Дело Холлингсворта против Вирджинии: Президент и поправки к Конституции США

Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U. S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled early in America's history that the President of the United States has no formal role in the process of amending the United States Constitution and that the Eleventh Amendment was binding on cases already pending prior to its ratification.

Levi Hollingsworth was a Pennsylvania merchant who owned shares in the Indiana Company, which was heavily involved in land speculation. The Indiana Company was seeking to resolve a land claim with the state of Virginia regarding land in what is now West Virginia. Hollingsworth replaced a previous plaintiff in the case, a Virginian named William Grayson. U. S. Attorney General Charles Lee took the position during oral argument in Hollingsworth that the Eleventh Amendment had been properly proposed, and Lee's argument was reproduced together with the opposing argument and the Court's decision in the case. The brief report by the reporter of decisions quotes Chase and the arguments of the opposing attorneys, but fails to explicitly give precise reasons for the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in this case, though it is known that none of the earlier amendments had been presented to the president for approbation either. Article V of the Constitution says: "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution". Although the Presentment Clause generally gives the president veto power, the ancient interpretive principle that the specific governs the general (generalia specialibus non derogant) is applicable to the specific circumstance of a constitutional amendment. The question of whether the president can veto a proposed amendment was also answered negatively in INS v. Chadha (1983), albeit in dicta:

An exception from the Presentment Clauses was ratified in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798). There the Court held Presidential approval was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment which had passed both Houses of Congress by the requisite two thirds majority. See U. S. Const., Art. V We also note that the Court's holding in Hollingsworth, supra, that a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution need not be presented to the President, is subject to two alternative protections. First, a constitutional amendment must command the votes of two thirds of each House. Second, three fourths of the states must ratify any amendment. Hollingsworth remains good law. Even those scholars who find it difficult to justify concede that it is firmly entrenched.

Hollingsworth was one of the earliest instances of judicial review by the U. S. Supreme Court. In this case, the Court decided whether the Eleventh Amendment would be upheld or stricken down. Hollingsworth also may mark the first time that the Court struck down a federal law as unconstitutional, assuming that the Court in Hollingsworth was reading the Eleventh Amendment retroactively to invalidate part of the Judiciary Act of 1789. However, there was an even earlier case, U. S. v. Todd (1794), that also may have held an act of Congress unconstitutional. In 1800, Justice Chase implied that neither Hollingsworth nor Todd involved any unconstitutional federal statute:
It is indeed a general opinion—it is expressly admitted by all this bar and some of the judges have, individually in the circuits decided, that the Supreme Court can declare an act of Congress to be unconstitutional, and therefore invalid, but there is no adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon the point. Assuming that Chase was correct, then perhaps Marbury v. Madison was the first such case. Indeed, Walter Dellinger has written that the first judicial review of a constitutional amendment (in Hollingsworth) pre dated the first invalidation of federal legislation (in Marbury).

In 2005, an article in the Texas Law Review This notwithstanding that the Court—in decisions issued in the twentieth century—itself has adopted that interpretation of its prior decision in Hollingsworth. Kyvig suggests that the Court adopted Lee's position. However, Kyvig does not explain which of Lee's specific arguments were adopted by the Court or how the language in the Court's opinion explains the primary issue in the case: the scope of Article V and the scope of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 and the interplay (if any) between the two provisions.