Введение
Книга 1938 года Бертранда Рассела. Другие книги.
"Власть: Новый социальный анализ" Бертранда Рассела (1-е изд. Лондон, 1938, Allen & Unwin, 328 с.) – это работа по социальной философии, написанная Бертраном Расселом. Власть, по мнению Рассела, – это способность достигать целей. В частности, Рассел имеет в виду социальную власть, то есть власть над людьми. В книге содержится ряд аргументов. Однако четыре темы играют центральную роль во всей работе. Первая тема, рассматриваемая в анализе, заключается в том, что стремление к власти является частью человеческой природы. Во-вторых, работа подчеркивает, что существуют различные формы социальной власти, и что эти формы существенно взаимосвязаны. В-третьих, Рассел утверждает, что "организации обычно связаны с определенными типами людей". Наконец, работа завершается утверждением, что "произвольное правление можно и должно подавлять". На протяжении всей работы Рассел стремится разработать новый метод осмысления социальных наук в целом. Для него все темы в социальных науках – это лишь изучение различных форм власти, главным образом экономических, военных, культурных и гражданских (Рассел, 1938:4). В конечном итоге он надеялся, что социальная наука станет достаточно развитой, чтобы выявить "законы социальной динамики", описывающие, как и когда одна форма власти переходит в другую. (Рассел, 1938:4–6) Как второстепенная цель работы, Рассел стремится отвергнуть однопричинные объяснения социальной власти, такие как экономический детерминизм, который он приписывает Карлу Марксу. (Рассел, 1938:4, 95)
other books
Power: A New Social Analysis by Bertrand Russell (1st imp. London 1938, Allen & Unwin, 328 pp.) is a work in social philosophy written by Bertrand Russell. Power, for Russell, is one's ability to achieve goals. In particular, Russell has in mind social power, that is, power over people. The volume contains a number of arguments. However, four themes have a central role in the overall work. The first theme given treatment in the analysis is that the lust for power is a part of human nature. Second, the work emphasises that there are different forms of social power, and that these forms are substantially interrelated. Third, Power insists that "organisations are usually connected with certain kinds of individuals". Finally, the work ends by arguing that "arbitrary rulership can and should be subdued". Throughout the work, Russell's ambition is to develop a new method of conceiving the social sciences as a whole. For him, all topics in the social sciences are merely examinations of the different forms of power – chiefly the economic, military, cultural, and civil forms (Russell 1938:4). Eventually, he hoped that social science would be robust enough to capture the "laws of social dynamics", which would describe how and when one form of power changes into another. (Russell 1938:4–6) As a secondary goal of the work, Russell is at pains to reject single cause accounts of social power, such as the economic determinism he attributes to Karl Marx. (Russell 1938:4, 95)
Содержание
Новый социальный анализ рассматривает как минимум четыре общие темы: природа власти, формы проявления власти, структура организаций и этика власти.
Характер власти
Взгляд Рассела на человеческую природу, как и у Томаса Гоббса, в некоторой степени пессимистичен. По мнению Рассела, стремление к самоутверждению уникально для человеческой природы. Никакие другие животные, кроме Homo sapiens, как он утверждает, не способны настолько быть недовольными своей участью, чтобы стремиться накопить больше благ, чем необходимо для удовлетворения своих потребностей. "Стремление к власти", как он это называет, не возникает, пока не удовлетворены основные желания человека. Тогда пробуждается воображение, мотивирующее действующее лицо к обретению большей власти. Рассел считает, что любовь к власти почти универсальна среди людей, хотя она принимает различные формы у разных людей. Человек с большими амбициями может стать следующим Цезарем, но другие могут довольствоваться лишь господством в доме. Этот импульс к власти присутствует не только "явно" у лидеров, но иногда и "скрыто" у последователей. Очевидно, что лидеры могут преследовать и извлекать выгоду из реализации своей повестки дня, но в "искренне кооперативном предприятии" последователи, кажется, косвенно выигрывают от достижений лидера. Подчеркивая этот момент, Рассел явно опровергает печально известный аргумент Фридриха Ницше о "морали господ и рабов". Рассел объясняет: "Большинство людей не чувствуют в себе компетентности, необходимой для того, чтобы вести свою группу к победе, и поэтому ищут вождя, который, кажется, обладает мужеством и проницательностью, необходимыми для достижения превосходства. Блаженны кроткие, ибо они наследуют землю" (Рассел 1938:9, выделение его). Существование скрытой власти, как он объясняет, является причиной того, что люди способны терпеть социальное неравенство в течение длительного периода времени (Рассел 1938:8). Однако Рассел быстро отмечает, что обращение к человеческой природе не должно происходить за счет игнорирования исключительных личных темпераментов искателей власти. Следуя Адлеру (1927) – и в некоторой степени перефразируя Ницше – он разделяет людей на два класса: тех, кто властен в определенной ситуации, и тех, кто не властен. Любовь к власти, как говорит Рассел, вероятно, не мотивирована фрейдистскими комплексами (т. е. обидой на отца, похотью к матери, влечениями к Эросу и Танату – направления любви и смерти, которые составляют основу всех человеческих побуждений и т. д.), а скорее чувством собственного достоинства, которое возникает из исключительной и глубоко укоренившейся уверенности в себе (Рассел 1938:11).
This impulse to power is not only "explicitly" present in leaders, but also sometimes "implicitly" in those who follow. It is clear that leaders may pursue and profit from enacting their own agenda, but in a "genuinely cooperative enterprise", the followers seem to gain vicariously from the achievements of the leader. (Russell 1938:7–8)
In stressing this point, Russell is explicitly rebutting Friedrich Nietzsche's infamous "master slave morality" argument. Russell explains:
"Most men do not feel in themselves the competence required for leading their group to victory, and therefore seek out a captain who appears to possess the courage and sagacity necessary for the achievement of supremacy Nietzsche accused Christianity of inculcating a slave morality, but ultimate triumph was always the goal. 'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. '" (Russell 1938:9, emphasis his). The existence of implicit power, he explains, is why people are capable of tolerating social inequality for an extended period of time (Russell 1938:8). However, Russell is quick to note that the invocation of human nature should not come at the cost of ignoring the exceptional personal temperaments of power seekers. Following Adler (1927) – and to an extent echoing Nietzsche – he separates individuals into two classes: those who are imperious in a particular situation, and those who are not. The love of power, Russell tells us, is probably not motivated by Freudian complexes, (i. e., resentment of one's father, lust for one's mother, drives towards Eros and Thanatos (Love and Death drives, which constitute the basis of all human drives, etc.,) but rather by a sense of entitlement which arises from exceptional and deep rooted self confidence. (Russell 1938:11)
The imperious person is successful due to both mental and social factors. For instance, the imperious tend to have an internal confidence in their own competence and decisiveness which is relatively lacking in those who follow. (Russell 1938:13) In reality, the imperious may or may not actually be possessed of genuine skill; rather, the source of their power may also arise out of their hereditary or religious role. (Russell 1938:11)
"I greatly doubt whether the men who become pirate chiefs are those who are filled with retrospective terror of their fathers, or whether Napoleon, at Austerlitz, really felt that he was getting even with Madame Mère. I know nothing of the mother of Attila, but I rather suspect that she spoilt the little darling, who subsequently found the world irritating because it sometimes resisted his whims." Bertrand Russell (1938:11)
Non imperious persons include those who submit to a ruler, and those who withdraw entirely from the situation. A confident and competent candidate for leadership may withdraw from a situation when they lack the courage to challenge a particular authority, are timid by temperament, simply do not have the means to acquire power by the usual methods, are entirely indifferent to matters of power, and/or are moderated by a well developed sense of duty. (Russell 1938:13–17)
Accordingly, while the imperious orator will tend to prefer a passionate crowd over a sympathetic one, the timid orator (or subject) will have the opposite preferences. The imperious orator is interested mostly in a mob that is more given to rash emotion than to reflection. (Russell 1938:18) The orator will try to engineer two 'layers' of belief in his crowd: "a superficial layer, in which the power of the enemy is magnified so as to make great courage seem necessary, and a deeper layer, in which there is a firm conviction of victory" (Russell 1938:18). By contrast, the timid will seek a sense of belonging, and "the reassurance which is felt in being one of a crowd who all feel alike" (Russell 1938:17). When any given person has a crisis in confidence, and is placed in a terrifying situation, they will tend to behave in a predictable way: first, they submit to the rule of those who seem to have greater competence in the most relevant task, and second, they will surround themselves with that mass of persons who share a similarly low level of confidence. Thus, people submit to the rule of the leader in a kind of emergency solidarity. (Russell 1938:9–10)
Властный человек преуспевает благодаря как умственным, так и социальным факторам. Например, властные люди склонны обладать внутренней уверенностью в своей компетентности и решительности, которой относительно не хватает тем, кто следует за ними. В действительности, властные люди могут обладать или не обладать подлинным мастерством; скорее, источник их власти может также возникать из их наследственного или религиозного положения (Рассел 1938:11). "Я сильно сомневаюсь, что люди, которые становятся пиратскими вождями, переполнены ретроспективным ужасом перед своими отцами, или что Наполеон в Аустерлице действительно чувствовал, что мстит мадам Мэр. Я ничего не знаю о матери Аттилы, но подозреваю, что она баловала маленького любимца, который впоследствии находил мир раздражающим, потому что иногда он сопротивлялся его капризам" (Бертран Рассел, 1938:11).
This impulse to power is not only "explicitly" present in leaders, but also sometimes "implicitly" in those who follow. It is clear that leaders may pursue and profit from enacting their own agenda, but in a "genuinely cooperative enterprise", the followers seem to gain vicariously from the achievements of the leader. (Russell 1938:7–8)
In stressing this point, Russell is explicitly rebutting Friedrich Nietzsche's infamous "master slave morality" argument. Russell explains:
"Most men do not feel in themselves the competence required for leading their group to victory, and therefore seek out a captain who appears to possess the courage and sagacity necessary for the achievement of supremacy Nietzsche accused Christianity of inculcating a slave morality, but ultimate triumph was always the goal. 'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. '" (Russell 1938:9, emphasis his). The existence of implicit power, he explains, is why people are capable of tolerating social inequality for an extended period of time (Russell 1938:8). However, Russell is quick to note that the invocation of human nature should not come at the cost of ignoring the exceptional personal temperaments of power seekers. Following Adler (1927) – and to an extent echoing Nietzsche – he separates individuals into two classes: those who are imperious in a particular situation, and those who are not. The love of power, Russell tells us, is probably not motivated by Freudian complexes, (i. e., resentment of one's father, lust for one's mother, drives towards Eros and Thanatos (Love and Death drives, which constitute the basis of all human drives, etc.,) but rather by a sense of entitlement which arises from exceptional and deep rooted self confidence. (Russell 1938:11)
The imperious person is successful due to both mental and social factors. For instance, the imperious tend to have an internal confidence in their own competence and decisiveness which is relatively lacking in those who follow. (Russell 1938:13) In reality, the imperious may or may not actually be possessed of genuine skill; rather, the source of their power may also arise out of their hereditary or religious role. (Russell 1938:11)
"I greatly doubt whether the men who become pirate chiefs are those who are filled with retrospective terror of their fathers, or whether Napoleon, at Austerlitz, really felt that he was getting even with Madame Mère. I know nothing of the mother of Attila, but I rather suspect that she spoilt the little darling, who subsequently found the world irritating because it sometimes resisted his whims." Bertrand Russell (1938:11)
Non imperious persons include those who submit to a ruler, and those who withdraw entirely from the situation. A confident and competent candidate for leadership may withdraw from a situation when they lack the courage to challenge a particular authority, are timid by temperament, simply do not have the means to acquire power by the usual methods, are entirely indifferent to matters of power, and/or are moderated by a well developed sense of duty. (Russell 1938:13–17)
Accordingly, while the imperious orator will tend to prefer a passionate crowd over a sympathetic one, the timid orator (or subject) will have the opposite preferences. The imperious orator is interested mostly in a mob that is more given to rash emotion than to reflection. (Russell 1938:18) The orator will try to engineer two 'layers' of belief in his crowd: "a superficial layer, in which the power of the enemy is magnified so as to make great courage seem necessary, and a deeper layer, in which there is a firm conviction of victory" (Russell 1938:18). By contrast, the timid will seek a sense of belonging, and "the reassurance which is felt in being one of a crowd who all feel alike" (Russell 1938:17). When any given person has a crisis in confidence, and is placed in a terrifying situation, they will tend to behave in a predictable way: first, they submit to the rule of those who seem to have greater competence in the most relevant task, and second, they will surround themselves with that mass of persons who share a similarly low level of confidence. Thus, people submit to the rule of the leader in a kind of emergency solidarity. (Russell 1938:9–10)
Невластные люди включают тех, кто подчиняется правителю, и тех, кто полностью отстраняется от ситуации. Уверенный и компетентный кандидат на лидерство может отказаться от ситуации, когда ему не хватает смелости бросить вызов определенной власти, он роб по темпераменту, у него просто нет средств для приобретения власти обычными методами, он совершенно безразличен к вопросам власти и/или его сдерживает хорошо развитое чувство долга. Соответственно, в то время как властный оратор будет склонен предпочесть страстную толпу сочувствующей, застенчивый оратор (или подданный) будет иметь противоположные предпочтения. Властный оратор больше заинтересован в толпе, которая более склонна к необузданным эмоциям, чем к размышлениям (Рассел 1938:18). Оратор попытается создать в своей толпе два "слоя" веры: "поверхностный слой, в котором сила врага преувеличивается, чтобы показать, что требуется большое мужество, и более глубокий слой, в котором есть твердая уверенность в победе" (Рассел 1938:18). Напротив, застенчивый человек будет искать чувство принадлежности и "уверенности, которую испытываешь, будучи одним из толпы, которая чувствует то же самое" (Рассел 1938:17). Когда у любого человека возникает кризис уверенности и он попадает в пугающую ситуацию, он будет склонен вести себя предсказуемо: сначала он подчинится власти тех, кто, кажется, обладает большей компетентностью в наиболее актуальной задаче, а во-вторых, он окружит себя массой людей, которые разделяют аналогично низкий уровень уверенности. Таким образом, люди подчиняются власти лидера в своего рода экстренной солидарности (Рассел 1938:9–10).
