Введение
Дело Верховного суда США 1996 года о сексуальной ориентации и законах штатов
Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case dealing with sexual orientation and state laws. It was the first Supreme Court case to address gay rights since Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), when the Court had held that laws criminalizing sodomy were constitutional. The Court ruled in a 6–3 decision that a state constitutional amendment in Colorado preventing protected status based upon homosexuality or bisexuality did not satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. The state constitutional amendment failed rational basis review. The decision in Romer set the stage for Lawrence v. Texas (2003), where the Court overruled its decision in Bowers; According to public opinion surveys, Coloradans strongly opposed discrimination based upon sexual orientation, but at the same time they opposed affirmative action based upon sexual orientation, and the latter concern is what led to the adoption of Amendment 2. The governor of Colorado, Roy Romer, opposed the measure, but also opposed retaliatory boycotts against his state. as well as other individuals and three Colorado municipalities, brought suit to enjoin the amendment. A former Colorado Supreme Court justice, Jean Dubofsky, was the lead attorney. A state trial court issued a permanent injunction against the amendment, and upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the amendment was subject to "strict scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. The state trial court, upon remand, concluded that the amendment could not pass strict scrutiny, which the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with upon review. Both times, the Colorado Supreme Court rendered 2–1 decisions.</blockquote>
The dissenting justice on the Colorado Supreme Court argued that neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right was involved in the case, and thus he would have applied a rational basis test instead of strict scrutiny. On May 20, 1996, the court ruled 6–3 that Colorado's Amendment 2 was unconstitutional, though on different reasoning from the Colorado courts. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. The Court majority held that the Colorado constitutional amendment targeting homosexuals based upon animosity lacked a rational relation to any legitimate governmental purpose.</blockquote>
While leaving that question unresolved by his opinion, Kennedy concluded that the amendment imposed a special disability upon homosexuals by forbidding them to seek safeguards "without constraint". Its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests. And:
[Amendment 2] is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence. The majority opinion in Romer neither mentioned nor overruled the Court's prior opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,
Dissenting opinion
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas. Scalia asserted that Amendment 2 did not deprive anyone of the "protection [afforded by] general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings", which he said was confirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court and not disputed by Justice Kennedy's opinion. Scalia's dissent said Amendment 2 merely provided that homosexuals "cannot as readily as others obtain preferential treatment under the laws". His objections also included these:
Regarding the Court's earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, had held that laws against polygamy were not an "impermissible targeting" of polygamists, and Scalia asked: "Has the Court concluded that the perceived social harm of polygamy is a 'legitimate concern of government,' and the perceived social harm of homosexuality is not?" The Court, Scalia said, was engaged in judicial activism; as the Constitution says nothing on the topic, it should be decided by democratic processes. The dissent added: "it [is] no business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war. But the Court today has done so, not only by inventing a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the victory away from traditional forces, but even by verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes."
Дело *Romer v. Evans*, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), является знаковым решением Верховного суда США, касающимся сексуальной ориентации и законов штатов. Оно стало первым делом Верховного суда, посвященным правам геев после дела *Bowers v. Hardwick* (1986), когда Суд постановил, что законы, криминализирующие содомию, являются конституционными. Суд вынес решение 6 голосов против 3 о том, что поправка к конституции штата Колорадо, запрещающая предоставление охраняемого статуса на основании гомосексуальности или бисексуальности, не соответствует положению о равной защите. Поправка к конституции штата не прошла проверку на рациональность. Решение по делу *Romer* заложило основу для дела *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003), где Суд отменил свое решение по делу *Bowers*; согласно опросам общественного мнения, жители Колорадо решительно выступали против дискриминации на основании сексуальной ориентации, но в то же время выступали против позитивных мер, направленных на поддержку представителей ЛГБТК+, и именно эта обеспокоенность привела к принятию Поправки 2. Губернатор Колорадо Рой Ромер выступал против этой меры, но также выступал против ответных бойкотов в отношении его штата. Истцами в деле, оспаривающем поправку, были отдельные лица и три муниципалитета Колорадо. Главным адвокатом была бывший судья Верховного суда штата Колорадо Жан Дубофски. Окружной суд штата выдал постоянный судебный запрет на действие поправки, и после апелляции Верховный суд Колорадо постановил, что поправка подлежит "строгой проверке" в соответствии с пунктом о равной защите федеральной конституции. Окружной суд штата, после возврата дела на новое рассмотрение, пришел к выводу, что поправка не может пройти строгую проверку, с чем согласился Верховный суд Колорадо после повторного рассмотрения. В обоих случаях Верховный суд Колорадо вынес решения с перевесом в 2–1 голосов.