Әмір би Әһкам Алла: Фатима әулетінің он бесінші халифасы

Fatimid caliph and imam from 1101 to 1130

Abu Ali al Mansur ibn al Musta'li (أبو علي المنصور بن المستعلي; 31 December 1096 – 7 October 1130), better known by his regnal name al Amir bi Ahkam Allah (الآمر بأحكام الله) was the tenth Fatimid caliph, ruling from 1101 to his death in 1130, and the 20th imam of the Musta'li Isma'ili branch of Shia Islam. Until 1121, he was a de facto puppet of his uncle and father in law, the vizier al Afdal Shahanshah. When the latter was murdered, possibly with al Amir's connivance, he appointed al Ma'mun al Bata'ihi as his vizier, but took an increasing direct role in government, and after 1125 ruled without a vizier. His reign saw the progressive loss of all Fatimid strongholds in Palestine to the Crusaders, apart from Ascalon. His assassination in 1130, leaving only his infant son al Tayyib as heir, threw the Fatimid regime into a succession struggle during which it almost collapsed. Fatimid rule was restored with the succession of al Amir's cousin al Hafiz li Din Allah in 1132, which led to the division of Musta'li Isma'ilism into the rival Hafizi and Tayyibi branches.

The future al Amir was born on 31 December 1096 as Mansur, the oldest son of the ninth Fatimid imam caliph, al Musta'li His mother was a sister of the all powerful vizier, al Afdal Shahanshah, who had raised al Musta'li to the throne in 1094 and was the de facto ruler of the Fatimid state.

Al Musta'li died on 11 December 1101, and on the same day, at the age of five, al Amir was proclaimed caliph by al Afdal. Al Afdal was already al Amir's maternal uncle, and further strengthened the familial ties with the young caliph by marrying him to his own daughter. This was a departure from usual practice, as the Fatimid caliphs had until then had children with concubines and never legally wed. The formal marriage was evidently an attempt by al Afdal to secure the succession of any progeny of this union over other children of the caliph. A decree, dictated by al Afdal, renewed his appointment as vizier with plenipotentiary powers and ensured his ascendancy over the child caliph. The first twenty years of al Amir's reign were thus dominated by al Afdal, who controlled government and restricted al Amir to a few ceremonial duties. Like his father before him, al Amir lived mostly confined in the caliphal palaces, while al Afdal arrogated most ceremonial functions to himself. Under al Afdal's rule, the Fatimid state was chiefly occupied with the conflict with the Crusaders of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. This holy war also served as the main legitimization device for al Afdal's rule and for the dynasty itself. During the previous decade, both the Fatimid state (the ) and the Fatimid Isma'ili mission (the ) had suffered setbacks: much of the Levant had been lost to the Sunni Seljuk Turks, while al Afdal's coup that installed al Musta'li on the throne resulted in the breaking away of the Nizari Isma'ilis from Fatimid allegiance. As the historian Michael Brett writes, the struggle against the Crusaders "had given the dynasty fresh purpose". Despite al Afdal's continuous campaigns, most of Palestine was lost to the Crusaders, along with the Levantine coastal cities of Tartus (1102), Acre (1104), Tripoli (1109), and Sidon (1111). Egypt itself was briefly invaded by King Baldwin I of Jerusalem in 1117. The Fatimids largely fell back on the coastal city of Ascalon, which developed into a major fortress and outpost of the holy war: for the next half century it was to remain a centre for raids against the Crusader territories, and a guard of the route from Palestine into Egypt. Medieval Muslim historians often blame al Amir for these disasters, but in reality he played no role in the Fatimid government during those years; the caliph was confined to the palace and public ceremonies, while al Afdal ruled almost as a sultan via his own secretaries, first Mukhtar Taj al Ma'ali and then al Qa'id al Bata'ihi. In 1115, the increasingly ill and feeble al Afdal appointed his own son, Sama' al Mulk Husayn, as his deputy and heir presumptive, but after a failed assassination attempt in 1118 the vizier withdrew all privileges from his sons, whom he suspected of being involved, thus ending the prospect of a dynastic succession.

Al Afdal's tutelage ended with his assassination on 11 December 1121, on the eve of the Eid al Fitr. The deed was officially blamed on Nizari agents, but both medieval historians and modern scholars are skeptical: given his own resentment at the subordinate figurehead role to which al Afdal had relegated him, al Amir is suspected of having been the true instigator of the assassination. While engaging in a public display of grief for his vizier and father in law and arranging a public burial ceremony in the caliphal palace, al Amir moved quickly to imprison al Afdal's sons and confiscate al Afdal's enormous fortune, houses, and estates, while the moveable items were brought from the vizieral palace to his own palace. During their long rule over Egypt as quasi sultans, al Afdal and his father, Badr al Jamali, had accumulated an enormous treasure, "the extent of which no one knew apart from God", according to the 13th century encyclopaedist Ibn Khallikan. It was considered to have been larger than that of any previous king, and it took forty days to move it.

