Кіріспе
Ричард Докинстің 1976 жылғы кітабы. «Эгоистикалық ген» – этолог Ричард Докинстің 1976 жылғы эволюция туралы кітабы. Кітапта автор Джордж С. Уильямстың «Адаптация және табиғи сұрыптау» (1966) еңбегіндегі негізгі теорияны дамытады. Докинз «эгоистикалық ген» терминін эволюцияға гендік тұрғыдан қарау үшін пайдаланады (организм мен топқа бағытталған көзқарастардан өзгеше), бұл идеяны 1960 жылдары У. Д. Гамильтон және басқалар қалыптастырған және танымал еткен. Гендік тұрғыдан қарағанда, егер екі адам генетикалық жағынан қаншалықты жақын болса, олардың бір-бірімен ынтымақтасып әрекет етуі гендер деңгейінде соншалықты маңызды. Туыстастық қатары эволюциялық даму жолымен өзінің жан-жақты сәйкестігін – гендерінің көшірмелерінің санын (нақты бір адам арқылы емес) бүкіл әлемде көбейтуге ұмтылады. Осының нәтижесінде популяциялар эволюциялық тұрақты стратегияға қарай дамиды. Кітапта сонымен қатар, адам мәдениетінің эволюциялық бірлігін білдіретін «мем» термині енгізілген, бұл «өзімшіл» көбейту адам мәдениетін де, әлдеқандай жаңа мағынада үлгілей алады деген болжам жасалады. Кітап жарық көргеннен бері меметикалық зерттеулер көптеген тақырыптарды қамтыды. Гамильтонның идеяларын жариялаумен қатар, бұл салаға құнды үлес қосып, кітап адамның жан-жақты сәйкестігін зерттеуге де серпін берді. Кітаптың 30 жылдығына арналған алғы сөзінде Докинс «кітаптың атауы оның мазмұны туралы толыққанды түсінік бермейтінін» айтты және кейіннен Том Машлердің кеңесіне құлақ салып, кітапты «Өлмес ген» деп атағаны жөн еді деп ойлайды. 2017 жылдың шілдесінде Корольдік қоғамның ғылыми кітаптар сыйлығының 30 жылдығына арналған сауалнамада «Эгоистикалық ген» – барлық уақыттағы ең ықпалды ғылыми кітап деп танылды.
1976 book by Richard Dawkins
The Selfish Gene is a 1976 book on evolution by ethologist Richard Dawkins, in which the author builds upon the principal theory of George C. Williams's Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966). Dawkins uses the term "selfish gene" as a way of expressing the gene centred view of evolution (as opposed to the views focused on the organism and the group), popularising ideas developed during the 1960s by W. D. Hamilton and others. From the gene centred view, it follows that the more two individuals are genetically related, the more sense (at the level of the genes) it makes for them to behave cooperatively with each other. A lineage is expected to evolve to maximise its inclusive fitness—the number of copies of its genes passed on globally (rather than by a particular individual). As a result, populations will tend towards an evolutionarily stable strategy. The book also introduces the term meme for a unit of human cultural evolution analogous to the gene, suggesting that such "selfish" replication may also model human culture, in a different sense. Memetics has become the subject of many studies since the publication of the book. In raising awareness of Hamilton's ideas, as well as making its own valuable contributions to the field, the book has also stimulated research on human inclusive fitness. In the foreword to the book's 30th anniversary edition, Dawkins said he "can readily see that [the book's title] might give an inadequate impression of its contents" and in retrospect thinks he should have taken Tom Maschler's advice and called the book The Immortal Gene. In July 2017, a poll to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Royal Society science book prize listed The Selfish Gene as the most influential science book of all time.
