibility and improvisation while in command.

The current combat doctrine of the Indian Army is based on the effective combined utilization of holding formations and strike formations. In the case of an attack, the holding formations would contain the enemy and strike formations would counter attack to neutralize enemy forces. In the case of an Indian attack, the holding formations would pin enemy forces down whilst the strike formations attack at a point of Indian choosing. India's nuclear doctrine follows the policy of credible minimum deterrence, No first strike, No use of nuclear weapons on Non nuclear states and Massive nuclear retaliation in case deterrence fails. India has recently adopted a new war doctrine known as "Cold Start" and its military has conducted exercises several times since then based on this doctrine. "Cold Start" involves joint operations between India's three services and integrated battle groups for offensive operations. A key component is the preparation of India's forces to be able to quickly mobilize and take offensive actions without crossing the enemy's nuclear use threshold. A leaked US diplomatic cable disclosed that it was intended to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72 hour period during a crisis.

IDF command has been decentralized since the early days of the state, with junior commanders receiving broad authority within the context of mission type orders. Israeli junior officer training has emphasized the need to make quick decisions in battle to prepare them appropriately for maneuver warfare.

The Soviet meaning of military doctrine was very different from U. S. military usage of the term. Soviet Minister of Defence Marshal Andrei Grechko defined it in 1975 as "a system of views on the nature of war and methods of waging it, and on the preparation of the country and army for war, officially adopted in a given state and its armed forces". In Soviet times, theorists emphasised both the political and "military technical" sides of military doctrine, while from the Soviet point of view, Westerners ignored the political side. However, the political side of Soviet military doctrine, Western commentators Harriet F Scott and William Scott said, "best explained Soviet moves in the international arena". Soviet (and contemporary Russian) doctrine emphasizes combined arms warfare as well as operational warfare. It emphasizes the initiation of military hostilities at a time, date, and location of its choosing on terms of its choosing and the extensive preparation of the battlespace for operations. Former Soviet/Russian doctrine sacrifices tactical flexibility and adaptability for strategic and operational flexibility and adaptability; tactical personnel are trained as relatively inflexible executors of specific, detailed orders, while the operational strategic level of Russian military doctrine is where most innovation takes place. The Soviet response to problems of nuclear strategy began with classified publications. However, by 1962, with the publication in the Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Sokolovsky's volume, Military Strategy, the Soviets laid out their officially endorsed thoughts on the matter, and their ideas on how to cope with nuclear conflict.

In the 2000s and early 2010s, the Moderate Party–led governments transformed the Swedish Armed Forces from a Cold War posture of defence to one of participation in international operations. The assumption was that Sweden's homeland would face minimal external threats. Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson estimates that as of 2014, Swedish forces could resist a limited enemy attack for only one week. The 2014 Crimean Crisis and the subsequent invasion of Ukraine has stirred debate within Sweden that a return to significant defensive forces and a closer alliance with NATO is necessary in the wake of Russia's actions in Ukraine.

Most modern US doctrine is based around the concept of power projection and full spectrum operations, which combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint or combined force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all dimensions of the operational environment. Offensive operations defeat and destroy enemy forces, and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander's will on the enemy. Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted abroad to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Civil support operations are support tasks and missions to homeland civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. This includes operations dealing with the consequences of natural or manmade disasters, accidents, and incidents within the homeland. Under President Lyndon Johnson it was stated that the US armed forces should be able to fight two—at one point, two and a half—wars at the same time. This was defined to mean a war in Europe against the Soviet Union, a war in Asia against China or North Korea, and a "half war" as well—in other words, a "small" war in the Third World. When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, he altered the formula to state that the United States should be able to fight one and a half wars simultaneously. This doctrine remained in place until 1989–90, when President George H. W. Bush ordered the "Base Force" study which forecast a substantial cut in the military budget, an end to the Soviet Union's global threat, and the possible beginning of new regional threats. In 1993, President Bill Clinton ordered a "Bottom Up Review", based on which a strategy called "win hold win" was declared—enough forces to win one war while holding off the enemy in another conflict, then moving on to win it after the first war is over. The final draft was changed to read that the United States must be able to win two "major regional conflicts" simultaneously. The current strategic doctrine, which Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld issued in his Quadrennial Defense Review of early 2001 (before the 9/11 attacks), is a package of U. S. military requirements known as 1 4 2 1. The first 1 refers to defending the US homeland. The 4 refers to deterring hostilities in four key regions of the world. The 2 means the US armed forces must have the strength to win swiftly in two near simultaneous conflicts in those regions. The final 1 means that the US forces must win one of those conflicts "decisively". The general policy objectives are to (1) assure allies and friends; (2) dissuade future military competition, (3) deter threats and coercion against U. S. interests, and (4) if deterrence fails, decisively defeat any adversary.

