State of Katanga

1960–1963 unrecognised state in Africa

The State of Katanga (; ), also known as the Republic of Katanga, was a breakaway state that proclaimed its independence from Congo Léopoldville on 11 July 1960 under Moise Tshombe, leader of the local Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) political party. The new Katangese state did not enjoy full support throughout the province and was constantly plagued by ethnic strife in its northernmost region. It was dissolved in 1963 following an invasion by United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) forces, and reintegrated with the rest of the country as Katanga Province. The Katangese secession was carried out with the support of Union Minière du Haut Katanga, a mining company with concession rights in the region, and a large contingent of Belgian military advisers. The Katanga Gendarmerie, an army raised by the Tshombe government, was initially organised and trained by Belgium's military and consisted of Belgian soldiers as well as mercenaries from Northern Rhodesia and elsewhere. There was a similarly organized Katangese Air Force. Although the rebellion was conceived as an opposition to Patrice Lumumba's central government, it continued even after the democratically elected prime minister was violently overthrown, leading to Lumumba's own kidnap and murder inside the breakaway state. After Operation Grandslam, the rebels either scattered or surrendered to United Nations forces in 1963.

In 1906, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) company was founded and was granted the exclusive rights to mine copper in Katanga. The principal shareholders in the Union Minière du Haut Katanga were Comité Spécial du Katanga, the Société Générale de Belgique and the British Tanganyika Concessions. In turn, the largest shareholder in the Comité Spécial de Katanga was the Belgian state. Katanga was a center of mining with uranium, tin and copper all being extracted from the earth. The wealth drawn by the mining industry had attracted about 32,000 Belgian settlers to Katanga by the 1950s, making it into the province of the Belgian Congo with the largest number of Belgian settlers. As 33.7% of the revenue of the Congo came from the sale of the copper mined in Katanga, ownership of the company was an important consideration for the leaders of the Congolese Independence movement while the Belgian government was most reluctant to give up its share in the UMHK, and did not finally do so until 1967. In January 1959, it was announced that Belgium would grant independence to the Congo in June 1960. Starting in March 1960, the UMHK began to financially support CONAKAT and bribed the party leader, Moïse Tshombe, into advocating policies that were favorable to the company. Economically, the Katanga province of the Belgian Congo was closely linked to the autonomous Central African Federation that united the British colonies of Northern Rhodesia (modern Zambia), Nyasaland (modern Malawi), and Southern Rhodesia (modern Zimbabwe). Via gerrymandering, much of the black population of the Central African Federation was in effect disfranchised and the Federation was dominated by the white population. In the run up to the Congolese independence, the leaders of the white Belgian settlers in Katanga were in close contact with the leaders of the white settlers in the Central African Federation, discussing a plan under which Katanga would break away from the Congo once independence was granted, and then join the Central African Federation. In March 1960, Etienne Harford, the Belgian consul in Salisbury (modern Harare) told Sir Roy Welensky, the prime minister of the Federation, that the Belgian government wanted a "political association" of Katanga with the federation after independence. The same month in an interview with Rene McColl, a journalist from The Daily Express newspaper, Welensky stated that he fully expected Katanga to break away from the Congo and join the Federation. When the Belgian Congo received independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, it was already wracked by ethnic factionalism and political tension. A coalition of CONAKAT politicians and Belgian settlers had made an attempt shortly before that date to issue their own declaration of independence in Katanga, but the Belgian government opposed their plans. CONAKAT was especially concerned that the emerging Congolese government under prime minister Patrice Lumumba would dismiss its members from their positions in the Katangese provincial government and replace them with his supporters. On the evening of 11 July, CONAKAT leader Moïse Tshombe, accusing the central government of communist leanings and dictatorial rule, announced that Katanga was seceding from the Congo. To assist him, the UMHK gave Tshombe an advance of 1,250 million Belgian francs (approximately 25 million US dollars in 1960 – $ today). Tshombe's first act was to ask the Belgian Prime Minister, Gaston Eyskens, for help. When the newly appointed commander of the Élisabethville military garrison arrived in the city, Katangese authorities immediately detained and expelled him. He flew to Luluabourg and informed Lumumba and President Joseph Kasa Vubu of the secession. The two decided to fly to Katanga to examine the situation themselves. Katangese Minister of Interior Godefroid Munongo denied them permission to land at the airport and radioed that while Kasa Vubu could visit Katanga if he wished, Lumumba was not allowed to enter the territory. Infuriated, the President and Prime Minister returned to Luluabourg. Tshombe immediately appointed his own commander, a Colonel Norbert Muke of the Force Publique, to form a new military force, the Katanga Gendarmerie. For the most part, Katanga's white residents openly backed the secession. Unlike Lumumba, Tshombe had openly courted them, likely because he believed they possessed much needed technical skills, and their exodus would prove catastrophic to the Katangese economy. The numbers of the new force were originally fixed at 1,500 volunteers from 16 to 21 years of age recruited from 'safe' ethnic groups. Almost all the aircraft of the Force Publique had been transferred to Kamina, then requisitioned by Katanga.