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case dealing with sexual orientation and state laws. It was the first Supreme Court case to address gay rights since Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), when the Court had held that laws criminalizing sodomy were constitutional. The Court ruled in a 6–3 decision that a state constitutional amendment in Colorado preventing protected status based upon homosexuality or bisexuality did not satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. The state constitutional amendment failed rational basis review. The decision in Romer set the stage for Lawrence v. Texas (2003), where the Court overruled its decision in Bowers; According to public opinion surveys, Coloradans strongly opposed discrimination based upon sexual orientation, but at the same time they opposed affirmative action based upon sexual orientation, and the latter concern is what led to the adoption of Amendment 2. The governor of Colorado, Roy Romer, opposed the measure, but also opposed retaliatory boycotts against his state. as well as other individuals and three Colorado municipalities, brought suit to enjoin the amendment. A former Colorado Supreme Court justice, Jean Dubofsky, was the lead attorney. A state trial court issued a permanent injunction against the amendment, and upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the amendment was subject to "strict scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. The state trial court, upon remand, concluded that the amendment could not pass strict scrutiny, which the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with upon review. Both times, the Colorado Supreme Court rendered 2–1 decisions.</blockquote>
The dissenting justice on the Colorado Supreme Court argued that neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right was involved in the case, and thus he would have applied a rational basis test instead of strict scrutiny. On May 20, 1996, the court ruled 6–3 that Colorado's Amendment 2 was unconstitutional, though on different reasoning from the Colorado courts. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. The Court majority held that the Colorado constitutional amendment targeting homosexuals based upon animosity lacked a rational relation to any legitimate governmental purpose.</blockquote>
While leaving that question unresolved by his opinion, Kennedy concluded that the amendment imposed a special disability upon homosexuals by forbidding them to seek safeguards "without constraint". Its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests. And:
[Amendment 2] is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence. The majority opinion in Romer neither mentioned nor overruled the Court's prior opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,
Dissenting opinion
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas. Scalia asserted that Amendment 2 did not deprive anyone of the "protection [afforded by] general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings", which he said was confirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court and not disputed by Justice Kennedy's opinion. Scalia's dissent said Amendment 2 merely provided that homosexuals "cannot as readily as others obtain preferential treatment under the laws". His objections also included these:
Regarding the Court's earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, had held that laws against polygamy were not an "impermissible targeting" of polygamists, and Scalia asked: "Has the Court concluded that the perceived social harm of polygamy is a 'legitimate concern of government,' and the perceived social harm of homosexuality is not?" The Court, Scalia said, was engaged in judicial activism; as the Constitution says nothing on the topic, it should be decided by democratic processes. The dissent added: "it [is] no business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war. But the Court today has done so, not only by inventing a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the victory away from traditional forces, but even by verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes."
Судья, выразивший несогласие в Верховном суде Колорадо, утверждал, что в деле не затронут ни "подозреваемый класс", ни фундаментальное право, и, следовательно, он применил бы тест на рациональность вместо строгой проверки. 20 мая 1996 года Суд постановил 6 голосами против 3, что Поправка 2 штата Колорадо является неконституционной, хотя и по иным соображениям, чем суды Колорадо. Судья Энтони Кеннеди написал мнение большинства, к которому присоединились Джон Пол Стивенс, Сандра Дэй О'Коннор, Дэвид Саутер, Рут Бадер Гинзбург и Стивен Брейер. Большинство судей посчитало, что конституционная поправка Колорадо, направленная против гомосексуалистов на основе враждебности, не имеет рациональной связи с какой-либо законной государственной целью. Оставляя этот вопрос нерешенным, Кеннеди пришел к выводу, что поправка налагает особое ограничение на гомосексуалистов, запрещая им искать правовую защиту "без ограничений". Ее чрезмерная широта настолько несовместима с причинами, по которым предлагается поправка, что она кажется необъяснимой чем-либо, кроме враждебности к классу, на который она влияет; ей не хватает рациональной связи с законными государственными интересами. И: [Поправка 2] одновременно слишком узкая и слишком широкая. Она определяет людей по одному признаку, а затем отказывает им в защите во всех отношениях. В результате лишение группы лиц права искать специальную защиту от закона является беспрецедентным в нашей юриспруденции. Мнение большинства по делу *Romer* не упоминало и не отменяло предыдущее решение Суда по делу *Bowers v. Hardwick*.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case dealing with sexual orientation and state laws. It was the first Supreme Court case to address gay rights since Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), when the Court had held that laws criminalizing sodomy were constitutional. The Court ruled in a 6–3 decision that a state constitutional amendment in Colorado preventing protected status based upon homosexuality or bisexuality did not satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. The state constitutional amendment failed rational basis review. The decision in Romer set the stage for Lawrence v. Texas (2003), where the Court overruled its decision in Bowers; According to public opinion surveys, Coloradans strongly opposed discrimination based upon sexual orientation, but at the same time they opposed affirmative action based upon sexual orientation, and the latter concern is what led to the adoption of Amendment 2. The governor of Colorado, Roy Romer, opposed the measure, but also opposed retaliatory boycotts against his state. as well as other individuals and three Colorado municipalities, brought suit to enjoin the amendment. A former Colorado Supreme Court justice, Jean Dubofsky, was the lead attorney. A state trial court issued a permanent injunction against the amendment, and upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the amendment was subject to "strict scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. The state trial court, upon remand, concluded that the amendment could not pass strict scrutiny, which the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with upon review. Both times, the Colorado Supreme Court rendered 2–1 decisions.</blockquote>