The Selfish Gene is a 1976 book on evolution by ethologist Richard Dawkins, in which the author builds upon the principal theory of George C. Williams's Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966). Dawkins uses the term "selfish gene" as a way of expressing the gene centred view of evolution (as opposed to the views focused on the organism and the group), popularising ideas developed during the 1960s by W. D. Hamilton and others. From the gene centred view, it follows that the more two individuals are genetically related, the more sense (at the level of the genes) it makes for them to behave cooperatively with each other. A lineage is expected to evolve to maximise its inclusive fitness—the number of copies of its genes passed on globally (rather than by a particular individual). As a result, populations will tend towards an evolutionarily stable strategy. The book also introduces the term meme for a unit of human cultural evolution analogous to the gene, suggesting that such "selfish" replication may also model human culture, in a different sense. Memetics has become the subject of many studies since the publication of the book. In raising awareness of Hamilton's ideas, as well as making its own valuable contributions to the field, the book has also stimulated research on human inclusive fitness. In the foreword to the book's 30th anniversary edition, Dawkins said he "can readily see that [the book's title] might give an inadequate impression of its contents" and in retrospect thinks he should have taken Tom Maschler's advice and called the book The Immortal Gene. In July 2017, a poll to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Royal Society science book prize listed The Selfish Gene as the most influential science book of all time.
Өмірбаян
Докинз Джордж К. Уильямстың "Адаптация және табиғи таңдау" (1966) кітабына сүйене отырып, альтруизмнің өзі топтық пайдаға емес, басқа нәрсеге негізделгенін көрсетті.
Dawkins builds upon George C. Williams's book Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), which argued that altruism is not based upon group benefit per se,
«Өзімшіл» деген сөз гендерге қолданылғанда, мүлдем «өзімшіл» дегенді білдірмейді. Оның орнына, бұл өте маңызды қасиет, оған ағылшын тілінде тиімді сөз жоқ: «Дарвиндік таңдау процесі арқылы көшірілу қабілеті». Бұл өте қиын айтылатын сөз. Қысқарақ, жақсырақ сөз болуы керек, бірақ «жекешiлiк» емес». Дональд Саймонс ғылыми мағынаны жеткізуде антропоморфизмді қолдануды жалпы орынсыз деп санайды, әсіресе осы жағдайда. Ол "Адамдардың жыныстық қатынасының эволюциясы" (1979) еңбегінде былай деп жазады:
""Selfish", when applied to genes, doesn't mean "selfish" at all. It means, instead, an extremely important quality for which there is no good word in the English language: "the quality of being copied by a Darwinian selection process." This is a complicated mouthful. There ought to be a better, shorter word—but "selfish" isn't it." Donald Symons also finds it inappropriate to use anthropomorphism in conveying scientific meaning in general, and particularly in this instance. He writes in The Evolution of Human Sexuality (1979):
«Қорыта айтқанда, "Өзімшіл ген" еңбегіндегі сөздік шындықты кері қайтарады: метафора арқылы гендерге тек саналы тіршілік иелері ғана ие бола алатын қасиеттер беріледі, мысалы, өзімшілдік, ал саналы тіршілік иелері осы қасиеттерден айырылып, машиналар деп аталады. Гендерді антропоморфизмдеу, өмір ғылымдарындағы ең терең құпияны жасырады: сананың пайда болуы мен мәні».
"In summary, the rhetoric of The Selfish Gene exactly reverses the real situation: through [the use of] metaphor genes are endowed with properties only sentient beings can possess, such as selfishness, while sentient beings are stripped of these properties and called machines The anthropomorphism of genes obscures the deepest mystery in the life sciences: the origin and nature of mind."
Сөздерді таңдау
"Эгоисттік ген" кітабына қарсылықтың басты себебі – оның "таңдау" және "көшіру" ұғымдарын әрқашан нақты жеткізе алмауы. Докинс генді таңдаудың негізгі бірлігі дейді, бірақ таңдау генге тікелей емес, "көлік құралдарына" немесе "кеңейтілген фенотиптерге" әсер етеді. Стивен Джей Гулд генді "таңдау бірлігі" деп атауға қарсы болды, себебі таңдау тек фенотиптерге қатысты. Стерлни Докинс пен Гулдтың пікірталасын қорытындылап былай дейді: "Гулд гендік айырмашылықтар эволюциялық өзгерістерге себеп болмайды, олар осы өзгерістерді тіркейді". – Ким Стерлни: Докинс және Гулд, 83-бет.