This impulse to power is not only "explicitly" present in leaders, but also sometimes "implicitly" in those who follow. It is clear that leaders may pursue and profit from enacting their own agenda, but in a "genuinely cooperative enterprise", the followers seem to gain vicariously from the achievements of the leader. (Russell 1938:7–8)
In stressing this point, Russell is explicitly rebutting Friedrich Nietzsche's infamous "master slave morality" argument. Russell explains:
"Most men do not feel in themselves the competence required for leading their group to victory, and therefore seek out a captain who appears to possess the courage and sagacity necessary for the achievement of supremacy Nietzsche accused Christianity of inculcating a slave morality, but ultimate triumph was always the goal. 'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. '" (Russell 1938:9, emphasis his). The existence of implicit power, he explains, is why people are capable of tolerating social inequality for an extended period of time (Russell 1938:8). However, Russell is quick to note that the invocation of human nature should not come at the cost of ignoring the exceptional personal temperaments of power seekers. Following Adler (1927) – and to an extent echoing Nietzsche – he separates individuals into two classes: those who are imperious in a particular situation, and those who are not. The love of power, Russell tells us, is probably not motivated by Freudian complexes, (i. e., resentment of one's father, lust for one's mother, drives towards Eros and Thanatos (Love and Death drives, which constitute the basis of all human drives, etc.,) but rather by a sense of entitlement which arises from exceptional and deep rooted self confidence. (Russell 1938:11)
The imperious person is successful due to both mental and social factors. For instance, the imperious tend to have an internal confidence in their own competence and decisiveness which is relatively lacking in those who follow. (Russell 1938:13) In reality, the imperious may or may not actually be possessed of genuine skill; rather, the source of their power may also arise out of their hereditary or religious role. (Russell 1938:11)
"I greatly doubt whether the men who become pirate chiefs are those who are filled with retrospective terror of their fathers, or whether Napoleon, at Austerlitz, really felt that he was getting even with Madame Mère. I know nothing of the mother of Attila, but I rather suspect that she spoilt the little darling, who subsequently found the world irritating because it sometimes resisted his whims." Bertrand Russell (1938:11)
Non imperious persons include those who submit to a ruler, and those who withdraw entirely from the situation. A confident and competent candidate for leadership may withdraw from a situation when they lack the courage to challenge a particular authority, are timid by temperament, simply do not have the means to acquire power by the usual methods, are entirely indifferent to matters of power, and/or are moderated by a well developed sense of duty. (Russell 1938:13–17)
Accordingly, while the imperious orator will tend to prefer a passionate crowd over a sympathetic one, the timid orator (or subject) will have the opposite preferences. The imperious orator is interested mostly in a mob that is more given to rash emotion than to reflection. (Russell 1938:18) The orator will try to engineer two 'layers' of belief in his crowd: "a superficial layer, in which the power of the enemy is magnified so as to make great courage seem necessary, and a deeper layer, in which there is a firm conviction of victory" (Russell 1938:18). By contrast, the timid will seek a sense of belonging, and "the reassurance which is felt in being one of a crowd who all feel alike" (Russell 1938:17). When any given person has a crisis in confidence, and is placed in a terrifying situation, they will tend to behave in a predictable way: first, they submit to the rule of those who seem to have greater competence in the most relevant task, and second, they will surround themselves with that mass of persons who share a similarly low level of confidence. Thus, people submit to the rule of the leader in a kind of emergency solidarity. (Russell 1938:9–10)
Формы власти
Для начала Рассел интересуется классификацией различных способов, которыми один человек может обладать властью над другим – то, что он называет «формами власти». Эти формы можно подразделить на две категории: влияние на личность и психологические типы влияния. (Рассел 1938:24,27)
Чтобы понять, как функционируют организации, Рассел объясняет, что мы должны сначала разобраться в базовых методах, с помощью которых они вообще могут осуществлять власть, то есть понять, каким образом люди убеждаются подчиняться какой-либо власти. Рассел разделяет формы влияния на три широкие категории: «власть силы и принуждения», «власть стимулов», включающую оперантное обусловливание и конформизм, и «власть пропаганды и/или привычки» (Рассел 1938:24). Для иллюстрации каждой формы Рассел приводит примеры. Власть грубой силы подобна привязыванию веревки к брюху свиньи и поднятию ее на корабль, игнорируя ее визг. Власть стимулов уподобляется двум вещам: либо дрессировке, как в случае с цирковыми животными, обученными выполнять те или иные трюки перед публикой, либо согласию группы, как когда вожака овец тащат по цепи, чтобы заставить остальное стадо следовать за ним. Наконец, власть пропаганды схожа с использованием кнута и пряника для воздействия на поведение осла, в том смысле, что осла убеждают в том, что совершение определенных действий (следование за пряником, избегание кнута) будет более или менее выгодно для него. (Рассел 1938:24)
Рассел проводит различие между традиционными, революционными и явными формами психологического влияния. (Рассел 1938:27) Эти психологические типы в некоторой степени пересекаются с формами влияния: например, «явная власть» может быть сведена к одному лишь принуждению. (Рассел 1938:63) Однако другие типы представляют собой отдельные единицы анализа и требуют отдельного рассмотрения.
Голая и экономическая власть
Когда сила применяется в отсутствие других форм, это называется "обнаженной властью". Иными словами, обнаженная власть – это беспощадное применение силы без стремления к согласию или попыток его добиться. Во всех случаях источниками обнаженной власти являются страхи бессильных и амбиции сильных (Рассел 1938:127). В качестве примера обнаженной власти Рассел вспоминает историю Агафокла, сына гончара, ставшего тираном Сиракуз (Рассел 1938:69–72).
Рассел утверждает, что обнаженная власть возникает в правительстве при определенных социальных условиях: когда два или более фанатичных вероисповедания борются за власть, и когда все традиционные убеждения утратили силу. Период обнаженной власти может завершиться иностранным завоеванием, установлением стабильности и/или возникновением новой религии (Рассел 1938:74). Процесс, посредством которого организация достигает достаточного влияния для осуществления обнаженной власти, можно описать как правило трех фаз (Рассел 1938:63). Согласно этому правилу, начинающийся с фанатизма в толпе процесс в конечном итоге приводит к завоеванию посредством обнаженной власти. В конечном счете, согласие населения превращает обнаженную власть в традиционную власть. И, наконец, как только традиционная власть укрепляется, она прибегает к подавлению инакомыслия с помощью обнаженной власти. Для Рассела экономическая власть параллельна власти обуславливания (Рассел 1938:25). Однако, в отличие от Маркса, он подчеркивает, что экономическая власть не является первичной, а скорее является результатом сочетания различных форм власти. По его мнению, экономика во многом зависит от функционирования закона, особенно права собственности; а закон в значительной степени определяется властью над общественным мнением, которую нельзя полностью объяснить заработной платой, трудом и торговлей (Рассел 1938:95).
В конечном итоге Рассел утверждает, что экономическая власть достигается благодаря способности защищать свою территорию (и завоевывать другие земли), обладать ресурсами для развития и удовлетворять потребности других на рынке (Рассел 1938:97–101, 107).
Сила (и над) мнением
В модели Рассела власть над убеждениями и привычками людей легко поддается неверной оценке. Он утверждает, что, с одной стороны, экономические детерминисты недооценили силу общественного мнения. Однако, с другой стороны, он доказывает, что легко показать, что вся власть – это власть над мнением: «Армии бесполезны, если солдаты не верят в правое дело, за которое они сражаются. Закон бессилен, если ему не оказывают уважения». Тем не менее, он признает, что военная сила может формировать общественное мнение и (за редким исключением) изначально наделять его силой:
«Таким образом, мы имеем своего рода качели: сначала чистое убеждение, приводящее к обращению меньшинства; затем применение силы для обеспечения того, чтобы остальная часть общества была подвергнута правильной пропаганде; и, наконец, искренняя вера со стороны большинства, которая вновь делает использование силы ненужным». (Рассел, 1938:109)
«Не совсем верно, что убеждение – это одно, а сила – другое. Многие формы убеждения – даже те, которые все одобряют – на самом деле являются разновидностью силы. Подумайте о том, что мы делаем с нашими детьми. Мы не говорим им: «Некоторые люди считают Землю круглой, а другие – плоской; когда вы вырастете, вы сможете, если захотите, изучить доказательства и сделать собственные выводы». Вместо этого мы говорим: «Земля круглая». К тому времени, когда наши дети достигают возраста, когда могут изучить доказательства, наша пропаганда уже закрывает их разум». (Рассел, 1938:221)
Таким образом, хотя «власть над мнением» может возникать как с применением силы, так и без нее, сила убеждения возникает только после того, как влиятельное и убедительное меньшинство добровольно его приняло. Исключение составляет случай западной науки, которая, по-видимому, приобрела культурную привлекательность, несмотря на непопулярность среди представителей истеблишмента. Рассел объясняет, что популярность науки основана не на общем уважении к разуму, а исключительно на том, что наука производит технологии, а технологии – вещи, которые люди желают. Аналогично, религия, реклама и пропаганда обладают силой благодаря их связи с желаниями аудитории. Рассел приходит к выводу, что разум имеет очень ограниченное, хотя и специфическое, влияние на мнения людей, поскольку разум эффективен только тогда, когда апеллирует к желаниям. (Рассел, 1938:111–112)
Затем Рассел исследует силу разума в обществе по сравнению с фанатизмом. Кажется, что сила разума заключается в его способности повышать вероятность успеха в практических вопросах за счет технической эффективности. Ценой разумного исследования является терпимость к интеллектуальному разногласию, что, в свою очередь, вызывает скептицизм и ослабляет силу фанатизма. Напротив, кажется, что общество сильнее и сплоченнее, если в нем существует широкое согласие относительно определенных убеждений, а аргументированные дебаты редки. Для полной реализации обоих этих противоположных условий в краткосрочной перспективе потребуется две вещи: во-первых, чтобы какое-либо убеждение разделялось мнением большинства (через силу и пропаганду), а во-вторых, чтобы большинство представителей интеллектуальной элиты согласилось с ним (через аргументированную дискуссию). Однако в долгосрочной перспективе убеждения, как правило, вызывают усталость, легкий скептицизм, откровенное неверие и, наконец, апатию. (Рассел, 1938:123–125)
Рассел остро осознает, что власть, как правило, концентрируется в руках меньшинства, и это особенно верно, когда речь идет о власти над мнением. Результатом является «систематическая пропаганда», или монополия государства на пропаганду. Удивительно, но Рассел утверждает, что последствия систематической пропаганды не так ужасны, как можно было бы ожидать. (Рассел, 1938:114–115) Истинная монополия на мнение приводит к беспечной надменности лидеров, а также к безразличию к благополучию управляемых и отсутствию доверчивости со стороны управляемых к государству. В долгосрочной перспективе конечный результат:
«задержать революцию, но сделать ее более жестокой, когда она наступит. Когда официально разрешена только одна доктрина, люди не получают практики в мышлении или взвешивании альтернатив; только мощная волна страстного восстания может свергнуть ортодоксию; и для того, чтобы оппозиция была достаточно искренней и жестокой, чтобы добиться успеха, будет казаться необходимым отрицать даже то, что было правдой в государственной догме». (Рассел, 1938:115) Напротив, проницательный пропагандист современного государства позволит существовать разногласиям, чтобы ложные устоявшиеся мнения имели на что реагировать. По словам Рассела: «Ложь нуждается в конкуренции, чтобы сохранить свою силу». (Рассел, 1938:115)
Революционная сила против традиционной
Среди психологических типов влияния выделяют "традиционную, явную и революционную власть". (Явная власть, как отмечалось ранее, – это применение принуждения без какой-либо видимости легитимности.) Под "традиционной властью" Рассел понимает способы, которыми люди апеллируют к силе привычки для оправдания политического режима. Именно в этом смысле традиционная власть носит психологический, а не исторический характер, поскольку она не основывается полностью на приверженности линейному историческому учению, а скорее на простой привычке. Более того, традиционная власть не обязательно должна основываться на реальной истории, а может основываться на воображаемой или сфабрикованной истории. Таким образом, он пишет: "Как религиозные, так и светские новаторы – по крайней мере, те, кто добился наиболее устойчивого успеха, – обращались, насколько это было возможно, к традиции и делали все, что в их силах, чтобы минимизировать элементы новизны в своей системе" (Рассел, 1938:40).
Двумя наиболее очевидными примерами традиционной власти являются "королевская власть" и "священническая власть". Рассел прослеживает исторические корни обеих до определенных ролей, которые выполняли некую функцию в ранних обществах. Священник сродни шаману племени, которому приписывают уникальные способности к проклятиям и исцелению (Рассел, 1938:36). В большинстве современных случаев священники опираются на религиозные социальные движения, основанные на харизматической власти, которые оказались более эффективными в захвате власти, чем религии, лишенные знаковых основателей (Рассел, 1938:39–40). История короля сложнее для изучения, и исследователь может лишь строить предположения об ее происхождении. По крайней мере, власть королевской власти, по-видимому, укрепляется войной, даже если изначально война не была функцией короля (Рассел, 1938:56). Когда традиционные формы власти исчерпывают себя, обычно происходит соответствующее изменение в убеждениях. Если традиционные убеждения подвергаются сомнению без каких-либо альтернатив, то традиционная власть все больше полагается на применение явной власти. А там, где традиционные убеждения полностью заменяются альтернативными, традиционная власть порождает революционную власть (Рассел, 1938:82). "Революционная власть" отличается от традиционной тем, что она апеллирует к общественному согласию с определенным учением, а не просто к общественному повиновению или привычке. Таким образом, для революционера власть является средством достижения цели, а цель – это то или иное учение. Независимо от своих намерений, власть революционера со временем либо деградирует до явной власти, либо трансформируется в традиционную власть (Рассел, 1938:82). Революционер сталкивается, по крайней мере, с двумя особыми проблемами. Во-первых, возврат к явной власти происходит, когда революционная власть существует в течение длительного периода, не достигнув разрешения своего ключевого конфликта. В какой-то момент первоначальная цель учения, как правило, забывается, и, следовательно, фанатики движения меняют свои цели и стремятся к простому господству (Рассел, 1938:92). Во-вторых, революционер всегда должен иметь дело с угрозой контрреволюционеров и, следовательно, сталкивается с дилеммой: поскольку революционная власть по определению должна считать первоначальную революцию оправданной, она "не может, логически, утверждать, что все последующие революции должны быть злыми" (Рассел, 1938:87). Переход к традиционной власти также возможен. Подобно тому, как существуют два вида традиционной власти – священническая и королевская, – существуют два вида революционной власти, а именно "авантюрист" и "божественный завоеватель". Рассел относит Бенито Муссолини и Наполеона Бонапарта к авантюристам, а Адольфа Гитлера, Оливера Кромвеля и Владимира Ленина – к божественным завоевателям (Рассел, 1938:12). Тем не менее, традиционные формы имеют лишь несовершенную, если вообще какую-либо, связь с революционными формами.
