Введение
«Эгоистичный ген» – книга 1976 года, посвященная эволюции и написанная этологом Ричардом Докинзом, в которой автор развивает основную теорию адаптации и естественного отбора, представленную Джорджем С. Уильямсом в его работе «Адаптация и естественный отбор» (1966). Докинз использует термин «эгоистичный ген» для выражения генно-центрированного взгляда на эволюцию (в отличие от подходов, фокусирующихся на организме и группе), популяризируя идеи, разработанные в 1960-х годах У. Д. Гамильтоном и другими учеными. Исходя из генно-центрированного взгляда, чем ближе генетическое родство двух особей, тем больше смысла (с точки зрения генов) имеет их кооперативное поведение. Можно ожидать, что линия эволюционирует для максимизации своей инклюзивной приспособленности – количества копий своих генов, передаваемых в глобальном масштабе (а не конкретной особью). В результате популяции будут стремиться к эволюционно стабильной стратегии. В книге также вводится термин «мем» для обозначения единицы человеческой культурной эволюции, аналогичной гену, предполагая, что подобное «эгоистичное» воспроизводство может также моделировать человеческую культуру, но в ином смысле. С момента публикации книги меметика стала предметом многочисленных исследований. Повышая осведомленность об идеях Гамильтона и внося собственный ценный вклад в эту область, книга также стимулировала исследования инклюзивной приспособленности человека. В предисловии к 30-летнему изданию книги Докинз отметил, что «легко видит, что [название книги] может создать неверное впечатление о ее содержании», и, оглядываясь назад, считает, что ему следовало прислушаться к совету Тома Машлера и назвать книгу «Бессмертный ген». В июле 2017 года в опросе, посвященном 30-летию премии Королевского общества за научную литературу, «Эгоистичный ген» был назван самой влиятельной научной книгой всех времен.
The Selfish Gene is a 1976 book on evolution by ethologist Richard Dawkins, in which the author builds upon the principal theory of George C. Williams's Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966). Dawkins uses the term "selfish gene" as a way of expressing the gene centred view of evolution (as opposed to the views focused on the organism and the group), popularising ideas developed during the 1960s by W. D. Hamilton and others. From the gene centred view, it follows that the more two individuals are genetically related, the more sense (at the level of the genes) it makes for them to behave cooperatively with each other. A lineage is expected to evolve to maximise its inclusive fitness—the number of copies of its genes passed on globally (rather than by a particular individual). As a result, populations will tend towards an evolutionarily stable strategy. The book also introduces the term meme for a unit of human cultural evolution analogous to the gene, suggesting that such "selfish" replication may also model human culture, in a different sense. Memetics has become the subject of many studies since the publication of the book. In raising awareness of Hamilton's ideas, as well as making its own valuable contributions to the field, the book has also stimulated research on human inclusive fitness. In the foreword to the book's 30th anniversary edition, Dawkins said he "can readily see that [the book's title] might give an inadequate impression of its contents" and in retrospect thinks he should have taken Tom Maschler's advice and called the book The Immortal Gene. In July 2017, a poll to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Royal Society science book prize listed The Selfish Gene as the most influential science book of all time.
Предыстория
Докинз опирается на книгу Джорджа К. Уильямса «Адаптация и естественный отбор» (1966), в которой утверждалось, что альтруизм не основан на пользе для группы как таковой.
«Эгоистичный», когда применяется к генам, вовсе не означает «эгоистичный». Вместо этого это означает чрезвычайно важное качество, для которого нет подходящего слова в английском языке: «способность копироваться посредством дарвиновского отбора». Это сложное и громоздкое определение. Должно быть более короткое и удачное слово, но «эгоистичный» – не подходит. Дональд Саймонс также считает неуместным использование антропоморфизма при передаче научного смысла в целом, и особенно в данном случае. В своей книге «Эволюция человеческой сексуальности» (1979) он пишет:
«В итоге, риторика книги «Эгоистичный ген» полностью искажает реальное положение вещей: посредством метафоры гены наделяются свойствами, свойственными только разумным существам, таким как эгоизм, в то время как разумные существа лишаются этих свойств и объявляются машинами. Антропоморфизм генов затуманивает самую глубокую тайну в биологии: происхождение и природу сознания».