A good deal of objection to The Selfish Gene stemmed from its failure to be always clear about "selection" and "replication". Dawkins says the gene is the fundamental unit of selection, and then points out that selection does not act directly upon the gene, but upon "vehicles" or '"extended phenotypes". Stephen Jay Gould took exception to calling the gene a 'unit of selection' because selection acted only upon phenotypes. Summarizing the Dawkins Gould difference of view, Sterelny says:
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"Себеп" сөзінің мағынасы осы жерде күрделі: лотерея ережелерінің өзгеруі (мысалы, ауруға "жауапты" кемістік генді мұраға алу) болашақ нәтижелердегі айырмашылықтарға "себеп" бола ма, болмаса олардың пайда болу ықтималдығын ғана өзгерте ме? Бұл оқиғалардың болу мүмкіндігін өзгертеді, бірақ оқиғалардың тізбегі нақты не болатынын анықтайды. Докинс "себепті" статистикалық салмақ ретінде қолдануды қалыпты жағдайда қабылдайды. Гулд сияқты, Габриэль Довер "Эгоисттік генді" сынға алып былай дейді: "Докинс айтқандай, гендерге таңдаудың нәтижесін бақылауға "құдірет" беру дұрыс емес. Жеке гендердің өзара әрекеттесуіне арналған гендер жоқ, керісінше, әрбір мұраға алынған гендер жиынтығы бірегей фенотипке өзара әсер етеді – таңдаудың нағыз анықтамасы". – Габриэль Довер: Құрметті мырза Дарвин, 56-бет.
A good deal of objection to The Selfish Gene stemmed from its failure to be always clear about "selection" and "replication". Dawkins says the gene is the fundamental unit of selection, and then points out that selection does not act directly upon the gene, but upon "vehicles" or '"extended phenotypes". Stephen Jay Gould took exception to calling the gene a 'unit of selection' because selection acted only upon phenotypes. Summarizing the Dawkins Gould difference of view, Sterelny says:
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
Дегенмен, Докинстің осы мәселені талқылауымен салыстырғанда, Гулд пен Довердің пікірлері оның түсінігінің шалаңдығын сынға алудан гөрі көзқарастардың өзгешелігінен туындаған сияқты. "Көшіргіш" термині гендерді ең негізгі көшіргіштер ретінде қамтиды, бірақ басқа да агенттер болуы мүмкін, ал "өзара әрекеттесуші" организмдерді, бірақ басқа агенттерді де қамтиды, дәл Докинстің "көлік құралдары" сияқты. Айырмашылығы мынадай:
A good deal of objection to The Selfish Gene stemmed from its failure to be always clear about "selection" and "replication". Dawkins says the gene is the fundamental unit of selection, and then points out that selection does not act directly upon the gene, but upon "vehicles" or '"extended phenotypes". Stephen Jay Gould took exception to calling the gene a 'unit of selection' because selection acted only upon phenotypes. Summarizing the Dawkins Gould difference of view, Sterelny says:
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
Көшіргіш: құрылымын келесі көшірулерде көбінесе толық сақтап беретін бірлік.
Өзара әрекеттесуші: қоршаған ортамен тұтас бірлік ретінде өзара әрекеттесетін және осы өзара әрекеттесу көшірудің өзгеше болуына себеп болатын бірлік.
Таңдау: өзара әрекеттесушілердің әртүрлі жойылуы немесе көбеюі оларды тудырған көшіргіштердің мәңгілік сақталуына әкелетін процесс.
A good deal of objection to The Selfish Gene stemmed from its failure to be always clear about "selection" and "replication". Dawkins says the gene is the fundamental unit of selection, and then points out that selection does not act directly upon the gene, but upon "vehicles" or '"extended phenotypes". Stephen Jay Gould took exception to calling the gene a 'unit of selection' because selection acted only upon phenotypes. Summarizing the Dawkins Gould difference of view, Sterelny says:
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
Халл кейбір ұқсастықтарға қарамастан, Докинс бұл терминдерге тым тар көзқараспен қарап, оның пікірлеріне қарсылық тудырады. Годфри Смиттің айтуынша, осы мұқият терминология "таңдау бірліктері" туралы пікірталастардағы түсініспеушіліктерді жойды. – Д. Д. Тиссен, мінез-құлық генетикасындағы механизмге тән тәсілдер, 91-бет.