The dissenting justice on the Colorado Supreme Court argued that neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right was involved in the case, and thus he would have applied a rational basis test instead of strict scrutiny. On May 20, 1996, the court ruled 6–3 that Colorado's Amendment 2 was unconstitutional, though on different reasoning from the Colorado courts. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. The Court majority held that the Colorado constitutional amendment targeting homosexuals based upon animosity lacked a rational relation to any legitimate governmental purpose.</blockquote>
While leaving that question unresolved by his opinion, Kennedy concluded that the amendment imposed a special disability upon homosexuals by forbidding them to seek safeguards "without constraint". Its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests. And:
[Amendment 2] is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence. The majority opinion in Romer neither mentioned nor overruled the Court's prior opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,
Dissenting opinion
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas. Scalia asserted that Amendment 2 did not deprive anyone of the "protection [afforded by] general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings", which he said was confirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court and not disputed by Justice Kennedy's opinion. Scalia's dissent said Amendment 2 merely provided that homosexuals "cannot as readily as others obtain preferential treatment under the laws". His objections also included these:
Regarding the Court's earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, had held that laws against polygamy were not an "impermissible targeting" of polygamists, and Scalia asked: "Has the Court concluded that the perceived social harm of polygamy is a 'legitimate concern of government,' and the perceived social harm of homosexuality is not?" The Court, Scalia said, was engaged in judicial activism; as the Constitution says nothing on the topic, it should be decided by democratic processes. The dissent added: "it [is] no business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war. But the Court today has done so, not only by inventing a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the victory away from traditional forces, but even by verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes."
Особое мнение
Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case dealing with sexual orientation and state laws. It was the first Supreme Court case to address gay rights since Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), when the Court had held that laws criminalizing sodomy were constitutional. The Court ruled in a 6–3 decision that a state constitutional amendment in Colorado preventing protected status based upon homosexuality or bisexuality did not satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. The state constitutional amendment failed rational basis review. The decision in Romer set the stage for Lawrence v. Texas (2003), where the Court overruled its decision in Bowers; According to public opinion surveys, Coloradans strongly opposed discrimination based upon sexual orientation, but at the same time they opposed affirmative action based upon sexual orientation, and the latter concern is what led to the adoption of Amendment 2. The governor of Colorado, Roy Romer, opposed the measure, but also opposed retaliatory boycotts against his state. as well as other individuals and three Colorado municipalities, brought suit to enjoin the amendment. A former Colorado Supreme Court justice, Jean Dubofsky, was the lead attorney. A state trial court issued a permanent injunction against the amendment, and upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the amendment was subject to "strict scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. The state trial court, upon remand, concluded that the amendment could not pass strict scrutiny, which the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with upon review. Both times, the Colorado Supreme Court rendered 2–1 decisions.</blockquote>
The dissenting justice on the Colorado Supreme Court argued that neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right was involved in the case, and thus he would have applied a rational basis test instead of strict scrutiny. On May 20, 1996, the court ruled 6–3 that Colorado's Amendment 2 was unconstitutional, though on different reasoning from the Colorado courts. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. The Court majority held that the Colorado constitutional amendment targeting homosexuals based upon animosity lacked a rational relation to any legitimate governmental purpose.</blockquote>
While leaving that question unresolved by his opinion, Kennedy concluded that the amendment imposed a special disability upon homosexuals by forbidding them to seek safeguards "without constraint". Its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests. And:
[Amendment 2] is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence. The majority opinion in Romer neither mentioned nor overruled the Court's prior opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,
Dissenting opinion
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas. Scalia asserted that Amendment 2 did not deprive anyone of the "protection [afforded by] general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings", which he said was confirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court and not disputed by Justice Kennedy's opinion. Scalia's dissent said Amendment 2 merely provided that homosexuals "cannot as readily as others obtain preferential treatment under the laws". His objections also included these:
Regarding the Court's earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, had held that laws against polygamy were not an "impermissible targeting" of polygamists, and Scalia asked: "Has the Court concluded that the perceived social harm of polygamy is a 'legitimate concern of government,' and the perceived social harm of homosexuality is not?" The Court, Scalia said, was engaged in judicial activism; as the Constitution says nothing on the topic, it should be decided by democratic processes. The dissent added: "it [is] no business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war. But the Court today has done so, not only by inventing a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the victory away from traditional forces, but even by verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes."
