Battle of Xuân Lộc

Last major battle of the Vietnam War

During a meeting with the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Frederick C. Weyand on 3 April, Thiệu outlined his strategy to defend South Vietnam, vowing to hold what was left of his country. In his strategy, Thiệu decided that Xuân Lộc would be the center of his country's resistance, together with Tây Ninh and Phan Rang on either side.

On 8 April 1975, the ARVN 18th Division was the main unit defending Xuân Lộc, composed of three infantry regiments: the 43rd, 48th and 52nd. There were also five armored brigades, four regional force battalions (340th, 342nd, 343rd and 367th Battalions), two artillery units (181st and 182nd Artillery Battalions) equipped with a total of forty two artillery guns, and two companies of the People's Self Defense Force. On the afternoon of 11 March, ARVN General Lê Nguyên Khang ordered the 345th Armored Squadron to move out from Bau Don to relieve the military zone of Dầu Tiếng, but they were defeated by the PAVN 16th Infantry Regiment at Suoi Ong Hung, and forced to retreat to their base. At the same time, ARVN artillery units at Bau Don and Rung Nan were subdued by elements of the 9th Infantry Division, so they were unable to return fire. Also on 17 March, the 3rd Battalion, 43rd Regiment killed 10 PAVN in heavy fighting northwest of Hoai Duc. At the same time another outpost of Xuân Lộc District, Ong Don, defended by an RF company and an artillery platoon, came under artillery and infantry attack. The PAVN assault was repulsed with heavy losses on both sides, and another RF company, sent to reinforce, ran into strong resistance on Highway 1 west of Ong Don. North of Ong Don, Gia Ray on Route 333 was under attack by the PAVN 274th Infantry Regiment, 6th Division. The 18th Division headquarters therefore realized that two PAVN divisions, the 6th and the 7th, were committed in Long Khánh. While the battle raged at Gia Ray, another post on Highway 1 west of Ong Don came under attack. Meanwhile, a bridge and a culvert on Highway 1 on each side of the Route 332 junction were blown up by PAVN sappers. Thus, all ARVN forces east of Route 332 were isolated from Xuân Lộc by formidable obstacles and PAVN roadblocks. North from Xuân Lộc, on Route 20, hamlets along the road were occupied to varying degrees by PAVN soldiers, and the RF outpost far to the northeast near the Lam Dong boundary was overrun. Đảo decided to counterattack up Route 20 with his 52nd Regiment, minus one battalion but reinforced with the 5th Armored Cavalry Squadron from Tây Ninh Province. The regiment was ordered to clear the road as far as Định Quán, but the attack quickly stalled as it met heavy resistance well short of its objective. While the PAVN were closing in on Xuân Lộc, Đảo and the chief of Long Khánh Province, Colonel Nguyen Van Phuc, were also busy lining up their units in anticipation of the PAVN onslaught. Prior to the battle, Đảo told foreign media that: "I am determined to hold Xuân Lộc. I don't care how many divisions the Communist will send against me, I will smash them all! The world shall see the strength and skill of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam". However, all PAVN units moving down from the north were forced to stop when elements of the ARVN 52nd Task Force counter attacked from the south. From the east, the PAVN 7th Infantry Division advanced on ARVN positions without tank support, so they sustained heavy casualties in the initial stages of the fighting. At 08:00, the 4th Army Corps Command sent eight tanks to support the 7th Infantry Division, but three were destroyed by entrenched ARVN soldiers at Bao Chanh A. On the same day, an artillery bombardment of 1,000 rounds fell on the headquarters and 3rd Battalion, 52nd Regiment, an artillery battalion, and elements of the 5th Armored Cavalry Squadron, four 155 mm and eight 105 mm howitzers were destroyed, and the PAVN 6th Infantry Division and the 95B Infantry Regiment defeated a combined ARVN formation which included the 52nd Task Force and the 13th Armored Squadron west of Xuân Lộc. On 16 and 17 April, the PAVN 6th Infantry Division and the 95B Infantry Regiment defeated the ARVN 8th Task Force and 3rd Armored Brigade, when the ARVN tried to recapture the military zone of Dau Giay. Around Xuân Lộc, the ARVN 43rd and 48th Infantry Regiments, as well as the 1st Airborne Brigade, suffered heavy casualties as PAVN infantry units attacked them from all sides. The armored task forces on Route 1 had to pull back; half of their equipment had been destroyed. The 1st Airborne Brigade, frustrated in its attack toward Xuân Lộc, withdrew through the plantations and jungles toward Bà Rịa in Phước Tuy Province. With Dau Giay and all the main roads under PAVN control, Xuân Lộc was completely isolated, the 18th Division was cut off from reinforcements and surrounded by the PAVN 4th Army Corps. On 19 April, the Joint General Staff ordered Đảo to evacuate the 18th Division and other support units from Xuân Lộc to a new defensive line formed east of Bien Hoa at the town of Trảng Bom which was defended by the remnants of the Division, the 468th Marine Brigade and the reconstituted 258th Marine Brigade. On 20 April, under the cover of heavy rain, South Vietnamese soldiers and civilians began pulling out from Xuân Lộc, in a convoy of about 200 military vehicles. On 21 April, Xuân Lộc was completely abandoned, with the ARVN 1st Airborne Brigade being the last unit to be evacuated from the area. At 04:00 on 21 April, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Airborne Brigade was completely destroyed by the PAVN at the hamlet of Suoi Ca. By the end of the day Xuân Lộc was under North Vietnamese control and the gateway to Saigon was open.