Структура организаций
Познакомив читателя с формами власти, Рассел применяет эти формы к анализу ряда организаций. Цель обсуждения организаций заключается в том, что они представляются одним из наиболее распространенных источников социальной власти. Под «организацией» Рассел понимает совокупность людей, объединенных общей деятельностью и направленных на достижение общих целей, что характеризуется перераспределением власти (Рассел 1938:128). Организации различаются по размеру и типу, однако общим для всех является тенденция к увеличению неравенства власти с ростом числа участников. Составить исчерпывающий список типов организаций невозможно, поскольку он был бы столь же обширен, как и список причин, по которым люди объединяются в группы. Тем не менее, Рассела интересует лишь небольшая выборка организаций: армия и полиция, экономические организации, образовательные учреждения, правовые организации, политические партии и церкви – все они признаются общественными институтами. (Рассел 1938:29–34,128,138,140)
Исследователь также может оценивать организацию по ее использованию коммуникаций, транспорта, масштабу и распределению власти по отношению к населению. (Рассел 1938:130,132,134) Улучшенные возможности коммуникации и транспортировки, как правило, стабилизируют крупные организации и дестабилизируют более мелкие. Любую организацию сложно однозначно отнести к определенной форме власти. Например, полиция и армия, очевидно, являются инструментами силы и принуждения, но было бы упрощением утверждать, что они обладают властью исключительно благодаря своей способности к физическому принуждению. Скорее, полиция воспринимается частью населения как инструмент законного института, и организация зависит от пропаганды и привычки для поддержания уважения к ее авторитету. Аналогично, экономические организации функционируют посредством обуславливания, выраженного в форме денег; однако прочность экономики во многом зависит от эффективной работы правоохранительных органов, обеспечивающих возможность торговли посредством регулирования мира и прав собственности. (Рассел 1938:25,95)
Рассел полагает, что общий эффект организации заключается либо в повышении благосостояния людей, либо в обеспечении выживания самой организации: «В основном, последствия деятельности организаций, за исключением тех, что обусловлены стремлением правительства к самосохранению, направлены на увеличение индивидуального счастья и благополучия». (Рассел 1938:170)
Этика власти
Завершив главы, анализирующие соответствующие аспекты власти в общественной жизни, Рассел переключает свое внимание на философские вопросы, связанные с этими проблемами. Переходя к этой новой области, он размышляет о том, как можно ограничить стремления тех, кто жаждет власти. Ответы можно найти либо в возможных коллективных действиях, либо в личных обязанностях.
Позитивная и частная мораль
Среди людей подчинение женщин на определенном уровне цивилизации гораздо полнее, чем среди дикарей. И это подчинение всегда подкрепляется моралью. Бертран Рассел о доминировании над женщинами (1938:188–189)
Существует различие между позитивной и личной моралью. Позитивная мораль обычно ассоциируется с традиционной властью и следованием древним принципам с узкой направленностью; например, с нормами и табу брачного права. Личная мораль связана с революционной силой и следованием собственной совести. (Рассел 1938:186–206)
Доминирующая социальная система оказывает определенное влияние на господствующие позитивные моральные кодексы населения. В системе, где доминирует сыновняя почтительность, в культуре будет уделяться больше внимания мудрости пожилых людей. (Рассел 1938:188–189) В монархии культуру будут поощрять верить в мораль подчинения, с культурными табу, наложенными на использование воображения; оба эти фактора усиливают социальную сплоченность, поощряя самоцензуру и подавление инакомыслия. (Рассел 1938:190–191) Влияние священнической власти не столь значительно, даже в период ее расцвета. На пике своего могущества священство зависит от того, что ему не будет противостоять царская власть и что нравственность совести не узурпирует его положение; и даже тогда ему угрожает широкий скептицизм. (Рассел 1938:192–193) Тем не менее, некоторые моральные убеждения, по-видимому, не имеют никакого источника в правящей элите: например, отношение к гомосексуальности в начале двадцатого века, по-видимому, не связано с успехом конкретного правления. (Рассел 1938:194)
Рассел задается вопросом, можно ли найти иную основу для этики, кроме позитивной морали. Он связывает позитивную мораль с консерватизмом и понимает ее как образ действий, который подавляет дух мира и не способен обуздать вражду. (Рассел 1938:197) Между тем, личная мораль является первоисточником позитивной морали и в большей степени основана на интеллекте. (Рассел 1938:198–199) Однако личная мораль настолько тесно связана с желаниями отдельных людей, что если бы она осталась единственным руководством к моральному поведению, это привело бы к социальному хаосу, порожденному «анархическим бунтарем». (Рассел 1938:206)
Выступая за компромисс между позитивной и личной моралью, Рассел прежде всего подчеркивает, что существует моральный прогресс, который может происходить посредством революций. (Рассел 1938:199) Во-вторых, он предлагает метод, с помощью которого мы можем проверить, является ли конкретный вид личной морали формой прогресса:
«Человек может постичь образ жизни или метод социальной организации, посредством которых можно было бы удовлетворить больше желаний человечества, чем при существующем методе. Если он постиг это верно и сможет убедить людей принять его реформу, он оправдан [в восстании]». (Рассел 1938:206)
Философия власти
Индивидуальное сопротивление власти может принимать две диаметрально противоположные формы: те, которые потакают стремлению к власти, и те, которые стремятся полностью подавить это стремление. Некоторые из тех, кто пытался найти выход из импульса к власти, прибегали к формам смирения или пацифизма. Одним из главных сторонников таких подходов был философ Лао-цзы. С точки зрения Рассела, такие взгляды несостоятельны, поскольку они лишь отказываются от принудительной власти над собой, но сохраняют интерес к убеждению других в своей правоте; а убеждение, по мнению Рассела, является формой власти. Более того, он утверждает, что любовь к власти может быть даже полезной. Например, если человек чувствует определенный долг перед своими ближними, он может стремиться к власти, чтобы помочь им (Рассел 1938:215–216). В целом, фокус любой политики должен быть не на запрете видов власти, а скорее на определенных формах её применения (Рассел 1938:221). «Любовь к власти – часть человеческой природы, но философии власти, в определенном и точном смысле, безумны. Существование внешнего мира может отрицать только сумасшедший. Сертифицированных душевнобольных заключают из-за склонности к насилию, когда их притязания подвергаются сомнению; незасертифицированным же предоставляют контроль над мощными армиями, и они могут принести смерть и разрушение всем здравомыслящим людям, находящимся в пределах их досягаемости». Бертран Рассел (1938:212).
Другие мыслители подчеркивали стремление к власти как добродетель. Некоторые философии коренятся в любви к власти, поскольку философия, как правило, представляет собой последовательное объединение в стремлении к определенной цели или желанию. Подобно тому, как философия может стремиться к истине, она также может стремиться к счастью, добродетели, спасению или, наконец, к власти. Среди философий, которые Рассел осуждает как основанные на любви к власти, – все формы идеализма и антиреализма, такие как солипсизм Иоганна Готтлиба Фихте; определенные формы прагматизма; доктрина творческой эволюции Анри Бергсона; и труды Фридриха Ницше (Рассел 1938:209–214). По мнению Рассела, есть четыре условия, при которых власть следует стремиться с моральным убеждением. Во-первых, она должна преследоваться только как средство достижения какой-либо цели, а не как самоцель; более того, если она является самоцелью, то её ценность должна быть сравнительно ниже, чем ценность других целей. Во-вторых, конечной целью должно быть удовлетворение желаний других. В-третьих, средства, с помощью которых человек преследует свою цель, не должны быть вопиющими или злонамеренными, так, чтобы они перевешивали ценность цели; как, например, отравление детей ради будущей демократии (Рассел 1938:201). В-четвертых, моральные доктрины должны быть направлены на истину и честность, а не на манипулирование другими (Рассел 1938: 216–218). Чтобы реализовать эти взгляды, Рассел советует читателю сдерживать жестокие наклонности, возникающие из-за недостатка возможностей. Кроме того, читатель должен поощрять развитие конструктивных навыков, которые предоставляют человеку альтернативу более легким и разрушительным вариантам. Наконец, следует поощрять чувство сотрудничества и обуздывать соревновательные желания (Рассел 1938: 219–220, 222).
Одомашнивание произвола
Среди проблем, требующих коллективных этических действий, Рассел выделяет «политическое правление», «экономическую конкуренцию», «пропагандистскую борьбу» и «психологическую жизнь». Чтобы добиться позитивных изменений в каждой из этих сфер коллективного поведения, Рассел считал необходимым сделать власть более рассредоточенной и менее произвольной. Для успешного обуздания произвола в политике, по мнению Рассела, целью общества должно быть поощрение демократии. Рассел настаивает на том, что начало всех улучшающих реформ в правительстве должно исходить из демократии как нормы. Даже формальное признание олигархий – например, поддержка якобы доброжелательных диктаторов – должно быть отвергнуто как иллюзия. (Рассел 1938:226)
Moreover, democracy must be infused with a respect for the autonomy of persons, so that the political body does not collapse into the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this result, people must have a well developed sense of separation between acquiescence to the collective will, and respect for the discretion of the individual. (Russell 1938:227)
Collective action should be restricted to two domains. First, it should be used to treat problems that are primarily "geographical", which include issues of sanitation, transportation, electricity, and external threats. Second, it ought to be used when a kind of individual freedom poses a major threat to public order; for instance, speech that incites the breaking of law (Russell 1938:227–228). The exception to this rule is when there is a minority which densely populates a certain well defined area, in which case, political devolution is preferable. In formulating his outlook on the preferable size of government, Russell encounters a dilemma. He notes that, the smaller the democracy, the more empowerment the citizen feels; yet the larger the democracy, the more the citizen's passions and interests are inflamed. In both situations, the result is voter fatigue. (Russell 1938:229) There are two possible solutions to this problem: to organise political life according to vocational interests, as with unionisation; or to organise it according to interest groups. (Russell 1938:229–230)
"In former days, men sold themselves to the Devil to acquire magical powers. Nowadays they acquire those powers from science, and find themselves compelled to become devils. There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed, and brought into the service, not of this or that group of fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race for science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die." Bertrand Russell (1938:22)
A federal government is only sensible, for Russell, when it has limited but well defined powers. Russell advocates the creation of a world government made up of sovereign nation states (Russell 1938:197, 230–31). On his view, the function of a world government should only be to ensure the avoidance of war and the pursuit of peace (Russell 1938:230 31). On the world stage, democracy would be impossible, because of the negligible power any particular individual could have in comparison with the entire human race. One final suggestion for political policy reform is the notion that there ought to be a political balance in every branch of public service. Lack of balance in public institutions creates havens for reactionary forces, which in turn undermine democracy. Russell emphasises two conditions necessary for the achievement of balance. He advocates, first, the abolition of the legal standing of confessions as evidence, to remove the incentive for extraction of confession under torture by the police (Russell 1938:232). Second, the creation of dual branches of police to investigate particular crimes: one which presumes the innocence of the accused, the other presuming guilt (Russell 1938:233). Competition, for Russell, is a word that may have many uses. Although most often meant to refer to competition between companies, it may also be used to speak of competition between states, between ideologues, between classes, rivals, trusts, workers, etc. On this topic, Russell ultimately wishes to answer two questions: "First, in what kinds of cases is competition technically wasteful? Secondly, in what cases is it desirable on non technical grounds?" (Russell 1938:176). In asking these questions, he has two concerns directly in mind: economic competition, and the competition of propaganda. The question of whether or not economic competition is defensible requires an examination from two perspectives: the moral point of view and the technical point of view. From the view of the technician, certain goods and services can only be provided efficiently by a centralised authority. For Russell, it seems to be an economic fact that bigger organisations were capable of producing items at a certain standard, and best suited to fill needs that are geographical in nature, such as railways and water treatment. By contrast, smaller organisations (like businesses) are best suited to create products that are customised and local. (Russell 1938:176–177, 234)
From the view of the ethicist, competition between states is on the same moral plane as competition between modern businesses (Russell 1938:177). Indeed, by Russell's account, economic power and political power are both capable of devastation:
"In democratic countries, the most important private organisations are economic. Unlike secret societies, they are able to exercise their terrorism without illegality, since they do not threaten to kill their enemies, but only to starve them." (Russell 1938:147)
Since they are morally equivalent, perhaps it is not surprising that the cure for political injustices is identical to the cure for economic ones: namely, the institution of democracy in both economic and political spheres (Russell 1938:234). By 'economic democracy', Russell means a kind of democratic socialism, which at the very least involves the nationalisation of select industries (railways, water, television). In order for this to operate effectively, he argues that the social system must be such that power is distributed across a society of highly autonomous persons. (Russell 1938:238–240)
Russell is careful to indicate that his support for nationalisation rests on the assumption that it can be accomplished under the auspices of a robust democracy, and that it may be safeguarded against statist tyranny. If either condition fail, then nationalisation is undesirable. In delivering this warning, Russell emphasises the distinction between ownership and control. He points out that nationalisation – which would allow the citizens to collectively own an industry – would not guarantee any of them control over the industry. In the same way, shareholders own parts of companies, but the control of the company ultimately rests with the CEO (Russell 1938:235). Control over propaganda is another matter. When forming his argument here, Russell specifically targets the doctrines of John Stuart Mill. Russell argues that Mill's argument for the freedom of speech is too weak, so long as it is balanced against the harm principle; for any speech worth protecting for political reasons is likely to cause somebody harm. For example, the citizen ought to have the opportunity to impeach malicious governors, but that would surely harm the governor, at the very least (Russell 1938:179). Russell replaces Mill's analysis with an examination of the issue from four perspectives: the perspective of the governor, the citizen, the innovator, and the philosopher. The rational governor is always threatened by revolutionary activities, and can always be expected to ban speech which calls for assassination. Yet the governor would be advised to allow freedom of speech to prevent and diminish discontent among the subjects, and has no reason to suppress ideas which are unrelated to his governance, for instance the Copernican doctrine of heliocentrism. Relatedly, the citizen mainly understands free speech as an extension of the right to do peaceably that which could only otherwise be done through violence (Russell 1938:179–182). The innovator does not tend to care much about free speech, since they engage in innovation despite social resistance. Innovators may be separated into three categories: the hard millenarians, who believe in their doctrine to the exclusion of all others, and who only seek to protect the dissemination of their own creeds; the virtuous millenarians, who emphasise that revolutionary transitions must begin through rational persuasion and the guidance of sages, and so are supportive of free speech; and the progressives, who cannot foresee the direction of future progress, but recognise that the free exchange of ideas is a prerequisite to it. For the philosopher, free speech allows people to engage in rational doubt, and to grow in their prudential duties. (Russell 1938:182–185)
In any case, the citizen's right to dissent and to decide their governor is sacrosanct for Russell. He believes that a true public square could be operated by state run media outlets, like the BBC, which would be charged with the duty to provide a wide range of points of view on political matters. For certain other topics, like art and science, the fullest and freest competition between ideas must be guaranteed. (Russell 1938:185)
The final discussion in the work is concerned with Russell's views on education. (Russell 1938:242–251) Citizens of a healthy democracy must have two virtues, for Russell: the "sense of self reliance and confidence" necessary for autonomous action; and the humility required to "submit to the will of the majority" when it has spoken. (Russell 1938:244) The last chapter of Power: A New Social Analysis concentrates significantly on the question of how to inspire confidence in students, from an educator's point of view. Two major conditions are necessary. First, the citizen/student must be free from hatred, fear, and the impulse to submit. (Russell 1938:244–245) Economic opportunities will have some impact on the student's temperament in this regard, and so, economic reforms need to be made to create more opportunities. But reform to the education system is also necessary, in particular, to foster in the student a kindness, curiosity, and intellectual commitment to science. The common trait of students with the scientific mind is a sense of balance between dogmatism and scepticism. (Russell 1938:246)
Moreover, the student must have good instructors, who emphasise reason over rhetoric. Russell indicates that the critical mind is an essential feature of the healthy citizen of a democracy, since collective hysteria is one of the greatest threats to democracy (Russell 1938:248). To foster a critical mind, he suggests, the teacher ought to show the students the consequences of pursuing one's feelings over one's thoughts. For example, the teacher might allow students to choose a field trip between two different locations: one fantastic place which is given a dull overview, and a shabby place which is recommended by impressive advertisements. In teaching history, the teacher might examine a particular event from a multitude of different perspectives, and allow the students to use their critical faculties to make assessments of each. (Russell 1938:247) In all cases, the object would be to encourage self growth, a willingness to be "tentative in judgment", and "responsiveness to evidence". (Russell 1938:250)
The work ends with the following words: Fichte and the powerful men who have inherited his ideals, when they see children, think: 'Here is material that I can manipulate' All this, to any person with natural affection for the young, is horrible; just as we teach children to avoid being destroyed by motor cars if they can, so we should teach them to avoid being destroyed by cruel fanatics This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve (Russell 1938:251).