Судья Антонин Скалия написал особое мнение, к которому присоединились председатель Верховного суда Уильям Ренквист и судья Кларенс Томас. Скалия утверждал, что Поправка 2 не лишает кого-либо "защиты, предоставляемой общими законами и политикой, запрещающими произвольную дискриминацию в правительственных и частных учреждениях", что, по его словам, было подтверждено Верховным судом Колорадо и не оспаривалось мнением судьи Кеннеди. Скалия выразил несогласие, заявив, что Поправка 2 лишь предусматривает, что гомосексуалисты "не могут так же легко, как и другие, получать льготное обращение в соответствии с законами". Его возражения также включали следующее: в более раннем решении Суда по делу *Bowers v. Hardwick* было установлено, что законы против полигамии не являются "недопустимым преследованием" полигамистов, и Скалия спросил: "Пришел ли Суд к выводу, что предполагаемый социальный вред полигамии является 'законной заботой правительства', а предполагаемый социальный вред гомосексуализма - нет?" Суд, сказал Скалия, занимался судебным активизмом; поскольку Конституция ничего не говорит по этой теме, ее должны решать демократические процессы. В особом мнении добавлено: "судам (в отличие от политических ветвей власти) не следует вмешиваться в эту культурную войну. Но сегодня Суд сделал это, не только изобретя новую и экстравагантную конституционную доктрину, чтобы отнять победу у традиционных сил, но даже словесно унизив приверженность традиционным взглядам как предрассудок".
Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case dealing with sexual orientation and state laws. It was the first Supreme Court case to address gay rights since Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), when the Court had held that laws criminalizing sodomy were constitutional. The Court ruled in a 6–3 decision that a state constitutional amendment in Colorado preventing protected status based upon homosexuality or bisexuality did not satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. The state constitutional amendment failed rational basis review. The decision in Romer set the stage for Lawrence v. Texas (2003), where the Court overruled its decision in Bowers; According to public opinion surveys, Coloradans strongly opposed discrimination based upon sexual orientation, but at the same time they opposed affirmative action based upon sexual orientation, and the latter concern is what led to the adoption of Amendment 2. The governor of Colorado, Roy Romer, opposed the measure, but also opposed retaliatory boycotts against his state. as well as other individuals and three Colorado municipalities, brought suit to enjoin the amendment. A former Colorado Supreme Court justice, Jean Dubofsky, was the lead attorney. A state trial court issued a permanent injunction against the amendment, and upon appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the amendment was subject to "strict scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution. The state trial court, upon remand, concluded that the amendment could not pass strict scrutiny, which the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with upon review. Both times, the Colorado Supreme Court rendered 2–1 decisions.</blockquote>
The dissenting justice on the Colorado Supreme Court argued that neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right was involved in the case, and thus he would have applied a rational basis test instead of strict scrutiny. On May 20, 1996, the court ruled 6–3 that Colorado's Amendment 2 was unconstitutional, though on different reasoning from the Colorado courts. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and was joined by John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer. The Court majority held that the Colorado constitutional amendment targeting homosexuals based upon animosity lacked a rational relation to any legitimate governmental purpose.</blockquote>
While leaving that question unresolved by his opinion, Kennedy concluded that the amendment imposed a special disability upon homosexuals by forbidding them to seek safeguards "without constraint". Its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests. And:
[Amendment 2] is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence. The majority opinion in Romer neither mentioned nor overruled the Court's prior opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick,
Dissenting opinion
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas. Scalia asserted that Amendment 2 did not deprive anyone of the "protection [afforded by] general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings", which he said was confirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court and not disputed by Justice Kennedy's opinion. Scalia's dissent said Amendment 2 merely provided that homosexuals "cannot as readily as others obtain preferential treatment under the laws". His objections also included these:
Regarding the Court's earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, had held that laws against polygamy were not an "impermissible targeting" of polygamists, and Scalia asked: "Has the Court concluded that the perceived social harm of polygamy is a 'legitimate concern of government,' and the perceived social harm of homosexuality is not?" The Court, Scalia said, was engaged in judicial activism; as the Constitution says nothing on the topic, it should be decided by democratic processes. The dissent added: "it [is] no business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war. But the Court today has done so, not only by inventing a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the victory away from traditional forces, but even by verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes."
