Ирактағы уақытша әкімшілік: 2003-2004 жылдар

2003–2004 transitional government of Iraq after the U. S. led invasion

The Coalition Provisional Authority (سلطة الائتلاف المؤقتة; , CPA) was a transitional government of Iraq established following the invasion of the country on 19 March 2003 by U. S. led Coalition forces. The invasion marked the fall of Ba'athist regime led by Saddam Hussein. Citing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) and the laws of war, the CPA was established in May 2003 and vested itself with executive, legislative, and judiciary authority over the Iraqi government from the period of the CPA's inception on 21 April 2003 until its dissolution on 28 June 2004. The CPA was admonished for its mismanagement of funds allocated to the reconstruction of post invasion Iraq, with over $8 billion of these unaccounted for, including over $1.6 billion in cash that emerged in a basement in Lebanon.

The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (مكتب إعادة الإعمار والمساعدة الإنسانية; , ORHA) was established on 20 January 2003 by the United States government two months before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was intended to act as a caretaker administration in Iraq until the creation of a democratically elected civilian government. Retired United States Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner was appointed as the Director of ORHA, along with three deputies, including British Major General Tim Cross, in 2003. Upon the dissolution of ORHA and the creation of the CPA, he then became the first chief executive of the CPA. Due to his past military experiences in Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and his reconstruction efforts in northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort, Garner's credentials and close ties to the U. S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made him an obvious choice for the task. His term, however, lasted only from 21 April 2003 until he was replaced abruptly less than a month later by Paul Bremer on 11 May 2003. Garner's swift dismissal from his post by U. S. authorities came as a surprise to many within the CPA. In an interview with the BBC program Newsnight Garner publicly stated that his preference was to put the Iraqi people in charge as soon as possible and to do it with some form of elections. Upon assuming the post of chief executive of the CPA in May 2003, Paul Bremer also assumed the title of U. S. Presidential Envoy and Administrator in Iraq. He was frequently called Ambassador by numerous media organizations and the White House because it was the highest government rank he had achieved (Ambassador to Netherlands). But Bremer was not ambassador to Iraq, and there was no U. S. diplomatic mission in Iraq until June 2004, after the CPA transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government. At the CPA, Bremer moved quickly to install opaque and corruption prone methods for the withdrawal and transportation of extremely large amounts of cash often transported from the US to Iraq by C 17 transport plane. The CPA was created and funded as a division of the United States Department of Defense, and as Administrator, Bremer reported directly to the Secretary of Defense. Although troops from several of the coalition countries were present in Iraq at this time, the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) was the primary military apparatus charged with providing direct combat support to the CPA to enforce its authority during the occupation of Iraq. While many of Saddam Hussein's ornate palaces were looted in the days immediately following the invasion, most of the physical structures themselves survived relatively intact. It is in these numerous palaces situated throughout the country that the CPA chose to set up office in order to govern. Several of these palaces were retained by the U. S. government even after the transition of power back to the Iraqi people. The administration was centered in a district of Baghdad known as the Green Zone, which eventually became a highly secure walled off enclave. The CPA was also responsible for administering the Development Fund for Iraq during the year following the invasion. This fund superseded the earlier UN Oil for food programme, and provided funding for Iraq's wheat purchase program, the currency exchange program, the electricity and oil infrastructure programs, equipment for Iraq's security forces, Iraqi civil service salaries, and the operations of the various government ministries. The first act of the CPA under Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1, was to order the de Ba'athification of Iraqi society. On 23 May, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2 formally disbanded the Iraqi army, as well as other public servants including nurses and doctors and eventually led to the direct unemployment of more than 500,000 Iraqi citizens. On 22 July 2003, the CPA formed the Iraqi Governing Council and appointed its members. The Council membership consisted largely of Iraqi expatriates who had previously fled the country during the rule of Saddam Hussein and also with many outspoken dissidents who had been persecuted by the former Ba'athist regime. The CPA under Bremer then went on to privatise and sell off publicly owned assets and companies to multinational companies, whilst setting about issuing unilaterally developed decrees such as Order 37 and Order 39, which reduced Iraq's corporation tax from 40% to 15% and allowed foreign entities to enjoy 100% ownership of Iraqi assets.

The CPA was divided into four geographic regions. CPA North was headquartered in the northern Iraqi city of Erbil, CPA Central in Baghdad at Saddam's former Republican Palace, CPA South Central in the Iraqi city of Hillah near the ruins of Babylon and CPA South in the southern Iraqi city of Basra. Each region operated semi autonomously, and all four had the same common goals for reconstruction of the country. Throughout the existence of the CPA, the security situation and levels of civil unrest throughout the country varied by region, and these variances were reflected in the different levels of program
successes within the CPA divisions.