Выбор слов
Значительное число возражений против книги "Эгоистичный ген" возникло из-за недостаточной ясности в отношении понятий "отбор" и "репликация". Докинз утверждает, что ген является фундаментальной единицей отбора, а затем указывает, что отбор действует не непосредственно на ген, а на "носители" или "расширенные фенотипы". Стивен Джей Гулд возражал против определения гена как "единицы отбора", поскольку отбор действует исключительно на фенотипы. Подводя итог различию во взглядах Докинза и Гулда, Стерлни пишет: "Гулд считает, что генетические различия не *вызывают* эволюционные изменения в популяциях, они их *регистрируют*". — Ким Стерлни: Докинз против Гулда, с. 83.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
Слово "вызывать" здесь несколько неоднозначно: приводит ли изменение правил лотереи (например, наследование дефектного гена, "ответственного" за заболевание) к различиям в исходе, которые могут или не могут произойти? Оно, безусловно, изменяет вероятность событий, но совокупность случайностей определяет, что произойдет на самом деле. Докинз считает, что использование "вызывать" в качестве статистической оценки допустимо в обычной речи. Как и Гулд, Габриэль Довер, критикуя "Эгоистичный ген", заявляет: "Неправомерно наделять гены "властью" контролировать исход отбора, как это делает Докинз. Не существует генов для взаимодействия как таковых: скорее, каждый уникальный набор унаследованных генов интерактивно вносит вклад в один уникальный фенотип – истинный детерминант отбора". — Габриэль Довер: Дорогой мистер Дарвин, с. 56.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
Однако, сравнивая это с обсуждением Докинзом того же самого вопроса, кажется, что комментарии Гулда и Довера – это скорее критика его небрежного использования терминов, чем принципиальное различие во взглядах. Термин "репликатор" включает гены как наиболее фундаментальные репликаторы, но, возможно, и другие агенты, а "интерактор" включает организмы, но, возможно, и другие агенты, подобно "носителям" Докинса. Различие заключается в следующем:
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
репликатор: сущность, передающая свою структуру в значительной степени нетронутой в последовательных репликациях. интерактор: сущность, взаимодействующая с окружающей средой как единое целое таким образом, что это взаимодействие приводит к дифференциальной репликации. отбор: процесс, в котором дифференциальное вымирание или размножение интеракторов приводит к дифференциальному сохранению репликаторов, которые их произвели. Халл предполагает, что, несмотря на некоторые сходства, Докинз придерживается слишком узкого взгляда на эти термины, что порождает некоторые возражения против его идей. По мнению Годфри Смита, эта более точная терминология прояснила "недопонимания в дебатах о "единицах отбора"". — Д. Д. Тиссен, Механизм-специфические подходы в поведенческой генетике, с. 91.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
Этот взгляд, сформировавшийся в 1970-х годах, все еще актуален сегодня и противоречит представлению Докинза о "гене как форме "информации, которая проходит через тела и влияет на них, но не подвергается влиянию на пути через них"". Философско-биологическое направление энактивизма подчеркивает взаимодействие живого агента с окружающей средой и связь исследования окружающей среды с познанием и адаптацией. Активация генов зависит от клеточной среды. Подробное обсуждение контрастов между энактивизмом и взглядами Докинза, а также их обоснование Деннетом, представлено в работе Томпсона. В книге "Разум в жизни" философ Эван Томпсон собрал многостороннюю критику идеи "эгоистичного гена". — Ричард Докинз: Река из Эдема: Дарвиновский взгляд на жизнь, с. 19.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"На берегу Оксфордского канала растет большая ива, и она выбрасывает в воздух пушистые семена. Там идет дождь инструкций; это дождь программ; это дождь деревьев, растущих, пушистых алгоритмов распространения. Это не метафора, это простая истина." — Ричард Докинз: Слепой часовщик, с. 111.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
Томпсон возражает, что ген не может функционировать сам по себе, поскольку ему необходима среда, такая как клетка, а жизнь – это "творческий результат высокоструктурированных случайностей". Томпсон цитирует Саркара: это равносильно принятию формы материального информационного дуализма, не имеющего объяснительной ценности и научной основы. (Томпсон, с. 187). Однако, с точки зрения энактивизма, информация является результатом исследования и экспериментирования агента с окружающей средой, с учетом ограничений способностей агента исследовать и обрабатывать результаты исследования, а ДНК – это лишь один из механизмов, который агент использует в своей деятельности.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
Публикация
Книга "Эгоистичный ген" была впервые опубликована Оксфордским университетом в 1976 году в одиннадцати главах с предисловием автора и введением Роберта Триверса. Второе издание было опубликовано в 1989 году. В этом издании были добавлены две дополнительные главы и значительные примечания к предыдущим главам, отражающие новые открытия и размышления. Также было добавлено второе предисловие автора, но первоначальное введение Триверса было исключено. Книга не содержит иллюстраций. Книга была переведена как минимум на 23 языка, включая арабский, тайский и турецкий. В 2006 году было опубликовано юбилейное издание к 30-летию с введением Триверса и новым предисловием автора, в котором он отмечает: "В этом издании, однако, и это доставляет мне особую радость, восстановлено первоначальное введение Роберта Триверса". Это издание сопровождалось сборником статей в честь юбилея под названием "Ричард Докинз: как ученый изменил наше мышление" (2006). В марте 2006 года в Лондонской школе экономики состоялось специальное мероприятие под названием "Эгоистичный ген: тридцать лет спустя". В марте 2011 года Audible Inc. опубликовала аудиокнигу, озвученную Ричардом Докинзом и Лаллой Уорд. В 2016 году Оксфордский университет опубликовал издание к 40-летию с новым эпилогом, в котором Докинз описывает сохраняющуюся актуальность взгляда на эволюцию с точки зрения гена и заявляет, что он, вместе с анализом коалесценции, "проливает свет на глубокое прошлое способами, о которых я не подозревал, когда впервые писал "Эгоистичный ген"".
Издания
Год Название ISBN Формат 1976 Эгоистичный ген (1-е издание) Твердый переплет 1978 Эгоистичный ген (издание Научного книжного клуба) Твердый переплет 1978 Эгоистичный ген (1-е издание, переиздание) Мягкая обложка 1989 Эгоистичный ген (2-е издание) Мягкая обложка 2006 Эгоистичный ген: издание к 30-летию (3-е издание) Твердый переплет Мягкая обложка 2011 Эгоистичный ген (MP3 CD) Аудиокнига 2016 Эгоистичный ген: издание к 40-летию (4-е издание) Мягкая обложка 2016 "Расширенный" эгоистичный ген (4-е издание) Твердый переплет