Более того, демократия должна быть пронизана уважением к автономии личности, чтобы политическое тело не скатилось к тирании большинства. Чтобы предотвратить такой исход, люди должны обладать развитым чувством разграничения между принятием коллективной воли и уважением к свободе действий индивида. (Рассел 1938:227)
Moreover, democracy must be infused with a respect for the autonomy of persons, so that the political body does not collapse into the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this result, people must have a well developed sense of separation between acquiescence to the collective will, and respect for the discretion of the individual. (Russell 1938:227)
Collective action should be restricted to two domains. First, it should be used to treat problems that are primarily "geographical", which include issues of sanitation, transportation, electricity, and external threats. Second, it ought to be used when a kind of individual freedom poses a major threat to public order; for instance, speech that incites the breaking of law (Russell 1938:227–228). The exception to this rule is when there is a minority which densely populates a certain well defined area, in which case, political devolution is preferable. In formulating his outlook on the preferable size of government, Russell encounters a dilemma. He notes that, the smaller the democracy, the more empowerment the citizen feels; yet the larger the democracy, the more the citizen's passions and interests are inflamed. In both situations, the result is voter fatigue. (Russell 1938:229) There are two possible solutions to this problem: to organise political life according to vocational interests, as with unionisation; or to organise it according to interest groups. (Russell 1938:229–230)
"In former days, men sold themselves to the Devil to acquire magical powers. Nowadays they acquire those powers from science, and find themselves compelled to become devils. There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed, and brought into the service, not of this or that group of fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race for science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die." Bertrand Russell (1938:22)
A federal government is only sensible, for Russell, when it has limited but well defined powers. Russell advocates the creation of a world government made up of sovereign nation states (Russell 1938:197, 230–31). On his view, the function of a world government should only be to ensure the avoidance of war and the pursuit of peace (Russell 1938:230 31). On the world stage, democracy would be impossible, because of the negligible power any particular individual could have in comparison with the entire human race. One final suggestion for political policy reform is the notion that there ought to be a political balance in every branch of public service. Lack of balance in public institutions creates havens for reactionary forces, which in turn undermine democracy. Russell emphasises two conditions necessary for the achievement of balance. He advocates, first, the abolition of the legal standing of confessions as evidence, to remove the incentive for extraction of confession under torture by the police (Russell 1938:232). Second, the creation of dual branches of police to investigate particular crimes: one which presumes the innocence of the accused, the other presuming guilt (Russell 1938:233). Competition, for Russell, is a word that may have many uses. Although most often meant to refer to competition between companies, it may also be used to speak of competition between states, between ideologues, between classes, rivals, trusts, workers, etc. On this topic, Russell ultimately wishes to answer two questions: "First, in what kinds of cases is competition technically wasteful? Secondly, in what cases is it desirable on non technical grounds?" (Russell 1938:176). In asking these questions, he has two concerns directly in mind: economic competition, and the competition of propaganda. The question of whether or not economic competition is defensible requires an examination from two perspectives: the moral point of view and the technical point of view. From the view of the technician, certain goods and services can only be provided efficiently by a centralised authority. For Russell, it seems to be an economic fact that bigger organisations were capable of producing items at a certain standard, and best suited to fill needs that are geographical in nature, such as railways and water treatment. By contrast, smaller organisations (like businesses) are best suited to create products that are customised and local. (Russell 1938:176–177, 234)
From the view of the ethicist, competition between states is on the same moral plane as competition between modern businesses (Russell 1938:177). Indeed, by Russell's account, economic power and political power are both capable of devastation:
"In democratic countries, the most important private organisations are economic. Unlike secret societies, they are able to exercise their terrorism without illegality, since they do not threaten to kill their enemies, but only to starve them." (Russell 1938:147)
Since they are morally equivalent, perhaps it is not surprising that the cure for political injustices is identical to the cure for economic ones: namely, the institution of democracy in both economic and political spheres (Russell 1938:234). By 'economic democracy', Russell means a kind of democratic socialism, which at the very least involves the nationalisation of select industries (railways, water, television). In order for this to operate effectively, he argues that the social system must be such that power is distributed across a society of highly autonomous persons. (Russell 1938:238–240)
Russell is careful to indicate that his support for nationalisation rests on the assumption that it can be accomplished under the auspices of a robust democracy, and that it may be safeguarded against statist tyranny. If either condition fail, then nationalisation is undesirable. In delivering this warning, Russell emphasises the distinction between ownership and control. He points out that nationalisation – which would allow the citizens to collectively own an industry – would not guarantee any of them control over the industry. In the same way, shareholders own parts of companies, but the control of the company ultimately rests with the CEO (Russell 1938:235). Control over propaganda is another matter. When forming his argument here, Russell specifically targets the doctrines of John Stuart Mill. Russell argues that Mill's argument for the freedom of speech is too weak, so long as it is balanced against the harm principle; for any speech worth protecting for political reasons is likely to cause somebody harm. For example, the citizen ought to have the opportunity to impeach malicious governors, but that would surely harm the governor, at the very least (Russell 1938:179). Russell replaces Mill's analysis with an examination of the issue from four perspectives: the perspective of the governor, the citizen, the innovator, and the philosopher. The rational governor is always threatened by revolutionary activities, and can always be expected to ban speech which calls for assassination. Yet the governor would be advised to allow freedom of speech to prevent and diminish discontent among the subjects, and has no reason to suppress ideas which are unrelated to his governance, for instance the Copernican doctrine of heliocentrism. Relatedly, the citizen mainly understands free speech as an extension of the right to do peaceably that which could only otherwise be done through violence (Russell 1938:179–182). The innovator does not tend to care much about free speech, since they engage in innovation despite social resistance. Innovators may be separated into three categories: the hard millenarians, who believe in their doctrine to the exclusion of all others, and who only seek to protect the dissemination of their own creeds; the virtuous millenarians, who emphasise that revolutionary transitions must begin through rational persuasion and the guidance of sages, and so are supportive of free speech; and the progressives, who cannot foresee the direction of future progress, but recognise that the free exchange of ideas is a prerequisite to it. For the philosopher, free speech allows people to engage in rational doubt, and to grow in their prudential duties. (Russell 1938:182–185)
In any case, the citizen's right to dissent and to decide their governor is sacrosanct for Russell. He believes that a true public square could be operated by state run media outlets, like the BBC, which would be charged with the duty to provide a wide range of points of view on political matters. For certain other topics, like art and science, the fullest and freest competition between ideas must be guaranteed. (Russell 1938:185)
The final discussion in the work is concerned with Russell's views on education. (Russell 1938:242–251) Citizens of a healthy democracy must have two virtues, for Russell: the "sense of self reliance and confidence" necessary for autonomous action; and the humility required to "submit to the will of the majority" when it has spoken. (Russell 1938:244) The last chapter of Power: A New Social Analysis concentrates significantly on the question of how to inspire confidence in students, from an educator's point of view. Two major conditions are necessary. First, the citizen/student must be free from hatred, fear, and the impulse to submit. (Russell 1938:244–245) Economic opportunities will have some impact on the student's temperament in this regard, and so, economic reforms need to be made to create more opportunities. But reform to the education system is also necessary, in particular, to foster in the student a kindness, curiosity, and intellectual commitment to science. The common trait of students with the scientific mind is a sense of balance between dogmatism and scepticism. (Russell 1938:246)
Moreover, the student must have good instructors, who emphasise reason over rhetoric. Russell indicates that the critical mind is an essential feature of the healthy citizen of a democracy, since collective hysteria is one of the greatest threats to democracy (Russell 1938:248). To foster a critical mind, he suggests, the teacher ought to show the students the consequences of pursuing one's feelings over one's thoughts. For example, the teacher might allow students to choose a field trip between two different locations: one fantastic place which is given a dull overview, and a shabby place which is recommended by impressive advertisements. In teaching history, the teacher might examine a particular event from a multitude of different perspectives, and allow the students to use their critical faculties to make assessments of each. (Russell 1938:247) In all cases, the object would be to encourage self growth, a willingness to be "tentative in judgment", and "responsiveness to evidence". (Russell 1938:250)
The work ends with the following words: Fichte and the powerful men who have inherited his ideals, when they see children, think: 'Here is material that I can manipulate' All this, to any person with natural affection for the young, is horrible; just as we teach children to avoid being destroyed by motor cars if they can, so we should teach them to avoid being destroyed by cruel fanatics This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve (Russell 1938:251).
Коллективные действия должны быть ограничены двумя областями. Во-первых, они должны использоваться для решения проблем, которые носят преимущественно «географический» характер, включая вопросы санитарии, транспорта, электроснабжения и внешней безопасности. Во-вторых, они должны применяться, когда определенная форма индивидуальной свободы представляет серьезную угрозу общественному порядку, например, речь, подстрекающая к нарушению закона. (Рассел 1938:227–228) Исключением из этого правила является ситуация, когда меньшинство компактно проживает на четко определенной территории, в этом случае предпочтительна политическая децентрализация. Формулируя свои взгляды на оптимальный размер правительства, Рассел сталкивается с дилеммой. Он отмечает, что чем меньше демократия, тем больше чувства вовлеченности испытывает гражданин, но чем больше демократия, тем сильнее разжигаются страсти и интересы граждан. В обоих случаях результатом является усталость избирателей. (Рассел 1938:229) Существует два возможных решения этой проблемы: организовать политическую жизнь в соответствии с профессиональными интересами, как это делается в профсоюзах, или организовать ее в соответствии с группами интересов. (Рассел 1938:229–230)
Moreover, democracy must be infused with a respect for the autonomy of persons, so that the political body does not collapse into the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this result, people must have a well developed sense of separation between acquiescence to the collective will, and respect for the discretion of the individual. (Russell 1938:227)
Collective action should be restricted to two domains. First, it should be used to treat problems that are primarily "geographical", which include issues of sanitation, transportation, electricity, and external threats. Second, it ought to be used when a kind of individual freedom poses a major threat to public order; for instance, speech that incites the breaking of law (Russell 1938:227–228). The exception to this rule is when there is a minority which densely populates a certain well defined area, in which case, political devolution is preferable. In formulating his outlook on the preferable size of government, Russell encounters a dilemma. He notes that, the smaller the democracy, the more empowerment the citizen feels; yet the larger the democracy, the more the citizen's passions and interests are inflamed. In both situations, the result is voter fatigue. (Russell 1938:229) There are two possible solutions to this problem: to organise political life according to vocational interests, as with unionisation; or to organise it according to interest groups. (Russell 1938:229–230)
"In former days, men sold themselves to the Devil to acquire magical powers. Nowadays they acquire those powers from science, and find themselves compelled to become devils. There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed, and brought into the service, not of this or that group of fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race for science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die." Bertrand Russell (1938:22)
A federal government is only sensible, for Russell, when it has limited but well defined powers. Russell advocates the creation of a world government made up of sovereign nation states (Russell 1938:197, 230–31). On his view, the function of a world government should only be to ensure the avoidance of war and the pursuit of peace (Russell 1938:230 31). On the world stage, democracy would be impossible, because of the negligible power any particular individual could have in comparison with the entire human race. One final suggestion for political policy reform is the notion that there ought to be a political balance in every branch of public service. Lack of balance in public institutions creates havens for reactionary forces, which in turn undermine democracy. Russell emphasises two conditions necessary for the achievement of balance. He advocates, first, the abolition of the legal standing of confessions as evidence, to remove the incentive for extraction of confession under torture by the police (Russell 1938:232). Second, the creation of dual branches of police to investigate particular crimes: one which presumes the innocence of the accused, the other presuming guilt (Russell 1938:233). Competition, for Russell, is a word that may have many uses. Although most often meant to refer to competition between companies, it may also be used to speak of competition between states, between ideologues, between classes, rivals, trusts, workers, etc. On this topic, Russell ultimately wishes to answer two questions: "First, in what kinds of cases is competition technically wasteful? Secondly, in what cases is it desirable on non technical grounds?" (Russell 1938:176). In asking these questions, he has two concerns directly in mind: economic competition, and the competition of propaganda. The question of whether or not economic competition is defensible requires an examination from two perspectives: the moral point of view and the technical point of view. From the view of the technician, certain goods and services can only be provided efficiently by a centralised authority. For Russell, it seems to be an economic fact that bigger organisations were capable of producing items at a certain standard, and best suited to fill needs that are geographical in nature, such as railways and water treatment. By contrast, smaller organisations (like businesses) are best suited to create products that are customised and local. (Russell 1938:176–177, 234)
From the view of the ethicist, competition between states is on the same moral plane as competition between modern businesses (Russell 1938:177). Indeed, by Russell's account, economic power and political power are both capable of devastation:
"In democratic countries, the most important private organisations are economic. Unlike secret societies, they are able to exercise their terrorism without illegality, since they do not threaten to kill their enemies, but only to starve them." (Russell 1938:147)
Since they are morally equivalent, perhaps it is not surprising that the cure for political injustices is identical to the cure for economic ones: namely, the institution of democracy in both economic and political spheres (Russell 1938:234). By 'economic democracy', Russell means a kind of democratic socialism, which at the very least involves the nationalisation of select industries (railways, water, television). In order for this to operate effectively, he argues that the social system must be such that power is distributed across a society of highly autonomous persons. (Russell 1938:238–240)
Russell is careful to indicate that his support for nationalisation rests on the assumption that it can be accomplished under the auspices of a robust democracy, and that it may be safeguarded against statist tyranny. If either condition fail, then nationalisation is undesirable. In delivering this warning, Russell emphasises the distinction between ownership and control. He points out that nationalisation – which would allow the citizens to collectively own an industry – would not guarantee any of them control over the industry. In the same way, shareholders own parts of companies, but the control of the company ultimately rests with the CEO (Russell 1938:235). Control over propaganda is another matter. When forming his argument here, Russell specifically targets the doctrines of John Stuart Mill. Russell argues that Mill's argument for the freedom of speech is too weak, so long as it is balanced against the harm principle; for any speech worth protecting for political reasons is likely to cause somebody harm. For example, the citizen ought to have the opportunity to impeach malicious governors, but that would surely harm the governor, at the very least (Russell 1938:179). Russell replaces Mill's analysis with an examination of the issue from four perspectives: the perspective of the governor, the citizen, the innovator, and the philosopher. The rational governor is always threatened by revolutionary activities, and can always be expected to ban speech which calls for assassination. Yet the governor would be advised to allow freedom of speech to prevent and diminish discontent among the subjects, and has no reason to suppress ideas which are unrelated to his governance, for instance the Copernican doctrine of heliocentrism. Relatedly, the citizen mainly understands free speech as an extension of the right to do peaceably that which could only otherwise be done through violence (Russell 1938:179–182). The innovator does not tend to care much about free speech, since they engage in innovation despite social resistance. Innovators may be separated into three categories: the hard millenarians, who believe in their doctrine to the exclusion of all others, and who only seek to protect the dissemination of their own creeds; the virtuous millenarians, who emphasise that revolutionary transitions must begin through rational persuasion and the guidance of sages, and so are supportive of free speech; and the progressives, who cannot foresee the direction of future progress, but recognise that the free exchange of ideas is a prerequisite to it. For the philosopher, free speech allows people to engage in rational doubt, and to grow in their prudential duties. (Russell 1938:182–185)
In any case, the citizen's right to dissent and to decide their governor is sacrosanct for Russell. He believes that a true public square could be operated by state run media outlets, like the BBC, which would be charged with the duty to provide a wide range of points of view on political matters. For certain other topics, like art and science, the fullest and freest competition between ideas must be guaranteed. (Russell 1938:185)
The final discussion in the work is concerned with Russell's views on education. (Russell 1938:242–251) Citizens of a healthy democracy must have two virtues, for Russell: the "sense of self reliance and confidence" necessary for autonomous action; and the humility required to "submit to the will of the majority" when it has spoken. (Russell 1938:244) The last chapter of Power: A New Social Analysis concentrates significantly on the question of how to inspire confidence in students, from an educator's point of view. Two major conditions are necessary. First, the citizen/student must be free from hatred, fear, and the impulse to submit. (Russell 1938:244–245) Economic opportunities will have some impact on the student's temperament in this regard, and so, economic reforms need to be made to create more opportunities. But reform to the education system is also necessary, in particular, to foster in the student a kindness, curiosity, and intellectual commitment to science. The common trait of students with the scientific mind is a sense of balance between dogmatism and scepticism. (Russell 1938:246)
Moreover, the student must have good instructors, who emphasise reason over rhetoric. Russell indicates that the critical mind is an essential feature of the healthy citizen of a democracy, since collective hysteria is one of the greatest threats to democracy (Russell 1938:248). To foster a critical mind, he suggests, the teacher ought to show the students the consequences of pursuing one's feelings over one's thoughts. For example, the teacher might allow students to choose a field trip between two different locations: one fantastic place which is given a dull overview, and a shabby place which is recommended by impressive advertisements. In teaching history, the teacher might examine a particular event from a multitude of different perspectives, and allow the students to use their critical faculties to make assessments of each. (Russell 1938:247) In all cases, the object would be to encourage self growth, a willingness to be "tentative in judgment", and "responsiveness to evidence". (Russell 1938:250)
The work ends with the following words: Fichte and the powerful men who have inherited his ideals, when they see children, think: 'Here is material that I can manipulate' All this, to any person with natural affection for the young, is horrible; just as we teach children to avoid being destroyed by motor cars if they can, so we should teach them to avoid being destroyed by cruel fanatics This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve (Russell 1938:251).