On 14 July 1960, in response to requests by Prime Minister Lumumba, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 143. This called upon Belgium to remove its military personnel from the Congo and for the UN to provide 'military assistance' to the Congolese forces to allow them 'to meet fully their tasks'. Lumumba demanded that Belgium remove its troops immediately, threatening to seek help from the Soviet Union if they did not leave within two days. The UN reacted quickly and established United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The first UN troops arrived the next day, but there was instant disagreement between Lumumba and the UN over the new force's mandate. Because the Congolese army had been in disarray, Lumumba wanted to use the UN peacekeepers to subdue Katanga by force. Referring to the resolution, Lumumba wrote to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, 'From these texts it is clear that, contrary to your personal interpretation, the UN force may be used to subdue the rebel government of Katanga.' ONUC refused. To Hammarskjöld, the secession of Katanga was an internal Congolese matter and the UN was forbidden to intervene by Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. Disagreements over what the UN force could and could not do continued throughout its deployment despite the passage of two further Security Council resolutions. Passed on 22 July, Security Council Resolution 145 affirmed that Congo should be a unitary state and strengthened the call for Belgium to withdraw its forces. On 9 August, Security Council Resolution 146 mentioned Katanga for the first time and explicitly allowed UN forces to enter Katanga whilst forbidding their use to 'intervene in or influence the outcome of any internal conflict.' Unhappy with Eyskens's ambivalent policy, King Baudouin tried to replace him at the beginning of August with Paul Van Zeeland with a mandate to recognize Katanga. The King's maneuver failed when the man he designated to serve as Foreign Minister in the new government, Paul Henri Spaak, declined to take part. A subject of much controversy was Belgium's involvement with Katanga. Brussels had neither inspired nor engineered Moise Tshombe's scheme of Katangese secession, but provided technical, financial, and military aid in order to keep Katanga stable in terms of public order and domestic security. The Belgians went on to advise the ONUC force against unnecessary interventions against the state, as it would only "risk increasing the confusion." At the same time, Pierre Wigny, the Foreign Minister, informed the United States, France, and Britain that his government was opposed to Tshombe's intrigues and was concerned that long term separation would compromise Congo's economic vitality.

