Дело Риггса против Палмера: Убийство и наследование по закону.

1889 New York state civil court case

Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506 (1889), is an important New York state civil court case, in which the Court of Appeals of New York issued an 1889 opinion. Riggs was an example of the judiciary using the "social purpose" rule of statutory construction, the process of interpreting and applying legislation.

In Riggs, a probate suit, the plaintiffs, Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston, sought to invalidate the will of their father Francis B. Palmer; testated on August 13, 1880. The defendant in the case was Elmer E. Palmer, grandson to the testator. The will gave small legacies to two of the daughters, Mrs. Preston and Mrs. Riggs, and the bulk of the estate to Elmer Palmer to be cared for by his mother, Susan Palmer, the widow of a dead son of the testator, until he became of legal age. Knowing that he was to be the recipient of his grandfather's large estate, Elmer, fearing that his grandfather might change the will, murdered his grandfather by poisoning him. The plaintiffs argued that by allowing the will to be executed Elmer would be profiting from his crime. While a criminal law existed to punish Elmer for the murder, there was no statute under either probate or criminal law that invalidated his claim to the estate based on his role in the murder.

Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin uses Riggs in an argument against legal positivism, focusing on a version of positivism by H. L. A. Hart. As a leader of the philosophy of Legal Positivism, Hart argues that the decisions in this case should be based on existing law, which was silent on the issue at the time. Positivism holds that all legal decisions by courts are classified into one of two categories. Some are central to the legal rules at issue. In these cases, judges merely mechanically apply the rules which fall within their jurisdiction. The other category of decisions occupy the penumbra of legal rules, where the direction of the legal rule is unclear. In these cases, judges must decide which of the possible applications of the legal rules are best social policy and then apply the rule which is best. Dworkin argues that Riggs has two features which contradict Hart's interpretation of the legal process. First, this case does not appear to lie at the edge of legal rules, instead it is very clearly central. Despite this, the majority did not apply the legal rule as required. Second, there appears to be a legitimate debate about what the law is, and not what the law should be, in this case. According to Dworkin, under most versions of legal positivism, Hart's included, there should rarely be debate about what counts as law.