«В прежние времена люди продавали себя Дьяволу, чтобы обрести магические силы. Сегодня они приобретают эти силы у науки и оказываются вынужденными становиться дьяволами. Нет надежды для мира, если власть не будет обуздана и поставлена на службу не той или иной группе фанатичных тиранов, а всему человечеству, ибо наука сделала неизбежным, что все должны жить или все должны умереть». Бертран Рассел (1938:22)
Moreover, democracy must be infused with a respect for the autonomy of persons, so that the political body does not collapse into the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this result, people must have a well developed sense of separation between acquiescence to the collective will, and respect for the discretion of the individual. (Russell 1938:227)
Collective action should be restricted to two domains. First, it should be used to treat problems that are primarily "geographical", which include issues of sanitation, transportation, electricity, and external threats. Second, it ought to be used when a kind of individual freedom poses a major threat to public order; for instance, speech that incites the breaking of law (Russell 1938:227–228). The exception to this rule is when there is a minority which densely populates a certain well defined area, in which case, political devolution is preferable. In formulating his outlook on the preferable size of government, Russell encounters a dilemma. He notes that, the smaller the democracy, the more empowerment the citizen feels; yet the larger the democracy, the more the citizen's passions and interests are inflamed. In both situations, the result is voter fatigue. (Russell 1938:229) There are two possible solutions to this problem: to organise political life according to vocational interests, as with unionisation; or to organise it according to interest groups. (Russell 1938:229–230)
"In former days, men sold themselves to the Devil to acquire magical powers. Nowadays they acquire those powers from science, and find themselves compelled to become devils. There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed, and brought into the service, not of this or that group of fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race for science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die." Bertrand Russell (1938:22)
A federal government is only sensible, for Russell, when it has limited but well defined powers. Russell advocates the creation of a world government made up of sovereign nation states (Russell 1938:197, 230–31). On his view, the function of a world government should only be to ensure the avoidance of war and the pursuit of peace (Russell 1938:230 31). On the world stage, democracy would be impossible, because of the negligible power any particular individual could have in comparison with the entire human race. One final suggestion for political policy reform is the notion that there ought to be a political balance in every branch of public service. Lack of balance in public institutions creates havens for reactionary forces, which in turn undermine democracy. Russell emphasises two conditions necessary for the achievement of balance. He advocates, first, the abolition of the legal standing of confessions as evidence, to remove the incentive for extraction of confession under torture by the police (Russell 1938:232). Second, the creation of dual branches of police to investigate particular crimes: one which presumes the innocence of the accused, the other presuming guilt (Russell 1938:233). Competition, for Russell, is a word that may have many uses. Although most often meant to refer to competition between companies, it may also be used to speak of competition between states, between ideologues, between classes, rivals, trusts, workers, etc. On this topic, Russell ultimately wishes to answer two questions: "First, in what kinds of cases is competition technically wasteful? Secondly, in what cases is it desirable on non technical grounds?" (Russell 1938:176). In asking these questions, he has two concerns directly in mind: economic competition, and the competition of propaganda. The question of whether or not economic competition is defensible requires an examination from two perspectives: the moral point of view and the technical point of view. From the view of the technician, certain goods and services can only be provided efficiently by a centralised authority. For Russell, it seems to be an economic fact that bigger organisations were capable of producing items at a certain standard, and best suited to fill needs that are geographical in nature, such as railways and water treatment. By contrast, smaller organisations (like businesses) are best suited to create products that are customised and local. (Russell 1938:176–177, 234)
From the view of the ethicist, competition between states is on the same moral plane as competition between modern businesses (Russell 1938:177). Indeed, by Russell's account, economic power and political power are both capable of devastation:
"In democratic countries, the most important private organisations are economic. Unlike secret societies, they are able to exercise their terrorism without illegality, since they do not threaten to kill their enemies, but only to starve them." (Russell 1938:147)
Since they are morally equivalent, perhaps it is not surprising that the cure for political injustices is identical to the cure for economic ones: namely, the institution of democracy in both economic and political spheres (Russell 1938:234). By 'economic democracy', Russell means a kind of democratic socialism, which at the very least involves the nationalisation of select industries (railways, water, television). In order for this to operate effectively, he argues that the social system must be such that power is distributed across a society of highly autonomous persons. (Russell 1938:238–240)
Russell is careful to indicate that his support for nationalisation rests on the assumption that it can be accomplished under the auspices of a robust democracy, and that it may be safeguarded against statist tyranny. If either condition fail, then nationalisation is undesirable. In delivering this warning, Russell emphasises the distinction between ownership and control. He points out that nationalisation – which would allow the citizens to collectively own an industry – would not guarantee any of them control over the industry. In the same way, shareholders own parts of companies, but the control of the company ultimately rests with the CEO (Russell 1938:235). Control over propaganda is another matter. When forming his argument here, Russell specifically targets the doctrines of John Stuart Mill. Russell argues that Mill's argument for the freedom of speech is too weak, so long as it is balanced against the harm principle; for any speech worth protecting for political reasons is likely to cause somebody harm. For example, the citizen ought to have the opportunity to impeach malicious governors, but that would surely harm the governor, at the very least (Russell 1938:179). Russell replaces Mill's analysis with an examination of the issue from four perspectives: the perspective of the governor, the citizen, the innovator, and the philosopher. The rational governor is always threatened by revolutionary activities, and can always be expected to ban speech which calls for assassination. Yet the governor would be advised to allow freedom of speech to prevent and diminish discontent among the subjects, and has no reason to suppress ideas which are unrelated to his governance, for instance the Copernican doctrine of heliocentrism. Relatedly, the citizen mainly understands free speech as an extension of the right to do peaceably that which could only otherwise be done through violence (Russell 1938:179–182). The innovator does not tend to care much about free speech, since they engage in innovation despite social resistance. Innovators may be separated into three categories: the hard millenarians, who believe in their doctrine to the exclusion of all others, and who only seek to protect the dissemination of their own creeds; the virtuous millenarians, who emphasise that revolutionary transitions must begin through rational persuasion and the guidance of sages, and so are supportive of free speech; and the progressives, who cannot foresee the direction of future progress, but recognise that the free exchange of ideas is a prerequisite to it. For the philosopher, free speech allows people to engage in rational doubt, and to grow in their prudential duties. (Russell 1938:182–185)
In any case, the citizen's right to dissent and to decide their governor is sacrosanct for Russell. He believes that a true public square could be operated by state run media outlets, like the BBC, which would be charged with the duty to provide a wide range of points of view on political matters. For certain other topics, like art and science, the fullest and freest competition between ideas must be guaranteed. (Russell 1938:185)
The final discussion in the work is concerned with Russell's views on education. (Russell 1938:242–251) Citizens of a healthy democracy must have two virtues, for Russell: the "sense of self reliance and confidence" necessary for autonomous action; and the humility required to "submit to the will of the majority" when it has spoken. (Russell 1938:244) The last chapter of Power: A New Social Analysis concentrates significantly on the question of how to inspire confidence in students, from an educator's point of view. Two major conditions are necessary. First, the citizen/student must be free from hatred, fear, and the impulse to submit. (Russell 1938:244–245) Economic opportunities will have some impact on the student's temperament in this regard, and so, economic reforms need to be made to create more opportunities. But reform to the education system is also necessary, in particular, to foster in the student a kindness, curiosity, and intellectual commitment to science. The common trait of students with the scientific mind is a sense of balance between dogmatism and scepticism. (Russell 1938:246)
Moreover, the student must have good instructors, who emphasise reason over rhetoric. Russell indicates that the critical mind is an essential feature of the healthy citizen of a democracy, since collective hysteria is one of the greatest threats to democracy (Russell 1938:248). To foster a critical mind, he suggests, the teacher ought to show the students the consequences of pursuing one's feelings over one's thoughts. For example, the teacher might allow students to choose a field trip between two different locations: one fantastic place which is given a dull overview, and a shabby place which is recommended by impressive advertisements. In teaching history, the teacher might examine a particular event from a multitude of different perspectives, and allow the students to use their critical faculties to make assessments of each. (Russell 1938:247) In all cases, the object would be to encourage self growth, a willingness to be "tentative in judgment", and "responsiveness to evidence". (Russell 1938:250)
The work ends with the following words: Fichte and the powerful men who have inherited his ideals, when they see children, think: 'Here is material that I can manipulate' All this, to any person with natural affection for the young, is horrible; just as we teach children to avoid being destroyed by motor cars if they can, so we should teach them to avoid being destroyed by cruel fanatics This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve (Russell 1938:251).