A good deal of objection to The Selfish Gene stemmed from its failure to be always clear about "selection" and "replication". Dawkins says the gene is the fundamental unit of selection, and then points out that selection does not act directly upon the gene, but upon "vehicles" or '"extended phenotypes". Stephen Jay Gould took exception to calling the gene a 'unit of selection' because selection acted only upon phenotypes. Summarizing the Dawkins Gould difference of view, Sterelny says:
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
1970 жылғы бұл көзқарас әлі де қолданыста, және Докинстің "генді "дене арқылы өтіп, оларға әсер ететін, бірақ олардан әсер алмайтын" ақпарат түрі ретінде қарастыруымен қарама-қайшылықта. Энактивизмнің философиялық-биологиялық саласы тірі организмнің қоршаған ортамен өзара әрекеттесуіне және ортаны зерттеу мен бейімделуге қатысты. Гендердің белсенділігі жасуша ортасына байланысты. Энактивизм мен Докинстің көзқарастары арасындағы қарама-қайшылықтарды, сондай-ақ Деннеттің қолдауын Томпсон кеңінен талқылайды. "Өмірдегі сана" еңбегінде философ Эван Томпсон "эгоисттік ген" идеясына қарсы көптеген көзқарастарды жинады. – Ричард Докинс: Едемнен шыққан өзен: өмірге Дарвиндік көзқарас, 19-бет.
A good deal of objection to The Selfish Gene stemmed from its failure to be always clear about "selection" and "replication". Dawkins says the gene is the fundamental unit of selection, and then points out that selection does not act directly upon the gene, but upon "vehicles" or '"extended phenotypes". Stephen Jay Gould took exception to calling the gene a 'unit of selection' because selection acted only upon phenotypes. Summarizing the Dawkins Gould difference of view, Sterelny says:
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"Оксфорд каналының жағасында үлкен сабан ағашы бар, ол ауаға жұмсақ тұқымдарды шашып жатыр. Бұл – нұсқаулардың жауыны, бағдарламалардың жауыны, ағаш өсіру, құрғақ тұқымдарды тарату алгоритмдерінің жауыны. Бұл – метафора емес, таза шындық". – Ричард Докинс: Соқыр сағаттанушы, 111-бет.
A good deal of objection to The Selfish Gene stemmed from its failure to be always clear about "selection" and "replication". Dawkins says the gene is the fundamental unit of selection, and then points out that selection does not act directly upon the gene, but upon "vehicles" or '"extended phenotypes". Stephen Jay Gould took exception to calling the gene a 'unit of selection' because selection acted only upon phenotypes. Summarizing the Dawkins Gould difference of view, Sterelny says:
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
Томпсон геннің өзі жұмыс істей алмайтынын, себебі оған жасуша сияқты орта қажет екенін, ал өмір – "жоғары құрылымдалған кездейсоқтықтардың шығармашылық нәтижесі" деп қарсылық білдіреді. Томпсон Сакардың сөздерін келтіреді: бұл ғылыми негіздемесі жоқ және түсіндіру құндылығы жоқ материалдық ақпараттық дуализмді қабылдауға тең. (Томпсон, 187-бет). Дегенмен, энактивисттік көзқарас бойынша, ақпарат – агенттің ортамен зерттеуі мен тәжірибе жүргізуінің нәтижесі, агенттің зерттеудің нәтижесін зерттеу және өңдеу қабілеттерінің шектеулілігіне байланысты, ал ДНК – агенттің өз қызметіне қолданатын механизмдердің бірі.