Following their costly victory at Xuân Lộc, the PAVN effectively controlled two thirds of South Vietnam's territory. The loss of Xuân Lộc dealt a severe blow to the military strength of South Vietnam, which had lost almost every unit from its general reserve. On 18 April 1975, III Corps commander Toàn, informed Thiệu that the South Vietnamese forces at Xuân Lộc had been beaten and South Vietnam's armed forces could only hold out for a few more days as a result of their losses on the battlefield. According to North Vietnam's official account of the battle, about 2,036 South Vietnamese soldiers were either killed or wounded and another 2,731 were captured. Total casualties on the North Vietnamese side are unknown, but the 4th Army Corps alone claimed to have suffered 460 killed in action, and another 1,428 wounded. While Đảo claimed that the battle cost the PAVN over 50,000 killed and 370 tanks destroyed, American estimates only put PAVN casualties at around 10 percent of those figures with 5,000 troops killed or wounded and 37 tanks destroyed.

In the days following the loss of Xuân Lộc, there was still much debate in both houses of South Vietnam's National Assembly about the country's wartime policies. Pro war elements in the National Assembly argued South Vietnam should fight until the very end, in the belief that the United States would eventually give the country the necessary aid to resist the North Vietnamese. Anti war elements, on the other hand, strongly opposed the idea. They believed the Government should negotiate with the North Vietnamese, in order to avoid a catastrophic defeat. Despite their differences of opinion, members in both houses of South Vietnam's National Assembly agreed that Thiệu should be held responsible for the country's dire military and political situation, because his policies had allowed the North Vietnamese to easily penetrate South Vietnam's military defences. Finally at 20:00 on 21 April 1975, Thiệu officially resigned as the president of the Republic of Vietnam upon learning that Xuân Lộc had fallen that morning. In his final effort to save South Vietnam, Thiệu gambled his political career by sending the last units of the ARVN to Xuân Lộc in an attempt to hold off the PAVN. Ultimately, however, Thiệu's effort came too late. Trần Văn Hương was appointed president, and he was ordered by the National Assembly to seek a negotiated peace with North Vietnam at any cost, to the disappointment of many in South Vietnam's political elite, who argued that the situation could have been different if Thiệu had gone earlier.