On 3 October 1960, Katanga opened up an unrecognized diplomatic mission in New York with the aim of lobbying both for the recognition by the United States and to gain admission to the United Nations. The head of the mission was Michel Struelens, an "urbane and soft spoken" Belgian who had previously been in charge of promoting tourism to Belgian Congo. As the United States did not have diplomatic relations with Katanga, Struelens traveled to New York from Brussels on a Belgian passport. Struelens told a journalist that his mission was "to tell the Katanga story in the Western Hemisphere, based on the belief that Katanga is the only barrier against communist influence in the Congo". Though the United States refused to recognize Katanga, Struelens was able to persuade much of the American right to support Katanga. One of Struelens's allies were the ultra right wing Liberty Lobby, which in a pamphlet declared: "Each new demand, no matter how extreme, has been fulfilled by the groggy demoralized Western nations. From 'infant independence' to gold plated Cadillacs, every squeak of the Negro wheel has brought forth a new application of golden 'grease' in the effort to appease the unappeasable black revolution". The conservative American intellectual James Burnham wrote in a column praising Katanga that what African nationalists want was "to destroy the power and privileges of the white men; to take over their property, or most of it; and to permit white men to remain only as servants and handmaids". On 18 January, Katangese Secretary of State of Information Lucas Samalenge visited several bars in Élisabethville, telling patrons that Lumumba was murdered; the police took Samalenge away. The United Nations Security Council met in the wake of Lumumba's death in a highly emotional atmosphere charged with anti colonial feeling and rhetoric. On 21 February 1961, the Council adopted resolution 161, which authorised 'all appropriate measures' to 'prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including ' the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort'. This resolution demanded the expulsion from the Congo of all Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries but did not explicitly mandate the UN to conduct offensive operations. However, it was ultimately interpreted by the local UN forces to justify military operations in ending the secession of Katanga. Despite the resolution, during the next six months, the UN undertook no major military operations, concentrating instead on facilitating several rounds of political negotiations. However, many sources on location claimed that UN personnel initiated and maintained a high degree of violence and were both overtly and indirectly responsible for hundreds if not even thousands of civilian deaths. From late 1960 onwards, Katanga was characterised by a series of clashes between pro Tshombe loyalists and Baluba tribesmen, whose political leaders were nominally allied to Leopoldville and opposed Katangese secession. Smaller battles were fought against ANC units attacking from other provinces, as well. However, by August it was clear he had no intention of implementing this agreement. Tshombe openly declared in a speech that month that he would defend Katanga's rights as a sovereign state and would do everything to maintain this status quo even in the face of all opposition. During Tshombe's absence, posters with his image were put up on the streets of Élisabethville, and a college of three ministers was created to temporarily take over Tshombe's presidency. The triumvirate consisted of two of Katanga's strongmen, Munongo and Minister of Finance Jean Baptiste Kibwe, and Minister of National Education Joseph Kiwele to ensure the balance between the two leaders. In August and September, the UN conducted two operations to arrest and repatriate mercenary soldiers and the Belgian political advisers from Katanga by military force, deeming that such foreigners were the backbone behind the regime. The first operation was carried out by Indian UNF troops, who began rounding up mercenaries at 5 am, culminating in the bloodless capture of nearly 400 men. Not a single shot had been fired. The outnumbered Irish company was eventually forced to surrender. They were held as prisoners of war for approximately one month. No longer able to take the increasing violence in Katanga, the ONUC commanders finally agreed to a new plan which would remove the Katangese government from power. It called for UNF troops to apprehend mercenaries, seize post offices and radio stations in Élisabethville, and send a representative from the central Congolese government to take command. This attempt was not at all bloodless and was resisted by the Gendarmes and their mercenary allies. The initial UN initiative to take over the post offices was efficiently repulsed. Later that day, Katangese soldiers launched a coordinated attack on ONUC forces. An eight day battle was waged in the city, resulting in the deaths of 11 UN personnel. One company of Irish troops, at Jadotville, were captured. Tshombe's army enjoyed unchallenged air power, and the tiny Katangese Air Force carried out successful strafing and bombing runs on UN positions entrenched in Jadotville, Élisabethville, and Kamina. The dismal failure of the UNF could also be attributed to inferior equipment. While the Gendarmes were armed with automatic rifles, heavy machine guns, mortars, and Greyhound armored cars, the vast majority of UN troopers used antiquated rifles and civilian vehicles plated with only makeshift protection. During the fighting, the Katangese authorities offered a conditional ceasefire, which was immediately rejected by the ONUC. Eventually, it became clear that any objective to depose Moise Tshombe had failed. The British, Belgian, and French governments became especially critical of 'peacekeeping operations' in Congo which would involve such interference in domestic affairs. Hammarskjöld's death set off a succession crisis at the United Nations, as there was no line of succession and the Security Council had to vote on a successor. Under UN pressure (military attacks), Tshombe later agreed to a three stage plan from the new acting Secretary General, U Thant, which would have reunited Katanga with Congo. However, this remained an agreement on paper only. The Katangese government insisted that should the plan in full be honored by Leopoldville, Tshombe be entitled to aid in drafting a new Congolese constitution and elect his own representatives to Parliament. However, both sides began to express reservations about the terms less than a week later. The president wished that his agreement should be ratified by his national assembly before it could be considered binding; this misunderstanding quickly led to a collapse in relations with Congolese government of Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula. The frustrated United Nations went on to adopt a new plan, one that called for the adoption of a federal constitution in Congo within thirty days, an end to the illegal Katangese rebellion, the unification of currency, and the sharing of mining revenues on a fifty–fifty split between Katanga and the central government. As Katanga happened to possess most of the Congo's mineral wealth, it was realized that Adoula government could not economically function if Katanga were allowed to secede, causing Kennedy to come down on the side of Congolese unity. To win the propaganda war, Kennedy commissioned the Undersecretary of State George Ball to make a case to the media that Katanga was unworthy of American support. In a speech that was later published as a pamphlet published by the State Department, Ball argued that the majority of the people in Katanga did not support the Tshombe regime and noting the way that Belgian officials had all the real power in Katanga argued that Katanga like Manchukuo was an artificial state created as a cloak for imperialism of others.

As 1962 drew to a close, the United Nations gradually increased its operational strength in Katanga, with Thant considering ever more seriously the option of forcibly ending Tshombe's secession. As UNF forces continued to be harassed by Gendarmerie, the political stalemate rapidly escalated into outright military tension. When the Katangese populace celebrated the anniversary of their independence, for example, UN officials blocked the roads into Élisabethville, fearful of the 2,000 strong "honour guard" that was scheduled to march in upcoming parades. Several thousand civilian residents promptly demonstrated against this unilateral action.