A good deal of objection to The Selfish Gene stemmed from its failure to be always clear about "selection" and "replication". Dawkins says the gene is the fundamental unit of selection, and then points out that selection does not act directly upon the gene, but upon "vehicles" or '"extended phenotypes". Stephen Jay Gould took exception to calling the gene a 'unit of selection' because selection acted only upon phenotypes. Summarizing the Dawkins Gould difference of view, Sterelny says:
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
"Gould thinks gene differences do not cause evolutionary changes in populations, they register those changes." —Kim Sterelny: Dawkins vs. Gould, p. 83
The word "cause" here is somewhat tricky: does a change in lottery rules (for example, inheriting a defective gene "responsible" for a disorder) "cause" differences in outcome that might or might not occur? It certainly alters the likelihood of events, but a concatenation of contingencies decides what actually occurs. Dawkins thinks the use of "cause" as a statistical weighting is acceptable in common usage. Like Gould, Gabriel Dover in criticizing The Selfish Gene says:
"It is illegitimate to give 'powers' to genes, as Dawkins would have it, to control the outcome of selection There are no genes for interactions, as such: rather, each unique set of inherited genes contributes interactively to one unique phenotype the true determinants of selection". — Gabriel Dover: Dear Mr. Darwin, p. 56
However, from a comparison with Dawkins's discussion of this very same point, it would seem both Gould's and Dover's comments are more a critique of his sloppy usage than a difference of views. The term "replicator" includes genes as the most fundamental replicators but possibly other agents, and interactor includes organisms but maybe other agents, much as do Dawkins's 'vehicles'. The distinction is as follows:
replicator: an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in successive replications. interactor: an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential. selection: a process in which the differential extinction or proliferation of interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them. Hull suggests that, despite some similarities, Dawkins takes too narrow a view of these terms, engendering some of the objections to his views. According to Godfrey Smith, this more careful vocabulary has cleared up "misunderstandings in the "units of selection" debates." —D. D. Thiessen, Mechanism specific approaches in behavior genetics, p. 91
This view from 1970 is still espoused today, and conflicts with Dawkins's view of "the gene as a form of "information [that] passes through bodies and affects them, but is not affected by them on its way through"". The philosophical/biological field of enactivism stresses the interaction of the living agent with its environment and the relation of probing the environment to cognition and adaptation. Gene activation depends upon the cellular milieu. An extended discussion of the contrasts between enactivism and Dawkins's views, and with their support by Dennett, is provided by Thompson. In Mind in Life, the philosopher Evan Thompson has assembled a multi sourced objection to the "selfish gene" idea. — Richard Dawkins: River out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, p. 19
"On the bank of the Oxford canal is a large willow tree, and it is pumping downy seeds into the air It is raining instructions out there; it's raining programs; it's raining tree growing, fluff spreading algorithms. That is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth"
— Richard Dawkins: The Blind Watchmaker, p. 111
Thompson objects that the gene cannot operate by itself, since it requires an environment such as a cell, and life is "the creative outcome of highly structured contingencies". Thompson quotes Sarkar: is tantamount to adoption of a form of material informational dualism that has no explanatory value and no scientific basis. (Thomson, p. 187) The enactivist view, however, is that information results from the probing and experimentation of the agent with the agent's environment subject to the limitations of the agent's abilities to probe and process the result of probing, and DNA is simply one mechanism the agent brings to bear upon its activity.