As al Amir had been left out of government and was unfamiliar with its intricacies, he selected al Afdal's long time chief of staff, al Qa'id al Bata'ihi, as vizier. The sources that blame al Amir for al Afdal's murder also implicate the ambitious al Bata'ihi in the deed, or at least in concealing al Afdal's death until al Amir could arrive at the vizieral palace to designate al Bata'ihi as al Afdal's successor. After supervising the transfer of al Afdal's treasures, al Bata'ihi was formally proclaimed vizier on 13 February 1122, and given the honorific al Ma'mun ('the trusted one'), by which he is known. Al Bata'ihi formally assumed the same plenipotentiary powers that al Afdal had possessed, and was a capable administrator, but his position was much weaker vis à vis the caliph than his old master's: al Amir resumed many of the old caliphal ceremonial functions that al Afdal had arrogated to himself, and he henceforth had a voice in government. As historian Michael Brett writes, "The relationship itself was one of alliance, in which the minister was entrusted as before with the responsibilities of government, in return for bringing the monarch out from his seclusion into the public eye". Most importantly, al Amir ensured that all tax income and precious textiles would be kept in the caliphal palace, and distributed from there. As ruler, al Amir is portrayed in the sources as "unusually intelligent and knowledgeable", and was said to have memorized the Quran. The changed balance of power was apparent to al Bata'ihi, who sought to secure his position by extracting a written pledge from al Amir to communicate any denunciations or accusations directly to him. The document was to be valid until al Bata'ihi's death, and the caliph furthermore undertook to look after the vizier's offspring after that. In the aftermath of the assassination of al Afdal, the threat of the Nizaris, who were implacably hostile to the rule of al Amir and his father, was a major concern of the government, in view of the widespread network of agents they had established. Reports received in Cairo claimed that the chief Nizari leader, Hasan i Sabbah, celebrated al Afdal's murder and awaited the same fate for al Amir and al Bata'ihi. A hunt for Nizari agents was launched by the vizier, who established an extensive espionage network of his own to counter Nizati infiltration of Cairo. In addition, in December 1122 al Amir convened a meeting of officials in Cairo in which the Nizari claims to the Nizar's being the rightful successor of Caliph al Mustansir were publicly denounced, and the legitimacy of al Musta'li's succession affirmed, by none other than a person presented as Nizar's only sister. A proclamation to that effect, the , was issued on this occasion, publicly read from the pulpits of the mosques, and then sent to the Nizari communities in Persia. In spring 1122, the Fatimid fleet managed to recover control of the Levantine port city of Tyre from its Turkish governor, appointed by Toghtekin, the Sunni Turkish ruler of Damascus. This triumph was short lived, as a Venetian fleet under Doge Domenico Michiel attived to support the Crusader states of the Levant shortly after. While early Venetian raids on the Nile Delta were defeated, in 1123 the Venetians defeated the Fatimid fleet off Ascalon, and the Fatimid army sent to capture Jaffa was routed by the Crusaders at the Battle of Yibneh. With Tyre now again cut off and in danger of falling to the Crusaders, the Fatimids had to accept renewed Turkish control; left unsupported, the city capitulated to the Kingdom of Jerusalem in July 1124. In 1123, the Luwata Berbers invaded Egypt and reached as far as Alexandria, before they were driven back and forced to pay tribute. In the same year, the Zirid emir of Ifriqiya, Abu'l Hasan al Hasan ibn Ali, also sent envoys to Cairo to announce his return to recognizing Fatimid suzerainty, and sought Fatimid assistance in repelling a possible Norman invasion. Al Amir also paid attention to courting the remaining pro Fatimid, Musta'li Isma'ili communities abroad, especially in Yemen, led by the Sulayhid queen Arwa. Al Afdal had sent an envoy, Ali ibn Ibrahim ibn Najib al Dawla, in 1119 to bring the Yemeni Isma'ilis into closer alignment with Cairo; after al Afdal's death, the Fatimid engagement in Yemen intensified further, with the dispatch of military forces. This allowed Ibn Najib al Dawla to pursue his own policies regardless of Queen Arwa, but he was heavily defeated while attempting to capture Zabid in 1124, with most of his Fatimid supplied troops perishing. His independent activities and arrogant manner met with suspicion and then resistance from the Yemeni chieftains, who began to conspire against him and warned Cairo that he was engaged in Nizari propaganda; fake coins with the name of Nizar ibn al Mustansir were even produced for the purpose. Another military detachment was sent to Yemen in late 1125 (after al Bata'ihi's downfall) and brought back the disgraced envoy in chains. After public humiliation through the streets of Cairo, Ibn Najib al Dawla was thrown in prison.