The political system of Katanga was significantly different from that established in the Republic of the Congo where executive power was divided between the president as head of state and the prime minister as head of government. Instead Katanga had a purely presidential republic with the President of Katanga being both head of state and head of government. The president headed the Cabinet of Ministers and was also the Commander in Chief of the Katangese military. The president had a four year renewable term but was not elected by popular vote, but by a two thirds majority of the deputies of the Katanga parliament – the National Assembly. names of cabinet members are taken from Guy Weber, Le Katanga de Moïse Tshombe, unless otherwise noted. Salomon Tshizand died on 23 May 1961, Joseph Kiwele died on 14 November 1961, and Lucas Samalenge died on 19 November 1961. They were not replaced. Cléophas Mukeba resigned on 22 April 1961, and was replaced by Chrysostome Mwewa, who became Secretary of State of Public Health. + Government Ministers Name Function Party Cabinet members Moïse Tshombe President of the State of Katanga CONAKAT Jacques Bartelous (Chef de Cabinet); Xavier Grandjean (Deputy Chef de Cabinet); Paul Ngoie (Attaché); Captain Mwamba (Ordinance Officer); Ivan Grignard (government secretary); Evariste Mbuyi (deputy of Ivan Grignard) Godefroid Munongo Minister of the Interior CONAKAT Victor Tignée (Chef de Cabinet); Charles "Carlo" Huyghé (Deputy Chef de Cabinet, from 12 July 1960 until October 1960); Paul Boons (legal adviser) Jean Baptiste Kibwe Minister of Finance, Vice President of the Ministerial Council (from 30 August 1960) CONAKAT René Bastin (Chef de Cabinet); Jean Godefroid Mubanda (Deputy Chef de Cabinet); Paul Gibson (attaché and secretary) Alphonse Kiela Minister of Telecommunication CONAKAT U. Van Grabeeckx (Chef de Cabinet); Gaston Ilunga (Deputy Chef de Cabinet) Joseph Kiwele Minister of National Education CONAKAT Marcel Petit (Chef de Cabinet); Benoît Nyunzi (Deputy Chef de Cabinet) Évariste Kimba Minister of Foreign Affairs CONAKAT Henri Demers (Deputy Chef de Cabinet) Valentin Ilunga Minister of Justice CONAKAT Dominique Diur (Chef de Cabinet, until his appointment in Paris from December 1960); Pierre Ndaie (Deputy Chef de Cabinet) Cléophas Mukeba Minister of Public Health MNC—Kalonji André Muntu (Chef de Cabinet); Grégoire Kashala (Deputy Chef de Cabinet); Dr. de Scheitz (Adviser) Paul Muhona Minister of Work and Social Affairs Independent Raymond Deghilage (Chef de Cabinet); Christophe Kolongo (Deputy Chef de Cabinet) Sylvestre Kilonda Minister of Agriculture CONAKAT Jean Michel (Chef de Cabinet); Jean Kalume (Deputy Chef de Cabinet) Salomon Tshizand Minister of Economic Affairs Independent Jean Nawej (Chef de Cabinet); Pherson Nguza (Deputy Chef de Cabinet)

+ Others Name Function Party Notes Jacques Masangu Resident Minister at the European Economic Community in Brussels BALUBAKAT Former Vice President of the Senate in Léopoldville for CONAKAT's rival BALUBAKAT party, rallied to Tshombe's side on 15 July 1960. The office in Brussels closed on 26 January 1962. In December 1962, he moved back to Léopoldville as a Senator for the central government. His collaborators include Mwepu (head of the administrative section); Philippart (head of the consulate); De Spirlet (head of the cultural section); Mertens (protocol section); Henrard (economic section) Dominique Diur Resident Minister in Paris CONAKAT Collaborators at the Paris office include Colonel Bernard Delègue (political adviser); Captain Jean Louis Bovagnet (military adviser); and Jacques Sidos (consular adviser for cultural and press relations) Odilon Mwenda Secretary of State at the European Economic Community in Brussels CONAKAT Assisted Jacques Masangu at the representation in Brussels, and replaced him as the head of the office at the beginning of 1962. Furthermore, the Belgian Michel Struelens opened the Katanga Information Services office in New York on 1 October 1960.

The Katangese National Police was the law enforcement and state security of Katanga. The General Commissioner of Police was Pius Sapve and the force was governed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, headed by Godefroid Munongo.