Жарияланым
"Эгоистикалық ген" алғаш рет 1976 жылы Оксфорд университетінің баспасында он бір тараудан тұрады, автордың алғы сөзімен және Роберт Триверстің кіріспе сөзімен жарық көрді. 1989 жылы екінші басылымы жарыққа шықты. Бұл басылымға екі қосымша тарау, алдыңғы тарауларға жаңа тұжырымдар мен ойларды көрсететін маңызды түсіндірмелер енгізілді. Сондай-ақ, автордың екінші алғы сөзі қосылды, бірақ Триверстің бастапқы кіріспе сөзі алынып тасталды. Кітапта иллюстрациялар жоқ. Кітап кем дегенде 23 тілге аударылған, оның ішінде араб, тай және түрік тілдері де бар. 2006 жылы 30 жылдық мерейтойына арналған басылымда Триверстің кіріспе сөзі және автордың жаңа кіріспесі жарияланды. Онда автор: "Бұл басылым, әрине, мен үшін Роберт Триверстің бастапқы кіріспе сөзін қайта жариялауға мүмкіндік береді, бұл мен үшін үлкен қуаныш" дейді. Бұл басылымға "Ричард Докинз: Бір ғалымның ойлау жолымызды қалай өзгерткені" (2006) атты құрастырылған еңбек қоса берілді. 2006 жылдың наурыз айында Лондон экономика мектебінде "Эгоистикалық ген: отыз жылдан кейін" атты арнайы іс-шара өтті. 2011 жылдың наурыз айында Audible Inc Ричард Докинз бен Лалла Уорд оқыған аудиокітап нұсқасын шығарды. 2016 жылы Оксфорд университетінің баспасында 40 жылдық мерейтойына арналған басылымда жаңа эпилог жарық көрді. Онда Докинз геннің эволюцияға қатысты көзқарасының маңыздылығын одан әрі сипаттап, оның коалесценциялық талдаумен бірге "Мен «Эгоистикалық генді» алғаш жазғанда білмеген терең өткенді ашып көрсетеді" деп мәлімдеді.
The Selfish Gene was first published by Oxford University Press in 1976 in eleven chapters with a preface by the author and a foreword by Robert Trivers. A second edition was published in 1989. This edition added two extra chapters, and substantial endnotes to the preceding chapters, reflecting new findings and thoughts. It also added a second preface by the author, but the original foreword by Trivers was dropped. The book contains no illustrations. The book has been translated into at least 23 languages including Arabic, Thai and Turkish. In 2006, a 30th anniversary edition was published with the Trivers foreword and a new introduction by the author in which he states, "This edition does, however and it is a source of particular joy to me restore the original Foreword by Robert Trivers." This edition was accompanied by a festschrift entitled Richard Dawkins: How a Scientist Changed the Way We Think (2006). In March 2006, a special event entitled The Selfish Gene: Thirty Years On was held at the London School of Economics. In March 2011, Audible Inc published an audiobook edition narrated by Richard Dawkins and Lalla Ward. In 2016, Oxford University Press published a 40th anniversary edition with a new epilogue, in which Dawkins describes the continued relevance of the gene's eye view of evolution and states that it, along with coalescence analysis "illuminates the deep past in ways of which I had no inkling when I first wrote The Selfish Gene "
Басылымдар
Жыл Атауы ISBN Формат 1976 Эгоистикалық ген (1-ші басылым) Қалың қаптама 1978 Эгоистикалық ген (Scientific Book Club басылымы) Қалың қаптама 1978 Эгоистикалық ген (1-ші басылым, қайта басылым) Жұқа қаптама 1989 Эгоистикалық ген (2-ші басылым) Жұқа қаптама 2006 Эгоистикалық ген: 30 жылдық мерекелік басылым (3-ші басылым) Қалың қаптама Жұқа қаптама 2011 Эгоистикалық ген (MP3 CD) Аудиокнига 2016 Эгоистикалық ген: 40 жылдық мерекелік басылым (4-ші басылым) Жұқа қаптама 2016 "Кеңейтілген" Эгоистикалық ген (4-ші басылым) Қалың қаптама
Year Title ISBN Format 1976 The Selfish Gene (1st ed.) Hardback 1978 The Selfish Gene (Scientific Book Club ed.) Hardback 1978 The Selfish Gene (1st ed. Reprint) Paperback 1989 The Selfish Gene (2nd ed.) Paperback 2006 The Selfish Gene: 30th Anniversary Edition (3rd ed.) Hardback Paperback 2011 The Selfish Gene (MP3 CD) Audiobook 2016 The Selfish Gene: 40th Anniversary Edition (4th ed.) Paperback 2016 The 'Extended' Selfish Gene (4th ed.) Hardback