Научные комментарии
Мнение суда по делу Ромера не последовало строго установленной доктрине равной защиты (Поправка 2 "противоречила общепринятому анализу", – писал судья Кеннеди), и это мнение вызвало широкое обсуждение среди ученых и юристов. Одной из статей, получивших широкое внимание, была статья Ахила Амара, известного профессора права Йельского университета. Конституция не требует, чтобы "особые" права, защищающие от дискриминации, однажды предоставленные, необратимо закреплялись посредством какого-то волшебного и антидемократического одностороннего механизма. И если Денвер, Аспен и Боулдер могут отменить эти постановления, то, вероятно, законодательное собрание Колорадо может отменить их законом, а народ Колорадо – поправкой к конституции штата (путем инициативы или референдума). Думать иначе – совершенно нелепо. Тем не менее, Амар утверждал, что Поправка 2 нарушает положение о равной защите (хотя он предпочитал альтернативный аргумент, основанный на пункте об объявлении вне закона). Что касается положения о равной защите, Амар писал: Джеффрис и его соавтор, Дэрил Левинсон, заключают: "возрождение принципа невозврата как конституционного принципа является симптомом дрейфа Верховного суда в эпоху судебного активизма". По словам профессора права Эвана Герстманна, суд в деле Ромера не упомянул и не рассмотрел многие цели Поправки 2, которые суды Колорадо признали законными. Позже, в 1997 году, после решения по делу Ромера, Верховный суд направил дело на дальнейшее рассмотрение. Шестой апелляционный округ подтвердил поправку во второй раз, отличив ее от поправки на уровне штата, поскольку она представляла собой действие местного самоуправления, которое Поправка 2 была призвана предотвратить. 13 октября 1998 года Верховный суд отклонил апелляцию, оставив в силе решение Шестого апелляционного округа и городскую поправку. В 2005 году избиратели Цинциннати отменили поправку. Поскольку решение по делу Ромера явно противоречило более раннему решению суда по делу Боуэрс против Хардвика, в 2007 году, спустя пятнадцать лет после референдума по Поправке 2, законодательное собрание Колорадо внесло изменения в свой закон о борьбе с дискриминацией, запретив дискриминацию по признаку сексуальной ориентации и гендерной идентичности при трудоустройстве. В 2008 году Колорадо расширил свои меры защиты ЛГБТ, включив в них жилье, общественные места и рекламу. Будущий председатель Верховного суда Джон Робертс безвозмездно предоставил время для подготовки устных аргументов для истцов. Выступая в ходе процесса его утверждения, один из руководителей дела, Уолтер А. Смит-младший, высоко оценил его работу над делом, вспомнив: "Он сказал: "Давайте сделаем это". И это демонстрирует его открытость, его беспристрастность. Он проделал блестящую работу".
In 2007, fifteen years after the referendum on Amendment 2, the Colorado legislature amended its anti discrimination law by forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, in employment. In 2008, Colorado further expanded its LGBT protections to include housing, public accommodation, and advertising. Future Chief Justice John Roberts donated time pro bono to prepare oral arguments for the plaintiffs. Speaking during his nomination process, a case leader, Walter A. Smith Jr., praised his work on the case, recalling, "He said, 'Let's do it.' And it's illustrative of his open mindedness, his fair mindedness. He did a brilliant job."