Комиссия Вудхеда и раздел Палестины: Анализ планов и политическое влияние

the Woodhead Commission on the 1943 Bengal famine
The Woodhead Commission (officially the Palestine Partition Commission) was a British technical commission established to propose "a detailed" partition scheme for Mandatory Palestine, including recommending the partition boundaries and examination of economic and financial aspects of the Peel Plan. The Commission was appointed at the end of February 1938 and conducted its investigations from April to early August 1938. It rejected the Peel Commission's plan mainly on the grounds that it required a large transfer of Arabs, and considered two other plans. It preferred a modification of the partition, which forms a satisfactory basis of settlement, if the United Kingdom government accept "the very considerable financial liability involved," It was charged with examining the Peel Commission plan in detail, in order "to recommend boundaries for the proposed Arab and Jewish areas and the enclaves to be retained permanently or temporarily under British Mandate" and "to examine and report on the economic and financial questions involved in partition upon which decisions will require to be taken." However, the appointment of the Commission was regarded by the Colonial Office as an instrument to free Britain from its obligation to the partition plan. In accordance with a decision of the British cabinet, Woodhead was secretly advised that it was within the commission's authority to decide that "no workable scheme could be produced". Sir George Rendel, head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, did his utmost to ensure that the Commission would reach the "correct conclusion," by trying to influence the choice of personnel and placing his own memorandum before the Commission as evidence. The Commission spent over three months in Palestine, taking evidence from witnesses in 55 sessions. No Arabs came forward to submit evidence, though king Abdullah of Transjordan wrote to Woodhead giving support for partition as well as receiving the Commission in Amman. The Commission found that a self supporting Arab State could only be established if it "contained a large number of Jews, whose contributions to tax revenue would alone enable that state to balance its budget." As the Arab State would need the mandated territories for farming and the Jewish State would need them for industry, the Commission proposed a customs union. In their report, they examined three possible modifications of the Peel Commission proposal, which they called Plans A, B and C. These plans proposed the creation of a Jewish state surrounded by a larger Arab state and a British zone. The three plans are as follows:

Plan A, was based on the Peel Plan, with the boundaries redrawn "more exactly, taking their outline as a guide". It proposed a coastal Jewish state, a British mandated corridor from Jerusalem to the coastal city Jaffa, and the remainder of Palestine merged with Transjordan into an Arab state. Under Plan A, it was estimated that the Arab state would have 7,200 Jews and 485,200 Arabs, and the Jewish state would have 304,900 Jews and 294,700 Arabs.

Plan B, the same as Plan A, except that it reduced the size of the Jewish State by adding Galilee to the permanently mandated area and the southern part of the region south of Jaffa to the Arab State. Under Plan B, the Jewish state would have 300,400 Jews and 188,400 Arabs (50,000 in the Haifa district), while 90,000 Arabs and 76,000 Jews would continue to live under British rule.

The commission report was published on 9, November 1938, concluded that no plan of partition could be evolved within the terms of reference which would, in the view of the members of the Commission, offer much hope of success, However, the British government had already rejected Peel's suggestion that the transfer be compulsory, and the Commission considered that a voluntary transfer was also not expected to occur because of the Arab population's "deep attachment to the land". In addition, development difficulties for the Arabs were expected. Plan B was rejected but one member favored it. The problem of Galilee was considered fatal to Plan B. Including it in the Arab state would create a major security problem for the Jewish state, while keeping it indefinitely under mandate would deprive the large Arab population of its right to independence. Reid argued that all three plans were fatally flawed.

The Commission also declared that there were financial and economic difficulties "of such a nature that we can find no possible way to overcome them within our terms of reference." It found that "it is not possible, under our terms of reference, to recommend boundaries which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of a self supporting Arab State. This conclusion is, in our opinion, equally valid under plan C, plan B, and any other plan of partition which does not involve the inclusion in the Arab State of an area containing a large number of Jews, whose contributions to tax revenue would alone enable that state to balance its budget". They suggested that the Arab and Jewish states not be given fiscal independence but instead the UK government accept "the very considerable financial liability" First, Jewish citizens of Palestine made much higher per capita tax contribution than Arabs, yet any feasible partition would leave few Jews in the Arab state.

The report of the Woodhead commission was presented to Parliament and published on November 9, 1938. As a consequence, the government issued a policy statement that "the political, administrative and financial difficulties involved in the proposal to create independent Arab and Jewish States inside Palestine are so great that this solution of the problem is impracticable." The Jewish Agency Executive responded that the Woodhead report could not "serve as the basis for any negotiations, either between the Jews and the Arabs or between the Jewish Agency and the [British] government." Despite Britain's announcement that the plan was impracticable, it suggested that Arab Jewish agreement might still be possible.