Федеральное правительство имеет смысл, по мнению Рассела, только в том случае, если оно обладает ограниченными, но четко определенными полномочиями. Рассел выступает за создание мирового правительства, состоящего из суверенных национальных государств. (Рассел 1938:197, 230–231) По его мнению, функция мирового правительства должна заключаться лишь в предотвращении войны и обеспечении мира. (Рассел 1938:230–231) На мировой арене демократия была бы невозможна из-за незначительной власти, которой располагает отдельный индивид по сравнению со всем человечеством. Еще одно предложение по реформированию политической политики – идея о необходимости политического баланса во всех ветвях государственной службы. Неравновесие в государственных институтах создает убежища для реакционных сил, которые, в свою очередь, подрывают демократию. Рассел выделяет два условия, необходимых для достижения баланса. Он выступает, во-первых, за отмену юридической силы признательных показаний в качестве доказательства, чтобы устранить стимул для получения признаний под пытками со стороны полиции. (Рассел 1938:232) Во-вторых, за создание двух отделений полиции для расследования конкретных преступлений: одно, исходящее из презумпции невиновности обвиняемого, а другое – из презумпции виновности. (Рассел 1938:233) Конкуренция, по Расселу, – это слово, которое может иметь множество значений. Хотя чаще всего оно относится к конкуренции между компаниями, оно также может использоваться для описания конкуренции между государствами, идеологами, классами, соперниками, трестами, рабочими и т. д. В этой связи Рассел стремится ответить на два вопроса: «Во-первых, в каких случаях конкуренция технически неэффективна? Во-вторых, в каких случаях она желательна по нетехническим причинам?» (Рассел 1938:176). Задавая эти вопросы, он руководствуется двумя основными соображениями: экономической конкуренцией и конкуренцией пропаганды. Вопрос о том, является ли экономическая конкуренция оправданной, требует рассмотрения с двух точек зрения: моральной и технической. С точки зрения техника, определенные товары и услуги могут быть эффективно предоставлены только централизованными органами. По мнению Рассела, экономическим фактом является то, что крупные организации способны производить продукцию с определенным уровнем качества и лучше всего удовлетворять потребности географического характера, такие как железные дороги и очистка воды. Напротив, небольшие организации (например, предприятия) лучше всего подходят для создания индивидуализированной и локальной продукции. (Рассел 1938:176–177, 234)
Moreover, democracy must be infused with a respect for the autonomy of persons, so that the political body does not collapse into the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this result, people must have a well developed sense of separation between acquiescence to the collective will, and respect for the discretion of the individual. (Russell 1938:227)
Collective action should be restricted to two domains. First, it should be used to treat problems that are primarily "geographical", which include issues of sanitation, transportation, electricity, and external threats. Second, it ought to be used when a kind of individual freedom poses a major threat to public order; for instance, speech that incites the breaking of law (Russell 1938:227–228). The exception to this rule is when there is a minority which densely populates a certain well defined area, in which case, political devolution is preferable. In formulating his outlook on the preferable size of government, Russell encounters a dilemma. He notes that, the smaller the democracy, the more empowerment the citizen feels; yet the larger the democracy, the more the citizen's passions and interests are inflamed. In both situations, the result is voter fatigue. (Russell 1938:229) There are two possible solutions to this problem: to organise political life according to vocational interests, as with unionisation; or to organise it according to interest groups. (Russell 1938:229–230)
"In former days, men sold themselves to the Devil to acquire magical powers. Nowadays they acquire those powers from science, and find themselves compelled to become devils. There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed, and brought into the service, not of this or that group of fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race for science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die." Bertrand Russell (1938:22)
A federal government is only sensible, for Russell, when it has limited but well defined powers. Russell advocates the creation of a world government made up of sovereign nation states (Russell 1938:197, 230–31). On his view, the function of a world government should only be to ensure the avoidance of war and the pursuit of peace (Russell 1938:230 31). On the world stage, democracy would be impossible, because of the negligible power any particular individual could have in comparison with the entire human race. One final suggestion for political policy reform is the notion that there ought to be a political balance in every branch of public service. Lack of balance in public institutions creates havens for reactionary forces, which in turn undermine democracy. Russell emphasises two conditions necessary for the achievement of balance. He advocates, first, the abolition of the legal standing of confessions as evidence, to remove the incentive for extraction of confession under torture by the police (Russell 1938:232). Second, the creation of dual branches of police to investigate particular crimes: one which presumes the innocence of the accused, the other presuming guilt (Russell 1938:233). Competition, for Russell, is a word that may have many uses. Although most often meant to refer to competition between companies, it may also be used to speak of competition between states, between ideologues, between classes, rivals, trusts, workers, etc. On this topic, Russell ultimately wishes to answer two questions: "First, in what kinds of cases is competition technically wasteful? Secondly, in what cases is it desirable on non technical grounds?" (Russell 1938:176). In asking these questions, he has two concerns directly in mind: economic competition, and the competition of propaganda. The question of whether or not economic competition is defensible requires an examination from two perspectives: the moral point of view and the technical point of view. From the view of the technician, certain goods and services can only be provided efficiently by a centralised authority. For Russell, it seems to be an economic fact that bigger organisations were capable of producing items at a certain standard, and best suited to fill needs that are geographical in nature, such as railways and water treatment. By contrast, smaller organisations (like businesses) are best suited to create products that are customised and local. (Russell 1938:176–177, 234)
From the view of the ethicist, competition between states is on the same moral plane as competition between modern businesses (Russell 1938:177). Indeed, by Russell's account, economic power and political power are both capable of devastation:
"In democratic countries, the most important private organisations are economic. Unlike secret societies, they are able to exercise their terrorism without illegality, since they do not threaten to kill their enemies, but only to starve them." (Russell 1938:147)
Since they are morally equivalent, perhaps it is not surprising that the cure for political injustices is identical to the cure for economic ones: namely, the institution of democracy in both economic and political spheres (Russell 1938:234). By 'economic democracy', Russell means a kind of democratic socialism, which at the very least involves the nationalisation of select industries (railways, water, television). In order for this to operate effectively, he argues that the social system must be such that power is distributed across a society of highly autonomous persons. (Russell 1938:238–240)
Russell is careful to indicate that his support for nationalisation rests on the assumption that it can be accomplished under the auspices of a robust democracy, and that it may be safeguarded against statist tyranny. If either condition fail, then nationalisation is undesirable. In delivering this warning, Russell emphasises the distinction between ownership and control. He points out that nationalisation – which would allow the citizens to collectively own an industry – would not guarantee any of them control over the industry. In the same way, shareholders own parts of companies, but the control of the company ultimately rests with the CEO (Russell 1938:235). Control over propaganda is another matter. When forming his argument here, Russell specifically targets the doctrines of John Stuart Mill. Russell argues that Mill's argument for the freedom of speech is too weak, so long as it is balanced against the harm principle; for any speech worth protecting for political reasons is likely to cause somebody harm. For example, the citizen ought to have the opportunity to impeach malicious governors, but that would surely harm the governor, at the very least (Russell 1938:179). Russell replaces Mill's analysis with an examination of the issue from four perspectives: the perspective of the governor, the citizen, the innovator, and the philosopher. The rational governor is always threatened by revolutionary activities, and can always be expected to ban speech which calls for assassination. Yet the governor would be advised to allow freedom of speech to prevent and diminish discontent among the subjects, and has no reason to suppress ideas which are unrelated to his governance, for instance the Copernican doctrine of heliocentrism. Relatedly, the citizen mainly understands free speech as an extension of the right to do peaceably that which could only otherwise be done through violence (Russell 1938:179–182). The innovator does not tend to care much about free speech, since they engage in innovation despite social resistance. Innovators may be separated into three categories: the hard millenarians, who believe in their doctrine to the exclusion of all others, and who only seek to protect the dissemination of their own creeds; the virtuous millenarians, who emphasise that revolutionary transitions must begin through rational persuasion and the guidance of sages, and so are supportive of free speech; and the progressives, who cannot foresee the direction of future progress, but recognise that the free exchange of ideas is a prerequisite to it. For the philosopher, free speech allows people to engage in rational doubt, and to grow in their prudential duties. (Russell 1938:182–185)
In any case, the citizen's right to dissent and to decide their governor is sacrosanct for Russell. He believes that a true public square could be operated by state run media outlets, like the BBC, which would be charged with the duty to provide a wide range of points of view on political matters. For certain other topics, like art and science, the fullest and freest competition between ideas must be guaranteed. (Russell 1938:185)
The final discussion in the work is concerned with Russell's views on education. (Russell 1938:242–251) Citizens of a healthy democracy must have two virtues, for Russell: the "sense of self reliance and confidence" necessary for autonomous action; and the humility required to "submit to the will of the majority" when it has spoken. (Russell 1938:244) The last chapter of Power: A New Social Analysis concentrates significantly on the question of how to inspire confidence in students, from an educator's point of view. Two major conditions are necessary. First, the citizen/student must be free from hatred, fear, and the impulse to submit. (Russell 1938:244–245) Economic opportunities will have some impact on the student's temperament in this regard, and so, economic reforms need to be made to create more opportunities. But reform to the education system is also necessary, in particular, to foster in the student a kindness, curiosity, and intellectual commitment to science. The common trait of students with the scientific mind is a sense of balance between dogmatism and scepticism. (Russell 1938:246)
Moreover, the student must have good instructors, who emphasise reason over rhetoric. Russell indicates that the critical mind is an essential feature of the healthy citizen of a democracy, since collective hysteria is one of the greatest threats to democracy (Russell 1938:248). To foster a critical mind, he suggests, the teacher ought to show the students the consequences of pursuing one's feelings over one's thoughts. For example, the teacher might allow students to choose a field trip between two different locations: one fantastic place which is given a dull overview, and a shabby place which is recommended by impressive advertisements. In teaching history, the teacher might examine a particular event from a multitude of different perspectives, and allow the students to use their critical faculties to make assessments of each. (Russell 1938:247) In all cases, the object would be to encourage self growth, a willingness to be "tentative in judgment", and "responsiveness to evidence". (Russell 1938:250)
The work ends with the following words: Fichte and the powerful men who have inherited his ideals, when they see children, think: 'Here is material that I can manipulate' All this, to any person with natural affection for the young, is horrible; just as we teach children to avoid being destroyed by motor cars if they can, so we should teach them to avoid being destroyed by cruel fanatics This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve (Russell 1938:251).
С точки зрения этика, конкуренция между государствами находится на одном моральном уровне с конкуренцией между современными предприятиями. (Рассел 1938:177) Действительно, по мнению Рассела, экономическая и политическая власть способны на разрушения:
Moreover, democracy must be infused with a respect for the autonomy of persons, so that the political body does not collapse into the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this result, people must have a well developed sense of separation between acquiescence to the collective will, and respect for the discretion of the individual. (Russell 1938:227)
Collective action should be restricted to two domains. First, it should be used to treat problems that are primarily "geographical", which include issues of sanitation, transportation, electricity, and external threats. Second, it ought to be used when a kind of individual freedom poses a major threat to public order; for instance, speech that incites the breaking of law (Russell 1938:227–228). The exception to this rule is when there is a minority which densely populates a certain well defined area, in which case, political devolution is preferable. In formulating his outlook on the preferable size of government, Russell encounters a dilemma. He notes that, the smaller the democracy, the more empowerment the citizen feels; yet the larger the democracy, the more the citizen's passions and interests are inflamed. In both situations, the result is voter fatigue. (Russell 1938:229) There are two possible solutions to this problem: to organise political life according to vocational interests, as with unionisation; or to organise it according to interest groups. (Russell 1938:229–230)
"In former days, men sold themselves to the Devil to acquire magical powers. Nowadays they acquire those powers from science, and find themselves compelled to become devils. There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed, and brought into the service, not of this or that group of fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race for science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die." Bertrand Russell (1938:22)
A federal government is only sensible, for Russell, when it has limited but well defined powers. Russell advocates the creation of a world government made up of sovereign nation states (Russell 1938:197, 230–31). On his view, the function of a world government should only be to ensure the avoidance of war and the pursuit of peace (Russell 1938:230 31). On the world stage, democracy would be impossible, because of the negligible power any particular individual could have in comparison with the entire human race. One final suggestion for political policy reform is the notion that there ought to be a political balance in every branch of public service. Lack of balance in public institutions creates havens for reactionary forces, which in turn undermine democracy. Russell emphasises two conditions necessary for the achievement of balance. He advocates, first, the abolition of the legal standing of confessions as evidence, to remove the incentive for extraction of confession under torture by the police (Russell 1938:232). Second, the creation of dual branches of police to investigate particular crimes: one which presumes the innocence of the accused, the other presuming guilt (Russell 1938:233). Competition, for Russell, is a word that may have many uses. Although most often meant to refer to competition between companies, it may also be used to speak of competition between states, between ideologues, between classes, rivals, trusts, workers, etc. On this topic, Russell ultimately wishes to answer two questions: "First, in what kinds of cases is competition technically wasteful? Secondly, in what cases is it desirable on non technical grounds?" (Russell 1938:176). In asking these questions, he has two concerns directly in mind: economic competition, and the competition of propaganda. The question of whether or not economic competition is defensible requires an examination from two perspectives: the moral point of view and the technical point of view. From the view of the technician, certain goods and services can only be provided efficiently by a centralised authority. For Russell, it seems to be an economic fact that bigger organisations were capable of producing items at a certain standard, and best suited to fill needs that are geographical in nature, such as railways and water treatment. By contrast, smaller organisations (like businesses) are best suited to create products that are customised and local. (Russell 1938:176–177, 234)
From the view of the ethicist, competition between states is on the same moral plane as competition between modern businesses (Russell 1938:177). Indeed, by Russell's account, economic power and political power are both capable of devastation:
"In democratic countries, the most important private organisations are economic. Unlike secret societies, they are able to exercise their terrorism without illegality, since they do not threaten to kill their enemies, but only to starve them." (Russell 1938:147)
Since they are morally equivalent, perhaps it is not surprising that the cure for political injustices is identical to the cure for economic ones: namely, the institution of democracy in both economic and political spheres (Russell 1938:234). By 'economic democracy', Russell means a kind of democratic socialism, which at the very least involves the nationalisation of select industries (railways, water, television). In order for this to operate effectively, he argues that the social system must be such that power is distributed across a society of highly autonomous persons. (Russell 1938:238–240)
Russell is careful to indicate that his support for nationalisation rests on the assumption that it can be accomplished under the auspices of a robust democracy, and that it may be safeguarded against statist tyranny. If either condition fail, then nationalisation is undesirable. In delivering this warning, Russell emphasises the distinction between ownership and control. He points out that nationalisation – which would allow the citizens to collectively own an industry – would not guarantee any of them control over the industry. In the same way, shareholders own parts of companies, but the control of the company ultimately rests with the CEO (Russell 1938:235). Control over propaganda is another matter. When forming his argument here, Russell specifically targets the doctrines of John Stuart Mill. Russell argues that Mill's argument for the freedom of speech is too weak, so long as it is balanced against the harm principle; for any speech worth protecting for political reasons is likely to cause somebody harm. For example, the citizen ought to have the opportunity to impeach malicious governors, but that would surely harm the governor, at the very least (Russell 1938:179). Russell replaces Mill's analysis with an examination of the issue from four perspectives: the perspective of the governor, the citizen, the innovator, and the philosopher. The rational governor is always threatened by revolutionary activities, and can always be expected to ban speech which calls for assassination. Yet the governor would be advised to allow freedom of speech to prevent and diminish discontent among the subjects, and has no reason to suppress ideas which are unrelated to his governance, for instance the Copernican doctrine of heliocentrism. Relatedly, the citizen mainly understands free speech as an extension of the right to do peaceably that which could only otherwise be done through violence (Russell 1938:179–182). The innovator does not tend to care much about free speech, since they engage in innovation despite social resistance. Innovators may be separated into three categories: the hard millenarians, who believe in their doctrine to the exclusion of all others, and who only seek to protect the dissemination of their own creeds; the virtuous millenarians, who emphasise that revolutionary transitions must begin through rational persuasion and the guidance of sages, and so are supportive of free speech; and the progressives, who cannot foresee the direction of future progress, but recognise that the free exchange of ideas is a prerequisite to it. For the philosopher, free speech allows people to engage in rational doubt, and to grow in their prudential duties. (Russell 1938:182–185)
In any case, the citizen's right to dissent and to decide their governor is sacrosanct for Russell. He believes that a true public square could be operated by state run media outlets, like the BBC, which would be charged with the duty to provide a wide range of points of view on political matters. For certain other topics, like art and science, the fullest and freest competition between ideas must be guaranteed. (Russell 1938:185)
The final discussion in the work is concerned with Russell's views on education. (Russell 1938:242–251) Citizens of a healthy democracy must have two virtues, for Russell: the "sense of self reliance and confidence" necessary for autonomous action; and the humility required to "submit to the will of the majority" when it has spoken. (Russell 1938:244) The last chapter of Power: A New Social Analysis concentrates significantly on the question of how to inspire confidence in students, from an educator's point of view. Two major conditions are necessary. First, the citizen/student must be free from hatred, fear, and the impulse to submit. (Russell 1938:244–245) Economic opportunities will have some impact on the student's temperament in this regard, and so, economic reforms need to be made to create more opportunities. But reform to the education system is also necessary, in particular, to foster in the student a kindness, curiosity, and intellectual commitment to science. The common trait of students with the scientific mind is a sense of balance between dogmatism and scepticism. (Russell 1938:246)
Moreover, the student must have good instructors, who emphasise reason over rhetoric. Russell indicates that the critical mind is an essential feature of the healthy citizen of a democracy, since collective hysteria is one of the greatest threats to democracy (Russell 1938:248). To foster a critical mind, he suggests, the teacher ought to show the students the consequences of pursuing one's feelings over one's thoughts. For example, the teacher might allow students to choose a field trip between two different locations: one fantastic place which is given a dull overview, and a shabby place which is recommended by impressive advertisements. In teaching history, the teacher might examine a particular event from a multitude of different perspectives, and allow the students to use their critical faculties to make assessments of each. (Russell 1938:247) In all cases, the object would be to encourage self growth, a willingness to be "tentative in judgment", and "responsiveness to evidence". (Russell 1938:250)
The work ends with the following words: Fichte and the powerful men who have inherited his ideals, when they see children, think: 'Here is material that I can manipulate' All this, to any person with natural affection for the young, is horrible; just as we teach children to avoid being destroyed by motor cars if they can, so we should teach them to avoid being destroyed by cruel fanatics This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve (Russell 1938:251).