The Program Review Board (PRB) was an eleven member board that consisted of ten staff members from the CPA and one member of the Iraqi Governing Council. The chair of the board was also the CPA's senior advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. It was the board's responsibility to review and make recommendations to the CPA administrator on which contracts should be awarded. In order to ensure transparency, all key discussions regarding the pros and cons of the programs under consideration were to be made public. The CPA administrator was supposed to make decisions on the awarding of contracts only after receiving a recommendation from this committee. The Notes on Internal Control from KPMG's audit of DFI expenditures was particularly critical of PRB record keeping's failing to fulfill the CPA's transparency obligation. In particular:
Meetings were held in which attendance was not recorded. Meetings were held in which decisions were made in the absence of quorums. The Program Review Board never recorded the motions to approve expenditures, who seconded motions, or which members were for or against those motions. In the 43 meetings held in 2003, the single Iraqi member of the board attended only two meetings. The minutes failed to contain sufficient detail for readers to understand why programs were approved. Program decisions that had been tabled were later approved informally outside the meetings, with no recording of the reasoning behind the decision. The board chair refused to certify the accuracy of the Board's bookkeeping.

Prior to US occupation, Iraq had a centrally planned economy. Among other things, it prohibited foreign ownership of Iraqi businesses, ran most large industries as state owned enterprises, and imposed large tariffs to keep out foreign goods. After the invasion of Iraq, the CPA quickly began issuing many binding orders privatizing Iraq's economy and opening it up to foreign investment. CPA Order 39, entitled "Foreign Investment," provided that "A foreign investor shall be entitled to make foreign investments in Iraq on terms no less favorable than those applicable to an Iraqi investor," and that "[t]he amount of foreign participation in newly formed or existing business entities in Iraq shall not be limited " Additionally, the foreign investor "shall be authorized to transfer abroad without delay all funds associated with its foreign investment, including shares or profits and dividends ". Critics assert that the CPA drastically altered Iraq's economy, allowing virtually unlimited and unrestricted foreign investment and placing no limitations on the expatriation of profit. However, these policies were in accord with current international standards on foreign direct investment to which most of the developed world adheres. The order concluded, "Where an international agreement to which Iraq is a party provides for more favorable terms with respect to foreign investors undertaking investment activities in Iraq, the more favorable terms under the international agreement shall apply." According to critics, this order was designed to create as favorable an environment for foreign investors as possible, thereby allowing American and multinational corporations to dominate Iraq's economy. Others argue the CPA considered free market reform essential for Iraq's oil wealth to generate sustainable growth and development, instead of consigning Iraq to a resource trap by maintaining the laws of the previous totalitarian regime. CPA Order 17 granted all foreign contractors operating in Iraq immunity from "Iraqi legal process," effectively granting immunity from any kind of suit, civil or criminal, for actions the contractors engaged in within Iraq. CPA Order 49 provided a tax cut for corporations operating within Iraq. It reduced the rate from a maximum of 40% to a maximum of 15% on income. Corporations working with the CPA were exempted from owing any tax. CPA Order 12, amended by Order 54, suspended all tariffs, thus removing the advantage that domestic Iraqi producers had over foreign producers. However, a 5% "reconstruction levy" on all imported goods was later reimposed to help finance Iraqi initiated reconstruction projects. CPA Order 57 provided for the appointment of "Inspectors General" to operate within each Iraqi government ministry, for the purposes of rooting out corruption. These Inspectors General were to be "appointed to a 5 year term by the Administrator [Paul Bremer]," and were given sweeping powers "to conduct investigations, audits, evaluations, inspections, and other reviews "
Critics contend this is a mechanism for ensuring continuing American influence in Iraqi governance even after the transfer of all sovereignty to the country.

Critics contend that the controversial policies are fundamentally anti democratic, or illegal under international law, because significant economic reform can only be legitimate if passed initially by an elected Iraqi government free of foreign occupation and domination, and because an occupying power is prohibited from rewriting the laws of the occupied country. The CPA argued that imposing Order 39 was permitted under Resolution 1483, because it required the CPA to "promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory," and to create "conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future." Proponents of this position state Resolution 1483 necessarily requires radical economic restructuring, so it allowed an exception to international law regarding occupation. However, others point out that Resolution 1483 "calls upon all concerned to comply with international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949", which would require an occupying force to respect the laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented.

Although the CPA awarded contracts for essential reconstruction to American firms, some critics claim those firms did relatively little work. Bechtel, for instance, was awarded the contract to repair the Iraqi sewage and drinking water plants. Yet today many Iraqis remain without safe drinking water or adequate supplies of electricity. Coalition military forces were too heavily tasked to provide requisite security for all contractors in Iraq. Contract funds therefore had to be partially shifted from reconstruction activities to meet security requirements that had not been envisioned when the contracts were initially let. Moreover, progress in reconstruction frequently faced setbacks due to insurgency activities designed to disrupt rebuilding of the infrastructure. This insurgent activity significantly slowed reconstruction and required adjustment of project goals due to funds consumed by providing necessary security in excess of that originally planned. According to USAID, as of October 2003, peak electrical generation had reached pre war levels of 4,500 MW, and they were then collaborating with Bechtel as well as the Iraqi Interior Ministry and others on some 2,000 MW of projected capacity. The CPA set a goal of 6,000 MW generation capacity for the summer of 2004, which has never been reached. Peak generation capacity of 5,365 MW was achieved in August 2004, six weeks after the transfer of sovereignty. Current generation stands at approximately 13,000 MW. Weekly updates and financial summaries are provided by USAID's Iraq homepage as currently as is possible.