Планы обеспечения непрерывности деятельности правительства США

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Continuity of Operations (COOP) is a United States federal government initiative, required by U. S. Presidential Policy Directive 40 (PPD 40), to ensure that agencies are able to continue performance of essential functions under a broad range of circumstances. PPD 40 specifies certain requirements for continuity plan development, including the requirement that all federal executive branch departments and agencies develop an integrated, overlapping continuity capability, that supports the eight National Essential Functions (NEFs) described in the document. The Federal Emergency Management Agency provides guidance to the private sector for business continuity planning purposes. A continuity plan is essential to help identify critical functions and develop preventative measures to continue functions should disruption occur.

A Continuity of Operations Plan (or Continuity of Government Plan) has been a part of U. S. government operations since President Dwight D. Eisenhower provided (via executive order) various measures designed to ensure that the government of the United States would be able to continue operating after a nuclear war. These measures included construction of underground facilities such as "Mount Weather", a putatively nuclear weapon proof facility in a hollowed out mountain in northeastern Virginia; and Raven Rock Mountain Complex near Camp David in Maryland. The public can now tour one such facility, intended to house the entire United States Congress, on the grounds of the Greenbrier Resort in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. (See also Project Greek Island.) Other provisions of the plans included executive orders designating certain government officials to assume Cabinet and other executive branch positions and carry out the responsibilities of the position if the primary officeholders are killed.

The George W. Bush administration put the Continuity of Operations plan into effect for the first time directly following the September 11 attacks. Their implementation involved a rotating staff of 75 to 150 senior officials and other government workers from every federal executive department and other parts of the executive branch in two secure bunkers on the East Coast. Friends, family, and co workers were only able to reach them through a toll free number and personal extensions. The Bush administration did not acknowledge the implementation of the COG plan until March 1, 2002. In 2007, Larry Sabato, a professor at the University of Virginia, criticized the incomplete nature of the plan in his book A More Perfect Constitution. In particular, he objected to the fact that there is no constitutional procedure for replacing U. S. House members in the case of a large scale disaster which could potentially kill a large number of representatives. In regard to the Continuity of Operations Plan, Sabato said it "failed outright" during the September 11 attacks.

On July 18, 2007, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D OR), a member of the U. S. House Committee on Homeland Security at that time, requested the classified and more detailed version of the government's continuity of operations plan in a letter signed by him and the chairperson of the House Homeland Security Committee, which is supposed to have access to confidential government information. The president refused to provide the information, to the surprise of the congressional committee. as of 2007, efforts by the committee to secure a copy of the plan continued.

A document named in italics supersedes a previously published document. The Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1) is a 2017 directive, released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), that provides doctrine and guidance to all federal organizations for developing continuity program plans and capabilities. FCD 1 also serves as guidance to state, local, and tribal governments. The Federal Continuity Directive 2 (FCD 2) of June 2017 is a directive to assist federal Executive Branch organizations in identifying their Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) and candidate Primary Mission Essential Functions (PMEFs). The DHS together with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and in coordination with other non federal partners in July 2013, developed the Continuity Guidance Circular 1 (CGC 1) and CGC 2. The preamble of the CGC 1 states that its function is to provide "direction to the non Federal Governments (NFGs) for developing continuity plans and programs. Continuity planning facilitates the performance of essential functions during all hazards emergencies or other situations that may disrupt normal operations. By continuing the performance of essential functions through a catastrophic emergency, the State, territorial, tribal, and local governments, and the private sector support the ability of the Federal Government to perform National Essential Functions (NEFs)." CGC 1 parallels the information in FCD 1 closely, but is geared to states, territories, tribal and local governments, and private sector organizations. The purpose of Continuity Guidance Circular 2 (CGC 2) is to provide "non Federal Governments (NFGs) with guidance on how to implement CGC 1, Annex D: ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS. It provides them with guidance, a methodology, and checklists to identify, assess, and validate their essential functions. This CGC includes guidance for conducting a continuity Business Process Analysis (BPA), Business Impact Analysis (BIA), and a risk assessment that will identify essential function relationships, interdependencies, time sensitivities, threats and vulnerabilities, and mitigation strategies."

The Continuity of Operations Plan involves numerous bunkers, special airplanes, and communication systems. Much of the information about them is classified; however, information on various systems has been released by the government or described to the public by reporters and writers. Since many of the details are classified, the public information may be incorrect. Also they are subject to change without public notice so this list may not reflect current plans.

During the Cold War, the United States constructed bunkers to help provide survivability to military command and government officials. Some have been decommissioned since the Cold War. The ones that are still considered to be in operation are listed here. The United States Congress was formerly housed in the Greenbrier Bunker, but since it was discovered in the early 1990s the new location of the Congressional bunker is unknown. Cheyenne Mountain Complex This underground facility is the former home of NORAD. Becoming fully operational on April 20, 1966, it is located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Currently, the military has the goal of placing the operations center on "warm stand by", meaning that the facility will be maintained and ready for use on short notice as necessary, but not used on a daily basis. In the event of an emergency deemed serious enough, NORAD and USNORTHCOM would use the bunker for C4ISTAR (command and control) of America's military. Site R (Raven Rock) Near Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, Site R is the emergency home for the Pentagon. Vice President Cheney is reported to have stayed there after the September 11 attacks. Mount Weather The Mount Weather Emergency Operations Center is a government facility located near Bluemont, Virginia. It houses operations and training facilities above ground for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and contains an underground facility designed to house key components of the American government in the case of nuclear war.

Air Force One is the radio call sign of any Air Force plane the President of the United States travels on. However, the term typically refers to a Boeing VC 25A the president normally uses. While the VC 25A is equipped with numerous systems to ensure its survival, in an emergency it is recommended that the president use the National Airborne Operations Center. National Airborne Operations Center (codenamed Nightwatch) is a Boeing E 4 specially built to serve as a survivable mobile command post for the National Command Authority (NCA). Either the President or the Secretary of Defense may use it. It is also possible that the president would authorize the vice president or others to use it, depending on the circumstances. Looking Glass is United States Strategic Command's Airborne Command Post, designed to take over in case U. S. Strategic Command is destroyed or incapable of communicating with strategic forces. Beginning February 3, 1961, an Air Force Looking Glass aircraft was in the air at all times 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. On July 24, 1990, Looking Glass ceased continuous airborne alert but remained on ground or airborne alert 24 hours a day. On October 1, 1998, the U. S. Navy replaced the U. S. Air Force in this duty. In addition, a battle staff now flies with the TACAMO crew.