«В демократических странах наиболее важными частными организациями являются экономические. В отличие от тайных обществ, они способны осуществлять свой террор без нарушения закона, поскольку они не угрожают убить своих врагов, а лишь обречь их на голод». (Рассел 1938:147)
Moreover, democracy must be infused with a respect for the autonomy of persons, so that the political body does not collapse into the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this result, people must have a well developed sense of separation between acquiescence to the collective will, and respect for the discretion of the individual. (Russell 1938:227)
Collective action should be restricted to two domains. First, it should be used to treat problems that are primarily "geographical", which include issues of sanitation, transportation, electricity, and external threats. Second, it ought to be used when a kind of individual freedom poses a major threat to public order; for instance, speech that incites the breaking of law (Russell 1938:227–228). The exception to this rule is when there is a minority which densely populates a certain well defined area, in which case, political devolution is preferable. In formulating his outlook on the preferable size of government, Russell encounters a dilemma. He notes that, the smaller the democracy, the more empowerment the citizen feels; yet the larger the democracy, the more the citizen's passions and interests are inflamed. In both situations, the result is voter fatigue. (Russell 1938:229) There are two possible solutions to this problem: to organise political life according to vocational interests, as with unionisation; or to organise it according to interest groups. (Russell 1938:229–230)
"In former days, men sold themselves to the Devil to acquire magical powers. Nowadays they acquire those powers from science, and find themselves compelled to become devils. There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed, and brought into the service, not of this or that group of fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race for science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die." Bertrand Russell (1938:22)
A federal government is only sensible, for Russell, when it has limited but well defined powers. Russell advocates the creation of a world government made up of sovereign nation states (Russell 1938:197, 230–31). On his view, the function of a world government should only be to ensure the avoidance of war and the pursuit of peace (Russell 1938:230 31). On the world stage, democracy would be impossible, because of the negligible power any particular individual could have in comparison with the entire human race. One final suggestion for political policy reform is the notion that there ought to be a political balance in every branch of public service. Lack of balance in public institutions creates havens for reactionary forces, which in turn undermine democracy. Russell emphasises two conditions necessary for the achievement of balance. He advocates, first, the abolition of the legal standing of confessions as evidence, to remove the incentive for extraction of confession under torture by the police (Russell 1938:232). Second, the creation of dual branches of police to investigate particular crimes: one which presumes the innocence of the accused, the other presuming guilt (Russell 1938:233). Competition, for Russell, is a word that may have many uses. Although most often meant to refer to competition between companies, it may also be used to speak of competition between states, between ideologues, between classes, rivals, trusts, workers, etc. On this topic, Russell ultimately wishes to answer two questions: "First, in what kinds of cases is competition technically wasteful? Secondly, in what cases is it desirable on non technical grounds?" (Russell 1938:176). In asking these questions, he has two concerns directly in mind: economic competition, and the competition of propaganda. The question of whether or not economic competition is defensible requires an examination from two perspectives: the moral point of view and the technical point of view. From the view of the technician, certain goods and services can only be provided efficiently by a centralised authority. For Russell, it seems to be an economic fact that bigger organisations were capable of producing items at a certain standard, and best suited to fill needs that are geographical in nature, such as railways and water treatment. By contrast, smaller organisations (like businesses) are best suited to create products that are customised and local. (Russell 1938:176–177, 234)
From the view of the ethicist, competition between states is on the same moral plane as competition between modern businesses (Russell 1938:177). Indeed, by Russell's account, economic power and political power are both capable of devastation:
"In democratic countries, the most important private organisations are economic. Unlike secret societies, they are able to exercise their terrorism without illegality, since they do not threaten to kill their enemies, but only to starve them." (Russell 1938:147)
Since they are morally equivalent, perhaps it is not surprising that the cure for political injustices is identical to the cure for economic ones: namely, the institution of democracy in both economic and political spheres (Russell 1938:234). By 'economic democracy', Russell means a kind of democratic socialism, which at the very least involves the nationalisation of select industries (railways, water, television). In order for this to operate effectively, he argues that the social system must be such that power is distributed across a society of highly autonomous persons. (Russell 1938:238–240)
Russell is careful to indicate that his support for nationalisation rests on the assumption that it can be accomplished under the auspices of a robust democracy, and that it may be safeguarded against statist tyranny. If either condition fail, then nationalisation is undesirable. In delivering this warning, Russell emphasises the distinction between ownership and control. He points out that nationalisation – which would allow the citizens to collectively own an industry – would not guarantee any of them control over the industry. In the same way, shareholders own parts of companies, but the control of the company ultimately rests with the CEO (Russell 1938:235). Control over propaganda is another matter. When forming his argument here, Russell specifically targets the doctrines of John Stuart Mill. Russell argues that Mill's argument for the freedom of speech is too weak, so long as it is balanced against the harm principle; for any speech worth protecting for political reasons is likely to cause somebody harm. For example, the citizen ought to have the opportunity to impeach malicious governors, but that would surely harm the governor, at the very least (Russell 1938:179). Russell replaces Mill's analysis with an examination of the issue from four perspectives: the perspective of the governor, the citizen, the innovator, and the philosopher. The rational governor is always threatened by revolutionary activities, and can always be expected to ban speech which calls for assassination. Yet the governor would be advised to allow freedom of speech to prevent and diminish discontent among the subjects, and has no reason to suppress ideas which are unrelated to his governance, for instance the Copernican doctrine of heliocentrism. Relatedly, the citizen mainly understands free speech as an extension of the right to do peaceably that which could only otherwise be done through violence (Russell 1938:179–182). The innovator does not tend to care much about free speech, since they engage in innovation despite social resistance. Innovators may be separated into three categories: the hard millenarians, who believe in their doctrine to the exclusion of all others, and who only seek to protect the dissemination of their own creeds; the virtuous millenarians, who emphasise that revolutionary transitions must begin through rational persuasion and the guidance of sages, and so are supportive of free speech; and the progressives, who cannot foresee the direction of future progress, but recognise that the free exchange of ideas is a prerequisite to it. For the philosopher, free speech allows people to engage in rational doubt, and to grow in their prudential duties. (Russell 1938:182–185)
In any case, the citizen's right to dissent and to decide their governor is sacrosanct for Russell. He believes that a true public square could be operated by state run media outlets, like the BBC, which would be charged with the duty to provide a wide range of points of view on political matters. For certain other topics, like art and science, the fullest and freest competition between ideas must be guaranteed. (Russell 1938:185)
The final discussion in the work is concerned with Russell's views on education. (Russell 1938:242–251) Citizens of a healthy democracy must have two virtues, for Russell: the "sense of self reliance and confidence" necessary for autonomous action; and the humility required to "submit to the will of the majority" when it has spoken. (Russell 1938:244) The last chapter of Power: A New Social Analysis concentrates significantly on the question of how to inspire confidence in students, from an educator's point of view. Two major conditions are necessary. First, the citizen/student must be free from hatred, fear, and the impulse to submit. (Russell 1938:244–245) Economic opportunities will have some impact on the student's temperament in this regard, and so, economic reforms need to be made to create more opportunities. But reform to the education system is also necessary, in particular, to foster in the student a kindness, curiosity, and intellectual commitment to science. The common trait of students with the scientific mind is a sense of balance between dogmatism and scepticism. (Russell 1938:246)
Moreover, the student must have good instructors, who emphasise reason over rhetoric. Russell indicates that the critical mind is an essential feature of the healthy citizen of a democracy, since collective hysteria is one of the greatest threats to democracy (Russell 1938:248). To foster a critical mind, he suggests, the teacher ought to show the students the consequences of pursuing one's feelings over one's thoughts. For example, the teacher might allow students to choose a field trip between two different locations: one fantastic place which is given a dull overview, and a shabby place which is recommended by impressive advertisements. In teaching history, the teacher might examine a particular event from a multitude of different perspectives, and allow the students to use their critical faculties to make assessments of each. (Russell 1938:247) In all cases, the object would be to encourage self growth, a willingness to be "tentative in judgment", and "responsiveness to evidence". (Russell 1938:250)
The work ends with the following words: Fichte and the powerful men who have inherited his ideals, when they see children, think: 'Here is material that I can manipulate' All this, to any person with natural affection for the young, is horrible; just as we teach children to avoid being destroyed by motor cars if they can, so we should teach them to avoid being destroyed by cruel fanatics This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve (Russell 1938:251).
Поскольку они морально эквивалентны, неудивительно, что лекарство от политической несправедливости идентично лекарству от экономической: а именно, установление демократии как в экономической, так и в политической сферах. (Рассел 1938:234) Под «экономической демократией» Рассел понимает разновидность демократического социализма, которая, по крайней мере, предполагает национализацию отдельных отраслей промышленности (железные дороги, водоснабжение, телевидение). Для эффективной работы этого механизма, он утверждает, что социальная система должна быть организована таким образом, чтобы власть была распределена между высокоавтономными личностями. (Рассел 1938:238–240)
Moreover, democracy must be infused with a respect for the autonomy of persons, so that the political body does not collapse into the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this result, people must have a well developed sense of separation between acquiescence to the collective will, and respect for the discretion of the individual. (Russell 1938:227)
Collective action should be restricted to two domains. First, it should be used to treat problems that are primarily "geographical", which include issues of sanitation, transportation, electricity, and external threats. Second, it ought to be used when a kind of individual freedom poses a major threat to public order; for instance, speech that incites the breaking of law (Russell 1938:227–228). The exception to this rule is when there is a minority which densely populates a certain well defined area, in which case, political devolution is preferable. In formulating his outlook on the preferable size of government, Russell encounters a dilemma. He notes that, the smaller the democracy, the more empowerment the citizen feels; yet the larger the democracy, the more the citizen's passions and interests are inflamed. In both situations, the result is voter fatigue. (Russell 1938:229) There are two possible solutions to this problem: to organise political life according to vocational interests, as with unionisation; or to organise it according to interest groups. (Russell 1938:229–230)
"In former days, men sold themselves to the Devil to acquire magical powers. Nowadays they acquire those powers from science, and find themselves compelled to become devils. There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed, and brought into the service, not of this or that group of fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race for science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die." Bertrand Russell (1938:22)
A federal government is only sensible, for Russell, when it has limited but well defined powers. Russell advocates the creation of a world government made up of sovereign nation states (Russell 1938:197, 230–31). On his view, the function of a world government should only be to ensure the avoidance of war and the pursuit of peace (Russell 1938:230 31). On the world stage, democracy would be impossible, because of the negligible power any particular individual could have in comparison with the entire human race. One final suggestion for political policy reform is the notion that there ought to be a political balance in every branch of public service. Lack of balance in public institutions creates havens for reactionary forces, which in turn undermine democracy. Russell emphasises two conditions necessary for the achievement of balance. He advocates, first, the abolition of the legal standing of confessions as evidence, to remove the incentive for extraction of confession under torture by the police (Russell 1938:232). Second, the creation of dual branches of police to investigate particular crimes: one which presumes the innocence of the accused, the other presuming guilt (Russell 1938:233). Competition, for Russell, is a word that may have many uses. Although most often meant to refer to competition between companies, it may also be used to speak of competition between states, between ideologues, between classes, rivals, trusts, workers, etc. On this topic, Russell ultimately wishes to answer two questions: "First, in what kinds of cases is competition technically wasteful? Secondly, in what cases is it desirable on non technical grounds?" (Russell 1938:176). In asking these questions, he has two concerns directly in mind: economic competition, and the competition of propaganda. The question of whether or not economic competition is defensible requires an examination from two perspectives: the moral point of view and the technical point of view. From the view of the technician, certain goods and services can only be provided efficiently by a centralised authority. For Russell, it seems to be an economic fact that bigger organisations were capable of producing items at a certain standard, and best suited to fill needs that are geographical in nature, such as railways and water treatment. By contrast, smaller organisations (like businesses) are best suited to create products that are customised and local. (Russell 1938:176–177, 234)
From the view of the ethicist, competition between states is on the same moral plane as competition between modern businesses (Russell 1938:177). Indeed, by Russell's account, economic power and political power are both capable of devastation:
"In democratic countries, the most important private organisations are economic. Unlike secret societies, they are able to exercise their terrorism without illegality, since they do not threaten to kill their enemies, but only to starve them." (Russell 1938:147)
Since they are morally equivalent, perhaps it is not surprising that the cure for political injustices is identical to the cure for economic ones: namely, the institution of democracy in both economic and political spheres (Russell 1938:234). By 'economic democracy', Russell means a kind of democratic socialism, which at the very least involves the nationalisation of select industries (railways, water, television). In order for this to operate effectively, he argues that the social system must be such that power is distributed across a society of highly autonomous persons. (Russell 1938:238–240)
Russell is careful to indicate that his support for nationalisation rests on the assumption that it can be accomplished under the auspices of a robust democracy, and that it may be safeguarded against statist tyranny. If either condition fail, then nationalisation is undesirable. In delivering this warning, Russell emphasises the distinction between ownership and control. He points out that nationalisation – which would allow the citizens to collectively own an industry – would not guarantee any of them control over the industry. In the same way, shareholders own parts of companies, but the control of the company ultimately rests with the CEO (Russell 1938:235). Control over propaganda is another matter. When forming his argument here, Russell specifically targets the doctrines of John Stuart Mill. Russell argues that Mill's argument for the freedom of speech is too weak, so long as it is balanced against the harm principle; for any speech worth protecting for political reasons is likely to cause somebody harm. For example, the citizen ought to have the opportunity to impeach malicious governors, but that would surely harm the governor, at the very least (Russell 1938:179). Russell replaces Mill's analysis with an examination of the issue from four perspectives: the perspective of the governor, the citizen, the innovator, and the philosopher. The rational governor is always threatened by revolutionary activities, and can always be expected to ban speech which calls for assassination. Yet the governor would be advised to allow freedom of speech to prevent and diminish discontent among the subjects, and has no reason to suppress ideas which are unrelated to his governance, for instance the Copernican doctrine of heliocentrism. Relatedly, the citizen mainly understands free speech as an extension of the right to do peaceably that which could only otherwise be done through violence (Russell 1938:179–182). The innovator does not tend to care much about free speech, since they engage in innovation despite social resistance. Innovators may be separated into three categories: the hard millenarians, who believe in their doctrine to the exclusion of all others, and who only seek to protect the dissemination of their own creeds; the virtuous millenarians, who emphasise that revolutionary transitions must begin through rational persuasion and the guidance of sages, and so are supportive of free speech; and the progressives, who cannot foresee the direction of future progress, but recognise that the free exchange of ideas is a prerequisite to it. For the philosopher, free speech allows people to engage in rational doubt, and to grow in their prudential duties. (Russell 1938:182–185)
In any case, the citizen's right to dissent and to decide their governor is sacrosanct for Russell. He believes that a true public square could be operated by state run media outlets, like the BBC, which would be charged with the duty to provide a wide range of points of view on political matters. For certain other topics, like art and science, the fullest and freest competition between ideas must be guaranteed. (Russell 1938:185)
The final discussion in the work is concerned with Russell's views on education. (Russell 1938:242–251) Citizens of a healthy democracy must have two virtues, for Russell: the "sense of self reliance and confidence" necessary for autonomous action; and the humility required to "submit to the will of the majority" when it has spoken. (Russell 1938:244) The last chapter of Power: A New Social Analysis concentrates significantly on the question of how to inspire confidence in students, from an educator's point of view. Two major conditions are necessary. First, the citizen/student must be free from hatred, fear, and the impulse to submit. (Russell 1938:244–245) Economic opportunities will have some impact on the student's temperament in this regard, and so, economic reforms need to be made to create more opportunities. But reform to the education system is also necessary, in particular, to foster in the student a kindness, curiosity, and intellectual commitment to science. The common trait of students with the scientific mind is a sense of balance between dogmatism and scepticism. (Russell 1938:246)
Moreover, the student must have good instructors, who emphasise reason over rhetoric. Russell indicates that the critical mind is an essential feature of the healthy citizen of a democracy, since collective hysteria is one of the greatest threats to democracy (Russell 1938:248). To foster a critical mind, he suggests, the teacher ought to show the students the consequences of pursuing one's feelings over one's thoughts. For example, the teacher might allow students to choose a field trip between two different locations: one fantastic place which is given a dull overview, and a shabby place which is recommended by impressive advertisements. In teaching history, the teacher might examine a particular event from a multitude of different perspectives, and allow the students to use their critical faculties to make assessments of each. (Russell 1938:247) In all cases, the object would be to encourage self growth, a willingness to be "tentative in judgment", and "responsiveness to evidence". (Russell 1938:250)
The work ends with the following words: Fichte and the powerful men who have inherited his ideals, when they see children, think: 'Here is material that I can manipulate' All this, to any person with natural affection for the young, is horrible; just as we teach children to avoid being destroyed by motor cars if they can, so we should teach them to avoid being destroyed by cruel fanatics This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve (Russell 1938:251).