On 3 October 1125 al Amir suddenly ordered al Bata'ihi, his brother Haydara al Mu'taman, and his chief aides arrested. Various reasons were put forward for this: that al Amir did not forgive al Bata'ihi the loss of Tyre; that the secretary Ibn Abi Usama convinced al Amri that the vizier conspired with Ja'far, al Amir's only full brother, to depose him; or that al Bata'ihi was the true instigator of the fake Nizari coinage struck in Yemen. The truth is rather that al Amir, like other caliphs in the past, had begun resenting the power of his over mighty vizier. The vizier was also a victim of his own policies: unlike Badr and al Afdal, al Bata'ihi lacked a power base of his own in the army, and relied on the caliph as his patron; and the revival of al Amir's public role, lavishly orchestrated by al Bata'ihi himself, only served to strengthen the caliph's authority and self confidence. Finally, the pledge extracted by al Bata'ihi from the caliph, intended to safeguard him, may have backfired, as al Amir perceived it as a personal humiliation. Haydara died in prison, but al Bata'ihi was executed along with Ibn Najib al Dawla on the night of 19/20 July 1128. Al Amir did not appoint a new vizier, becoming the first Fatimid caliph since al Hakim to personally lead the government, while relying on the heads of the various administrative departments for professional expertise. This was partly due to the lack of suitable candidates; the chief , Abu'l Hajjaj, refused to take on the job of supervising the departments citing his lack of experience in such matters. Soon, one of the department heads, the former Coptic Christian monk Ibn Qusa, rose to prominence due to his ability to provide the caliph with money through confiscations from Christians, Jews, and eventually Muslims as well, which caused much resentment among the latter. His ascendancy lasted for three years, from October/November 1126 to 1129, and he was awarded grand titles such as 'Holy Father', 'Lord of the [Coptic] Patriarchate', 'Father of Fathers', and even 'Thirteenth Apostle'. His end came when his exactions extended to the court eunuchs, who informed al Amir of popular discontent, and that an uprising was brewing if nothing was done. Thereupon Ibn Qusa was arrested and beaten to death with shoes; his corpse was nailed to a plank and thrown into the Nile. Having ignored the matter for so long, al Amir's own reputation was left tarnished from the affair, as well as from his extravagance and profligacy: it is said that the palace consumed 5,000 sheep per month, and the rich gifts he made to his favourites were remarked upon. The caliph saw himself obliged to make public gestures of contrition by freeing slaves, giving alms, and, on the advice of his jurists, extending the Ramadan fast by two months. In February/March 1130, al Amir finally had a son, who was named al Tayyib. His birth was celebrated with public festivals, and letters were sent abroad announcing his birth, and his designation as successor.

On 7 October 1130, al Amir was assassinated by Nizari agents. He left only his six month old son, al Tayyib, to succeed him, with no designated regent or serving vizier. Al Amir's murder not only undid his attempts to once again concentrate power in the caliph's hands instead of over mighty generals and ministers, but also, given the fragility of succession, endangered the very survival of the Fatimid dynasty. Al Tayyib was quickly sidelined, and his fate is unknown; modern historians speculate that he died in infancy or was killed. A new regime was installed under the regency of al Amir's cousin, Abd al Majid, which at first claimed to rule in the name of an unborn son by one of al Amir's concubines. Within a fortnight, an army mutiny brought al Afdal's last surviving son, Kutayfat, to power. Kutayfat abolished the Fatimid imamate and imprisoned Abd al Majid, but was himself assassinated by Fatimid loyalists in December 1131. With no other heir available, Abd al Majid took over as imam and caliph with the regnal name al Hafiz li Din Allah in January 1132, proclaiming that he had secretly received the designation by al Amir before he had died. Al Hafiz' succession broke a continuous line of father to son succession of ten generations, something extremely rare in the Islamic world and much remarked upon by medieval authors. Al Hafiz' accession thus represented an unprecedented departure from the accepted norm, and caused yet another schism in Isma'ilism, as the Musta'li sect was divided into those who accepted al Hafiz's succession (the "Hafizis") and those who did not, upholding instead the imamate of the vanished al Tayyib (the "Tayyibis"). The Hafizis were mostly concentrated in the Fatimid controlled territories in Egypt, Nubia, and the Levant, while the Tayyibis resided in the Yemen, where Queen Arwa took up a leading role in forming a separate Tayyibi that survives to the present day. The Tayyibis hold that al Tayyib was entrusted by al Amir to a certain Ibn Madyan, and that Ibn Madyan and his helpers hid the infant when Kutayfat came to power. Ibn Madyan was killed by Kutayfat, but his brother in law escaped with al Tayyib, who went into concealment. Al Tayyib is held to have died while still in concealment, and his offspring have continued as hidden imams to the present day. The public leadership of the Tayyibi community was instead assumed by a succession of 'absolute missionaries' .