The Department of Defense publishes Joint Publications which state all services doctrine. The current basic doctrinal publication is Joint Publication 3 0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations".

Headquarters, United States Air Force, publishes current USAF doctrine. The lead agency for developing Air Force doctrine is the LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education; the Air Staff International Standardization Office works on multinational standardization, such as NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs), and agreements between the American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies and Navies (ABCA) that affect the Air Force. Currently the basic Air Force doctrinal documents are the 10 series of Air Force publications.

The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is responsible for developing Army doctrine. TRADOC was developed early in the 1970s as a response to the American Army's difficulties in the Vietnam War, and is one of the reforms that improved Army professionalism. Currently the capstone Army doctrinal document is Army Doctrine Publication 3 0, Unified Land Operations (published October 2011).

The Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) Doctrine Department coordinates development, publication, and maintenance of United States Navy doctrine. Currently the basic unclassified naval doctrinal documents are Naval Doctrine Publications 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. NWDC is also the United States Navy lead for NATO and multinational maritime doctrine and operational standardization.

The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) has responsibility for United States Marine Corps doctrine. The capstone doctrinal document is Warfighting (MCDP1), along with MCDP's 1 1, 1–2, and 1–3 (Strategy, Campaigning, and Tactics, respectively). MCDP 1 0 (Marine Corps Operations) translates the philosophical based capstone/keystone publications into operational doctrine.

Headquarters, United States Coast Guard, published Coast Guard Publication 1, U. S. Coast Guard: America's Maritime Guardian, which is the source of USCG doctrine.

With the passing of the National Defense Law of 1969, Yugoslavia adopted a total war military doctrine named Total National Defense or Total People's Defense. It was inspired by the Yugoslav People's Liberation War against the fascist occupiers and their collaborators in the Second World War, and was designed to allow Yugoslavia to maintain or eventually reestablish its independent and non aligned status should an invasion occur. According to it, any citizen who resists an aggressor is a member of the armed forces, thus the whole population could be turned into a monolithic resistance army. Starting from the elementary school education, over high schools, universities, organizations and companies, the authorities prepared the entire population to contest an eventual occupation of the country and finally to liberate it. For this purpose, the Territorial Defense Forces (TO) would be formed to mobilize the population in case of an aggression. The combat readiness of the TO meant that the steps of organization and training could be bypassed after the start of hostilities. The TO would supplement the regular Yugoslav People's Army, giving it greater defensive depth and an armed local population ready to support combat actions. Large numbers of armed civilians would increase the cost of an invasion to a potential aggressor. The most likely scenario in the doctrine being used was a general war between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In such a situation, Yugoslavia would remain non aligned, and it would not accept foreign troops of either alliance on its territory. The doctrine recognized the likelihood that one side or the other might try to seize Yugoslav territory as a forward staging area, to ensure lines of communication or simply to deny the territory to enemy forces. Such action would be considered aggression and would be resisted. Regardless of ideology, the occupiers would be considered Yugoslavia's enemy.

The Territorial Defense Forces (TO) were formed in 1969 as an integral part of the Yugoslav Total National Defense doctrine. The TO forces consisted of able bodied civilian males and females. Between 1 and 3 million Yugoslavs between the ages of 15 and 65 would fight under TO command as irregular or guerrilla forces in wartime. In peacetime, however, about 860,000 TO troops were involved in military training and other activities. The TO concept focused on small, lightly armed infantry units fighting defensive actions on a familiar local terrain. A typical unit was a company sized detachment. More than 2000 communes, factories, and other enterprises organized such units, which would fight in their home areas, maintaining local defense production essential to the overall war effort. The TO also included some larger, more heavily equipped units with wider operational responsibilities. The TO battalions and regiments operated in regional areas with artillery and antiaircraft guns and some armoured vehicles. Using their mobility and tactical initiative, these units would attempt to alleviate the pressure of enemy armored columns and air strikes on smaller TO units. In the coastal regions, TO units had naval missions. They operated some gunboats in support of navy operations. They were organized to defend strategic coastal areas and naval facilities against enemy amphibious landings and raids. They also trained some divers for use in sabotage and other special operations. The TO was helped by the fact that most of its citizen soldiers were one time JNA conscripts who had completed their term of compulsory military service. However, TO recruitment was somewhat limited by the army's desire to include as many recently released conscripts as possible in its own military reserve. Other sources of TO manpower lacked prior military service and required extensive basic training. The TO organisation was highly decentralized and independent. TO units were organized and funded by the governments in each of the Yugoslav constituent republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.