Рассел подчеркивает, что его поддержка национализации основана на предположении, что она может быть осуществлена под эгидой прочной демократии и защищена от государственного тиранизма. Если хотя бы одно из этих условий не будет выполнено, то национализация нежелательна. Предупреждая об этом, Рассел подчеркивает различие между владением и контролем. Он указывает на то, что национализация – которая позволила бы гражданам коллективно владеть отраслью – не гарантировала бы ни одному из них контроля над этой отраслью. Точно так же акционеры владеют частью компаний, но контроль над компанией в конечном итоге принадлежит генеральному директору. (Рассел 1938:235) Контроль над пропагандой – это отдельный вопрос. Формулируя свои аргументы здесь, Рассел специально критикует доктрины Джона Стюарта Милля. Рассел утверждает, что аргумент Милля в пользу свободы слова слишком слаб, поскольку он уравновешивается принципом причинения вреда; ведь любая речь, достойная защиты по политическим причинам, вероятно, причинит кому-то вред. Например, гражданин должен иметь возможность отстранять злонамеренных губернаторов, но это, безусловно, причинит вред губернатору, по крайней мере. (Рассел 1938:179) Рассел заменяет анализ Милля исследованием вопроса с четырех точек зрения: точки зрения губернатора, гражданина, новатора и философа. Рациональный губернатор всегда находится под угрозой революционной деятельности и всегда будет запрещать речь, призывающую к убийству. Однако губернатору было бы целесообразно разрешить свободу слова, чтобы предотвратить и уменьшить недовольство среди подданных, и у него нет причин подавлять идеи, не связанные с его правлением, например, коперниканскую доктрину гелиоцентризма. В связи с этим, гражданин в основном стремится…
Moreover, democracy must be infused with a respect for the autonomy of persons, so that the political body does not collapse into the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this result, people must have a well developed sense of separation between acquiescence to the collective will, and respect for the discretion of the individual. (Russell 1938:227)
Collective action should be restricted to two domains. First, it should be used to treat problems that are primarily "geographical", which include issues of sanitation, transportation, electricity, and external threats. Second, it ought to be used when a kind of individual freedom poses a major threat to public order; for instance, speech that incites the breaking of law (Russell 1938:227–228). The exception to this rule is when there is a minority which densely populates a certain well defined area, in which case, political devolution is preferable. In formulating his outlook on the preferable size of government, Russell encounters a dilemma. He notes that, the smaller the democracy, the more empowerment the citizen feels; yet the larger the democracy, the more the citizen's passions and interests are inflamed. In both situations, the result is voter fatigue. (Russell 1938:229) There are two possible solutions to this problem: to organise political life according to vocational interests, as with unionisation; or to organise it according to interest groups. (Russell 1938:229–230)
"In former days, men sold themselves to the Devil to acquire magical powers. Nowadays they acquire those powers from science, and find themselves compelled to become devils. There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed, and brought into the service, not of this or that group of fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race for science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die." Bertrand Russell (1938:22)
A federal government is only sensible, for Russell, when it has limited but well defined powers. Russell advocates the creation of a world government made up of sovereign nation states (Russell 1938:197, 230–31). On his view, the function of a world government should only be to ensure the avoidance of war and the pursuit of peace (Russell 1938:230 31). On the world stage, democracy would be impossible, because of the negligible power any particular individual could have in comparison with the entire human race. One final suggestion for political policy reform is the notion that there ought to be a political balance in every branch of public service. Lack of balance in public institutions creates havens for reactionary forces, which in turn undermine democracy. Russell emphasises two conditions necessary for the achievement of balance. He advocates, first, the abolition of the legal standing of confessions as evidence, to remove the incentive for extraction of confession under torture by the police (Russell 1938:232). Second, the creation of dual branches of police to investigate particular crimes: one which presumes the innocence of the accused, the other presuming guilt (Russell 1938:233). Competition, for Russell, is a word that may have many uses. Although most often meant to refer to competition between companies, it may also be used to speak of competition between states, between ideologues, between classes, rivals, trusts, workers, etc. On this topic, Russell ultimately wishes to answer two questions: "First, in what kinds of cases is competition technically wasteful? Secondly, in what cases is it desirable on non technical grounds?" (Russell 1938:176). In asking these questions, he has two concerns directly in mind: economic competition, and the competition of propaganda. The question of whether or not economic competition is defensible requires an examination from two perspectives: the moral point of view and the technical point of view. From the view of the technician, certain goods and services can only be provided efficiently by a centralised authority. For Russell, it seems to be an economic fact that bigger organisations were capable of producing items at a certain standard, and best suited to fill needs that are geographical in nature, such as railways and water treatment. By contrast, smaller organisations (like businesses) are best suited to create products that are customised and local. (Russell 1938:176–177, 234)
From the view of the ethicist, competition between states is on the same moral plane as competition between modern businesses (Russell 1938:177). Indeed, by Russell's account, economic power and political power are both capable of devastation:
"In democratic countries, the most important private organisations are economic. Unlike secret societies, they are able to exercise their terrorism without illegality, since they do not threaten to kill their enemies, but only to starve them." (Russell 1938:147)
Since they are morally equivalent, perhaps it is not surprising that the cure for political injustices is identical to the cure for economic ones: namely, the institution of democracy in both economic and political spheres (Russell 1938:234). By 'economic democracy', Russell means a kind of democratic socialism, which at the very least involves the nationalisation of select industries (railways, water, television). In order for this to operate effectively, he argues that the social system must be such that power is distributed across a society of highly autonomous persons. (Russell 1938:238–240)
Russell is careful to indicate that his support for nationalisation rests on the assumption that it can be accomplished under the auspices of a robust democracy, and that it may be safeguarded against statist tyranny. If either condition fail, then nationalisation is undesirable. In delivering this warning, Russell emphasises the distinction between ownership and control. He points out that nationalisation – which would allow the citizens to collectively own an industry – would not guarantee any of them control over the industry. In the same way, shareholders own parts of companies, but the control of the company ultimately rests with the CEO (Russell 1938:235). Control over propaganda is another matter. When forming his argument here, Russell specifically targets the doctrines of John Stuart Mill. Russell argues that Mill's argument for the freedom of speech is too weak, so long as it is balanced against the harm principle; for any speech worth protecting for political reasons is likely to cause somebody harm. For example, the citizen ought to have the opportunity to impeach malicious governors, but that would surely harm the governor, at the very least (Russell 1938:179). Russell replaces Mill's analysis with an examination of the issue from four perspectives: the perspective of the governor, the citizen, the innovator, and the philosopher. The rational governor is always threatened by revolutionary activities, and can always be expected to ban speech which calls for assassination. Yet the governor would be advised to allow freedom of speech to prevent and diminish discontent among the subjects, and has no reason to suppress ideas which are unrelated to his governance, for instance the Copernican doctrine of heliocentrism. Relatedly, the citizen mainly understands free speech as an extension of the right to do peaceably that which could only otherwise be done through violence (Russell 1938:179–182). The innovator does not tend to care much about free speech, since they engage in innovation despite social resistance. Innovators may be separated into three categories: the hard millenarians, who believe in their doctrine to the exclusion of all others, and who only seek to protect the dissemination of their own creeds; the virtuous millenarians, who emphasise that revolutionary transitions must begin through rational persuasion and the guidance of sages, and so are supportive of free speech; and the progressives, who cannot foresee the direction of future progress, but recognise that the free exchange of ideas is a prerequisite to it. For the philosopher, free speech allows people to engage in rational doubt, and to grow in their prudential duties. (Russell 1938:182–185)
In any case, the citizen's right to dissent and to decide their governor is sacrosanct for Russell. He believes that a true public square could be operated by state run media outlets, like the BBC, which would be charged with the duty to provide a wide range of points of view on political matters. For certain other topics, like art and science, the fullest and freest competition between ideas must be guaranteed. (Russell 1938:185)
The final discussion in the work is concerned with Russell's views on education. (Russell 1938:242–251) Citizens of a healthy democracy must have two virtues, for Russell: the "sense of self reliance and confidence" necessary for autonomous action; and the humility required to "submit to the will of the majority" when it has spoken. (Russell 1938:244) The last chapter of Power: A New Social Analysis concentrates significantly on the question of how to inspire confidence in students, from an educator's point of view. Two major conditions are necessary. First, the citizen/student must be free from hatred, fear, and the impulse to submit. (Russell 1938:244–245) Economic opportunities will have some impact on the student's temperament in this regard, and so, economic reforms need to be made to create more opportunities. But reform to the education system is also necessary, in particular, to foster in the student a kindness, curiosity, and intellectual commitment to science. The common trait of students with the scientific mind is a sense of balance between dogmatism and scepticism. (Russell 1938:246)
Moreover, the student must have good instructors, who emphasise reason over rhetoric. Russell indicates that the critical mind is an essential feature of the healthy citizen of a democracy, since collective hysteria is one of the greatest threats to democracy (Russell 1938:248). To foster a critical mind, he suggests, the teacher ought to show the students the consequences of pursuing one's feelings over one's thoughts. For example, the teacher might allow students to choose a field trip between two different locations: one fantastic place which is given a dull overview, and a shabby place which is recommended by impressive advertisements. In teaching history, the teacher might examine a particular event from a multitude of different perspectives, and allow the students to use their critical faculties to make assessments of each. (Russell 1938:247) In all cases, the object would be to encourage self growth, a willingness to be "tentative in judgment", and "responsiveness to evidence". (Russell 1938:250)
The work ends with the following words: Fichte and the powerful men who have inherited his ideals, when they see children, think: 'Here is material that I can manipulate' All this, to any person with natural affection for the young, is horrible; just as we teach children to avoid being destroyed by motor cars if they can, so we should teach them to avoid being destroyed by cruel fanatics This is the task of a liberal education: to give a sense of the value of things other than domination, to help create wise citizens of a free community, and through the combination of citizenship with liberty in individual creativeness to enable men to give to human life that splendour which some few have shown that it can achieve (Russell 1938:251).
Исторический контекст
"Сила" (1938) написана с учетом политических проблем, стоявших на первых полосах газет того времени. Работа появилась на пороге Второй мировой войны и содержит более одной явной отсылки к диктатурам нацистской Германии и фашистской Италии, а также одну ссылку на преследование немецких чехословаков. (Рассел 1938:147) Когда его размышления касаются текущих событий, они часто окрашены пессимизмом. "Хотя люди ненавидят, эксплуатируют и мучают друг друга, до недавнего времени они почитали тех, кто проповедовал иной образ жизни." (Рассел 1938:204; выделено автором). Как заметил Кирк Уиллис, описывая взгляды Рассела в 1930-е годы, "внешняя и внутренняя политика сменяющих друг друга национальных правительств вызывала у него отторжение, равно как и триумф тоталитарных режимов на континенте и, казалось бы, неумолимое приближение войны, которое они за собой повлекли. Рассел, отчаявшись предотвратить войну и убежденный в том, что общеевропейский конфликт предвещает новую мрачную эпоху варварства и фанатизма, выразил свою подавленность в книге "На пути к миру?" (1936) – не столько в обоснованной защите политики умиротворения, сколько в выражении пораженчества." (Рассел 1938:xxii–xxiii)
В конечном итоге, располагая своим новым анализом, Рассел надеялся научить других, как обуздать произвольную власть. Он надеялся, что со временем возникнет стабильное мировое правительство, состоящее из суверенных национальных государств, которое будет удерживать страны от развязывания войн. Этот аргумент был выдвинут спустя годы после роспуска Лиги Наций (и за годы до создания Организации Объединенных Наций). Кроме того, на протяжении всей работы Рассел неоднократно упоминает о своем стремлении к утверждению определенной формы социализма. Это соответствовало его убеждениям того времени, периоду в его карьере, когда он верил в жизнеспособность гильдейского социализма. (Следд 1994; Рассел 1918)